

Some Security Implications of Commonwealth Caribbean Narcotics Operations

by
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INTRODUCTION

As the world enters the post-Cold War era, issues such as nuclear war and the Strategic Defense Initiative are quickly losing their salience. Other issues, such as drugs and the environment, are rising progressively to the top of the security agendas of both statesmen and scholars. One region where the drugs issue is particularly important is the Commonwealth Caribbean.¹ To date very little has been written on the security implications of illicit drug operations there. This article hopes to fill that void. It identifies four narcotics problem-areas and explores some of their political, military, and economic security implications. Finally, it briefly discusses some of the efforts aimed at countering the various narcotics operations.

DRUGS AND SECURITY

The drugs question is a legitimate security issue because drug operations present threats to the physical and psychological safety of citizens, and to the governability of states, in the Caribbean and elsewhere. As will be seen below, drug operations have military, political, and economic ramifications. The nexus between drugs and security is examined here in the context of the redefinition of the term security. This redefinition goes beyond the "high politics" characterization of security, which emphasizes its military dimension, especially in relation to the international arena. It extends the conceptual boundaries of the term to economic and ecological questions, stressing links between security and development. One scholar, whose work now reflects a departure from the conventional approach to which he once subscribed, concedes that "the traditional concern with territorial integrity and political independence has had to be broadened to include a concern with domestic stability — and thus also a concern with prospects for, and means of, domestic development."² This conceptualization of security also posits that internal security questions are not only important in their own right, but that they complicate (and sometimes aggravate) external problems. Moreover, the distinction between internal issues and external ones is often blurred.³

In the context of this reconceptualization, security is taken here to mean the protection and preservation of a people's freedom from external military attacks and coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values.⁴ Drug problems jeopardize all these freedoms. They not only undermine the safety and governability of Caribbean and other states, but they exacerbate other problems facing these states. For example, because Caribbean states are small in size and poor in economic and military

resources, they are vulnerable to actions by both state and non-state actors. This vulnerability becomes more pronounced when they are confronted with a wide range of drug problems. Their capability limitations also become more discernible as they adopt individual and collective coping strategies. Moreover, the underlying “softness” of many of these societies becomes manifest as drug traffickers test the nerves and political will of local political elites.

Prime Minister Lloyd Erskine Sandiford of Barbados deemed the drugs issue “perhaps the single most serious problem for the region in the next decade.” Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica until 28 March 1992 when he left office because of failing health, called illicit drugs a “scourge” and described the drug network as “probably the most highly organized and successfully interfaced collection of interlocking cartels of criminal purpose in human history.”⁵ In its 1992 final report, the West Indian Commission declared: “Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM [Caribbean Community and Common Market] countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the danger that drug abuse and drug trafficking hold for our Community.”⁶

The perception of the clear and present dangers of drugs is not confined to Caribbean decision-makers. Leaders in Europe, Latin America, the United States, and, indeed, throughout the world, also apprehend great dangers. The 1990 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly declared the concern of the international community to be justifiable:

[T]he magnitude of the rising trend in the illicit demand, production, supply, trafficking, and distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances [is] a grave and persistent threat to the health and well-being of mankind, the stability of nations, the political, economic, social, and cultural structures of all societies, and the lives and dignity of millions of human beings, most especially our young people....⁷

Because of the gravity of the situation, the Special Session declared 1991-2000 as the United Nations Decade Against Drugs.

It is important to understand the nature of the narcotics problems in the Commonwealth Caribbean before proceeding to examine their security implications. The main problems relate to drug production, abuse, transshipment, and money laundering.

Production

Of the region’s three main “danger drugs” — cocaine, marijuana, and heroin — only marijuana is produced in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It is not cultivated throughout the region, and cultivation varies from place to place. Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago are among the countries with the highest levels of marijuana production. For instance, in March 1992, joint army-police operations in Guyana discovered 60,000 pounds of marijuana in the Mahaica River area, and

10 fields, with an estimated 160,000 marijuana plants, along the Maduni Creek. Two months later, similar operations uncovered 799,700 pounds of marijuana, this time in the Berbice River area in eastern Guyana. That find had an estimated street value of over G \$1 billion.⁸

Among the four states named above, Belize and Jamaica have the highest levels of production and exportation of the drug. Compared to production in places such as the United States, Colombia, and Mexico, however, marijuana production in Belize and Jamaica is minuscule. Nevertheless, in both countries, marijuana has been the largest cash crop, producing some US \$350 million annually in Belize, and about US \$2 billion in Jamaica.⁹ The Bahamas, which figures prominently in drug transshipment, has traditionally been neither a drug-producing nor a drug-refining country. However, the production alarm was sounded in 1991 following the discovery and destruction of 40,000 cannabis seedlings and 1,000 medium-sized plants, and the seizure of 22 kilos of prepared marijuana, all on Andros Island.

Marijuana is cultivated mostly in the north and west of Belize, in small plots of about one acre or less. By the early 1980s Belize was the fourth largest supplier to the United States, behind Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica. But production has plummeted since 1985, largely due to countermeasures by the Belize government, often under pressure from the United States. The Belize government began aerial spraying in 1982, with the help of Mexico and the United States. Most of the marijuana that is discovered is destroyed immediately by aerial eradication, or by hand where there is close proximity to residences or to legitimate crops. The Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) of the US Department of State proudly reported in 1991 that: "After three years of intensive eradication efforts and the maintenance of an effective suppression program supported by the USG [United States Government], Belize is now only a marginal producer of marijuana."¹⁰ However, in spite of overall reduction, some concern remains about the cultivation of the *indica* variety of cannabis, which is shorter than the six-foot tall indigenous plants and grows much faster.

Jamaica's subtropical climate makes the entire island ideal for cannabis cultivation. "Ganja," as marijuana is popularly called there, traditionally is harvested in two main annual seasons, of five to six month cycles. However, the *indica* variety matures in three to four months, making four harvests possible. Large-scale cultivation of five to fifty acre plots were once common. However, because of eradication measures, most cultivation is now done in plots one acre or less, with yields of about 1,485 pounds per hectare. Ganja production in Jamaica rose continuously until, in response to United States pressure and with its assistance, eradication measures began to reduce cultivation. The campaign, called Operation BUCCANEER, is still undertaken annually. Initially, the campaign had dramatic success, with a drop in production from an estimated 405 metric tons in 1988 to 190 metric tons in 1989. However, shifts in cultivation patterns, a change in variety and reduced resources for aerial spraying led to a rebound in the 1990s. Although the operation eradicated about 1,000 hectares of marijuana in 1990, cultivation actually

expanded from 280 hectares in 1989 to 1,220 hectares in 1990.¹¹ Aerial spraying of cannabis in Jamaica is more controversial than in Belize because marijuana is an even larger source there. One estimate for the 1980s placed the number of farmers cultivating the crop at 6,000. In the late 1980s it is said to have contributed between US \$1 and US \$2 billion to the island's foreign exchange earnings, in excess of all other exports combined, including bauxite, sugar, and tourism.¹²

Abuse

The narcotics abuse problem in the Commonwealth Caribbean involves mainly marijuana and cocaine. Like production, drug use differs from place to place. The greatest concern is in Jamaica, the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and in parts of the Eastern Caribbean. While marijuana is abused in many places, it has had a long history of accepted socio-religious use, dating from the introduction of indentured workers from India following the abolition of slavery by the British in 1834. Marijuana's socio-religious use pattern has changed over the years. This use is now associated primarily with the Rastas, Afrocentric social-religious sects that identify with the late Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie. Hence, the socio-religious use pattern is found in places with large numbers of Rastas, including Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Grenada.

Cocaine abuse in the Caribbean results from a spill-over from the illicit cocaine trade. This problem is found mainly in the principal transit states: Bahamas, Jamaica, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, and to a lesser extent, in Guyana. In the case of the Bahamas, the Bureau of the INM has declared: "The Bahamas suffers from a serious drug abuse and addiction problem brought about by the ready availability of drugs as they transit the country. Cocaine is the drug of choice for addicts."¹³ Belize continues to suffer from an increase in the availability of cocaine. Indeed, one official source reported that cocaine and crack use has increased since 1990, contributing to an increase in crime and violence. This increase was clearly demonstrated during the September 1991 Belize Games when 44 out of 180 winning athletes tested positive for illegal drug use.¹⁴ Data from elsewhere also suggest the extent of the cocaine problem: cocaine seizures in Guyana rose from 400 grams in 1987 to 3,575 grams in 1988; the registration of addicts seeking rehabilitation in Barbados rose from seven in 1986 to 115 in 1988; hospital admission of cocaine and marijuana addicts in Trinidad and Tobago rose from 376 in 1983 to 1,041 in 1989.¹⁵

Transshipment

Apart from trading their own marijuana in the United States, some Caribbean countries are important transshipment centers for South American cocaine, heroin, and marijuana bound for Europe and North America. For more than two decades the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica dominated this business, but recently Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) countries, the Cayman Islands and other British dependencies have featured more prominently in the trafficking.¹⁶

On 4 July 1992, for instance, a joint army-police interdiction operation in Barbados confiscated over 2,000 pounds of marijuana, worth about B \$6 million, and arrested two Barbadians and one Canadian with arms and ammunition. Later that month, 26.5 kilos of cocaine, worth about TT \$35 million, were seized at Cali Bay, Tobago, following transshipment from Venezuela. Two months later, on 11 September 1992, a Barbadian national was caught trying to smuggle 20 pounds of cocaine, worth US \$12 million, out of Guyana to the United States.¹⁷ In January 1993, 2,761 pounds of cocaine — worth some US \$17 million — were seized in St. Vincent following a raid on a family residence in Glamorgan, just outside the capital.¹⁸

The geography of the Bahamian archipelago makes it an excellent candidate for drug transshipment, given its 700 islands and cays, and strategic location in the airline flight path between Colombia and South Florida. For example, one island, Bimini, is a mere 50 miles from the United States mainland.¹⁹ One writer has made an uncomplimentary, but valid, point about the country: "In a way, geography had always been the Bahamas' main commodity, and they had always marketed it with great skill."²⁰ This, of course, is true of other countries. The Bahamas has also become (in)famous for the marijuana and hashish traffic, from South America as well as Jamaica. When the Bahamas first became a transshipment center, the drug involved was mainly marijuana, with a few consignments of hashish. A 1983-84 drug inquiry found evidence of drug trafficking dating as far back as 1968, when a fly-drop mission was undertaken with 250-300 pounds of marijuana from Jamaica to Bimini. One of the earliest cocaine seizures was made in 1974: 247 pounds of pure cocaine, with a 1974 street value of US \$2 billion, at an airport in George Town, Exuma. That same year, the Bahamas police discovered a store of marijuana off Grand Bahama Island. It was over six feet high and more than two miles long.²¹

Bahamian National Security authorities noted a steep decline in cocaine seizures from June 1989 to November 1990: a mere 3,479 pounds. However, there was a dramatic upsurge in seizures in the one month from 14 November to 14 December 1990: 3,617 pounds of cocaine seized in three air delivery interceptions.²² In 1991, Bahamas officials were convinced that use of the country as a transit center for marijuana from Colombia and Jamaica to Florida by air and sea had virtually ended. But in 1992, they were forced to conclude that the major seizures during late 1990 and early 1991 suggested that the traffic from Colombia had returned to pre-August 1989 levels.

The geography and topography of Belize also make that country ideal for drug smuggling. There are large jungle-like areas, sparse settlements, and about 140 isolated airstrips that facilitate stops on flight from South America to North America. Moreover, there is virtually no radar coverage beyond a 30-mile radius of the international airport at Belize City. The 1992 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* noted: "Belize is now a marginal producer of marijuana. [However,] its growing importance as a transshipment point for South American cocaine is now the most important narcotics-related challenge confronting Belize."²³

Evidence of the increased trafficking is reflected in the increased number of drug seizures, numerous crashed and or seized aircraft, and increased availability of cocaine and crack in Belize. Trafficking arrests for 1987, 1988, and 1989, for example, numbered 1,540. In 1989 alone, 539 people were arrested.

Jamaica has long been key to the drug trade, given its long coastline, proximity to the United States, its many ports, harbors, and beaches, and its closeness to the Yucatan and Windward Passages. Trafficking takes place by both air and sea. Between 1984 and 1989 United States Customs made five major drug seizures on board Air Jamaica flights, involving 15,000 pounds of marijuana. After a significant drop in both marijuana and cocaine seizures, dramatic increases occurred for both substances in 1989. According to INM reports, the cocaine seized in 1990 totalled 1,676 pounds while marijuana seizures stood at 63,933 pounds. Those seizures involved the arrest of 5,432 people, 4,908 of whom were Jamaicans. Cocaine seizures in 1991 were a mere 132 pounds, but marijuana seizures rose to 94,799 pounds. The people arrested numbered 5,027, including 4,353 Jamaicans. Jamaica's Deputy Police Commissioner in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Bertram Milwood, reported in January 1993 that during 1992, Jamaican authorities seized 1,445 pounds of cocaine, 691 pieces of crack, and several other illegal drugs. The number of people arrested for possession, selling, and exporting narcotics was 16,298.²⁴

Money Laundering

Money laundering is another aspect of Caribbean narcotics operations. The countries known to be involved are the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Antigua-Barbuda is not considered an important money laundering center. It is one of several "sleeper" countries, with "the potential to become more important financial centers and havens for exploitation by money launderers, as the game of global musical chairs by narcotics money launderers continues."²⁵ Other "sleepers" are Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. For the INM, these countries have the appropriate qualifications for money laundering: bank secrecy; willingness to cooperate; and limited, usually poorly trained, enforcement resources. During Fall 1991 several allegations of money laundering were made in Grenada where the number of off-shore banks grew from three in early 1990 to 118 by late 1991.²⁶

Most of the money laundering allegations center around the British dependencies. A 1989 study by Rodney Gallagher of the international accounting firm Coopers and Lybrand revealed some telling reasons for this development. According to the Gallagher Report, over 525 international banks and trust companies have offices in one of these territories, the Cayman Islands. They accommodated 46 of the world's 50 largest banks, including Dai Ichi Kangyo and Fuji, Japan's two largest banks; Bank America; Barclays of the United Kingdom; Swiss Bank Corporation; and Royal Bank of Canada. The 1987 banking sector assets stood at US \$250 billion.

The Caymans and other dependencies provide many incentives and benefits for doing business there. The Caymans, for example, have no income, corporate, or withholding taxes. Hence, there are no international double taxation treaties. Companies that operate mainly outside the Caymans can register there as non-resident companies or incorporate as exempt companies, with the ability to issue bearer shares to non-residents, and thus avoid disclosure of beneficial owners. In addition, bank secrecy is guaranteed under the 1976 Preservation of Confidential Relations Act. The offshore financial industry itself is critical to the economic security of the Caymans, having grown to US \$360 billion during the past decade. It provides one-third of the jobs in the Caymans and about the same proportion of their GDP.²⁷

Anguilla was home to 2,400 registered companies in 1988, including 38 banks and 80 insurance companies. The inducements are freedom to move capital without exchange controls, no domestic taxes, minimum disclosure requirements, and the availability of professional services. The British Virgin Islands (BVI) has a tax regime, although a light one. They had 13,000 companies registered in 1988. Although they now have only six major banks, money launders reportedly use their services extensively. However, BVI and United States authorities have been able to obtain vital bank records and freeze drug-related money. In 1991, for example, over US \$3 million were transferred to the United States for forfeiture and sharing between the United States and the BVI. Of all the dependencies, the Turks and Caicos Islands has the least developed financial services sector.²⁸

In light of the above, what are the security implications of the region's narcotics operations?

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Political Security

The various narcotics-related problems discussed above present Caribbean countries with security challenges that are political, military, as well as economic in nature. One of the most critical political security aspects relates to the corruption of government officials. Drug corruption not only undermines the credibility of governments, but it also impairs the ability of government agencies to protect the public interest. It can even warp the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to define the national interest adequately. Moreover, it can lead to the development of cynicism within the general society, and to an increase in the level of public tolerance for corruption, both of which are dangerous. As such, corruption subverts the political security of the nations concerned.

Corruption has been unearthed in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, the Turks and Caicos, and elsewhere. Even more threatening than general government corruption is the corrupting of law enforcement officials, in police and defense forces, immigration and customs services, and internal revenue agencies. For example, in 1988 this author interviewed Cuthbert Phillips,

then Police Commissioner of St. Lucia, about Eastern Caribbean security concerns. The drug problem consumed much of our attention and Phillips declaimed against the drug barons and those who aided them.²⁹ Less than a month later Phillips was dismissed for being implicated in drug related corruption and inefficiency in the St. Lucia Police Force. (Later he was imprisoned following a manslaughter conviction.)

In some cases, law enforcement officials go beyond facilitating the traffic in drugs; they themselves become couriers. One of many such cases recently involved the arrest of a Barbadian immigration officer at London's Heathrow International Airport, on 14 May 1990, with a large quantity of cocaine he had brought from Barbados. Similarly, in March 1992 Sergeant Roger Newman of the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBDF) was charged with possession and intent to supply six kilos of cocaine. Sergeant Newman worked with the Bahamas special drug court where he often acted as a prosecutor.³⁰

Some of the region's most notorious corruption cases have occurred in the Bahamas. Continuous allegations about high-level drug-related corruption involving the prime minister and other government officials prompted an official inquiry in 1983. In its 1984 report, the Bahamas Commission of Inquiry noted that widespread transshipment of drugs through the Bahamas had adversely affected almost all strata of the society. Several top officials were indicted. Five government ministers either resigned or were dismissed. The Commission noted several questionable practices by the prime minister, and the fact that between 1977 and 1984 his expenditures and assets far exceeded his official income. For example, his bank deposits reflected US \$3.5 million in excess of his salary for that period. Nevertheless, there was no firm evidence of his being on a drug payroll as alleged.

The Commission reported:

We were also alarmed by the extent to which persons in the public service have been corrupted by the illegal trade. We have given our reasons later in this report for concluding that corruption existed at the upper and lower levels of the Royal Bahamas Police Force and we have concluded that certain Immigration and Customs officers accepted bribes. We were particularly concerned to discover that those corrupting influences made their presence felt at the levels of Permanent Secretary and Minister In our opinion, the whole nation must accept some responsibility. Apathy and a weak public opinion have led to the present unhappy and undesirable state of affairs in the nation.³¹

The Commission's report and the implementation of some of its recommendations have improved the situation in the Bahamas considerably, but drug corruption still exists. In President George Bush's March 1989 Statement of Explanation for the Bahamas to the United States Congress — part of the foreign assistance certification procedure — he noted: "While the Government of the

Commonwealth of the Bahamas is more active in investigating allegations of corruption, we are concerned by reports that corruption still exists. Prime Minister Pindling and his ministers must forcefully address this issue.” The Statement also called for “stronger unilateral efforts to curb drug trafficking and consumption within the Bahamas.”³²

Three months after the publication of the Bahamas inquiry report, the Chief Minister of the Turks and Caicos, Norman Saunders, was one of several people arrested in Miami on drug-related charges. Among the people arrested in March 1985 were Commerce and Development Minister Stafford Missick, and Andre Fournier, a French Canadian businessman in the Bahamas. The arrests followed three months of investigations by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in cooperation with the British Government, and Turks and Caicos Law enforcement agencies. The charges included conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States, conspiracy to violate the United States Travel Act, and the conduct of interstate and foreign travel to aid racketeering.

During the trial the DEA alleged that Saunders had accepted US \$30,000 from undercover DEA agents to guarantee safe stop-over refuelling on flights from Colombia to the United States. Moreover, the prosecution showed a video tape, filmed before the arrests, where Saunders was shown receiving US \$20,000 from a DEA undercover agent. The money was allegedly to protect drug shipments passing through South Caicos Island, en route to the United States. All the defendants were convicted in July 1985 on the conspiracy charges, although Saunders was acquitted of the more serious charges of conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. Missick was convicted of the additional charge of cocaine importation. Saunders and Missick were sentenced to eight and ten years respectively, and each was fined US \$50,000.³³

In April 1992, Rodwel Murray, Assistant Commissioner of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, publicly revealed allegations he had made in 1991 to National Security Ministry officials: that there was a “drug trafficking cartel” within the police force. Drug corruption allegations have surfaced in Trinidad and Tobago earlier. In 1987, for example, the Scott Commission report led to the suspension of 51 policemen and the eventual resignation of Commissioner of Police Randolph Burroughs, who had been indicted on bribery and other charges but later acquitted. In 1991, the La Tinta Commission report into the death of a police officer during an aborted drug operation led to the suspension of 16 policemen.

The increasing scale of drug trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago and the seniority of the police official making the accusations in 1992 caused Prime Minister Patrick Manning to invite Britain’s Scotland Yard to investigate the Murray allegations.³⁴ The situation was aggravated when some senior Trinidad police officials attempted to hinder the Scotland Yard investigations. This prompted Prime Minister Manning to reprimand several senior officers and suspend Superintendent Sagram Bhagwandin in November 1992.³⁵ The Trinidad and Tobago National Security Minister, Russell Huggins, reported to the country’s Parliament

in January 1993 that the Scotland Yard investigations, which had been completed in December 1992, did not confirm the existence of a “drug trafficking cartel” in the police force. However, they found evidence of “a hard core of corrupt officers who would do anything to get money and one method is to provide protection for those engaged in the drug trade. This is where the drug connection exists.”³⁶

Based on the Scotland Yard report, the Trinidad and Tobago government has agreed to make institutional changes to curb police corruption. These include creation of an independent Police Complaints Authority, establishment of a Complainants Division within the police force, and creation of five new senior positions within the force. The new positions — one Deputy Commissioner and four Assistant Commissioners — are to be filled with Scotland Yard officers. This decision infuriated Trinidad and Tobago police force officers, some of whom demonstrated outside Parliament and the police headquarters on 5 February against what they called “the recolonization of the police force.”³⁷

Another important political security dimension to narcotics operations is the threat they pose to the stability of governments. While there is no imminent threat of the “Colombianization” of the Caribbean in terms of violence waged by the drug barons against government officials and institutions, the openness and vulnerability of Caribbean societies are such that drug barons can easily subvert their sovereignty and governability. Indeed, some analysts contend that the 1 April 1989 Air Jamaica drug discovery, coming just one week after Prime Minister Manley had declared a war on drugs, resulted from a deliberate act, and was meant as a direct challenge to the Jamaican government.³⁸

Ron Sanders made a very pertinent observation: “A handful of well-trained narcotic soldiers or mercenaries could make a lightning trip to a country, wreak destruction, and fly out before a defense could be mounted by states friendly to the small island.”³⁹ Shridath Ramphal, former Commonwealth Secretary-General, put it more poignantly: “It only takes twelve men in a boat to put some of these governments out of business.” This is precisely one of the points made to the author by the former St. Lucia Police Commissioner in an August 1988 interview. Officials within and outside the British Virgin Islands harbored this concern in January 1989 after a group of Colombian traffickers had been arrested. This apprehension would be even greater where there is suspicion of significant collusion of government officials, especially in law enforcement agencies, with traffickers.

Military Security

The corrupting of law enforcement officials noted above has a distinct military security dimension: it compromises the agents of national security, with the implication that their capacity for effective action is undermined, and individuals and groups become inclined to resort to vigilante tactics because of that diminished capacity. Moreover, drugs have precipitated a sharp increase in crime generally and gang warfare in particular. Jamaica has suffered the brunt of this increase. One writer explained: “Indeed, Jamaica over the past few years has experienced, through

an upsurge in violent crime, the effects of a combination of drugs and money in the form of the naked display of power through the use of arms.”⁴⁰

Perhaps even worse, in some places the drug business is linked with a dangerous ancillary operation: gun running. In one case, a ten ton shipment of arms, with an estimated value of J \$8 million, arrived in Jamaica on 22 December 1988. It was to be air-lifted later to Colombia. The shipment, from Heckler and Koch of West Germany, included 1,000 G3A3 automatic assault rifles, 250 HK21 machine guns, ten 60 millimeter commando mortars, and 600 rounds of high explosive 60 millimeter mortar shells. The planned operation involved West Germans, Britons, Panamanians, Colombians, and Jamaicans. Interrogation of the conspirators revealed that the arms were destined for the leftist insurgent group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The operation was underwritten by Colombian cocaine dealers who finance FARC. The arms had been paid for out of a special drug shipment made earlier to Europe.

The affair ended on 6 January 1989 when the arms were placed on a Colombian military aircraft and sent to Bogota. The foreigners were extradited and the Jamaicans were held on a variety of charges. This was not the first or only reported incident of gun running in the region. Scott MacDonald, author of *Dancing on a Volcano*, documents the involvement of “Mickey” Tolliver, an American pilot, in a July 1986 operation, which began in Haiti where he picked up a DC-3 aircraft loaded with weapons and ammunition. He then flew to Costa Rica, then to Colombia where he took a consignment of 4,000 pounds of marijuana and 400-500 kilos of cocaine. Then, said Tolliver, he flew to the Bahamas where he watched Bahamian police unload the guns and drugs.

The narcoterrorism dimension of drug operations was illustrated even more dramatically by the Antigua-Barbuda case. Events leading to the discovery of the “Guns for Antigua Affair” began on 15 December 1989 when the Colombian police killed Rodriguez Gacha and his son Freddy, both of the Medellin drug cartel. Raids were made on several of Gacha’s properties, one of which uncovered hundreds of Israeli-made Galil rifles and supporting ammunition. Israel’s response to Colombia’s request for an explanation was that the weapons were part of a larger sale to the Antigua-Barbuda government for the Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force (ABDF). That disclosure led to a Colombian diplomatic protest to Antigua-Barbuda on 3 April 1990. The protest prompted Antigua-Barbuda to retain United States attorney Lawrence Barcella to investigate the matter. Shortly afterwards, an extensive public inquiry by a one-man Commission of Inquiry was held.

The inquiry, carried out by British jurist Louis Blom-Cooper, uncovered an incredible scheme involving Israelis, Antiguans, Panamanians, and Colombians. Yair Klein, a retired Israeli army Colonel, and Pinchas Schachar, a retired Brigadier-General, then a representative of Israel Military Industries (IMI), were told by Maurice Sarfati, another Israeli, that the Antigua-Barbuda government was interested in acquiring weapons and ammunition. Sarfati presented forged documents showing he was an authorized Antiguan government representative, and an arms

purchase had been authorized by Vere Bird, Jr. (son of Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr.) Antigua's "National Security Minister," and head of the ABDF, Colonel Clyde Walker. Consequently, the relevant End-User Certificate, the official weapons requisition by an arms purchaser, was forwarded to Israel.⁴¹ It should be noted that Sarfati had indeed been a government representative at one time, but in this case the documents were forged. Moreover, there was no person in the Antiguan government designated "National Security Minister."

The United States Senate's investigations into the affair revealed that the initial order was for 500 weapons and 200,000 rounds of ammunition, valued at US \$353,700. (The final order total was US \$324,205.) A down payment of US \$95,000 was made, and between 14 November 1988 and 13 February 1989, thirteen financial transactions — ranging in value between US \$44,000 and US \$100,000 — were made on the deal. The banks used were Banco Aleman-Panameno, Philadelphia International Bank, Manufacturer Hanover Trust, Bank Hapoalim of Israel, and American Security Bank of Washington, DC.⁴² The weapons were placed aboard a Danish ship, *MV Else TH*, which sailed from Haifa, Israel on 29 March 1989 bound for Central and South America, via Antigua. The Antigua consignment was transhipped at Port Antigua to the *Seapoint*, a Panamanian ship. The *Seapoint* then took the arms to Colombia to the real consignee, the Medellin drug cartel.

Sarfati, the leading Israeli figure, first went to Antigua in April 1983. He cultivated a friendship with Vere Bird, Jr, then an attorney in private practice, who was instrumental in securing official approval for one of Sarfati's pet schemes, a melon cultivation project. The Bird-Sarfati friendship produced many advantages for Sarfati between 1983 and 1990: appointment in October 1984 by Vere Bird, Jr. as Special Adviser on Civil Aviation; appointment in May 1985 as Special Envoy in the Ministry of External Affairs, Economic Development, and Tourism; a 1985 OPIC ([US] Overseas Private Investment Corporation) loan of US \$700,000; a supplemental loan from OPIC for US \$600,000 in 1986; appointment in February 1986 as Managing Director of Antigua-Barbuda Airways, with a token annual salary of US \$100, but a US \$70,000 expense account; and a series of 1987 promissory notes by the Antiguan government, amounting to US \$4 million.⁴³

Thus, Sarfati had developed a relationship with the Antiguan government, and with Vere Bird, Jr. in particular, enabling him to exploit the relationship and not have to account for any of his actions. Vere Bird also benefitted from the links. For example, his law firm, Bird and Bird, handled the legal interests of Sarfati's corporate holdings — Roydan Ltd, and Antigua Promoters Ltd. In addition, Sarfati guaranteed Bird's loans, amounting to US \$92,000 in November 1988. Blom-Cooper observed: "It seems to me a matter of some significance that at the time the conspiracy was negotiated, Mr. Vere Bird, Jr. was in financial difficulties and was beholden to the bankrupt Mr. Sarfati. Not only did he need money, but he also needed to help Mr. Sarfati earn money."⁴⁴ He made an even more damaging observation: "I entertain no doubt Mr. Vere Bird, Jr. was paid by or at least with, money emanating from Senor Rodriguez Gacha, for the services rendered to the arms transshipment."⁴⁵

The transshipment was, however, only part of a larger scheme initiated in September 1988 to create a mercenary training academy using the ABDF as an organizational cover. According to a brochure produced by Spearhead Ltd, the project's corporate entity, the aim was to establish a security academy school to train "corporate security experts, ranging from the executive level to the operational level, and bring them to the highest professional capacity in order to confront and defuse any possible threat." A central part of the enterprise was to be a "speciality shop" that would sell "small arms," among other things.

The planners were catering to a special clientele, including "local private and official entities," international banks, international oil and industrial companies, and "international private business people." The curriculum was to include training in communication, intelligence, arms and shooting, negotiation techniques, rescue techniques, and security planning and logistics. Commissioner Blom-Cooper asserted: "To any one with the slightest knowledge of armed forces it was obvious that the training school proffered by Spearhead Ltd was intended, among other things, to train mercenaries in assault techniques and assassination."⁴⁶ Antigua and Antiguan public officials were, therefore, deeply implicated in schemes with direct and indirect connections to the devious and dangerous pursuits of the drug underworld. The key Antiguanus involved were Vere Bird, Jr., Minister of Public Works and Communications, Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Walker, ABDF Commander, Vernon Edwards, Managing Director of a shipping and brokerage agency, and Glenton Armstrong and Sean Leitch, customs officers.⁴⁷

Economic Security

As is the case elsewhere, much of the drug corruption in the Caribbean springs from greed. However, some of it relates to the relative economic deprivation in parts of a region where unemployment is high, economies have declined, prices are astronomical, and where the 1990 public debt was \$US 10.2 billion. Under these circumstances one can appreciate that some people who engage in drug production and trafficking are driven by basic economic needs. Even for those without such motives, like public officials, it is often difficult to resist the temptation to earn "easy money" to supplement the low incomes.

The drug trade takes a heavy toll on the already weak Caribbean economies. One aspect relates to the charges and fines levied against the owners of carriers on which drugs are found. For example, United States Customs imposed a US \$1.2 million fine on the Guyana Airways Corporation (GAC) in January 1992 after a GAC flight had arrived in New York with almost 100 pounds of marijuana. On 7 November another GAC plane arrived in New York with 17.1 pounds of cocaine in an unaddressed mail bag, triggering a fine of US \$273,600 by the United States Customs.⁴⁸ Both state and commercial enterprises suffer. The fines have been devastating for Air Jamaica, contributing to its 1988-89 losses of US \$14 million, 20 percent more than the losses for the previous year. Between 1989 and 1991 Air Jamaica was fined about US \$37 million for illegal drugs found on its planes

entering the United States. The fines were, however, reduced to US \$3 million, with agreement that the remaining money would be used to upgrade security at the country's international airports.⁴⁹ The campaigns to eliminate drug production and curb drug trafficking also require some Caribbean states to devote considerable portions of their already scarce financial resources to the drug problems.

Because of economic and institutional deficiencies, Caribbean countries are forced to rely significantly on foreign economic and technical assistance, at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels.⁵⁰ At the bilateral level, United States assistance is important to many countries. However, drug operations have often jeopardized the assistance to some countries. There are provisions under the 1986 United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act (PL 99-570) for mandatory and discretionary trade sanctions against "offending countries." In the Western Hemisphere the list of "offending countries" includes the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. Sanctions against these countries can include a 50 percent withholding of bilateral aid, and votes against multilateral development bank loans to them. The President is allowed to impose trade sanctions, including duties, loss of tariff benefits, and suspension of air services. Congress can, however, reverse presidential action to grant aid or impose sanctions by passing a joint resolution within 45 days of the president's determination on the matter, due on 1 March of each year.⁵¹

Ever since the passage of PL 99-570 the Commonwealth Caribbean countries concerned have managed to receive certification. Congress, however, did not always agree with the President's assessment and certification efforts. In 1988, for instance, Congress attempted to overturn the certification of the Bahamas. And in 1989 Senator John Kerry led another effort to decertify the Bahamas. Fortunately, his effort was defeated, by a 57 to 40 vote.⁵² What is troubling about the drugs-aid link is that the United States pressures countries into specific kinds of cooperation, using the aid suspension as a threat.

The economic security implications of drug operations mentioned above, however, reflect only part of the economic security matrix. Tourism, a key sector in many Caribbean countries, has been adversely affected in many places. The link between drugs and tourism needs substantive assessment, but there is evidence to suggest that the negative effect of drugs on tourism is a consequence of the negative press that frightens potential tourists away, and the high incidence of drug-related crime in some places. In addition, drug use has contributed to the loss of employment man-hours due to addiction, rehabilitation, and incarceration. It also affects the shaping of attitudes and norms in societies that are highly vulnerable to American materialist values.

COUNTERMEASURES

While the main purpose of this article is to discuss the nature of drug problems and their security implications, it is useful to conclude by noting some of the responses to the various problems, in addition to those noted above.

Countermeasures have been taken at the domestic, regional, and international levels. The importance attached to the regional and international efforts reflects the recognition that Caribbean countries do not possess the capabilities to deal adequately with the problems individually. But perhaps, more importantly, it also reflects acceptance by states in the Caribbean and, indeed, throughout the world, that the international scope of the problems demands international responses. It is also important to note that responses come not only from governments and international governmental agencies, but also from non-governmental organizations. This is a demonstration by these organizations that the implications of the problems are such that the collective will and the resources of all are required.

Countermeasures include campaigns to eradicate cultivation and reduce production of drugs, to rehabilitate addicts, and to educate the public on the dangers of drug use. Interdiction and law enforcement have been boosted, and several countries have found it necessary to introduce draconian laws to deal with some aspects of the problem. For instance, the Jamaica Parliament passed the Dangerous Drugs Act in 1987; the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act was approved in Guyana in 1988; Barbados had the Drug Abuse (Prevention and Control) Act approved in 1990; and in fall 1991 Trinidad and Tobago's Dangerous Drug Act became law.

Calls have been made for capital punishment for certain drug offenses.⁵³ But generally, the new laws impose stiff fines and terms of imprisonment for drug use and trafficking. They also provide for the confiscation of property acquired through drug-trading, and they create or expand institutions to deal with different aspects of the problem. In Guyana, for example, the 1988 legislation imposes heavy fines and prison terms for the possession, sale, dispensing, and trafficking of illicit drugs. In some cases the penalty is life imprisonment. The law also sanctions seizure of drug acquired property, and allows bail for drug offenders only under special circumstances. These laws are often applied fully, as when, in March 1992, Guyana's Chief Magistrate, Claudette La Bennett, refused bail to a nine-month pregnant woman accused of possessing six pounds of cocaine and weapons and ammunition. The woman, Sharon Morgan, who had been charged along with Colombian and Venezuelan accomplices, appealed La Bennett's decision and was released on G. \$100,000 bail. During her release she delivered her baby, but then failed to show for trial on three occasions. She was later convicted and sentenced to four years in jail, *in absentia*.⁵⁴

Jamaica's National Security Minister, K.D. Knight, reported to the Jamaican Parliament in July 1991 on a special anti-cocaine trafficking strategy introduced in 1990. It involves identifying organizations in Jamaica and the United States involved in the trade; targeting high risk flights; profiling legitimate Jamaican entrepreneurs suspected of trading; and using the intelligence capability of the newly created National Firearms and Drug Intelligence Center. Jamaica also increased the manpower of the Port Security Corps in 1991 to 900, and allowed the United States National Guard to install a radar station on the island. The success of

the initial radar operations, from August to October 1991, convinced officials in Jamaica and the United States to make the operations permanent.⁵⁵

As a result of the Gallagher Report mentioned above and investigations by Britain's Scotland Yard, measures were taken in 1991 to curb money laundering in Montserrat. The most dramatic measure was the March 1991 revocation of 311 banking licenses. Many of the institutions that lost their licenses were described as "little more than a smart title and a letter head," and "nothing more than a few documents in a lawyer's filing cabinet." Yet, they provided the legal basis for moving money around the world. Britain also amended the island's constitution, giving responsibility for the financial sector, previously held by local politicians, to the Governor of the dependency. In addition, a British adviser was appointed to oversee a new financial supervisory agency.⁵⁶

At the regional level the CARICOM High Level Ad Hoc Group on the Regional Drug Program has undertaken several joint initiatives in education, intelligence, rehabilitation, law enforcement, and other subjects. One significant initiative was the endorsement by CARICOM leaders of Jamaica's proposal for a Regional Training Center for Drug Law Enforcement. The Jamaica plan calls for a regional agency to serve as a resource base for technical advice to Caribbean governments, and to systematize the region's anti-narcotic law enforcement training. The Center will be financed by the Jamaica government, the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), and other sources. It is to become part of an existing criminal justice complex that includes the Police Staff College and the Jamaica Police Academy.⁵⁷

Some Caribbean countries have signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with the United States in the counter-narcotics effort. Treaties have been signed by Jamaica, the Bahamas, Belize, and by Grenada, on 18 September 1991. These treaties provide for training, joint interdiction, asset sharing, intelligence, and material and technical assistance. Air Jamaica and the United States Customs Service also signed an agreement on 13 December 1991 to bolster trafficking countermeasures. On 14 August 1992, the United States gave Guyana an additional US \$50,000 in assistance to help combat trafficking. The sum augments the US \$300,000 given in 1989 and will be used to repair Guyana Defense Force Coast Guard radar equipment and to upgrade army and police computer facilities. Moreover, on 18 November 1992, United States Ambassador to Guyana, George Jones, presented US \$11,000 worth of "drug war" equipment to Police Commissioner Laurie Lewis.

Other bilateral narcotics treaties exist. Belize, for example, has four agreements with Mexico for improved narcotics cooperation, including intelligence exchange, and Mexican assistance with prevention and rehabilitation programs. Some multilateral treaties are also in force. The Bahamas, Britain, and the United States, for instance, signed one on 12 July 1990 providing for joint law enforcement involving the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos, and the United States.

This treaty extends the basing network of OPBAT — Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos — from three bases to four. The new base is at Great Inagua, the southernmost island of the Bahamas.⁵⁸

At the international level, Caribbean countries are party to several agreements designed to facilitate information sharing, education, and joint combat measures, among other things. Among these are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Convention; and the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Indeed, the Bahamas has the distinction of being the first country to ratify the 1988 Convention. States in the region also participate in many hemispheric and international agencies and networks. These include the OAS Money Laundering Experts Group; UNDCP; the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC); the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB); the Caribbean Drug Money Laundering Conference; the Meeting of Heads of National Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA); and the Maritime Security Council.

CONCLUSION

This article shows that Caribbean countries are facing multidimensional narcotics problems. There is now even greater acceptance of the validity of the assertion made by Lynden Pindling in 1980 while he was Prime Minister of the Bahamas: "I have no doubt ... that it's the greatest single threat to the social, economic fabric ... Unchecked it will destroy us ... the money available is just too great."⁵⁹ Several domestic, regional, and international initiatives and measures designed to help counter the problems of illicit drug production, abuse, and trafficking, and money laundering are in place. Narcotics operations present the Caribbean with its greatest security challenge. Caribbean governments and law abiding citizens are coping as best as they can given their economic and institutional limitations. But considering the increasing scope and gravity of the problems, their best might not be good enough.

Endnotes

1. The Commonwealth Caribbean is a geopolitical unit comprised of territories in the Caribbean Sea and in Central and South America that are part of the Commonwealth of Nations, once called the British Commonwealth. Some members of the unit are independent states, others are dependencies of Britain. The independent states are: Antigua-Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. The dependencies are: Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands.
2. Robert L. Rothstein, "The Security Dilemma and the 'Poverty Trap' in the Third World," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 8, no. 4 (1986), pp. 8-9.
3. For a useful discussion on the reconceptualization of security, see Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Third World National Security: Towards a New Conceptual Framework," *International Interactions*, 11, no. 2 (1984), pp. 103-35; Patricia Mische, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternatives*, 13, no. 4 (1989), pp. 389-427; Nicholas Eberstadt, "Population Change and National Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 70 (Summer 1991), pp. 115-31;

- Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "The Environment and International Security," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Kumar Rupesinghe, "The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts," in Elise Boulding, ed., *New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamined* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1992).
4. For an elaboration of this definition, see Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), chapter one.
 5. "Sandiford Addresses Caribbean Coast Guards," *New York Carib News*, 31 July 1990, p. 36; and "Statement of Honorable Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica," p. 7 in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, *U.S. International Drug Policy - Multilateral Strike Forces - Drug Policy in the Andean Nations*, Joint Hearings, 101st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 6 November 1989, and 18 January and 27 March 1990. Manley's testimony was given on 6 November.
 6. *Time for Action: The Report of the West Indian Commission* (Black Rock, Barbados, 1992), p. 343. The Commission was formed by Commonwealth Caribbean leaders in 1989 to help chart a course for the Caribbean as it moves into the twenty-first century. It was headed by former Guyana Foreign Minister and Commonwealth of Nations Secretary General, Sir Shridath Ramphal. Ramphal is Chancellor of the University of the West Indies. Until December 1992 he was also Chancellor of the University of Guyana.
 7. United Nations General Assembly, *Political Declaration*, XVIIth Special Session, A/RES/S-17/2. 15 March 1990, p. 2.
 8. Gitanjali Persaud, "Police, Army Uncover Biggest Ganja Plot Yet," *Stabroek News* (Guyana), 15 March 1992, p. 1; and Frederick Gilbert, "Police Discover G\$1 Billion of Ganja in Berbice," *Stabroek News*, 23 May 1992, p. 1.
 9. Scott B. MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade* (New York: Praeger, 1988), p. 89.
 10. U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (Washington, DC, 1991), p. 133. Hereafter cited as *International Narcotics Report*.
 11. "Ganja Growers Finding New Ways to Harvest," *Sunday Sun* (Barbados), 5 November 1989, p. 24A; and *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), p. 195.
 12. MacDonald, *Dancing on a Volcano*, p. 90.
 13. *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), p. 182.
 14. *International Narcotics Report*, (1992), p. 142. Also see, Howard Frankson, "An Upsurge of Crime in Belize," *Caribbean Contact*, July-August 1992, pp. 5, 8.
 15. "Police Reports Alarming Increase in Cocaine Seizures," *Guyana Chronicle*, 15 December 1989; and Ronald Sanders, "The Drug Problem: Social and Economic Effects - Policy Options for the Caribbean," *Caribbean Affairs*, 3 (July-September 1990); p. 20.
 16. See Rickey Singh, "Barbados Named in Trinidad Drug Report," *Daily Nation* (Barbados), 3 February 1987; Roy Morris, "Bajan Connection Arrested in London Cocaine Catch," *Daily Nation*, 16 May 1990, p. 1; "10 Arrested in Drugs Shootout [in St. Lucia]," *New York Carib News*, 16 October 1990, p. 4; Ron Sanders, "Narcotics, Corruption, and Development: The Problems in the Smaller Islands," *Caribbean Affairs*, 3 (January-March 1990), pp. 79-92; "Bellyful of Dope is Fatal," *Barbados Advocate*, 11 April 1990; "\$30 Million in Cocaine is Seized in Trinidad," *New York Carib News*, 29 February 1990, p. 4; "\$300M in Illegal Drugs Seized Last Year," *Sunday Chronicle* (Guyana), 6 January 1991, pp. 6, 7; Gitanjali Persaud, "Witness Tells of Cocaine Found in Soap Powder Box," *Stabroek News*, 14 January 1992, pp. 1, 12; and "Cops Tell of Finding Cocaine Among Panties," *Stabroek News*, 15 February 1992, p. 3.
 17. Janice Griffith, "\$6M Ganja Haul," *Sunday Sun*, 5 July 1992, p. 1; "Trinidad and Tobago Police Make Big Cocaine Seizure," *Stabroek News*, 29 July 1992, p. 7; and "Cops in US \$12M Cocaine Timehri Haul," *Stabroek News*, 12 September 1992, p. 1. The police detective responsible for canine drug detection at the airport was charged as an accomplice of the Barbadian national. See "Sniffer Dog Handler Charged in Timehri Coke Case," *Stabroek News*, 29 September 1992, p. 3.

- The smuggler, 44 year-old Juliet Evelyn, was sentenced on 18 December 1992 to four years in prison and fined G \$10,000. See "Four Years for US \$12M Cocaine Accused," *Stabroek News*, 19 December 1992, p. 20.
18. "St. Vincent Top Cop Wants legal loopholes Tightened," *Caribbean Daylight* (USA), 24 January 1993, p. 16.
 19. For a detailed examination of the use of Bimini and other areas for trafficking, see Government of the Bahamas, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal Use of the Bahamas for the Transshipment of Dangerous Drugs Destined for the United States* (Nassau, the Bahamas, 1984), pp. 9-51.
 20. Anthony P. Maingot, "Laundering the Gains of the Drug Trade: Miami and the Caribbean Tax Havens," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 30 (Summer-Fall 1988), p. 168.
 21. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, pp. 7-8.
 22. *Summary Report*, p. 31.
 23. *International Narcotics Report*, (1992), p. 141.
 24. "Murder Tally: 629," *New York Carib News*, 12 January 1993, p. 3.
 25. *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), pp. 364-65.
 26. See Michael D. Roberts, "Grenada's Second Invasion," *New York Carib News*, 12 November 1991, p. 3.
 27. *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), pp. 366-67. See also Steve Lohr, "Where the money Washes Up," *New York Times Magazine*, 27 March 1992, p. 27ff.
 28. *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), pp. 367-68; and *International Narcotics Report*, (1992), pp. 421-22.
 29. Interview with Commissioner Phillips, Police Headquarters, Castries, St. Lucia, 16 August 1988.
 30. See Morris, "Bajan Connection." Also see "Two [Bajan] Cops Detained Following Ganja Bust," *Guyana Chronicle*, 21 January 1992, p. 7; and "Bahamian Policeman Charged for Cocaine," *Stabroek News*, 18 March 1992, p. 7.
 31. *Report of Commission of Inquiry*, p. 35.
 32. "Statement of Explanation: The Bahamas," Appendix C of Raphael Perl, *International Narcotics Control: The President's March 1, 1989 Certification for Foreign Assistance Eligibility and Options for Congressional Action*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 89-141F, 7 April 1989.
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 37. Deborah John, "A Bid to Police the Police," *Daily Express*, 2 February 1993, pp. 1, 10; and Alvia Viarruel, "Police March in Historic Protest," *Daily Express*, 6 February 1993, pp. 1, 10.
 38. See, for example, testimony by Anthony Maingot in U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, *Drugs and Latin America: Economic and Political Impact and U.S. Policy Options*, Report of the Seminar held by the Congressional Research Service, 101st Cong., 1st Sess, 26 April 1989, p. 13.
 39. Ron Sanders, "Narcotics, Corruption, and Development," p. 84.

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42. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Arms Trafficking, Mercenaries, and Drug Cartels*, Hearings, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess, 27 and 28 February 1991, pp. 127-30.
43. Blom-Cooper, *Guns for Antigua*, pp. 47-52; 120-21.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
47. Based on the Blom-Cooper report Minister Bird, who had resigned earlier pending the outcome of the inquiry, was banned from public life and Lieutenant Colonel Walker was dismissed as army head. But to everyone's surprise, Bird and Walker were appointed as government consultants on 1 December 1992. Bird was to advise the prime minister, and Walker was to advise the Minister of Public Utilities on airport security. See "Black-Hand Consultants," *New York Carib News*, 19 January 1993, p. 5.
48. "GAC Fined 1.2M (US) for Transporting Ganja," *Guyana Chronicle*, 29 January 1992, p. 3; and "GAC Faces Further US \$273,600 fine for Cocaine Mail Bag," *Stabroek News*, 8 December 1992, p. 20.
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53. See, for example, "Trinidad Senator Advocates Hanging for Drug Traffickers," *Stabroek News*, 29 August 1991, p. 9; and "[Dominica Prime Minister] Charles Says No to Drugs: Hang Them," *New York Carib News*, 29 July 1992, p. 3.
54. See "Court Refuses Bail to Nine-Month Pregnant Accused," *Stabroek News*, 3 March 1992, p. 16; and "Drugs Accused Sentenced to Jail in Her Absence," *Stabroek News*, 14 April 1992, p. 16.
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57. Government of Jamaica, *Memorandum Submitted by the Government of Jamaica on the Establishment of Regional Training Center for Drug Law Enforcement Officers in Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica, 1991), p. 4.

58. *International Narcotics Report*, (1991), p. 133; "Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela Consider Joint Air Operations," *Trinidad Express*, 24 July 1991, p. 2; *Bahamas Narcotics Control Report 1991*, p. 5; "Jamaica, Mexico at One Against Drug Dealers," *Daily Gleaner* (Jamaica), 16 March 1992, p. 16; "Venezuela, Guyana Agreed on Joint Anti-Drug Plan," *Stabroek News*, 17 April 1992, p. 1; "US Worried About Guyana Coke Trafficking," *Stabroek News*, 15 August 1992, p. 1; and "Police Get More U.S. Help for Drug Fight," *Stabroek News*, 20 November 1992, p. 11.
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