

expected that terrorism, the method, will expire from itself, together with the dissolution of its carriers.” Or again, on page 153, “Indifference towards terrorism, at least theoretically, means in moral terms moving away from the rejection towards the collaborative-tolerating end of the continuum. Omission still bears the responsibility for wrong-doing.” What does this mean? Such jargon would not be tolerated even in university undergraduate essays. It’s hard to believe that a publisher like Routledge would allow such a poorly-written and badly-edited book to bear its imprint.

Further, there is no description of the authors’ credentials or background beyond the mention, in the last chapter, of their disciplines. But the final indignity is that a book of 164 pages, with no appendices, can possibly sell for a total of CDN \$87.50 or US \$69.95. It is hard to know who will pay such a price.

Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the basic premise for this book, the need for comparative study of Western tolerance of terrorism, is a good one; it simply needs much better articulation. Also, Gal-Or’s chapter on Israel contains some very interesting material, but the poor conceptualization already referred to and the inappropriate use of language are the enemy of a good read.

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Smist, Frank J., Jr. *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947-1989*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990.

Frank Smist’s book will prove useful to students of the American intelligence community. Carefully researched, it is enriched by numerous interviews (including, fascinatingly, one with Thomas Fox, identified as “barber, House of Representatives”). The book’s pages are a treasure trove of information and lively quotation from those who have struggled with the business of congressional oversight. For beginning students of the subject this is an excellent introduction. Everything is there, and, while Smist tends to the conventional wisdom that sees the overseers as heroes and the intelligence operatives as villains, the treatment is generally fair and balanced. It is a more satisfying account of what happened, especially in the tumultuous years of the Church Committee and the establishment of the Senate and House intelligence committees, than one finds in either of the two existing sources, Loch Johnson’s *A Season of Inquiry* or John Oseth’s *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations*.<sup>1</sup>

That said, it is important to note that the book began life as a doctoral dissertation in political science. It bears the marks of its origin. In good dissertation fashion the organization is chronological — one thing simply follows another — and the result is that story predominates over analysis. There are historical

questions, constitutional questions, and public policy questions, which beg to be addressed but find no place in the author's bustling progress from the late 1940s to almost the present. And it is also the case that the narrative is notably thinner on the ends; that is, oversight before the intelligence scandals of the mid-1970s is briefly characterized because little detail is known, and the battle over intelligence oversight which broke out again so lustily toward the end of the Reagan years over Iran-Contra is not treated in detail, probably because the author was struggling to get his thesis finished! It is no accident that the best part of the book deals with the Church and Pike Committee days and the early years of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. One goes where the available material is.

More frustrating, however, are the opportunities for analysis which were allowed to pass by. Simply as an historical matter, for instance, one might have hoped that the author would pause to explore the irony and significance of the role of William Colby in triggering (and then attempting to manage) the intelligence scandals that lead to the creation of the Church Committee in 1974-75. As is well known, and as Smist recounts, Colby, newly appointed Director of Central Intelligence, leaked to the *New York Times* a seven-hundred page agency document which he had prepared at the direction of James Schlesinger, his predecessor as DCI, which identified various possible violations of law in the CIA's operations over the preceding fifteen years. The leak forced the resignation of James Angleton, Colby's principle rival within the agency, and brought on a period of internal strife which left the CIA demoralized and arguably crippled by the end of the 1970s. Furthermore, as the Church Committee geared up, Colby played the lone hand; his testimony was not coordinated with the White House, and so, again by Smist's account, we have the spectacle of the head of an executive agency as a loose cannon, seeking to persuade Congress to remake the Central Intelligence Agency in his desired image without any effort to coordinate his views with the president whose servant he was. This is much too interesting to pass over matter-of-factly as Smist does.

As to constitutional questions, Smist's views are essentially undeveloped. There are very complex issues of separation of powers which arise in context of congressional oversight of the intelligence community. It is not enough to say, as Smist does in his conclusion, that "separation of powers" or "the system designed by the founding fathers" requires complete disclosure of all executive branch information to oversight committees. Whose theory of separation of powers? Which founders? There is a rich diversity of opinion both today and in the late eighteenth century as to the relative responsibilities of executive and congress in such matters.

With respect to public policy Smist is principally interested in what kind of oversight mechanism should exist to insure against "abuses" by the intelligence agencies. But beyond this he evinces little interest in what kind of intelligence community we should have, what its taskings and successes indicators should be, what it's doing well or what it's doing badly. He continues to work within the

intellectual paradigm of the Church Committee, which was passed down to both the permanent intelligence committees, in which the object of the oversight business is to keep the executive branch from doing bad things.

This limited vision is reinforced by the political science Smist brings to bear on the subject — that is, by the conceptual model he employs. This model is drawn from the work of Richard Fenno and John Manley, two leading students of Congress, and it identifies two styles of oversight: the institutional and the investigative. In the institutional model, oversight is seen “as a cooperative relationship between the legislative and executive branches.”<sup>2</sup> The congressional overseers are fully committed to advancing the work of the agency or of the program involved. In the investigative model, there is “an adversarial relationship between the executive and legislative branches,” and there is a constant searching for “abuses.”

While Smist is certainly correct in observing that the style of oversight from 1947 through the mid-1970s was institutional, and that that gave way to the investigative styles of the Church and Pike committees, his attempt to apply the models to the latter workings of the Senate and House intelligence committees is less successful. For instance, Smist identifies William Miller, the staff director of the Senate Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as attempting to practice both institutional and investigative oversight — that is to build constructive relations with the intelligence community and still pursue the agenda of the old, investigative Church committee (of which he had also been staff director). Many who know the period and the personalities intimately will resist this interpretation. In fact, it is only just in recent years, since Smist concluded his study, that there have been signs that a more mature oversight style may be emerging both in the Senate and House committees.

At the end of the Reagan era, of course, there was a resurgence (with a vengeance!) of the investigative style of oversight into intelligence matters triggered by the Iran-Contra affair. But the political disaster of the televised joint congressional hearings appears to have stopped that impulse cold. In contrast, Senate chair David Boren, along with ranking minority member William Cohen and House chair Dave McCurdy, are pursuing noninvestigative, reformist agendas. Bills have issued from both committees which would reorganize the intelligence community and create a new position of Director of Strategic Intelligence, separate from and above the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Whatever the fate of the proposals, and it is early days yet, they appear to be a serious effort by the congressional intelligence committees to participate creatively in the realignment of American intelligence institutions and capabilities that has become inevitable with the end of the Cold War.

Much is now up for grabs in American intelligence policy and the congressional committees are showing evidence that they desire to and are qualified to be major participants in the reform process. I would argue, then, that we may finally

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be seeing the congressional oversight of intelligence finding its way back to an institutional style, but only after almost two decades in the howling wilderness of "investigation."

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#### Endnotes

1. Loch K. Johnson, *A Season of Inquiry: the Senate Intelligence Investigation* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985); John M. Oseth, *Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985).
2. Richard J. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), and, *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little Brown, 1986); John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).

Farson, A. Stuart, David Stafford, and Wesley K. Wark, eds. *Security and Intelligence in a Changing World: New Perspectives for the 1990s*. London: Frank Cass, 1991.

Shulsky, Abram N. *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*. New York: Brassey's (US), 1991.

The articles in *Security and Intelligence in a Changing World* originally were papers presented in September 1989 at a conference organized by the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. The theme of the conference, and hence one of the main threads binding the articles in this volume, is the question of Canada's perceived and projected security and intelligence needs as the end of this century approaches.

The book is divided into three parts, each having its own sub-theme, editor, and introduction. The articles within the book's first section, "International Perspective on Intelligence," edited by Wesley Wark, put forward the security and intelligence perspective of those nations which have often been seen as the Great Game's predominant three players: Great Britain, the former USSR and the USA. The section's latter two articles, although thorough, are largely descriptive, while Christopher Andrew's piece on the "British View" gives an interesting cameo comparison of British and Canadian approaches to intelligence and its gathering.

Part Two, "Canadian and Comparative Perspective," edited by David Stafford, explores, within the Canadian context, the debate linked to the balancing of an agency's licence to act independently with the necessity for agency accountability. Frank Cain's article, "Accountability and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation," allows an interesting comparison of the measures implemented