

**Of Men and Plans: the Kenya Campaign
as part of the British
Counterinsurgency Experience**

by
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During the early years of the Emergency in Malaya the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos) received only one letter from the then Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. It read:

Dear Lyttelton

Malaya. We must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.

Lyttelton remarked in his memoirs: "This had occurred to me."¹

It is relatively easy for historians to look back at the period of the 1950s and draw out the similarities, "Montgomery's plan" as it were, and the lessons to be learned; some are quite straightforward, others require a detailed comparison of the records over an extended period. The continuities may look obvious to a researcher in the reading room of the Public Record Office, but they were far less apparent those present at the scene of the conflict. Counterinsurgency, by its very nature, is a multi-layered endeavor. The administration, military, colonial police and Special Branch, although all involved in the campaigns, all had their different perspectives and all had their own institutional memories.

This article will briefly outline the course of events during the Mau Mau Emergency (1952-1956) and examine some of the instances when the experience of Malaya and other insurgencies was used and misused, and also when past experience required reshaping to meet the unique requirements of the conflict in Kenya. While the counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya appears to fall neatly in the post-1945 flow from Palestine to Malaya to Kenya to Cyprus and onward, the actual movement of ideas, strategies and tactics in and out of Kenya was, in fact, slow and uneven, as it was in campaigns both before and after. In this sense, Kenya is a convenient mid-point for observation as it was both a receiver and sender of experience along the British post-war counterinsurgency chain.

Simply stated, support for the organization known as Mau Mau was linked to a series of long-standing Kikuyu grievances (both real and imagined) against the colonial government, focused primarily on the issues of land alienation and overcrowding in native areas. Moderate Kikuyu leaders, denied access to the political process, appeared unable to resolve these issues and the initiative shifted to younger, more radical elements advocating the violent expulsion of all Europeans from Kenya.² The pre-Emergency phase in Kenya, roughly 1948 to 1952, was marked by low level organization by the Mau Mau movement in anticipation of a

confrontation with the government, the oathing and radicalization of sectors of the Kikuyu tribe, and the theft of arms and ammunition. Accurate intelligence on the Mau Mau was lacking, given that the Kenya Police had little representation in the Kikuyu heartland and Special Branch activities were generally limited to Nairobi. Moreover, the government, especially the Governor at that time, Sir Philip Mitchell, greatly underestimated the threat posed by Mau Mau and tended to ignore any contrary reports by administrative officers. Mau Mau activity, including the intimidation of loyal Kikuyu, arson attacks and the maiming of livestock, accelerated during 1952 to a point where the newly arrived Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Howick), recommended to the Colonial Secretary the declaration of a state of emergency in October.³

Unfortunately for the Government of Kenya, the previously neglected and undersized Special Branch was incapable of identifying more than the more visible politically-active supporters and a limited number of Mau Mau's probable leaders. After the arrest sweep "decapitated" the political leadership of the movement, the initial blindness of Special Branch to most happenings in the native reserves made it unable to accurately track the growth and development of Mau Mau Militant (active fighters) and Passive Wing (non-combatants living in the native reserves and in Nairobi) support at the lower levels of the organization.⁴ This limited view provided by intelligence shaped the Government's perception of the problem. At first, the situation appeared similar to earlier difficulties faced in the West African colony of the Gold Coast. When a Gold Coast-style arrest sweep failed to quell the problem, the Kenya Government and the Security Forces responded with a repressive campaign similar to that seen in the early days of the Malaya campaign, while ironically, the British government and many in Kenya continued to deny that a Malaya-type situation was at hand. Only after the fledgling intelligence network in the native reserves began to provide some indications of the range of Mau Mau support, a message amplified by sporadic, often bloody attacks against both Africans and Europeans, did the government officials in London and Nairobi come to grips with the fact that a serious, widely-supported insurgency might be brewing. Kenya moved sluggishly to adopt the emergency and intelligence structures that were proving so successful in Malaya, while under constant pressure from the European settler community for stronger action. These delays also allowed Mau Mau to enjoy a relatively untroubled interlude during which it increased the size of its Militant Wing forces in the forests and secured its political support in Kikuyu areas.⁵

During the spring of 1953, after an unexpected intensification of Mau Mau attacks against police posts and Kikuyu supporters of the government, there was a realization both in Nairobi and London that Kenya faced a full blown insurgency in rough parallel to Malaya, and therefore a more forceful response was required. The full-scale military campaign against Mau Mau did not begin until June 1953, seven months after the Emergency was declared, when the British government made Kenya an independent military command under a full general, allotted an second brigade headquarters and provided additional British battalions along with

increased Royal Air Force support. By October 1953, a third brigade headquarters and two more British battalions were added. But even with these additional manpower resources, progress was slow given the lack of operational intelligence about Mau Mau activities and the overwhelming support the movement enjoyed in Kikuyu areas.

The powers given to the new commander-in-chief, General Sir George Erskine, fell well short of those enjoyed by General Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya. Erskine originally requested overall command of both the civil administration and the Security Forces, but this was refused on the grounds that, unlike Malaya, the emergency in Kenya was concentrated in a relative small geographic area, therefore, wide-ranging powers were not required. However, the threat of military rule was also kept as a last resort should the European settlers become excessively critical or obstructive of the Governments' handling of the campaign.⁶

With the gearing-up of the activities of the Security Forces in Kenya after mid-1953 the obvious influence of Malaya operations in Kenya became apparent. The organization and expansion of Home Guard units, the food denial programme, villagization, the detention camp and rehabilitation system, and several other components of the campaign were drawn directly from Malaya. In some cases, such as detention camps, government officials travelled to observe first hand the system in Malaya, although many of the re-education aspects of dealing with hard-core Mau Mau can be linked back to de-Nazification in post-war Germany. In fact, the use of the terms "white", "grey" and "black" in categorizing detainees in Kenya were the same terms used by the Allies to divide up German prisoners of war.⁷ At a tactical level, the Army's "Handbook on anti-Mau Mau Operations", issued in 1954, was based largely on a similar publication concerning Malaya published in 1952.⁸

During 1953 a Malayan-style emergency committee system was established throughout the affected areas. Chaired by the senior administrative official, along with the ranking police and military officers, the so-called "three-legged stool" was responsible for the local conduct of the Emergency. Special Branch personnel were assigned to provincial and district headquarters in the native reserves and the European Settled Areas to assist in the collection and assessment of intelligence, and a system of intelligence committees roughly paralleled that of the emergency committee structure. By August 1953 the first of a small number of military officers were posted to Special Branch as "Field Intelligence Officers" to aid in the development of military or "contact" intelligence to quickly engage the Mau Mau gangs, the best known and most effective of whom was Captain (later General Sir) Frank Kitson.⁹

Malaya was not the only influence. When considering the problems of extensive Mau Mau activity in Nairobi, Erskine looked to the British experience in Palestine for an example. He based his own "Operation Anvil" the large-scale cordon and search of Nairobi in May 1954, on "Operation Shark," the cordon and search of Tel Aviv in 1946.¹⁰ By the time of Operation Anvil the Security Forces

had wrestled the initiative away from large Mau Mau gangs and, after securing Nairobi, began to force out the remaining Mau Mau organization from the Kikuyu Reserves and into the extensive forests around the Aberdares Mountains and Mount Kenya. As the Reserves became progressively more secure, security responsibility was transferred to the administration and the police, allowing the military to concentrate additional forces against the forest gangs.

At various times during the emergency the colonial administration, through Special Branch, attempted to arrange for the mass surrender of Mau Mau fighters in the forests as a way of ending the Emergency quickly. The first surrender offer in August 1953 was drawn directly from the experience in Malaya. In Kenya, direct talks between the government and the insurgents on two occasions in early 1954 and 1955 came close to ending the insurgency outright, but for some bad luck and the great suspicions held by Mau Mau regarding to real intentions of the government.

The final phase of the active insurgency starting in early 1955 saw the isolation and destruction of the remaining Mau Mau gangs and leaders in the Aberdares and Mount Kenya forests. After several months of relatively ineffective large scale forest operations and a final abortive attempt by Special Branch to negotiate a mass surrender, operations concentrated on the use of relatively small “tracker combat teams” of the Army, and “pseudo-gangs” composed of former Mau Mau members, under Special Branch guidance, willing to fight against the remaining gangs. During 1956 the effort to track down the remaining small number of gang leaders was waged by a specialized pseudo-gang force. While the pseudo-gang technique did not originate in Kenya – some aspects were used in both Palestine and Malaya – it was developed during counter-Mau Mau operations over a period of almost three years. Starting in 1954 in the European Settled Areas of Central Province, it became the most effective means of rooting out terrorists in the forests and of eliminating the remaining principal Mau Mau gang leaders.¹¹ It is also interesting as example of a technique that was not deliberately drawn from previous insurgencies, but used successfully and modified to a level of high sophistication. In October 1956 the last important Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, was captured and soon afterward the remaining military units were withdrawn from active service and the counterinsurgency period of the Emergency ended.

In studying the Kenya Emergency one is struck how many ideas about the conduct of the campaign arrived from Malaya. But it is also important to recognise that many of the mistakes made in Malaya were repeated at great cost in Kenya, while other aspects of the campaign against the Communists simply did not work in the Kenyan political/security environment. For example, during the early months of the campaign, despite the lessons of Malaya, the use of extensive military sweeps, large-scale screening operations and collective punishment in the native reserves wasted valuable manpower and alienated many Kikuyu. Ambush tactics used in Malaya, which in turn were based on the Army’s experience in Burma during the Second World War, were also found to be ineffective given the fact that Mau Mau possessed relatively few automatic or precision weapons and tended to withdraw after coming into contact with Army patrols rather than pressing the attack. As a

result, the Army adopted a number of unorthodox ambush tactics in the forest that were simply not applicable to any other theatre of operations. The detention of those suspected of supporting or participating in the insurgency was a regular aspect of British counterinsurgency. But only in Kenya did the use of detention reach such extreme levels, over 70,000 detainees at one point, a product of over-zealous administration officials and a military which, from the top down, saw the detention of suspects as a key element in efforts to rid the native areas of Mau Mau influence.

The “hearts and minds” campaign, a cornerstone to the effort in Malaya, was generally unsuccessful in Kenya in winning over the Kikuyu population to the government side. At the height of the Emergency, the government estimated that around 95 percent of all Kikuyu either passively or actively supported Mau Mau or felt in sympathy with its goals. The detention camp system, the rehabilitation programme and a variety of economic incentives geared to draw people away from Mau Mau, while scoring some successes, failed to generate genuine support for the government cause among a majority of Kikuyu. In terms of the villagization programme, the government assessed that only a limited number of Kikuyu were likely to be drawn away from Mau Mau through the provision of increased social services, better living conditions and a degree of physical security. The remainder, in the eyes of the government, were not likely converts and, therefore, had to be dealt with harshly. This policy spawned two completely different styles of village, each with a separate security and political objective. In some areas “model” villages were built “... in which the huts are well-spaced, each wife having her own hut, and some with gardens. There is also room for a social centre and a few shops.”¹² In other parts of the native Reserves, however, the new villages reflected the government’s determination to “make the conditions of life arduous for the resident population.”¹³ A so-called “punitive” village:

... is built where the population are uncooperative. In nearly every case there is a punji moat and a fence round the village. Such a village is invariable unpopular with the inhabitants as it is crowded, dirty and unhygienic. Their very unpopularity makes them, however, an excellent disciplinary measure.¹⁴

Ultimately, it was force of arms and not a change of heart that defeated Mau Mau. Many Kikuyu simply gave up the fight after it became clear the superior power of the government would prevail and an end to the emergency might bring an end to their discomfort. General Sir Gerald Lathbury, who replaced Erskine as Commander-in-Chief in May 1955, believed Mau Mau had been suppressed rather than cured,¹⁵ and reported to the War Office in early 1956:

Although at the present time, greater numbers [of passive wing members] appear to be actively willing to assist Government, it cannot be said that this assistance has been offered as a result of a change of attitude towards Government, or abandonment of Mau Mau political aims.¹⁶

An important aspect in the transfer of expertise and experience gained in other insurgencies to Kenya was the role of individuals. The military was probably

the most successful in this regard, aided by the very nature of the Army and the regular movement of units and personnel. Several battalions served both Malaya and Kenya and doubtless applied their previous experience to the new environment. The career path of many junior Army officers started in Palestine or Malaya from where they moved through the counterinsurgency pipeline and some eventually became senior officers commanding in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Other officers were brought in for specific tasks. For example, Colonel Morcombe, a successful battalion commander in Malaya, took over the key post of Director, Kikuyu Guard. At the most senior levels, experience in the various emergencies was used to good advantage. General (later Field Marshal) Sir John Harding, served as Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, during the early years of the Malaya emergency and as CIGS (1952-55), was influential in seeing that the lessons of the Malayan experience were applied in Kenya.¹⁷ He later moved on to become Governor of Cyprus at the time of the EOKA terrorist offensive.

The remarkable colonial career of Arthur Young provides a reminder that successful experience gained in one emergency situation does not guarantee results elsewhere and is in many ways is a double-edged sword. From 1950 to 1953 Colonel Young was given leave from his position as head of the London Metropolitan Police to take up a short term appointment as Commissioner of Police in Malaya where he reduced the size of the force and pressed for the adoption of British police methods, with some success. The next year Young drafted a report for the government of the Gold Coast after civil disturbances and recommended his Malaya solution to the government that the police be removed from the control of the colonial administration and re-organized along British constabulary lines; his advice was largely ignored. After returning to London, Young was again called out to perform imperial service in 1954 in Kenya where the weight of the Mau Mau insurgency had revealed the need for new leadership in the greatly expanded Kenya Police ranks. Not surprisingly, Young recommended an independent status for the Police, outside the control of the colonial administration, and the adoption of more British standards in the conduct of police operations, especially in the discharge of weapons, the interrogation of prisoners and the prosecution of members of the Security Forces or others involved in the use of excessive force. While there was some sympathy for Young's approach within the government, it was not seen as practical in the middle of a bloody fight between the supporters of the government and Mau Mau. As Sir Frederick Crawford, the Deputy Governor, observed: "... his objectives were as unrealizable as trying to turn the Royal Irish Constabulary into the Winchester Police in the middle of the Irish Rebellion."¹⁸ Another source of friction between Young and the government arose from a difference in the organizational structures of Kenya and Malaya. In Malaya, Young was part of the top decision-making group with Templer; in Kenya the Commissioner of Police was not a member of the four-man War Council which directed the campaign. These differences, combined with Young's sometimes abrasive personality, led to a series of disputes with the Governor, ending in Young's resignation in December 1954. Thus, an attempt to directly transplant personnel and policies from one counterinsurgency to another ended in failure. As Young later remarked: "It is ironic that the same views and same

principles which ensured success in Malaya inevitably resulted in my resignation in Kenya.”¹⁹

Other police officers, such as Richard Catling, successfully applied their experience to new situations despite the difficulties involved in changing between colonies and continents. At the end of Britain’s responsibilities in Palestine over 400 Palestine Police took up positions in Malaya at the start of the emergency, eventually dominating the top ranks, including, at one time, the posts of Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner. Undoubtedly, great advantage was gained from the experience of these men, but their ascendancy also spawned some resentment within the original members of the police in Malaya. Catling, the Deputy Commissioner and one of the so-called “Palestinians”, was passed over for promotion to the top job in favor of a career Malaya policeman. This, in turn, was fortunate for Kenya as Catling, a highly effective policeman, was posted as Deputy Commissioner in July 1954 and later succeeded Young as Commissioner. He helped reorganize and professionalize the Kenya Police, remaining at the helm until after Kenyan independence in 1963.

The development of intelligence methods in Kenya during the Mau Mau campaign had an impact on several other colonies through the movement of top personnel within the various Special Branch organizations, very much in the “Man and a Plan” mold. For example, A.M. Macdonald, a veteran of Malaya and brought into Kenya from MI5 at the start of hostilities, went on to become Security Advisor to the Colonial Office, the top colonial intelligence position. Trevor Jenkins, Director of Intelligence and Security (DIS) arrived in Kenya in 1952 by way of the Gold Coast and was assigned in 1955 to re-organize a troubled Special Branch in Nigeria. Another Kenya DIS, John Prendergast, was sent to Cyprus as Director of Intelligence, along with two other high-ranking Kenya Special Branch officers. Prendergast later went on to yet another counterinsurgency campaign as head the intelligence organization in Aden. Ian Henderson, the single most effective Special Branch officer during the Kenya Emergency and key architect of the final version of pseudo-gangs, became a special advisor to Prime Minister Ian Smith in Rhodesia in 1965. Many of counter-Mau Mau tactics, including the use of pseudos, were evident in the campaign against nationalists guerillas in the late 1960s. In terms of military intelligence personnel, Frank Kitson went on to the campaigns in Malaya, Cyprus, Oman and Northern Ireland. Apart from his contributions regarding the development of pseudo-gangs and the gathering of “contact” intelligence, Kitson become a leading writer on the subject of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.

Institutions, however, are obviously not as flexible as individuals in transferring experience to new situations. After paying the price for the lack of any systematic collection of the knowledge gained in Palestine and Malaya, Kenya was equally guilty of not documenting and passing on the lessons learnt fighting Mau Mau. Unfortunately, but understandably, probably the last thing on the mind of a colonial official, policeman or Army officer in the heat of a complicated and brutal counterinsurgency campaign is his place in the history of low intensity operations.

There were some attempts at the time on the part of the British government, generally through the Colonial Office, to analyze the campaigns and to draw lessons for future use, but these were largely unsuccessful. In 1955, a committee of ministers under the chairmanship of Lord Swinton set out to examine the events leading up to the colonial conflicts Malaya, Kenya, British Guiana, Cyprus and others areas. General Templer, tasked with researching the study, had little success in piecing together the background to events or determining common threads. A typical response came from the department in the Colonial Office responsible for Malaya, in what must be a sobering message to any historians of the period:

The events leading up the Emergency in Malaya took place nearly seven years ago. The memory of them has dimmed as [Colonial Office research] has shown, the material with which to write a history "is, from an historian's point of view, scanty and awkward". It is certainly not to be found in London.²⁰

Two years later, Colonial Office officials responsible for Cyprus lamented the lack of any historical record on other emergencies from which to draw:

In dealing with the Cyprus Emergency problems we have from time to time felt a need for information regarding what we had done in Palestine but we usually drew a blank or had to rely on failing memories. As far as I know the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya were never written up in this way, but it is significant that the general course of events from the point of view of counter-terrorist operations has followed a remarkably similar pattern in Cyprus.²¹

A similar observation is provided by A.M. Macdonald, a veteran of both India and Malaya who reorganized the intelligence organization in Kenya during the early years of the Mau Mau campaign (1952-53):

I think that in the past we have failed to make proper use of previous experience. When the Emergency was declared in Kenya, that Government set about its problems of detention, propaganda, rehabilitation, etc. as if they were a new and strange phenomena. Cyprus in turn did much the same thing. I do not think that this is the fault of either Government. It was merely that the experience gained in Malaya was nowhere summarized in a form available for reference. Cyprus, in turn, suffered from a lack of systematic collation of experience gained in Kenya.²²

As mentioned earlier, the cross-posting of British battalions and personnel greatly aided the military, as an institution, in the transfer of experience gained in one insurgency to another. The higher ranking military officers, such as Harding and Templer, were likely to have exposure to more than one conflict. Unlike many members of the military, colonial police and Special Branch, however, most members of the colonial administration were unlikely to gain experience in more than one emergency or transfer between continents from Malaya to Kenya or Cyprus.

Yet the military also had problems with its own institutional memory. As Thomas Mockaitis points out, the decentralized nature of the British Army made it ideally suited for counterinsurgency, but also “singularly resistant to preserving and transmitting its experience in an orderly fashion.”²³ Given the British military’s general disdain for doctrine, the extensive experience of pre-war British low intensity conflict was never formalized into a coherent doctrine and even with the advent of the major post-war insurgencies, no extensive body of official literature emerged until the 1960s.

In the specific case of Kenya, the military often played down the experience gained. It was not a glamorous campaign because it was not fighting Communism; a career was thought to be better served in Korea or Western Europe. Although the enemy in Kenya possessed considerable fieldcraft, they were badly armed and led, avoiding contact with the Army at all costs and not really a challenge to professional fighting men. As most of the fighting and the fatalities were inflicted by Kikuyu on Kikuyu, the Army viewed the situation more akin to inter-tribal score-settling than the “real” warfare; certainly not on a par with the triumph in Malaya.

Kenya has long been regarded as the “poor sister” to Malaya in terms of its impact on the development of police and military thinking. However, as many African nations move from single-party states to multi-party democracies, unleashing the pent-up pressures of tribalism, the example of Kenya eventually may be viewed as the precursor of future conflict in Africa in the same way Malaya came to be seen as the model for anti-Communist counterinsurgency campaigning.

Endnotes

1. Oliver Lyttelton, *Memoirs of Lord Chandos* (London: The Bodley Head), p. 379.
2. See: David Throup, *Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau* (London: 1988); Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book Two; Violence and Ethnicity* (London: James Currey, 1992).
3. For an examination of the British campaign against Mau Mau see: Anthony Clayton, *Counter-insurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau, 1952-60* (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1984); Michael Carver, *War since 1945* (London: The Ashfield Press, 1990); Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986); Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), F. Majdalany, *State of Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau* (London: Longmans, 1962).
4. For an examination of the intelligence war during Mau Mau see: Randall W. Heather, “Intelligence and Counter-insurgency in Kenya: 1952-56”, *Intelligence and National Security*, 5, no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 57-83.
5. There are a wide range of books written by former Mau Mau members, but no overall description of the campaign from their viewpoint. For the most systematic approach, at least for the campaign in the Aberdares mountains see: D.L. Barnett and K. Njama, *Mau Mau From Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* (London: 1966); Others include: Waruhiu Itote, *Mau Mau General* (Nairobi: 1967); Kiboi Muriithi with Peter Ndoria, *War in the Forest: The Autobiography of a Mau Mau leader* (Nairobi: 1971); Paul Maina, *Six Mau Mau Generals* (Nairobi: 1977); Kahinga Wachanga, *The Swords of Kirinyaga: The Fight for Land and Freedom* (Nairobi: 1975).

6. Erskine, in fact, carried a letter inside his spectacles case authorizing him to take over the civil administration and proclaim Martial Law should he consider it necessary. As reported in Michael Blundell, *So Rough a Wind* (London: 1963), p. 163.
7. Lothar Kettenacker, "The Planning of 'Re-education' during the Second World War", in *The Political Re-Education of Germany and her Allies After World War II* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), Eds. Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, pp. 73-74; It is interesting to note that several key members of the security structure early in the Kenya Emergency had served together in occupied Germany under General Sir Brian Robertson, who later became Commander Middle East Land Forces (MELF), with overall responsibility for Kenya until June 1953. Major General W.R.N. Hinde, the first Director of Operations in Kenya, was Deputy Military Governor of the British Sector of Berlin. Kenya Police Commissioner M.S. O'Rorke was a Public Safety Advisor in Germany and Brigadier W.L. Gibson, Director of Information in Kenya, served as Robertson's Chief of Public Relations in Germany.
8. *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations* (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954).
9. See: Frank Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960); *Low Intensity Operations* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); and *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977).
10. Heather, p. 71; on Operation Shark see, David A. Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 119-20.
11. For the early development of the pseudo gang technique in Kenya see: Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs*, pp. 73-77; for the refinement of the pseudo gang technique in the forests, see: Ian Henderson and Philip Goodhart, *The Hunt for Kimathi* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1958).
12. Control of Villages, 29 January 1955, WC/CM/1/1, Kenya National Archives (KNA).
13. Appendix A to War Council Directive No. 1, 23 April 1954, WO276/90. Public Record Office (PRO).
14. Control of Villages, 29 January 1955, WC/CM/1/1, KNA.
15. Lt. Gen. G.W. Lathbury to Templer, 5 December 1955, WO216/892 PRO.
16. General G.W. Lathbury, "Appreciation of possible future Mau Mau intentions," 16 January 1956, p. 9, WO276/4, PRO.
17. Thomas R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* (London: Macmillan), p. 184.
18. Sir Frederick Crawford to Sir Oliver Lyttelton, 12 January 1955, WC/ Reel 1, KNA; Crawford's comments proved rather prophetic. In October 1969, after a summer of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland and the entry of the British Army on the streets, Arthur Young was appointed to head the newly reorganized Royal Ulster Constabulary. Back in the harness again Young attempted, not surprisingly, to transform the RUC into a British style, unarmed police force in the face of a deteriorating security situation brought about by mounting Provisional IRA violence. After a series of disputes with his political masters Young resigned his position less than a year later.
19. Young to Basil O'Connell, 31 January 1955. Young Papers (9), Rhodes House, Oxford. O'Connell was a colleague of Young in Malaya.
20. Minute by C.Y. Carstairs to Sir G. Martin, 27 January 1955, CO1030/16 PRO.
21. K.J. Neale, Note to File, 3 January 1957, CO926/1076, PRO.
22. A.M. Macdonald to K.J. Neale, January 1957, CO926/1076, PRO.
23. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 156.