tion of Pinochet supporter and author of the 1980 constitution, Senator Jaime Guzman. Fighting crime and terrorism became the new government's main public concern, preempting its program for democratization, demilitarization of politics, and trials of officers guilty of human rights violations. Fighting crime also overshadowed improvement in the living conditions of the five million poor that appeared in much of the *Concertación's* (the seventeen party coalition opposing Pinochet) electoral propaganda.

Constable and Valenzuela know all this, even as they emphasize the "new appreciation for the values of moderation and compromise that had once been discarded" and that "each political group had made enormous concessions to ensure that the political transition would take place." (p. 319) In these respects they are also correct, but leave the impression that this moderation and compromise was reciprocal, that the political right and the military have become more tolerant also, that should there be rising inflation, a populist push by elements of the left, a breakdown of the Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition, a rejection of the triumphant neo-liberal religion, and renewed social mobilization that new tragedy might not occur. They also leave the impression that sincere accommodation to Pinochet's victory in defeat, what the General repeatedly calls *Misión Cumplida*, rather than fear of renewed repression is the glue holding together the governing coalition.

I hope Constable and Valenzuela are right. I fear otherwise.

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John A. English. *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command.* New York: Praeger, 1991.

History is replete with surprises, not the least of which is the realization that some long-forgotten event can provide insights into the most pressing problems of the day. Viewed in this manner, John English's work offers more than just a novel explanation of the dismal performance of the Canadian army following the opening of the Second Front during World War II. Instead, his work stands as a warning to officers, policy makers and Americans and Canadians alike about the dangers of ignoring the need to prepare for war in times of tranquillity. Without exaggeration, English's work should be required reading for senior officers as they adjust military operations and force structures to accommodate the reduction in public interest and resources that has accompanied the demise of the Soviet empire.

Now that the Cold War is over, it is increasingly clear that an emerging challenge facing the members of NATO is the problem of maintaining professional and effective militaries. As English clearly notes, this was the same challenge Canadians faced during the interwar period. Canada, however, failed to rise to this task. Convinced that the nation would never again face a major military threat from overseas, Canadians were content to allow their military to atrophy. For over twenty years, members of the Canadian military failed to prepare seriously for the possibility of hostilities. Instead, officers and interested public officials became consumed by the task of securing resources for defense and the routine of the militia system. As a result, the Canadians produced an officer corps that knew little about warfare.

It was this officer corps, according to English, that was largely responsible when Canadian forces were stopped cold during the Normandy campaign by badly stressed, out numbered and under strength German units. Senior Canadian officers were unable to conduct effectively division-sized operations. Employing archaic tactics, reminiscent of the artillery-dominated battlefield of World War I, officers often launched ill-conceived assaults that were virtually doomed to failure. Additionally, the Canadians never seemed able to coordinate armor, infantry, artillery and air support in their assaults. In the end, Canadian infantry was often left to spearhead attacks, which inevitably led to extremely high casualties. The fact that Canadian soldiers sometimes reached their objectives under these conditions, even while being subjected to artillery barrages fired by their comrades, only serves to highlight, in English's analysis, the incompetence of the Canadian officer corps during the unsuccessful drive to close the Falaise pocket.

Equally fascinating is English's description of how Canadians were unable to assimilate the lessons offered by battlefield experience. While training in England for two years, they seemed incapable of recognizing and correcting their inadequacies. Once again, English identifies the absence of a professional officer corps as the cause of this problem. Even under the most gruelling wartime conditions, when imminent combat concentrates the minds of all concerned, it was impossible to rectify quickly certain shortcomings produced by years of neglect. New weapons can be manufactured rapidly; forces can expand enormously overnight. But, without a skilled cadre of leaders, a nation cannot meet the demands of modern combat on short notice.

At the height of the Cold War, the behavior of democracies during the interwar period not only appeared misguided but often incomprehensible to many observers. Moreover, the policy of appeasement was often singled out as the primary cause of civilization's tardy response to the fascist threat of the 1930s. But English's analysis points to a more fundamental problem. Democratic polities tend to interpret the elimination of a current threat to national security as evidence of an irreversible elimination of the possibility of major conflict in international relations. Military organizations, and the serious study

of warfare, are viewed as anachronisms, a lingering manifestation of the problems that afflicted the old world. Instead of being viewed as guardians of national security, soldiers are seen as threats to peace because they strive to preserve knowledge and practices from the recent decadent past.

Soldiers are not immune to this kind of shift in public attitudes. Indeed, they must respond to secure minimal funding offered by increasingly disinterested legislatures. With apparently nothing left to do, the Canadian military acted — to borrow Geoffrey Blainey's term — in the tradition of the Manchester School. It transformed itself into a "Gentlemen's Club" and concentrated on providing construction jobs to workers left unemployed by the Depression.

English, in this richly detailed history, does more than just chronicle the path traveled by the Canadian army to the French countryside. He reminds us that military organizations are not "scouting" programs for oversized youths. As NATO militaries search for new missions in the postwar world — drug interdiction, disaster relief, or environmental protection — officers must keep in mind their *raison d'etre*. Sometime in the future, they, or the officers they train, might face an opponent who has considered seriously how to best prosecute a war. And as the Canadian drive across Normandy demonstrates, this day of reckoning can be an extremely unpleasant experience.

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