organizational strength, and external assistance, as well as the kind of government response they provoke. He says some puzzling things about why the Algerian revolt against France succeeded, and largely ignores the question of guerrilla bases and government response to them (as well as the important question of when and how the government should solidify its own base). But this brief, clearly written volume usually hits the target, beginning with its prediction that insurgencies will continue as a major world political phenomenon.

For O'Neill, the government response to insurgency is decisive. A correct response can only be rooted in the all-important will to resist defeat. It includes timely efforts to split the leadership of an insurgency from the mass by instituting some important reforms, and successful efforts to control violence and rapine by government troops against civilians (something far easier to prescribe than to enforce). To aid in developing the correct response, Bard wants the target government to identify the real aim of the guerrillas: do they want to change certain government policies, or get rid of the present rulers, or change some basic rules of the political game, or secede from the community entirely?

Among other important points, Bard calls into question the universal applicability of the old Maoist-Chinese model of insurgency into question, pointing out that most governments today are indigenous, and have much more sophisticated weapons than either the Japanese or Chiang's Nationalists had in the 1940s. And he reminds us that external support, much emphasized by writers on guerrilla war, has played practically no part among the Peruvian Senderistas or the Philippine NPA.

In summary, Bard’s book is a valuable addition to the increasingly sophisticated literature on guerrilla insurgency.

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His fourth book on the post-independence expulsion of Spaniards from Mexico, Harold Sims describes the present study as a summation and expansion of his previous works on the topic. For centuries the small Spanish born minority in Mexico, identified by the derogatory term as *gachupines*, enjoyed special access to administrative posts in the colonial bureaucracy, military, and Church; dominated commerce; and expressed haughty attitudes to anything Mexican.
During the eighteenth century, new and often impecunious immigrants from the Peninsula became small town shop keepers and local administrators, made their way through marriage into the land-owning and mining elites, and in the process earned the enduring hatred of many Mexicans. The Revolt of Father Miguel Hidalgo in 1810 gained much of its popularity with the invocation, "Death to the gachupines." Through the destructive decade of insurgency and guerrilla warfare [1810-1821], the wealthy Spaniards sought refuge in the cities, abandoning the fight against revolutionary forces to armies of royalist Mexicans and imported Spanish expeditionary officers and soldiers. In 1821 when the royalist army joined the rebellion of Agustín de Iturbide to declare independence, many of the European Spanish officers and soldiers — known later as the capitulados — supported independence and settled down to begin new lives.

The decade of insurgency served to fragment the old centralist viceroyalty. Exhaustion, dislocations, loss of capital, and struggles for political power prevented the return to prosperity anticipated by the population. Rather than recognizing its defeat, Spain clung to the quixotic illusion that anarchy would drive the wayward Mexicans back into the colonial fold. Until 1825, Spanish forces occupied the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa at Veracruz, harassed Mexican trade, and compelled the new nation to maintain an enormous army that consumed eighty percent of the national budget. Spanish spies and schemes to retake Mexico exacerbated relations and deepened resentments against Spaniards who continued to hold important posts in the government bureaucracy, army and Church hierarchy. In 1829, Spain launched a small ill-equipped invasion force from Cuba that landed at Tampico and immediately succumbed to yellow fever and other diseases. While the Spanish troops surrendered, Mexicans anticipated a major invasion attempt at any moment. Until 1836 when Spain recognized Mexican independence, there were obvious reasons why many Mexicans identified the gachupines as dangerous and wished to expel all of them from the country.

The impetus to eliminate the Spaniards came from both the Mexican states and from both houses of the federal Congress. Of the approximately 6,600 Spanish men in the country, a third were former expeditionary soldiers who had married Mexican women, fathered large families, and settled down to pursue quite humble occupations. Notwithstanding the fact that these people posed little danger to Mexico, politicians identified all Spaniards as potential enemies. With the rise of the Yorkista Party in 1825 supported by the York rite masons, nationalist politicians encouraged hispanophobia and condemned the more conservative Escoces Party supported by Scottish rite masons, as pro-monarchy and pro-Spanish. The Yorkistas swept to power in many states and in the lower house of Congress where they demanded the removal of Spaniards from the army, clergy, and public service. Internal conspiracies and belligerent acts by Cuban-based Spanish forces served to give legitimacy to the most ridiculous plots and in 1827 produced the first deportation law.
Although many Spaniards managed to evade expulsion, some gachupines saw little future in Mexico and departed with their capital and extensive expertise for New Orleans, New York, Bordeaux, or other destinations. A few ended up in Spain where they counseled the regime of King Fernando VII to dispatch forces to restore Spanish rule in Mexico. The expulsion law devastated the regular clergy in the settled regions of Mexico where they operated many of the best schools and hospitals. Uprisings, political infighting, and conspiracies focused attention upon the Spaniards who were made responsible for all of Mexico’s ills. Once sweeping expulsion laws were in place, no level of government could agree on what to do with those Spanish men who were aged, infirm, married to Mexican women with dependents, or who had distinguished themselves on the patriot side during the Independence war. Because there were many loopholes in the expulsion law, in 1829 the federal government promulgated a new and less flexible expulsion law that permitted fewer exceptions. Many nationalist leaders such as Carlos Maria Bustamante, criticized the negative impact of capital flight and the “horrifying depopulation” caused by the loss of valuable people. Sims points out that the tough 1829 law deported harmless and poorly connected ex-soldiers and left untouched many of the hated Spanish merchants, bureaucrats, and landlords. The fact that this law coincided with the Spanish invasion attempt at Tampico intensified an expulsion fever among the populace and removed any sympathy for those affected. While medical boards and Congress permitted some exceptions for money and some states and territories, such as California, were not enthusiastic about the expulsion of missionary friars, larger numbers of Spaniards and their Mexican families headed for New Orleans. This time, army officers, senior civil servants, merchants, clerics, landowners, and even students left the country. Two other expulsion laws in the early 1830s maintained pressure upon the Spanish minority until Spain recognized Mexican independence.

Sims estimates that the expulsion laws removed approximately three quarters of the Spanish community of some 6,600 men. Already depleted, the Mexican treasury wasted large sums to pay for the deportations and for pensions owed to the exiles. Many of those who sought refuge in New Orleans returned in a few years to re-enter Mexico with dubious documentation claiming to be United States citizens. Others managed to obtain exemptions that opened the way to new forms of corruption. In many respects, the expulsion fever obscured other deeper issues that needed to be solved in the new nation. Sims’s book is useful, but he tends to over-emphasize the actual military threat posed by Spain. The 1829 invasion led by Isidro Barradas suffered from terrible intelligence, stupid planning, lack of reserves, and logistical failures. Mexicans wanted scapegoats to blame for their devastated economy, national bankruptcy, and continuing fragmentation of the new nation. In pursuing the Spanish minority, the nation exiled many valuable people and suffered a significant outflow of capital. Although much more research is needed on early post-independence
Mexico, in this book and in his previous works, Sims has clarified the damages caused by the expulsion of the Spaniards.

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All those interested in the progress of the American war in Viet Nam have been long grateful to Douglas Kinnard for giving us his earlier book, *The War Managers* (1977). Now he offers another work, a study of the life and career of General Maxwell Davenport Taylor, focused primarily on those crucial years when America fought to ensure the continued independence of the southern Republic of Viet Nam. Kinnard’s choice of subject was worthwhile for no first-rate biography has been written. Only General Taylor’s eldest son, John, has previously tried to provide a biographical examination of this important cold warrior in his *General Maxwell Taylor* (New York: Doubleday, 1989). Unfortunately, Kinnard’s study fails to do justice to his subject.

Taylor had an interesting career. Graduating from West Point in 1922, he saw service at Schofield Barracks, Camp Lewis, Fort Sill, and Fort Leavenworth. He taught Spanish and French at the United States Military Academy for five years and by 1935 was a military observer in Japan. With Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Taylor watched the Japanese army spread across China. By D-Day 1944 he was an airborne general, commander of the 101st Division. After the war he became Superintendent of the Military Academy and later served as US military commander in Berlin. Following a stint as Army deputy chief of staff at the Pentagon, Taylor became commander of the US 8th Army in Korea in the last days of conflict there. He was army chief of staff from 1955 to his retirement in 1959. Called back to active duty by John Kennedy, he served as the president’s White House military representative (1961-62) and then as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-64). President Johnson named him Ambassador to Vietnam, (1964-65), after which he served three more years as a presidential consultant on Vietnam. All this would be fascinating grist for a biographer.

It was not his purpose, however, Kinnard tells us, to write a well-rounded biography: “The main subject of this book is the American experience in Vietnam. The public life of Maxwell Taylor is used as a prism to tell the story of high-level American decision making and its consequence in Vietnam.” (p. 204) Notwithstanding the late announcement of his purpose, Kinnard has