Conflict Quarterly

has engaged in covert operations for the US in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East. The authors document these actions.

This cooperation has happened indeed, and all of it is rather well-known to those that follow US-Israeli relations. The moral indignation at this aspect of the bilateral relations is an accompanying theme of the book, which indicates a rather naive grasp of what international politics really are. The desire to criticize the US and Israel overcomes the better judgement of the authors. For example, the challenge of Nasser to Western interests in the Middle East is belittled; and Jerusalem is blamed for the outbreak of the 1967 war. Similarly, Israel is portrayed as being the largest weapons supplier to Central America in the early 1980s, while the correct figures allot this achievement to the Soviet Union (through sales to Nicaragua).

Indeed, the book is flawed by many factual mistakes. Only a few will be enumerated here: Israel’s arms sales abroad do not constitute 40% of the country’s exports (p. 7), but 10%; the arms sold to Egypt in 1956 by the Soviets were not rectifying the military balance (p. 58), but constituted a qualitative and quantitative arsenal unmatched by Israel; the seminal meeting discussing nuclear strategy in the early 1960s (pp. 86-87) actually ended with a decision to continue relying on conventional power and Rabin and Sharon were not participants in the meeting; Allon never served as Chief of Staff (p. 142); Rabin did not oppose the decision to take the Golan in 1967 (p. 152), but actually lobbied for it; the Likud did not have a majority in the Knesset in 1984 (p. 339) or at any other time. Using sources such as the works of Shahak and Beth Hallahmi, quasi-scholars and propagandists of the radical left, further undermine the credibility of the authors.

This book is not recommended.

Efraim Inbar
Bar-Ilan University


This is not an easy book, but it is most worthwhile. It is especially recommended to Canadian readers given the current constitutional embroglio in this country.

Using case studies of Northern Ireland and Germany from Weimar to the present, Finn sets himself the task of examining the essence of constitutions and
how they are tested by the ultimate in constitutional crisis — regnant domestic political violence.

Political violence challenges the very presuppositions upon which our commitment to constitutional politics must be predicated - the belief that ‘good government’ may be established upon the basis of reason and deliberation ... a study of political violence in constitutional democracies allows us to examine the cases in which this most basic of assumptions is exposed as contingent or naive. (p.6)

Drawing on sources as disparate as Alexander Hamilton and Livy on Cincinnatus, he sets out a theory of constitutional maintenance and crisis dependent not upon the written, limited texts, but encompassing what Finn calls constitutive principles. These predate and inform the actual documents as well as act as inherent limitations but are not necessarily textually specific.

... a constitutional government is under an obligation in an emergency to abide by the limitations constitutional-ism itself imposes upon emergency powers ... they bind independent of their expression or inclusion in any particular constitutional text ... (p. 26)

Finn is careful to point out that his position does not shackle governments’ options in crisis. His principles of constitutional formation,

... insofar as they permit suspension of documentary restraints upon power, they allow governments a very broad measure of discretion and authority to respond to emergencies. But they do so in a manner which does not threaten our commitment to constitutionalism itself. The principles ensure that the assumption and utilization of emergency powers takes place in a constitutional manner and that such powers are not exercised in an arbitrary fashion or solely for the self-interest of the holder. (p. 28)

The key point underlying Finn’s principles is the concept of reasonableness and “articulated reason.” There must be public articulation of reasons in support of particular actions taken by government for the public welfare. Equally important, “Good reasons must be reasons that can persuade another on their own merit and must admit of a response.” (p. 33) From this comes the bricks and mortar of Finn’s constitutive principles: independent review and necessity being the foremost.

In his case studies Finn examines in detail political violence in Northern Ireland and Germany since the 1920s, the various significant constitutional changes in those states occasioned by these crises (emergency legislation), and how closely these changes conform to constitutive principles. I found the Northern Irish chapters most intriguing because of my own research into British anti-terrorist policy. Finn does a superb job of dissecting emergency legislation
in Great Britain (Prevention of Terrorism Acts) as well as that in Northern Ireland. Equally fascinating, especially to someone not well versed in modern German history, is his explanation of how the failure of the Weimar constitutional experiment has informed the subsequent Basic Law and the policy of “militant democracy” in modern Germany. The case study chapters are supported by a wealth of documentation from official government reports to case law arising out of emergency legislation. Uniting this is Finn’s regular reference to his theory of constitutive principles and the conformity of changes wrought in the name of protecting the constitution with these precepts.

In formulating a constitutional response to political violence, then, governmental authorities may, in certain cases of the sort I have identified, properly suspend a wide variety of individual liberties. But they cannot act arbitrarily and they cannot unilaterally deprive citizens of their citizenship or act in ways that foreclose the possibility of reasoned deliberations in the future with their opponents. (p. 42)

For constitutional scholars, specialists in Northern Ireland or Germany, or even the well-read layman interested in how reasonable men deal with the unreasonable, this book is highly recommended. It’s not an evening’s read in front of the fireplace, nor should it be, but it is well worth the effort.

Bruce W. Warner
Ottawa and University of Exeter


It is difficult to resist such aphorisms as “good things come in small packages” when referring to this edited collection of seminar papers. Indeed it is a work that deserves to be welcomed, both by those engaged in research on terrorism and by those involved in the formulation of public policy.

The volume is the outcome of a seminar held at the School of American Research, Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 1987. Introduced as a “very diverse group” by Clark McCauley of Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvania, the participants were: Everett Wheeler (historian), Joseba Zulaika (anthropologist), Gustavo Gorriti (journalist), Martha Crenshaw, Ehud Sprinzak, John Thompson (political scientists), Ariel Merari, McCauley, Raphael Ezekiel (psychologists), and Jerrold