Both Smith and Dulles took their revenge on Darling. Smith fired him. He then hired one of his own long-serving aides, Ludwell L. Montague, to write an alternative history—Montague, in a work also published by Penn State Press, dutifully ridiculed Darling’s work. Not satisfied with this Dulles, once he had become DCI, restricted access to Darling’s history, of which there were only fourteen copies in the 1950s.

The Darling volume as recently declassified and currently produced has a familiar blemish. In all, about two hundred lines of text have been deleted, in some places apparently at the request of the British. On page 317, for example, about fifteen lines are missing in the context of a discussion of biological warfare provision in Britain and America and intelligence liaison arrangements concerning them. Surely the truth cannot be more sinister than the deletions?

But none of this can detract from the merits of this courageous book. The CIA was in the front line of the world’s most serious potential conflict, and arguably through its realistic estimates helped to keep us from the brink. Though completed almost four decades ago, Darling’s book helps us to understand why.

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James Jesus Angleton, the legendary chief of CIA’s counterintelligence (CI) branch was known to have said that “if you control counterintelligence, you control the intelligence service.” A recent book by Tom Mangold, a British journalist and senior correspondent for the BBC programme *Panorama*, now sheds new light on the career of one of CIA’s most enigmatic men. As Mangold aptly points out, Angleton presided over many successes during his tenure as CI chief, as well as some colossal blunders.

*Cold Warrior* began as a biography, but while his research was in progress Mangold concluded that describing Angleton’s tenure as CI chief was more useful, effective, and beneficial than a “dutiful record” of Angleton’s life. In this context, *Cold Warrior* is a record of Angleton’s 20-year career as CI chief and an examination of the legacy he left behind.

James Angleton’s CI career with CIA was shaped by service in the X-2 Division of CIA’s precursor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), during World War II. He joined CIA in 1948, and rose rapidly during the period Loch
Johnson calls the “Era of Trust.” Allen Dulles personally appointed Angleton as head of CI in December 1954, a post he would retain for 20 years.

Certain activities carried out by the CI staff Angleton directed demonstrated how CIA was involved in shocking abuses. One such abuse was the incarceration of former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko for 1277 days, discussed at length in Chapter 10, entitled “The CIA’s Secret Prisoner.” Moreover, CI’s involvement in operations HT-LINGUAL (covert mail opening) and CHAOS (domestic collection of intelligence concerning the activities of US citizens opposed to the Vietnam War) illustrate the manner by which CIA in general and the CI staff in particular betrayed the trust of American citizens.

According to Henry Brandon, CI can cause someone to become overly suspicious and mistrustful. It is full of risks, dangers, and never-ceasing suspicions that the “man in the office next to yours may be a Soviet agent.” It is no wonder, Loch Johnson opined, that Angleton’s “brilliance was counterbalanced by profound paranoia.”

Cold Warrior demonstrates how two significant events profoundly shaped Angleton’s professional and personal life in future years: Kim Philby’s defection; and the arrival of Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB officer serving as a vice consul in the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. Angleton and Philby were more than professional colleagues; indeed, Angleton described Philby as his “friend hero and mentor.” The latter’s defection left Angleton with a deep sense of betrayal.

Due to the fact that Philby defected barely a year after Golitsyn, it is no wonder that Angleton turned toward the latter to prop up his image within the Agency and perhaps to bolster Angleton’s damaged self-worth and esteem following Philby’s flight. Anyone who challenged, refuted, or disagreed with Golitsyn’s allegations was immediately suspect. Unfortunately, their relationship was to have serious consequences, since the duo contributed to ruining the careers of many CIA officers. One career that was profoundly affected was that of James Bennett, former head of the RCMP Security Service who was dismissed for allegedly being a Soviet spy, while the real mole remained unknown and unpunished. Subsequent evidence discredited some of the “take” Golitsyn provided, but Angleton’s patronage allowed Golitsyn to retain his influence within the Agency.

Although Cold Warrior is well-researched, the book lacks depth. For example, it leaves the reader with more questions than answers, not the least of which is how Angleton was able to stay in place for so long while being so ineffective. A broader discussion of the place of CI within the American political context during Angleton’s tenure would have addressed this point. In addition, Chapter 16 “The Sleepless Hunter” seems misplaced, since a better understanding of Angleton’s character would enable the reader to more fully comprehend what drove Angleton, placing his later activities in an appropriate perspective. Third, the author claims that Vitaliy Yurchenko, who defected in Rome in
August of 1985 warned those who debriefed him that KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky was “under suspicion” three months after he fled the USSR. In addition, Cold Warrior suffers from hyperbole; too often, things are described as being a “top defector,” or “top source,” or even a “top Ballistic Missile.” Finally, while Mangold points out that Angleton’s performance as the head of CIA’s Israeli desk would fill a book of its own, within the context of Angleton’s career as a whole, the Israeli connection is not explored adequately.

As a review of James Angleton’s career, Cold Warrior is a chronicle of narrow scope. On the other hand, this book does show that excessive centralized authority without adequate supervisory attention or peer review can do more damage than a string of agents to an organization such as CIA, to which, ironically, Angleton was deeply devoted.

Effective CI is an essential part of the overall intelligence process. By chronicling the manner in which Angleton’s personal character shaped his approach to CI, Cold Warrior contributes meaningfully to the study of the successes, failures, and requirements of CI. The book also demonstrates the important role which CI played and continues to play within Western intelligence agencies during the closing years of the twentieth century.

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It was a tedious job to finish reading this long book. The reader is exposed to a rehashing of old stories, though sometimes in greater detail than has usually been provided. Most of the time, the detail is irrelevant since the authors offer no real analysis.

The main thesis of the book is that Israel has served the US in its struggle against Soviet encroachment and did some of the “dirty” work the Americans were unable or unwilling to do in many areas of the world. Israel began endearing itself to the CIA in the 1950s by providing information acquired by the debriefing of Jewish immigrants coming to the promised land from the Eastern Bloc. The main achievement was the smuggling out of the famous speech of Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Communist party in 1956, in which he accused Stalin of many wrongdoings. Since the Cold War, Israel