occasion, Costello’s logic becomes confused — when discussing Hitler’s Halt Order before Dunkirk, he mistakes evidence of a political background for proof of a political cause, while his case about the existence of a significant peace party in Britain after 1940 surpasses understanding. As a whole, however, the work is provocative and original and surprisingly well argued. It hangs together well and at worst most of its links are at least plausible. While, for example, the idea that the Hess mission was provoked by a sting from MI 5 seems *prima facie* unlikely, Costello supports this view with powerful evidence from British, American and KGB sources. Even the least certain part of the work — the argument that Churchill used the Kent Tyler espionage case and material on Kennedy’s more dubious dealings as ammunition to blackmail various American authorities — remains possible and certainly is intriguing and worth further consideration, if ultimately no more than an argument by coincidence. If one picks up *Ten Days to Destiny* ready to scoff, one will put it down with respect: this is a first rate piece of historical detective work.

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In the 1980s, the former CIA official historian Jack B. Pfeiffer conducted a running legal battle with his former employers, in order to obtain permission to publish his history of the Taylor investigation of the Bay of Pigs affair. He won. From this, it may be deduced that to be an official historian within the agency is not quite the constricting fate that might be expected to befall an historian in, say, Hoxha’s Albania. In our internationally-relaxed times, this may not come as a great surprise. But what were things like at the height of the Cold War? It seems evident from the book under review that the History Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have never worn the straightjacket of orthodoxy or succumbed to the allurements of remunerated disinformation.

Deputy Director William Jackson established the Staff in 1950. He hired Arthur Burr Darling to write, for internal reference purposes only, a secret history of the three-year old agency. Darling must have seemed a reliable man. He had studied at Harvard University with the conservative frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner. After producing a dull book on Jacksonian democracy in Massachusetts, he had become a master at Phillips Academy. At this élite school, his pupils had included such future CIA luminaries as Sherman
Kent (who for many years directed the Office of National Estimates) and George Bush (briefly CIA director in the 1970s). Darling seemed the right man to pluck from obscurity and consign to oblivion.

To appreciate the position in which Darling now found himself, one has to understand that, at the time of his appointment, the Truman administration’s intelligence policy was coming under attack. Within Republican circles, a group led by Allen Dulles held that the fledgling CIA was incompetent in intelligence matters and wimpish in the realm of covert operations, and that these deficiencies stemmed from weak leadership. Following the CIA’s alleged failure to predict the supposedly Communist-inspired 1948 Bogota riots, the Truman administration — in an attempt to raise intelligence above politics — had put Dulles and Jackson on an official investigative committee, known as the Dulles Group. But Dulles and Jackson had mounted a sustained attack on the CIA leadership, with copious leaks to Hansen Baldwin at the New York Times.

By the time Darling was appointed, the CIA had a new, “reforming” director in General Walter Bedell Smith, and Dulles, already in charge of covert operations, was in line to be the general’s successor. According to Darling (this is taken from the introduction by Berkowitz and Goodman), Jackson’s brief to him was to write a history of the “horrors of the pre-Smith period in order to justify and applaud the reforms of the Smith era.”

Darling reacted, instead, with a spirited defence of the founding fathers of the CIA. The closely-documented pages of his study perform the long-overdue task of chronicling the heart of the debate over post-war intelligence. He goes some way to rescuing from obscurity Admiral Sidney Souers. This former Missouri businessman served as the first director of central intelligence (DCI). It was he who perceived the need to legitmatize a central intelligence agency through legislation. Unlike the abrasive wartime intelligence chief and CIA critic, “Wild Bill” Donovan, Souers had a sophisticated grasp of the possible in terms of cabinet politics, perceiving that no DCI could coordinate intelligence and win the president’s ear unless he commanded the cooperation and respect of the State Department and the military. Basing his account on the store of secret records put at his disposal by his unwitting superiors, Darling similarly puts the case for Souers’ successors Hoyt Vandenburg and Roscoe Hillenkoetter. “Hilly”, in particular, has hitherto been harshly treated in both contemporary and historical accounts, but now emerges in a more credible and sympathetic light.

Turning his attention to the Dulles Group, Darling exposes what he regards as its intellectual vacuousness, in a way that suggests he thought Dulles and Jackson were mere opportunists. Like Souers, he sees the problems of central evaluation of intelligence as stemming less from leadership than from bureaucratic obstruction by vested interests in the military and in State. Reforms proposed by the Dulles Group were “naive.”
Both Smith and Dulles took their revenge on Darling. Smith fired him. He then hired one of his own long-serving aides, Ludwell L. Montague, to write an alternative history — Montague, in a work also published by Penn State Press, dutifully ridiculed Darling’s work. Not satisfied with this Dulles, once he had become DCI, restricted access to Darling’s history, of which there were only fourteen copies in the 1950s.

The Darling volume as recently declassified and currently produced has a familiar blemish. In all, about two hundred lines of text have been deleted, in some places apparently at the request of the British. On page 317, for example, about fifteen lines are missing in the context of a discussion of biological warfare provision in Britain and America and intelligence liaison arrangements concerning them. Surely the truth cannot be more sinister than the deletions?

But none of this can detract from the merits of this courageous book. The CIA was in the front line of the world’s most serious potential conflict, and arguably through its realistic estimates helped to keep us from the brink. Though completed almost four decades ago, Darling’s book helps us to understand why.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones
University of Edinburgh


James Jesus Angleton, the legendary chief of CIA’s counterintelligence (CI) branch was known to have said that “if you control counterintelligence, you control the intelligence service.” A recent book by Tom Mangold, a British journalist and senior correspondent for the BBC programme *Panorama*, now sheds new light on the career of one of CIA’s most enigmatic men. As Mangold aptly points out, Angleton presided over many successes during his tenure as CI chief, as well as some colossal blunders.

*Cold Warrior* began as a biography, but while his research was in progress Mangold concluded that describing Angleton’s tenure as CI chief was more useful, effective, and beneficial than a “dutiful record” of Angleton’s life. In this context, *Cold Warrior* is a record of Angleton’s 20-year career as CI chief and an examination of the legacy he left behind.

James Angleton’s CI career with CIA was shaped by service in the X-2 Division of CIA’s precursor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), during World War II. He joined CIA in 1948, and rose rapidly during the period Loch