Finally, it is unfortunate that there is not a concluding chapter. This is especially the case since the authors have different understandings of what constitutes control and since they are dealing with widely varying aspects of the topic in different ways. The reader is left to draw his or her own conclusion from a group of essays, each of which is very valuable, but which together do not constitute a coherent whole.

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Of the many revisionist studies of British military and diplomatic history produced in 1991, *Ten Days to Destiny* is far and away the best. John Costello, has produced a book which cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. His arguments are interesting and important; every student of the events of 1940-41, those years which defined the next fifty, will have to address them. *Ten Days to Destiny* covers decision making in Berlin, London, Paris and Washington; it examines high politics, diplomacy, military affairs and the minds of statesmen. The research is thorough and multi-national, including material from the files of what once was the KGB. Briefly stated, Costello argues that in summer 1940 Britain came close to entering negotiations with Hitler; that during and after this time the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax and his Parliamentary Secretary, “Rab” Butler, continually made peace feelers to Germany; that only the cunning and ruthless maneuvers of Winston Churchill checked these possibilities and brought about a finest hour which wrecked the Third Reich and the British Empire; that only with extreme reluctance did Franklin Delano Roosevelt offer any support to Britain — and only because he was blackmailed by Churchill, who subsequently gave his former naval fellow a weapon to silence Joseph Kennedy, the defeatist American ambassador to Britain and potential candidate in the 1940 elections; that Rudolf Hess’s mission was authorized by Adolf Hitler and undertaken precisely because Germany believed there was a substantial peace faction in Britain, centring on the royalty and aristocracy — a belief which was accurate; and that this mission was triggered by a sophisticated MI 5 double-cross operation, one undertaken without Churchill’s knowledge. Much of *Ten Days to Destiny* is an unnecessarily detailed account of notorious events, and many of its arguments are far from novel; others might seem taken from one. On
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occasion, Costello’s logic becomes confused — when discussing Hitler’s Halt Order before Dunkirk, he mistakes evidence of a political background for proof of a political cause, while his case about the existence of a significant peace party in Britain after 1940 surpasses understanding. As a whole, however, the work is provocative and original and surprisingly well argued. It hangs together well and at worst most of its links are at least plausible. While, for example, the idea that the Hess mission was provoked by a sting from MI 5 seems prima facie unlikely, Costello supports this view with powerful evidence from British, American and KGB sources. Even the least certain part of the work — the argument that Churchill used the Kent Tyler espionage case and material on Kennedy’s more dubious dealings as ammunition to blackmail various American authorities — remains possible and certainly is intriguing and worth further consideration, if ultimately no more than an argument by coincidence. If one picks up Ten Days to Destiny ready to scoff, one will put it down with respect: this is a first rate piece of historical detective work.

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In the 1980s, the former CIA official historian Jack B. Pfeiffer conducted a running legal battle with his former employers, in order to obtain permission to publish his history of the Taylor investigation of the Bay of Pigs affair. He won. From this, it may be deduced that to be an official historian within the agency is not quite the constricting fate that might be expected to befall an historian in, say, Hoxha’s Albania. In our internationally-relaxed times, this may not come as a great surprise. But what were things like at the height of the Cold War? It seems evident from the book under review that the History Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have never worn the straightjacket of orthodoxy or succumbed to the allurements of remunerated disinformation.

Deputy Director William Jackson established the Staff in 1950. He hired Arthur Burr Darling to write, for internal reference purposes only, a secret history of the three-year old agency. Darling must have seemed a reliable man. He had studied at Harvard University with the conservative frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner. After producing a dull book on Jacksonian democracy in Massachusetts, he had become a master at Phillips Academy. At this elitist school, his pupils had included such future CIA luminaries as Sherman

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