

BOOK REVIEWS

Hastedt, Glenn P., ed. *Controlling Intelligence*. London: Frank Cass, 1991.

The volume contains eight chapters written by seven well-known authors in the intelligence field. The book is divided into three sections. The first is comprised of three chapters which serve to introduce the topic and set the scene. The second consists of four chapters dealing with the control of the substantive areas; namely, covert action; intelligence analysis and estimates; counter intelligence, and the values of intelligence professionals. The third section consists of one chapter on control in the Canadian context that is intended to serve as a comparative example.

The contributions to this volume are of a reasonably uniform high quality and contain a great deal of information and many useful insights. In the first section, Glenn Hastedt's introduction attempts the difficult task of clarifying the terminology and issues involved in the area of control generally. The second chapter, by Stafford Thomas, deals with the various eras through which the CIA has passed since its creation and examines the context for control in each of these eras. He concludes that the issue of control waxes and wanes in the USA, depending upon whether or not intelligence is seen as important to national security. When it is, control is not much of an issue. When it is not, control issues become more prominent. Thomas also concludes that the issue is like any other political issue in many respects and is, for example, subject to the usual contest between president and Congress and bureaucratic rivalry in which both act as forms of control on unbridled action by the CIA. Loch Johnson's final chapter in the introductory section surveys the range of current internal and external control mechanisms affecting the CIA. While indicating that many of the mechanisms are only partially effective and need improvement, he concludes that the range of mechanisms is so broad that, with some improvements, the USA can have both democracy and a CIA.

In the second section Arthur Hulnick's opening chapter discusses how control can be exercised by ensuring that the intelligence production process is properly managed. This consists of attempting to ensure that analysts are asked the right questions, that the analysis is relevant to policy makers and that the product is disseminated properly. Control is conceived of as achieving an appropriate quantity and, more importantly, quality of work. Glenn Hastedt's following chapter argues that control comes from intelligence professionals having the appropriate values. While arguing this is applicable to all employees, Hastedt concentrates on the values, or role orientation, of four DCIs and finds wide variations between them. He concludes that, since no one role orientation is necessarily superior to any other and each presents control problems, the goal should be to ensure a healthy mix of role orientations. Gregory Treverton's third

chapter in the second section deals with the thorny issue of how to control covert intelligence operations. He describes a range of successful and unsuccessful covert operations and points to the great fascination such operations seem to hold for presidents and how this often leads them into great conflict with Congress. Such conflict, Treverton argues, should not lead presidents to circumvent Congress and avoid using the CIA. However, even if they do not, Treverton is not sanguine about the prospects for effective control of covert operations. As he remarks, the fact that a fresh scandal seems to emerge every dozen years is worrying. Marion Doss's final chapter of the second section discusses the nature of counter intelligence in the United States and the various mechanisms of control. He concludes, much like Hastedt, that the key is getting good people and that organizational form is not the paramount concern.

Stuart Farson provides the chapter on Canada that constitutes the comparative example for the third section of the book. Farson's piece is a detailed analysis of the McDonald Royal Commission of Inquiry's Report. This report eventually led to the restructuring of the Canadian security and intelligence system. Farson concludes that the commission's work represents an important contribution to Canadian constitutional, administrative and organizational theory. However, he believes that, while the system of control now in place in Canada largely followed the commission's recommendations, it failed to implement two key ones. These were that Cabinet documents should be available to the newly created Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and the Inspector General, and that there should be a permanent Parliamentary Committee to monitor the work of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

While the individual chapters are each of good quality and are interesting to read, the book does not constitute a satisfactory whole for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the concentration is very heavily upon the CIA. Four of the eight chapters deal directly with the CIA and most of the rest emphasize the CIA. Only one of the seven chapters on the USA deals with primarily non-CIA related matters and that is the one by Marion Doss on counter intelligence. Such a strong emphasis on CIA leads to there being very little discussion of the problems of control that arise from there being a great multiplicity of intelligence agencies in the American intelligence network.

Secondly, it is unfortunate that the third part of the volume only contains one comparative example, the analysis of the Canadian situation by Farson. As a chapter it is, in and of itself, an interesting and useful piece that clearly indicates which problems tend to be generic and how the measures of control need to be related to the mores and institutions of the nation at hand. However, it would have been helpful if the book had contained examples of other nations or if there had been an actual comparative chapter, in the sense of one in which direct comparisons were drawn between the US example and other examples.

Finally, it is unfortunate that there is not a concluding chapter. This is especially the case since the authors have different understandings of what constitutes control and since they are dealing with widely varying aspects of the topic in different ways. The reader is left to draw his or her own conclusion from a group of essays, each of which is very valuable, but which together do not constitute a coherent whole.

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Costello, John. *Ten Days to Destiny. The Secret Story of the Hess Peace Initiative and British Efforts to Strike a Deal with Hitler*. New York: William Morrow, 1991.

Of the many revisionist studies of British military and diplomatic history produced in 1991, *Ten Days to Destiny* is far and away the best. John Costello, has produced a book which cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. His arguments are interesting and important; every student of the events of 1940-41, those years which defined the next fifty, will have to address them. *Ten Days to Destiny* covers decision making in Berlin, London, Paris and Washington; it examines high politics, diplomacy, military affairs and the minds of statesmen. The research is thorough and multi-national, including material from the files of what once was the KGB. Briefly stated, Costello argues that in summer 1940 Britain came close to entering negotiations with Hitler; that during and after this time the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax and his Parliamentary Secretary, "Rab" Butler, continually made peace feelers to Germany; that only the cunning and ruthless maneuvers of Winston Churchill checked these possibilities and brought about a finest hour which wrecked the Third Reich and the British Empire; that only with extreme reluctance did Franklin Delano Roosevelt offer any support to Britain — and only because he was blackmailed by Churchill, who subsequently gave his former naval fellow a weapon to silence Joseph Kennedy, the defeatist American ambassador to Britain and potential candidate in the 1940 elections; that Rudolf Hess's mission was authorized by Adolf Hitler and undertaken precisely because Germany believed there was a substantial peace faction in Britain, centring on the royalty and aristocracy — a belief which was accurate; and that this mission was triggered by a sophisticated MI 5 double-cross operation, one undertaken without Churchill's knowledge. Much of *Ten Days to Destiny* is an unnecessarily detailed account of notorious events, and many of its arguments are far from novel; others might seem taken from one. On