tion and personalization. While certain individual chapters in the two books reviewed here contribute some understanding to these processes, anyone seriously interested in the policy implications of these processes would be better served by looking elsewhere. For many of the policy issues addressed in Terrorism and the Media, Abraham Miller's edited collection — also based on a conference — is exemplary of what good editing can do.¹ For a scholarly volume that provides a more systematic range of perspectives than In the Camera's Eye, the recent volume by David Paletz and Alex Schmid — complete with index — might serve the serious scholar better.²

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Endnotes


2. See Abraham Miller, Terrorism, the Media and the Law (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational, 1982), Appendix A, Media Guideline Documents, pp. 153-60. Note that the publication date of 1982 precedes the year of the TWA hijacking in 1985.

3. Miller, Terrorism, the Media and the Law.


Kalevi Holsti has established a noteworthy reputation among theorists of international relations as a result of his Why Nations Realign, The Dividing Discipline: hegemony and diversity in international theory, and particularly from International Politics: a framework for analysis. In this major new work, Holsti has maintained some of the basic tenets presented in his earlier studies — particularly in his assumptions concerning the rationality of the actors in the international system — and extended his range by taking up the "paths of war" approach developed by Mansbach and Vasquez in their In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics. But he seeks to go beyond what he regards
as the limitations inherent in the study of the processes that lead to war, and instead to examine recurring phenomena that cannot be explained at the systemic level of analysis: concentrating on ecological variables is misleading, he argues, because what matters is not that states have different attributes, but how they behave: “Nowhere do we find the issues that excite men’s passions and fears, those stakes that predispose them to take up arms to pursue or defend their causes and purposes.” (p. 13)

The essential thesis developed by Holsti is that only by examining the stakes for which leaders went to war can we understand why they resorted to it, and thus how they attempted to prevent its recurrences through their arrangements for peace. Following the argument of Quincy Wright, Holsti asks, “Would it not make a difference in terms of war incidence whether decision-making elites view it as a duel, an avenue for fame, glory, and honor, an act of self-defense, the execution of a judgment, a crime, a technique of persuasion, or as an act of mutual suicide.” (p. 10) Thus, his approach promises both to identify the changing pattern of international relationships that emerged as a result of differences in aims and perceptions, and to explain the failures of the systems put in place by the peacemakers following the greatest wars of the past 350 years. Fundamentally, those systems failed because the peacemakers were more concerned with preventing a recurrence of the war they had just fought than they were with envisioning new possibilities for conflict; had they been more imaginative, they would have recognized the necessity of machinery that would permit peaceful alternations to the status quo.

The bulk of the book consists of an historical analysis of the stakes involved in all wars that occurred within the European state system from the Thirty Years’ War to 1989. Throughout this analysis, Holsti attempts to avoid asking why nations fought, and instead concentrates on what they fought about, or what they were fighting over. This leads him to develop a taxonomy of issues from his study of 177 wars and armed interventions. The assumption underlying this approach is that international politics is essentially a purposeful, rational activity engaged in by governments in order to solve, live with, or adapt to certain problems; the methodology that logically arises from this assumption consists of examining the outlook of the key decision-makers, both in terms of the stakes for which they went to war, and in order to understand the elements they sought to establish in the new system put in place by the peace that followed.

Five distinct periods are demarcated as occurring between 1648 and 1989, each of them marked by the conflicts that took place during the era that followed a major peacemaking effort. The period from the peace of Westphalia up to the end of the War of the Spanish Succession was marked by the dominance of territorial and dynastic disputes; the period from the peace of Utrecht up to the end of the Napoleonic Wars was characterized by territorial and commercial/navigational disputes, along with a decline in dynastic issues; the period from the
Congress of Vienna up to the First World War witnessed the growing importance of conflicts arising from the process of national unification/liberation and over national boundaries; in the period from the Treaty of Versailles up to the Second World War, territorial disputes continued to dominate, but also important were conflicts over state/regime survival and over treaty enforcement; and finally, in the contemporary era the variety of stakes at issue has been extended, but compressing them into “mega-issues” means that conflicts over national liberation/unification, territory, and government composition or ideological liberation are almost equally distributed. In his examination of the peacemakers at Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Paris and Yalta, Holsti concludes that their thinking was most often dominated by their appreciation of the causes of war in the preceding era, and that they were thus handicapped in constructing a system that could provide insurance against new sources of conflict.

For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to accept the taxonomy of issues that Holsti has constructed. To begin with, we are told nothing about the methodology by which they are arrived at; how has it been determined that Russia went to war in 1853 first in order to “protect religious confrères,” second for the “national liberation/state creation” of Wallachia and Moldavia, and third for “strategic territory”? How has it been determined that Britain, France and Austria(!) went to war for the “balance of power” and to “maintain the integrity of empire”? but not, apparently, to protect their religious confrères or for strategic territory. (p. 140) Are we to take at face value the explanations offered by the statesmen themselves? Or are we to construct these boxes from a synthesis of the historical literature? Neither approach would explain these categories which, although historians will certainly recognize that a blend of these elements were involved, might as easily have been drawn from slips of paper placed in a hat (and some of which argue backwards from the peace settlement and become a cause that no one conceived of at the outbreak). How is it that Austria is listed among the combatants when she did not fight? Because she was present at the peace conference? If so, why is Prussia not included as well? Perhaps such questions appear inconsequential to political scientists, but to historians they are vital. If compressing the complexities of the past into neatly constructed compartments violates our understanding of reality, what are we to make of the conclusions that are then offered by counting and measuring such constructions?

Reliance upon conventional wisdom will inevitably lead to a conventional conclusion; this does not make it correct, merely conventional. One of the results achieved by Holsti’s analysis is that in the nineteenth century interstate/international issues were replacing the dynastic issues of the previous century; this amounts to saying that as the dynastic state disappeared it became less important — an argument that is not likely to raise many eyebrows. But the conclusion hides more than it reveals. “Dynastic” is not mentioned in connection with the Franco-Prussian war, even though Hohenzollem candidature for the Spanish throne was clearly at issue; “dynastic” does not, in fact, enter a single
category in any of the conflicts between 1865 and 1914, when any historian would regard it as impossible to understand the international history of this period without giving a prominent place to the dynastic interests and outlooks of the Habsburgs and Romanovs, as well as the Hohenzollerns. Can we really distinguish between Russia’s desire “to protect religious confrères,” and the tsar’s position at the head of the Orthodox Church? And what are we to make of a typology that includes “Germany-Czechoslovakia (1938-39)” as a “War/major armed intervention” even though no shots were fired, on the grounds that “Hitler was committed to war to achieve his objectives had any resistance been offered, and Germany occupied the territories it had gained by coercion and extortion.” If the compartments constructed are not sufficient to incorporate the wicked, then it would appear reasonable to renovate them whenever it suits the values of the analyst.

It is equally difficult to disentangle Holsti’s values from his treatment of the statesmen-peacemakers who are to be found at the centre of his analysis, located there because they are the ones who have had the opportunity to create international orders and institutions that can manage or prevent international conflicts and crises. Men like Mazarin, Castlereagh, Clemenceau and Stalin approached their task, he argues, with theories of peace, war and international relations in mind, and their relative success or failure — like that of the system they created — ultimately depended upon the validity of their insights. While there is a good deal to be said for this, Holsti’s judgement of their abilities is deeply colored by his own preferences. Thus, those statesmen who appear to have been the most theoretical in their approach, like Alexander I and Woodrow Wilson, are singled out for praise, while those who appeared to have little taste for abstraction, like Metternich and Stalin, are criticized for their short-sightedness.

The fact that the theoretically-minded were usually liberal, while the realists were usually reactionaries, is more than coincidence. The reactionaries were more inclined to look backward, to preserve the existing order, than they were to look ahead, to anticipate changes in the status quo and to create mechanisms that would provide for the incorporation of change. The possibility that the material interests of the state represented by the liberal-theoreticians were embedded within the idealist program that they purported to uphold does not appear to have been entertained by Holsti, but it certainly occurred to those who engaged in a diplomatic dialogue with Alexander and Wilson. The possibility that the reactionary-realists did not lack the imagination or theoretical insight necessary to anticipate the new challenges that would be mounted against the existing order, but did their best to suppress them (even if it meant ignoring them) is also disregarded. One example will suffice: Palmerston is credited for “recognizing the importance of nationalism during the troubles of 1848,” whereas Russell is criticized for speaking in the old tradition when he “rejected the application of the principle in the Schleswig-Holstein conflict during 1864.” (p. 169) But the difference between them was neither abstract nor theoretical:

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Palmerston promoted nationalism in Hungary and Italy in order to weaken the Habsburg Empire and to disrupt the Austro-Russian partnership; Russell rejected nationalism in Schleswig-Holstein in order to forestall German expansion. To treat statesmen as if they were theorists who are to be judged for their prescience and for the comprehensiveness of their theory is to place them in a context where they are likely to remain incomprehensible.

*Peace and War* amounts to an essay in Whig history, compounded with elements of idealist philosophy. The peacemakers are treated throughout as if they can, and do, represent ideals that can reshape the world; if they fail to live up to this standard, they are failures *ipso facto*. Those who met at Utrecht in 1712-13, for instance, lacked a comprehensive diagnosis of war causation, and were therefore unable to develop a theory of peace, which accounts for the persistence of international anarchy in the century that followed. But things slowly get better. As war grows more expensive and more horrifying it comes to be perceived as an evil that must be eradicated. Thus, the failure of each system has provided a learning experience that we can draw upon in constructing a new order and the institutions necessary for its success. An international order which is constructed on the foundations of autonomy, independence and the exclusiveness of its members, and which includes a system of governance, which is regarded as legitimate, which provides for assimilation, a system of deterrence, conflict-resolving procedures and institutions, procedures for peaceful change, anticipates future issues that will generate conflict, and in which there is a consensus that the use of force will be resorted to only for self-defence or for the welfare and benefit of the society of states may provide the conditions necessary to sustain a stable order. (pp. 335-39) Perhaps the peacemakers of the past can be forgiven for their failure to grasp this simple formula, let alone apply it.

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