Despite these weaknesses, Stewart does present a convincing picture of the important role played by military professionalism in the creation of unit cohesion. As the British experience demonstrates, units will have fighting spirit if they are well trained and well equipped and led by dedicated officers who know something about combat. Societal support also plays a role. Without a requisite amount of public interest, soldiers will lack the financial and morale support needed to sustain them as they pursue their rigorous duties. In a sense, unit cohesion is produced naturally when societies and militaries take war seriously. But, as the Argentine experience demonstrates, a lack of unit cohesion is usually a manifestation of some deeper problem effecting military institutions or society at large.

James J. Wirtz  
US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.


Dilip Hiro has produced a very interesting work which reflects a good deal of research and thought. It also reflects some imagination in the interpretation of public media information, but this is where some of the major problems begin. It was admittedly difficult to obtain solid information on the conflict, since very early the antagonists began to employ the media for a variety of purposes for which the truth was not a necessary component. The rather uncritical treatment of much of this information leads to some interesting conclusions. For example, there is the section in which Iranian expatriates are found in Baghdad awaiting the success of Operation DESERT ONE, the attempted rescue of the American embassy hostages in Tehran. One of the fundamental causes of the failure of that mission was the fact that it was so compartmented, that many people in the US government and even within the US military establishment, including those who had legitimate interests in the mission, were kept uninformed until the very last minute. How plausible is a scenario which has expatriate Iranians waiting in Baghdad for the success of such a secret mission as a signal for their return? Part of such a problem lies in the materials relied upon for support, mainly news accounts — although some of them have proven to be quite reliable like *Jane's* and *The Economist*. Among the reporters there were degrees of reliability as well, Godfrey Jansen of *Middle East International* being one of the most reliable. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS) provided a great deal of information about the war if one had the patience to grind through all of it which Hiro did. As noted, however, the material presented was broadcast for a variety of reasons to a variety of audiences and required careful cross checking. This was not always done. For example, during the KARBALA V offensive in spring 1987, the
Iranians continuously claimed progress in increasingly general areas along the front. Gradually, these claims shifted to claims of destruction of things and soldiers, although the shrillness of the language changed not at all. Then came a shift to the successful repulse of Iraqi counterattacks. It became evident that the offensive had failed and failed badly, but it took careful reading to detect. Likewise, it took considerable cross checking to determine what actually happened during Iraq's final offensive, April through August 1988, to understand that the Iranian military forces had been almost totally destroyed. Along with their total destruction came the usual charges of massive use of chemical weapons. Very quickly after the event there appeared several sober western analyses that concluded that the "chemical solution" being offered by Tehran and most journalists was silly. The force ratios were such that chemicals would only have clogged a very efficiently run operation. None of this has a place in Hiro's analysis. All these criticisms aside, and there are other faults as well, this is a valuable book that deserves to be read. Hiro has managed to keep a very fair balance between his portrayals of the adversaries and, more than that, presents what appears to be a credible interpretation of the political processes at work. He clearly has a good understanding of the regional politics which are often lost to western audiences. The other benefit of the book is that it covers almost every relevant event to one degree or another. It is an easy read and broadly informative, but should not be relied upon as authoritative.

Douglas V. Johnson, II
U.S. Army War College


*The World in Their Minds*, by Yaacov Vertzberger, contains an incredibly thorough review of psychological and political psychological studies of information processing and resulting patterns of political decisionmaking. Each chapter explores a different set of factors affecting the use of information. Together they add up to a complete review of psychological, organizational and societal variables that impact the interpretation of the political environment. The book begins with an insightful evaluation of the current condition of international decisionmaking studies. It then proceeds to chapters on the nature of information, psychological characteristics of political decisionmakers, bureaucratic and organizational factors, and societal influences on decisionmaking. The last two chapters evaluate decisionmakers' use of the lessons of history and possible policy implications. Throughout the book the American experience in Vietnam and the Israeli experience in the