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sixty cases. As the foreword notes, there is nothing else like it in print (p. xi), and it should prove valuable for students of the congressional role in US foreign and military policy. Reference librarians might consider purchasing the book for this reason alone, eliminating the need for financially strapped academics to do so.

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Endnotes

1. Michael J. Engelhardt. "America Can Win, Sometimes: U.S. Success and Failure in Small Wars" *Conflict Quarterly* vol. IX no. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 20-35.

Stewart, Nora Kinzer. *Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War*. Washington: Brassey's 1991.

Officers have long recognized the relationship between unit cohesion and the behavior of soldiers in battle, a relationship that was again demonstrated by the lackluster performance turned in by Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. But, as American estimates of Iraqi military prowess demonstrate, it remains difficult to predict the cohesion of an opponent's units. For that matter, policymakers and officers sometimes fail to identify a lack of cohesion among their own units. Even though the importance of esprit de corps is readily acknowledged, the difficulty of measuring such an intangible quality leads officers and policymakers to focus on those aspects of warfare that can be more easily quantified in developing estimates of the military balance between opposing forces.

Nora Stewart attempts to rectify this shortcoming by advancing a model, synthesized from previous studies, of the factors that contribute to fighting spirit, or unit cohesion. In *Mates & Muchachos* she postulates four factors that contribute to the morale of a fighting force. If units are made up of strangers, for instance, relationships between peers will be undeveloped and the unit will lack *horizontal cohesion*. Under these circumstances, soldiers will not fight to save their comrades or to preserve their reputation with their friends. If soldiers have no confidence in their officers, units will lack *vertical cohesion*. Soldiers will not risk their lives when they believe that incompetent officers have already created a hopeless situation. *Organizational cohesion* will be absent if soldiers feel little personal attachment to their unit; they will not fight to preserve the honor of their particular organization. If soldiers do not embrace cultural goals or feel a degree of societal support, soldiers' loyalty will be directed only towards their unit. Without this sense of *societal*

cohesion, the possibility of revolutionary activity or brigandage increases dramatically.

In applying this model to her comparative study of British and Argentine unit cohesion during the war, however, Stewart never really specifies which research question she intends to address. As a result, it is difficult to decide whether she is attempting to determine which factors are critical to unit cohesion or whether unit cohesion affects the behavior of soldiers in battle. Stewart treats a model of *esprit de corps* (a description of the factors that make a unit cohesive) as a theory of battlefield performance. She postulates a link between unit cohesion and battlefield behavior: units that enjoy vertical, horizontal, organizational and societal cohesion fight well. Yet, this hypothesis is, more or less, a tautology: units that have “fighting spirit” (unit cohesion) fight well.

This methodological confusion also is apparent in the way Stewart supports this hypothesis. She claims that unit cohesion is a necessary condition for battlefield success; other factors also determine outcomes. This is not a trivial point. Most Argentine conscripts were untrained, ill-equipped and led by officers who knew nothing about modern combat. They did not fight because they literally could not perform on the battlefield. But, in providing evidence for her hypothesis, she treats unit cohesion as a sufficient condition for good battlefield performance — unit cohesion alone is sufficient to produce troops that will fight well. Her argument is structured to demonstrate that units that fought well were cohesive, while units that did not fight lacked unit cohesion. Yet, if her hypothesis was based on a necessary condition, she should have focused on instances of battlefield success to determine if the requisite unit cohesion was present. Instances in which units fought badly or lacked unit cohesion do not address her hypothesis.

Stewart’s work also suffers from a “unit of analysis” problem. A few Argentine forces did exhibit a high degree of unit cohesion. But in applying her model, Stewart considers the Argentine military in its entirety. As a result, she cannot explain variations in unit cohesion in the same military organization. For example, Stewart notes that Argentine officers’ preoccupation with ceremony and maintaining class distinctions between the ranks undermined vertical cohesion throughout their army. Yet, a relationship of mutual trust and respect between officers and their men emerged in some units, and those units were cohesive. But an explanation of these anomalies — how did these officers come to command in an army hostile to their leadership style — is beyond the reach of Stewart’s analysis.

Stewart’s observation that some units fought well because they enjoyed vertical cohesion raises another question. Is a combination of vertical, horizontal, organizational and societal cohesion needed to turn a unit into an effective fighting force, or will one form of cohesion do in a pinch? Stewart’s analysis never really addresses this point. She does not indicate if the soldiers who respected their commander also felt attached to their comrades, their unit, or their society.

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Despite these weaknesses, Stewart does present a convincing picture of the important role played by military professionalism in the creation of unit cohesion. As the British experience demonstrates, units will have fighting spirit if they are well trained and well equipped and led by dedicated officers who know something about combat. Societal support also plays a role. Without a requisite amount of public interest, soldiers will lack the financial and morale support needed to sustain them as they pursue their rigorous duties. In a sense, unit cohesion is produced naturally when societies and militaries take war seriously. But, as the Argentine experience demonstrates, a lack of unit cohesion is usually a manifestation of some deeper problem effecting military institutions or society at large.

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Hiro, Dilip. *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*. New York: Routledge, 1991.

Dilip Hiro has produced a very interesting work which reflects a good deal of research and thought. It also reflects some imagination in the interpretation of public media information, but this is where some of the major problems begin. It was admittedly difficult to obtain solid information on the conflict, since very early the antagonists began to employ the media for a variety of purposes for which the truth was not a necessary component. The rather uncritical treatment of much of this information leads to some interesting conclusions. For example, there is the section in which Iranian expatriates are found in Baghdad awaiting the success of Operation DESERT ONE, the attempted rescue of the American embassy hostages in Tehran. One of the fundamental causes of the failure of that mission was the fact that it was so compartmented, that many people in the US government and even within the US military establishment, including those who had legitimate interests in the mission, were kept uninformed until the very last minute. How plausible is a scenario which has expatriate Iranians waiting in Baghdad for the success of such a secret mission as a signal for their return? Part of such a problem lies in the materials relied upon for support, mainly news accounts — although some of them have proven to be quite reliable like *Jane's* and *The Economist*. Among the reporters there were degrees of reliability as well, Godfrey Jansen of *Middle East International* being one of the most reliable. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS) provided a great deal of information about the war if one had the patience to grind through all of it which Hiro did. As noted, however, the material presented was broadcast for a variety of reasons to a variety of audiences and required careful cross checking. This was not always done. For example, during the KARBALA V offensive in spring 1987, the