

than is the US State Department. To his credit Prisk insists that the United States must take the human rights record of its prospective clients into account, but his criticism of oppressive regimes is uneven. Quite willing to justify the isolation of Cuba, he down-plays the degree to which the US has supported equally oppressive but non-communist governments. Salvador Allende, whom the United States opposed, was after all a democratically elected Marxist. Legitimacy transcends political ideology.

The problems of redefining United States military doctrine to focus on low-intensity conflict are addressed by General Galvin, Ambassador Edwin Corr, and Dr. William Olson. Galvin calls upon a new generation of officers to abandon the traditional "fortress-cloister mentality" of the army and develop new, innovative approaches to low-intensity conflict. Corr astutely points out that America's difficulty with low-intensity conflict stems more from the "World War II syndrome" than from the "Vietnam Syndrome." Finally, Olson presents an excellent analysis of the institutional resistance to doctrinal change of any kind.

Despite a certain lack of unity and cohesiveness *Uncomfortable Wars* has much to commend it. What the work lacks as a whole is made up for by the value of its component essays, all of which advance understanding of low-intensity conflict. Some of these authors raise important issues that deserve further study in complete monographs.

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Collins, John M. *America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future*. Washington: Brassey's, 1991.

John Collins, senior defense analyst at the Library of Congress and author of a series of works on the US-Soviet military balance, has produced, at the request of the House Armed Services Committee, this book on the history of American low-intensity warfare. While the subtitle promises "Lessons for the Future," the work consists largely of two annexes, one listing and describing sixty cases and the other detailing the actions of Congress in each case. The two annexes are preceded by 89 pages of text, including numerous charts and graphs, but only five pages are devoted to drawing lessons from the past conflicts for the future.

Collins defines low-intensity conflict as anything between "normal peacetime competition" and mid-intensity wars like Korea, Vietnam and Desert Storm. (p. 4) Using this definition, he comes up with no less than sixty cases of US involvement in low-intensity conflict since 1899. A similar study by the author of this review in 1989 uncovered only fifteen such cases.<sup>1</sup> Upon closer examination, however, the difference between the two nearly disap-

pears. Thirteen of Collins' cases involved no military action at all: these included the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, during which the Secretary of State made a vague threat to use force, as well as cases like Turkey (1974-78) and South Africa where economic sanctions rather than military force was used. (pp. 20-21) Nelson Mandela, who according to some accounts may have been betrayed to South African police by the CIA, will be interested to know that the United States has been engaged in "low-intensity conflict" with the *apartheid* government since 1960. (pp. 145-46)

Of the remaining cases, ten involved American support for insurgent movements, ten were coups supported by the US without direct military involvement, and several others involved counterinsurgency advice and assistance to foreign governments. Only twenty-two cases involved direct use of US troops in combat, and several of these were resistance support operations in World War II, each of which Collins counts as a separate "conflict". (p. 25)

Unfortunately, nit-picking over definitions is necessary in this case, for, like other ideas, they have consequences. Accepting Collins' inflated total of small wars tends to lead toward his conclusion that the United States is perpetually engaged in "low-intensity conflict" and needs to increase its capabilities in this area (pp. 83-87), although many of his cases required no such capabilities. Some counterinsurgency capability is still needed in the post-Cold War world, but Collins' use of evidence makes his argument appear like special pleading at a time of declining threats. On the other hand, the Collins data could also be used by those who argue that the United States is an imperialist nation meddling throughout the world, although American policymakers avoided using military force in most of the cases.

Despite definitional problems, Collins' findings are not too different from those of earlier authors in the field. The US has been relatively successful in low-intensity conflict, with 18 successes, 10 failures and 32 cases with mixed or inconclusive outcomes. (pp. 69-70) However, Collins' criteria for determining success are not always consistent. For example, the interventions in the Dominican Republic (1965) Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-90) are rated as only "mixed" successes. Conceding that all US objectives were achieved, Collins bases his conclusion on the fact that there was adverse reaction from Latin American nations. (pp. 155-56, 195-96 and 209-10) This also applies to most of the interventions undertaken early in the century by the Theodore Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson administrations, but these are coded as successes. In addition, Collins finds that the US is more successful in conventional small wars than in counterinsurgency, pro-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations. (p. 74) Like others, he finds that the public and Congress usually supported executive branch initiatives, and that public opposition is overrated as a factor in producing unfavorable outcomes. (p. 79-80)

One is tempted to urge potential readers to ignore this less than systematic effort in favor of earlier work by D. Michael Shafer, Douglas Blaufarb, Sam Sarkesian and others. However, the book does have one saving grace: the second annex, which describes congressional action relating to each of the

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sixty cases. As the foreword notes, there is nothing else like it in print (p. xi), and it should prove valuable for students of the congressional role in US foreign and military policy. Reference librarians might consider purchasing the book for this reason alone, eliminating the need for financially strapped academics to do so.

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#### Endnotes

1. Michael J. Engelhardt. "America Can Win, Sometimes: U.S. Success and Failure in Small Wars" *Conflict Quarterly* vol. IX no. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 20-35.

Stewart, Nora Kinzer. *Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War*. Washington: Brassey's 1991.

Officers have long recognized the relationship between unit cohesion and the behavior of soldiers in battle, a relationship that was again demonstrated by the lackluster performance turned in by Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. But, as American estimates of Iraqi military prowess demonstrate, it remains difficult to predict the cohesion of an opponent's units. For that matter, policymakers and officers sometimes fail to identify a lack of cohesion among their own units. Even though the importance of esprit de corps is readily acknowledged, the difficulty of measuring such an intangible quality leads officers and policymakers to focus on those aspects of warfare that can be more easily quantified in developing estimates of the military balance between opposing forces.

Nora Stewart attempts to rectify this shortcoming by advancing a model, synthesized from previous studies, of the factors that contribute to fighting spirit, or unit cohesion. In *Mates & Muchachos* she postulates four factors that contribute to the morale of a fighting force. If units are made up of strangers, for instance, relationships between peers will be undeveloped and the unit will lack *horizontal cohesion*. Under these circumstances, soldiers will not fight to save their comrades or to preserve their reputation with their friends. If soldiers have no confidence in their officers, units will lack *vertical cohesion*. Soldiers will not risk their lives when they believe that incompetent officers have already created a hopeless situation. *Organizational cohesion* will be absent if soldiers feel little personal attachment to their unit; they will not fight to preserve the honor of their particular organization. If soldiers do not embrace cultural goals or feel a degree of societal support, soldiers' loyalty will be directed only towards their unit. Without this sense of *societal*