Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). However, the questions remains why consociationalism worked in these cases and not elsewhere (such as Lebanon, Cyprus and Fiji). What are the positive and negative catalytic processes and structures in these cases, and most importantly, are they transferable to other contexts?

Despite methodological difficulties, what is needed now, more than ever, is the sifting through of the complexities of successful and unsuccessful cases of ethnic conflict management so that both commonalities and differences can be clearly and systematically articulated. In the skilful hands of a Horowitz, broadly comparative studies are able to paint impressive understandings of the dynamics of ethnic conflict and suggest prescriptions. The big picture works because all the small details are attended to. For the rest of us, attention should be directed towards a “thick” understanding (to coin a phrase from Clifford Geertz) of ethnic conflict; for it is only through an intimate understanding of the subtleties of particular cases that one can toddler towards generalization, comparison, and ultimately, theory building. While Ryan’s book points to the important question of the impact of the international system on ethnic conflicts, it unfortunately fails to deliver the goods in its response.

Kenneth D. Bush
Cornell University

Endnotes

1. See for example the work of Peter Katzenstein, John Zysman, David Lake, John Ikenberry, Robert Putnam, and Miles Kahler, as well as the systemic level theorists Kenneth Waltz — especially his Theory of International Politics — and Immanuel Wallerstein.


Scholars tend to treat the rise and fall of the Marcos regime much like the blind men treated the elephant. While some examine the growth of the communist revolution, others credit or blame the military, and nationalists try to blame everything on the United States. As his title suggests, Robert Youngblood explores the rise of church activism and the fall of Marcos.

For most of its four centuries in the Philippines, the church had been a conservative force. When Marcos assumed power, the older and more
powerful of the church hierarchy were either conservatives who tended to support the regime or moderates who felt free to criticize specific unjust practices but fell short of challenging the legitimacy of the regime itself. A less powerful but vocal group was considered progressive or activist and considered the regime immoral and illegitimate.

Given the conservative nature of the church hierarchy and conditions in pre-martial law Philippines, it was not surprising that: “The initial reaction in 1972 of the hierarchies of the Catholic and Protestant churches to the declaration of martial law and the creation of the New Society was generally positive.” (172) The church’s transition to political activism was a slow, multifaceted evolution. This evolution began in convocations such as Vatican II, which refocused priorities within the international church hierarchy. In essence, the church was given license to go forth and actively confront social injustice.

The church initiated social action programs such as Basic Christian Communities (BCCs), which tended to stress self-help and community development. Were these BCCs left alone and allowed to help the poor and to improve social justice conditions, the church hierarchy might have been content with social, not political, action. Unfortunately, the BCCs encouraged local participation, which contradicted the efforts of the Marcos administration toward increased centralization of authority. The clergy were expected to stick to the gospel. Social activism did not fit into the martial law agenda.

As clergy and layworkers continued to aid the poor farmers, minority tribesmen, and wage-workers who were helpless in the face of military abuse, the military asserted control over the BCCs with raids and arrests of activist clergy and layworkers. Furthermore, the regime closed down church media and launched its own one-sided media campaign against alleged church radicals. This is not to say that there is no foundation for the administration’s allegations. The BCCs were certainly attractive to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and it can be assumed that there were some communities that were infiltrated by the CPP. However, the regime’s simple equation of linking church activism and BCCs to communism and subversion continued to aggravate the church moderates.

Youngblood provides hard data on human rights abuses to include major military raids on church institutions and a descriptive chapter on political detainees. As human rights abuses and basic economic inequalities continued and increased, so did official church protest. The regime responded with periodic announcements of programs in support of human rights. Unfortunately, in many cases, these pronouncements did not stand up to close examination. “Contrary to government protestations, abuses of political prisoners appeared to be more of a pattern than isolated aberrations attributable to a few undisciplined troops.” (168)

There were several “watersheds” in the relationship between Marcos and the church. Such a turning point was the lifting of martial law in 1981 — not because there was change — because there was not. The worst of the
abuses remained — the indiscriminate arrest policy, the abuse of prisoners and
the manipulation of the electoral process. The hopes of the moderates and
even the conservatives that progress could be achieved through the political
system languished.

Youngblood provides a good description of how Marcos exploited the
various referenda and elections. While questioning the honesty of the elec­
tions, the moderates did not join the progressives in calling for a boycott of the
electoral processes. The church was effective in its criticism of the Marcos
regime and its support of the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL). Church support provided NAMFREL with a legitimacy that
allowed it to become effective in the face of adversity.

The final break came with the February 1986 election. The church had
made every effort to expose human rights abuses and assure an honest elec­
tion. When Marcos continued to hang on in spite of the election results, the
bishops accused the regime of "... using fear and intimidation in a criminal
attempt to steal the election." (xii) They went further to say that "... a
government which attempts to gain or retain power through fraudulence was
immoral, and they recommended that Filipinos seek justice through nonvio­
lent struggle." (xii) In the eyes of the church, Marcos had lost all political
legitimacy.

This work would have been more valuable if Youngblood had ad­
dressed the tougher questions of church interest, development, and future
Philippine administrations. There were matters of specific church interest that
were mentioned but not examined. Issues such as the taxation of parochial
schools, the legalization of divorce or family planning and population control
are at the heart of current Philippine problems. On one hand we can accept "... that in the absence of improvements in the quality of life of the poor, church-
state relations in the Philippines will remain troubled into the indefinite
future." (203) But, on the other hand, if population control is at the center of
the common well-being, how could we expect the church to respond?

Although the lack of bibliography was a bit bothersome, the work is
adequately footnoted, the research is valid and the book is well laid out. This
book is not for the general market. Youngblood does not write in a comfort­
able style, his sentences tend to be long and involved. Nevertheless, Marcos
Against the Church is recommended to the Philippine studies and liberation
theology communities.

Stewart S. Johnson
University of California, Los Angeles.

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