It is true, as Clark tells us, that negotiating with the Spanish authorities has, in some instances, created and in others perpetuated internal problems in ETA. (p. 10) However, in spite of the failures, and the side effects the negotiations have caused, tensions have been reduced. More importantly, both parties have realized that problem-solving need not be done on the battlefield, as it could very well be achieved around the negotiating table. Equally important is the fact that negotiations between ETA and the Spanish government, although they were frequently hampered, could provide an impetus for other insurgent groups and governments involved in conflicts to try settling their problems through peaceful means.

In sum, this highly informative, well-written volume is of immense value, not only to the understanding of Basque-Spanish relations, but also to the discourse surrounding the study of conflict resolution. Researchers in peace studies and such related fields, too, will find the information and the theorizing presented in this volume very useful and enlightening. The originality by which this work is characterized, the strong background of the author in this area, and the fine organization of the material make Negotiating with ETA a highly desirable source for libraries to add to their collections.

Hisham H. Ahmed
University of North Dakota

Stephen Ryan of the University of Ulster attempts to address the crucial question of how to deal with ethnic conflict. Two books stand as standards by which his and other recent works on ethnic conflict should be measured: Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985) and the edited volume by Joseph Montville Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (1990). By these standards, Ryan’s book falls far short of the mark. The following review will focus on what Ryan claims to address, what he actually addresses, and what he fails to address.

The centre piece of Ethnic Conflict and International Relations is a model of ethnic conflict resolution which posits that under certain circumstances third party involvement, particularly by the UN, may be a vital component to conflict resolution strategies by: deinternationalizing a conflict; and contributing to peacekeeping (the targeting of armed groups to address violent behavior), peacemaking (the targeting of decisionmakers to address a perceived incompatibility of interests), and peacebuilding (the targeting of “ordinary people” to address negative attitudes and socio-economic structures). As these three strategies have already been articulated and developed by others,
the contribution of Ryan's book is that it collates them into a 3x3 table ("A Framework for Conflict Resolution") and elaborates on their interconnections. Ryan advocates the integration of management and resolution approaches to conflict. More specifically, he attempts to develop this approach through a discussion of past UN involvement in ethnic conflicts.

Ryan is not unaware of the discouraging record of the UN in the resolution of ethnic conflicts. Indeed, he identifies, in some detail, the formidable political, economic, institutional, and organizational barriers that have inhibited the UN from assuming an effective role in ethnic conflict resolution. Particularly inhibiting is the requirement that national governments invite the UN into a conflict to play a role, and the prohibition in the UN Charter against interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In light of such shortcomings, one wonders how the UN could then be forwarded as the right third party for facilitating the resolution process. Yet despite evidence to the contrary, Ryan asserts: "the UN has a unique ability to create new international norms and standards. But, this of course, requires an act of political will which is lacking in this area." (170) It is precisely this scrap reference to the lack of political will that constitutes the unexamined crux of the problem of managing, let alone resolving, ethnic conflict. It is perhaps not surprising that a call for an increased UN role in ethnic conflict management glosses over the centrality of political will, for if the UN is ineffective without the prior political will of states, it is also ineffective with the political will of states, since the states would then be motivated to address the issues underpinning the conflicts themselves. But Ryan only scratches the surface of this apparent paradox in a discussion of peacebuilding and the reduction of negative attitudes.

Although Ryan acknowledges that an individual may have more than one identity group, he retreats towards a primordialist stance and asserts that "there is enough evidence that the primary or terminal loyalty of many people is to the ethnic group and not to the state." (xxiii) It seems to this reviewer that it is incomplete to attempt to construct a model of ethnic conflict resolution without a thorough consideration of the dynamics of ethnic groups self-identification. Indeed, I would argue that a detailed examination of the axes of group and individual self-identification is the crucial prerequisite to a study of both the dynamics of ethnic conflict, and the mechanisms for management and resolution. Within the basket of attributes that constitutes ethnic identities, there are numerous cultural fault lines-cum-battle lines which may structure a conflict. An intriguing question is why some characteristics are politically more salient rather than others. And more importantly, (in the context of ethnic conflict management and resolution) how do some axes of identity become more or less salient. This type of study is important because different axes of identification have different impacts on the dynamics of conflict and violence as illustrated in the work of David Laitin. By foreclosing this line of inquiry, Ryan forecloses the possibility of addressing the crucial question of why ethnicity is of continuing, indeed increasing, importance in an interdependent world, and how its fluidity or contingency may be manipulated for the purposes of conflict management.
Ryan's theoretical orientation, which emphasizes the impact of the international system on ethnic conflict, inhibits his ability to crack open the "billiard ball" of ethnic groups. As a result, he is unable to fully probe why "sometimes not only will states feel sympathy for their kin group in a neighboring state, [but] there might also exist an irredentist claim over a part or whole of that state." (35) Such cross border relationships are neither constant nor given; they are variable and affected by a host of factors — international and domestic, institutional, historical, conjunctural, even accidental. The question of the dynamics of this variability and the consequences for conflict escalation and resolution are left unaddressed.

Ryan's focus on the "international factors that contribute to the development of violent ethnic conflict" (xxv) leads him to downplay the role of internal factors. This might have been justifiable on the grounds of parsimony if Ryan had led the reader into the tumultuous debates within IR theory concerning the impact of systemic and subsystemic variables on political behavior. However, the theoretically rich work in this area is ignored. Indeed, Ryan's self-proclaimed focus on the "second image reversed" (the impact of the international system on domestic politics) fails even to cite the originator of the term (Peter Gourevitch) and fundamental points of reference in this debate are left unexplored; for example, questions of the nature and consequences of "sovereignty," "anarchy," "self-help," and "hegemony"; the dynamics of interdependence; and the impact of international finance and trade, multinational corporations and international production. These are major omissions if one is to make the argument that the interstate system influences the development of ethnic relations within states. The determining impact of the "interstate system" is ultimately simply asserted and, as a result, Ryan misses the opportunity to make a novel contribution to ethnic conflict theory through the integration of these theoretical insights.

Ryan's second image reversed argument underscores the need for a broader discussion of when and why similarly situated countries (in the international structural sense) contain such variation in ethnic group relations. For example, why is Sri Lanka currently racked with ethnic violence, while Malaysia is relatively peaceful, particularly when predictions at independence would have prompted the opposite expectation? If the "interstate system" does inhibit intergroup accommodation within countries, then it seems to me that the interesting and truly pressing question — in a study that claims to develop a model of ethnic conflict resolution — is not so much when and why do intranational institutions fail, but when and why do they work at all? However, Ryan's decision to focus primarily on the conflict management failures of Cyprus, Lebanon, Palestine, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka forecloses the possibility of constructing a comprehensive model of ethnic conflict resolution. This would require the examination of successful cases as well as failures — for example, Switzerland, Malaysia, Nigeria, Canada. To be fair, Ryan does wave his finger in the direction of consociationalism, asserting that it provides the possible basis for the maintenance of stable and democratic states (as indeed it has in the "model countries" of the theory: Austria, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland). However, the question remains why consociationalism worked in these cases and not elsewhere (such as Lebanon, Cyprus and Fiji). What are the positive and negative catalytic processes and structures in these cases, and most importantly, are they transferable to other contexts?

Despite methodological difficulties, what is needed now, more than ever, is the sifting through of the complexities of successful and unsuccessful cases of ethnic conflict management so that both commonalities and differences can be clearly and systematically articulated. In the skilful hands of a Horowitz, broadly comparative studies are able to paint impressive understandings of the dynamics of ethnic conflict and suggest prescriptions. The big picture works because all the small details are attended to. For the rest of us, attention should be directed towards a “thick” understanding (to coin a phrase from Clifford Geertz) of ethnic conflict; for it is only through an intimate understanding of the subtleties of particular cases that one can todder towards generalization, comparison, and ultimately, theory building. While Ryan’s book points to the important question of the impact of the international system on ethnic conflicts, it unfortunately fails to deliver the goods in its response.

Kenneth D. Bush
Cornell University

Endnotes

1. See for example the work of Peter Katzenstein, John Zysman, David Lake, John Ikenberry, Robert Putnam, and Miles Kahler, as well as the systemic level theorists Kenneth Waltz — especially his *Theory of International Politics* — and Immanuel Wallerstein.


Scholars tend to treat the rise and fall of the Marcos regime much like the blind men treated the elephant. While some examine the growth of the communist revolution, others credit or blame the military, and nationalists try to blame everything on the United States. As his title suggests, Robert Youngblood explores the rise of church activism and the fall of Marcos.

For most of its four centuries in the Philippines, the church had been a conservative force. When Marcos assumed power, the older and more