Dashnaks who sponsored JCAG. This intra-Armenian violence was certainly a major reason for the ending of the terrorism against the Turks, as it illustrated how bankrupt its perpetrators' dedication was. Finally, of course, the rejection of terrorism by an increasingly embarrassed Armenian community further helps to explain its demise.

In discussing the implicit support some Armenian clerics gave to the terrorism, Hyland erroneously declares that “Bishop Tabakian, at the same time [1983], was the highest ranking Armenian Church official in the Western U.S.” (p. 63). Actually, however, Tabakian was only the top official of the Antelias (Cilician) See. A rival Etchmiadzin See also exists. Its Bishop in the Western US claims equal authority.

In the “Miscellaneous” section of his short bibliography, as well as in some places in his chapter notes, Hyland appears to be citing material from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). If he is, he has not stated so, but if he is not, what is he citing?

Throughout his book, Hyland inconsistently spells the popular name for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation — the preeminent Armenian political organization during the past 100 years — in three different ways: “Dashnak,” “Tashnak,” and “Dashnag.” Indeed he lists the first two versions separately in his index complete with page references, as if they were two separate entries. His spelling of “Abu Nidal” is also inconsistent, while the subtitle “The Third Class” on page 40 should, of course, read “The Third Phase.”

Finally, given Armenia's declared need for Turkish cooperation, as it moves toward independence amidst the wreckage of the former Soviet Union, Hyland's conclusion — based in part on Monte Melkonian's empty boasting mentioned above — that “there is little doubt that trained, experienced, dedicated members of the Armenian terrorist movement have every intention of at least trying to revive their struggle” (p. 89) would seem to be misplaced. Although it is impossible to predict the long-term future, Armenian terrorism against Turkey is passe in the current era.

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Minutes after penetrating Tel Aviv's Lod Airport on 30 May 1972, the Japanese Red Army unleashed a metal storm of machine gun bullets and hand grenade shrapnel. Over one hundred people were cut down; twenty-six of them died. In this highly useful book, William Farrell analyzes the deadly
dynamic of Japanese terrorist groups like the Japanese Red Army. His research is thorough, and his observations are often highly engaging.

Farrell meticulously traces the history of Japanese terrorism back to the student protests of the 1960s. He shows how the anti-US, anti-capitalist campus groups splintered like a drop of water hitting a boulder. Their disunity — over one hundred factions — and their utopian ideologies eventually alienated most supporters.

However, several hard core factions vowed never to become "robots [who] serve the capitalist class." They formed the United Red Army in the late 1960s. An internal split occurred, with some URA members calling for the revolution to be carried "into the international spotlight." In late 1969, the adventurous faction left the URA and formed the Japanese Red Army. The United Red Army disintegrated in a gruesome "purification" purge in 1971. However, the Japanese Red Army lived on to prove its terrorist mettle in the 1970s and 1980s through the Lod Airport attack, hijackings to Bangladesh, Malaysia, North Korea, and other actions in support of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Farrell could have enriched his analysis by drawing comparisons between the genesis, composition and ideology of Japanese terrorist groups and European groups like the Red Brigade. Did these groups inspire and learn from each other? If so, in what ways?

Nonetheless, he correctly describes the common strategy of all terrorists. Their surprise attacks are meant to garner publicity and to "create a climate of fear" in which an intimidated public and a paralysed government are cowed into making concessions.

The true value of the book, however, lies in Farrell's analysis of counter-activity aimed at the JRA. Technologically and organizationally, Tokyo is very well equipped to squelch the JRA. Socially and psychologically, however, Japanese society may actually make the terrorist challenge worse. For example, Farrell tells us that to defeat the armed, urban radicals who harden into terrorists, the police have developed new technology, undergone special training, and donned their distinctive neo-Samurai black armor. In fighting the established JRA cells, Japanese intelligence and national security organs have long realized that "Coordination with other investigative and criminal units [is] essential." Apparently, the Japanese are not greatly bedeviled by bureaucratic "territorial wars" within their governmental machinery.

Unfortunately, Farrell does not identify the intelligence and security organs which combat the JRA within Japan. Nor does he indicate how and when intelligence is shared between Tokyo and intelligence organs in Washington, Tel Aviv, Kuala Lumpur or Seoul. His many sources spoke "on a non-attribution basis;" one suspects that strategic wisdom — and the Japanese obsession with discretion — also prevented his sources from speaking freely.

Through its assiduous police efforts, Tokyo can foil many terrorist plots and attacks on Japanese soil. However, certain aspects of Japan's social
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and cultural norms might just be preventing Tokyo from scoring a more complete victory against terrorism. For example, Farrell states that Japanese society is so concerned with homogeneous behavior that it rapidly labels people “radical.” The Japanese group-mentality denies these outcasts “the opportunity to leave their [terrorist] group and seek reintegration into society.” Hence, deviants become even more alienated and driven into violence. Moreover, he states that Tokyo has been willing to capitulate to terrorist demands in the past because “the Japanese strongly prefer regularised patterns of behavior,” and they exalt order. When terrorists create chaos, there is no routine, established response available. Hence, Tokyo’s “preferred response might well be concession [which] leads to the restoration of order.” Such concessions are facilitated by Japan’s insular mentality and fixation with stable, harmonious social relations. That is, “Tossing such criminals out of [Japan’s] homogeneous society into the chaos of the world [is] not always a bad thing” for some Japanese people.

Not all of these theories are original, but they are definitely fascinating. Farrell articulates them without malice, and this reviewer finds them quite plausible. Further research is called for on these intriguing “cultural” dimensions of Japanese terrorism.

The JRA’s future is unpredictable. It has dwindled to about twenty members, but the author correctly states that “internal organizational dynamics” will prevent its demise. Along with their political motives, “Members come to the [group] for personal needs,” like a sense of belonging and purpose.

In 1988, the JRA carried out bombings in Italy for Qaddafi, and the group is likely still involved with Habash’s organization. However, Farrell believes that so many Japanese Red Army members have been killed, purged or arrested, the JRA striking power is badly diminished.

He may be right. During the Persian Gulf War, the JRA made an empty threat to defend Iraq. In March 1991, the US locked up a JRA terrorist for thirty-one years.

Recently, the Japanese press reported that some Japanese fascists are seeking an alliance with leftist terrorists to fight “American imperialism.” However, ideological differences will likely keep them apart. The press also stated that some JRA members have had plastic surgery and created a base in Manila.

Hence, Tokyo is wisely showing continued vigilance in fighting the lost children who fell from grace with their society.

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