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the then West Germans again limited their success with this audience. And while the Provos' ideological case has had a wider appeal, the disdain of violence felt by many Catholics has weakened their propaganda. PIRA propaganda of word and deed since the 1970s, nevertheless, has created a core of terrorist activists of an estimated 100 to 200 individuals.

Finally, propaganda directed at this active audience, the terrorists themselves, is designed to bond each individual to the cause. The propaganda themes emphasize a "war situation" that, although of long duration, will result in inevitable victory. Wrights' analysis of internal propaganda directed at potential prisoners and martyrs makes clear the importance of this type of propaganda for group cohesion. The isolation of the RAF helped it build cohesion, but its failure to build a sympathetic audience, the Maoist sea the terrorist fish swims in, kept the number of activists limited. A larger "sea" and greater resources account for the greater core of PIRA activists.

In addition to a theory on the role of audiences in terrorists' successes, Wright adds to the literature on how the treatment of prisoners, the behavior of security forces, and the changing of legislation contribute to the tactical successes of terrorists.

Some attention is given to the role of the media as an actor in terrorist propaganda, especially towards the uncommitted audience. But given that the literature on this subject is vast and that the propaganda message to particular audiences is what is studied here, not focusing on the media's role makes good sense.

This well-organized, well-written, and insightful monograph should be widely read.

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Hyland, Francis P. *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991.

This analysis of Armenian terrorism against Turkey covers much familiar ground, yet introduces very little that is new. This is not surprising since the subject of Hyland's study petered out in the mid-1980s, when the present reviewer published his "*Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A Study of Contemporary Terrorism* (1986). Accordingly, it might have been more useful for Hyland to have analyzed the staggering events which have occurred in Soviet Armenia since 1988. In this latter situation, for better or worse, a genuine national movement has arisen, rather than a series of cowardly murders and inept bombings.

An unusual feature of the present study is that more than 60 percent of it is devoted to two lengthy appendixes. The first lists more than 260 "Attacks" associated with Armenian terrorism, detailing each one's date, target country, victims, location, perpetrating group, commandos involved, weapons used, sources that reported it, and comments. This arrangement allows for useful comparisons and analyses of a large amount of data.

The second, much shorter appendix tabulates such "Quantitative Aspects" as targets by countries, geographic distribution of incidents, and type of facility attacked. Together, these two appendixes constitute the most useful part of Hyland's book.

Also of interest is the author's largely successful attempt to demonstrate that the New Armenian Resistance was a third, separate Armenian terrorist group, not a mere appendage of one of the two main ones — the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) — as most previous commentators have concluded.

Although Hyland has attempted to be objective — not a mean accomplishment when dealing with this subject — the present reviewer has a number of problems with his short text. The opening three chapters on the "Cultural/Historical Context," "World War I: Ottoman Turkey," and the "1915 Massacres" are especially light, ignoring some of the basic sources cited by the Armenians, such as the work of Richard Hovannisian, Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Lord James Bryce, Vahakn N. Dadrian, and Khachig Tololyan. As for the Turkish sources on this time period, it is as if they were virtually non-existent.

In telling his reader that "as bad as living conditions had been for Armenians [under the Turks], the situation began to worsen beginning in the seventeenth century," (pp. 3-4) Hyland seems to be unaware of the more subtle nuances of their relationship. Indeed, into the nineteenth century, the Turks considered the Armenians to be the *miller-i sadika*, or the "loyal nation."

In damning the Turks for the 1915 massacres, Hyland quotes from the notorious Andonian forgeries to "prove" that Talaat Pasha's intentions were genocidal without even citing the source. (p. 16) Furthermore, he seems unaware of the recent scholarly analysis of these "documents" by Vahakn N. Dadrian in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (August 1986 and November 1987), which attempted to defend their authenticity, and the one that called them into question: Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca, *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?* (1986).

In his analysis of the demise of ASALA, Hyland stresses the importance of Monte Melkonian's dissident ASALA-RM grouping without informing his reader that when Melkonian was captured by the French authorities in December 1985, his "organization" was revealed to be a mere phantom.

In addition, Hyland gives precious little attention to the vicious bloodletting in Lebanon during the mid-1980s between ASALA and the

Dashnaks who sponsored JCAG. This intra-Armenian violence was certainly a major reason for the ending of the terrorism against the Turks, as it illustrated how bankrupt its perpetrators' dedication was. Finally, of course, the rejection of terrorism by an increasingly embarrassed Armenian community further helps to explain its demise.

In discussing the implicit support some Armenian clerics gave to the terrorism, Hyland erroneously declares that "Bishop Tabakian, at the same time [1983], was the highest ranking Armenian Church official in the Western U.S." (p. 63). Actually, however, Tabakian was only the top official of the Antelias (Cilician) See. A rival Etchmiadzin See also exists. Its Bishop in the Western US claims equal authority.

In the "Miscellaneous" section of his short bibliography, as well as in some places in his chapter notes, Hyland appears to be citing material from the *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*. If he is, he has not stated so, but if he is not, what is he citing?

Throughout his book, Hyland inconsistently spells the popular name for the Armenian Revolutionary Federation — the preeminent Armenian political organization during the past 100 years — in three different ways: "Dashnak," "Tashnak," and "Dashnag." Indeed he lists the first two versions separately in his index complete with page references, as if they were two separate entries. His spelling of "Abu Nidal" is also inconsistent, while the subtitle "The Third Class" on page 40 should, of course, read "The Third Phase."

Finally, given Armenia's declared need for Turkish cooperation, as it moves toward independence amidst the wreckage of the former Soviet Union, Hyland's conclusion — based in part on Monte Melkonian's empty boasting mentioned above — that "there is little doubt that trained, experienced, dedicated members of the Armenian terrorist movement have every intention of at least trying to revive their struggle" (p. 89) would seem to be misplaced. Although it is impossible to predict the long-term future, Armenian terrorism against Turkey is *passé* in the current era.

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Farrell, William R. *Blood and Rage: the Story of the Japanese Red Army*.
Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1990.

Minutes after penetrating Tel Aviv's Lod Airport on 30 May 1972, the Japanese Red Army unleashed a metal storm of machine gun bullets and hand grenade shrapnel. Over one hundred people were cut down; twenty-six of them died. In this highly useful book, William Farrell analyzes the deadly