that German stupidity was not always caused by British intelligence — although it often was.

J.R. Ferris
University of Calgary


These books offer the reader interesting insights into the different approaches of academics and journalists to the discussion of security intelligence matters, and, taken together, provide complementary reviews of Canadian security intelligence during the last fifty years. Cleroux, the journalist, concentrates on domestic questions via the history of the RCMP Security Service and then CSIS during the last twenty years, while the academics only deal with domestic matters to the extent that they are connected with the international aspects of espionage. Given the lack of an offensive foreign intelligence agency in Canada, the RCMP and CSIS provide a common theme in both books; another is the “branch plant” status of Canadian agencies within the Western alliance.

Both books are organized thematically and chronologically, which can sometimes lead to a lack of clarity, but such a structure is more or less imposed by the nature of the material, that is, the record of events is not simply continuous and has to be reconstructed from a patchwork of material. Similarly, some themes reappear at irregular intervals and a purely chronological treatment could not analyze them sufficiently; for example, the impact of Anglophone dominance of security intelligence, and the problems of mounting prosecutions when sources might be compromised or “evidence” does not meet due process criteria.

Cleroux examines the activities of the RCMP in Quebec in the 1970s, the resulting McDonald Commission, and the subsequent legislation. The early management problems within the new CSIS, including the initial failure to “civilianize,” the turf wars with the RCMP, the Atwal case and the resignation of the first CSIS Director are all discussed. There is a critical review both of the overall government performance in the area of security screening and of the performance of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in its role as appeals tribunal. It is argued that the SIRC has proved too ready to accept automatically CSIS objections to witnesses answering questions, a point echoed in the Report of the Special Committee of the Commons on the review of the CSIS Act.1 Similarly, Cleroux’s criticism of the SIRC report on
the CSIS investigation into "native extremism" during 1988-89 is also echoed by the Commons committee report. Cleroux concludes that the CSIS report card might read that it "shows some improvement, but still needs to work harder." (p. 284)

The academic historians say their object is to identify the key people and events that shaped Canadian intelligence activities, making the important point that this must be done within the context of domestic politics. For example, any attempt to measure the "success" of domestic agencies by the numbers of spies "caught," is nullified by the fact that expulsion decisions will be made for broader political and diplomatic reasons and will affect only some small proportion of known foreign agents at any particular time. The development of cryptography in Canada is discussed from its shaky beginnings through to the UKUSA SIGINT agreement in 1948 which formalized Canada's "second division" status. Given the widespread belief within Western security agencies that communism rather than nazism represented the greatest long-term threat, the description of Gouzenko as "The man who started the Cold War" is an exaggeration. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that his revelations provided fertile ground for the element of red scare that occurred in Canada and continued to reverberate around Western security agencies for some time. The authors wisely avoid the issue of the loyalty or otherwise of Roger Hollis, but to refer to he and Anthony Blunt as names "thrown around" with no final answers is odd in light of Blunt's confession, which was made public in 1979.

Sir William Stephenson's career is discussed up to his elevation to the status of national hero after 1976 which, if unjustified, did at least provide an antidote to the revelations of RCMP abuse then being publicized. The authors provide even-handed accounts of the case of Herbert Norman, Leslie James Bennett, and Hugh Hambleton, and discuss some of the issues they raise, but perhaps they do not always follow through the implications of their analysis. With Norman, for example, they say that had the authorities pursued the truth or falsity of Norman's claims in 1952 then the case could have been resolved earlier and less tragically. What is known is that Norman was a Marxist and that there is no specific evidence that he was disloyal to Canada, but for some the mere presence of a Marxist in authority will be evidence of the existence of an agent of influence and no amount of confirmatory evidence of loyalty will be accepted as refutation. Regarding Bennett the authors point out that it is now acknowledged that he was the victim of a "mistake," but say also that he became the focus for the paranoia and discontents that existed within the Security Service, ultimately being "sacrificed on the altar of the state's interest in preserving relations with its allies." (p. 131) "Mistake" seems too gentle a conclusion.

The extent of French interference and the security intelligence shambles in Quebec is well-documented and the more recent concern with technological espionage and terrorism complete a thoroughly readable study. The extensive Canadian literature has been thoroughly referenced in the bibliographies to these books and its availability certainly permits of a more thorough
review of official and unofficial histories of security intelligence than would be possible in the UK; yet, as ever, the thoroughness of the analysis based on that literature is crucial. As one would expect, the academics have attempted to be more even-handed in the use of evidence, and Cleroux has placed more emphasis on telling a good story.

Yet the books show the continued importance of both academic and journalistic work as a supplement to the official review agencies in the drive to maintain the accountability of at least one part of the security intelligence network. To take just one example, both refer to the failed attempt to deport Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad in February 1988. Cleroux’s account is the most comprehensive, yet, taken together, the story of CSIS operations — interviewing Mohammad in Madrid before he entered Canada in 1987, interviewing him continuously after his arrival, including his abduction for three days in January 1988, and their coincidental presence at Toronto airport as the RCMP prepared for the deportation — raises a great many questions, for example, about the methods by which security intelligence services recruit “human sources.” SIRC’s minimalist report that CSIS neither slipped up in Mohammad’s entry nor compromised his attempt to leave did not discuss these wider issues.3

Peter Gill
Liverpool Polytechnic

Endnotes
2. Ibid., pp. 159-60.

Dean Rusk’s memoir provides a fascinating, if ultimately disappointing, record of the Georgian’s distinguished service in behalf of United States liberal-internationalist foreign policy after the Second World War. Undertaken by his son, Richard, as a labor that might heal the rupture that developed with his prominent father during the Vietnam War, As I Saw It allows both Rusks to speak for themselves — Rusk fils in probing, often poignant section introductions, Rusk pere in the main text. For of all recent secretaries of state, Dean Rusk has proved perhaps the most puzzling to historians and political