five years earlier." Despite minor factual inaccuracies, *In the Time of the Tyrants* will stand the test of time as one of the most brilliant renderings of Panama's agony.

The volume edited by Watson and Tsouras is a more conventional analysis of JUST CAUSE by Washington-based military intelligence professionals. Containing a useful chronology and extensive bibliography, it focuses on the background to the crisis, the prelude, operational aspects (forces, intelligence, command, control and communications, air power, logistics, civil affairs, the media) and the aftermath of intervention. The book integrates the efforts of various authors. Chapter quality varies from inconsistent to excellent. The best may be the penetrating essay by Susan G. Horwitz, "Indications and Warning Factors." Horwitz analyzes the series of decisions taken by figures on both the Panamanian and US sides in the 1987-89 period, and concludes that JUST CAUSE was the last resort imposed by Noriega's intransigence and provocations. Not a bad conclusion, given the unclassified evidence summoned. Future research may indicate that JUST CAUSE was the result of a peculiar combination of domestic and international factors that weighed on the presidency in December 1989. The shooting of American Lieutenant Robert Paz and other PDF brutalities on the weekend of December 16 was the final straw. Mark P. Sullivan's "The Future U.S. Role in Panama," is an excellent and sensitive analysis of the challenges ahead for the United States, such as the building of democracy, revitalizing the economy, eliminating drug-trafficking, establishing the new police force, and the future of bilateral defense relations after the treaty mandated departure of US military forces by 31 December 1999. Sullivan reminds us that while JUST CAUSE was a brilliant long-range contingency deployment, rebuilding a nation and knowing when and how to disengage in the post-conflict phase is the greater challenge for American strategy. It may indeed be its Achilles heel.

Gabriel Marcella  
U.S. Army War College


The official history of *British Intelligence in the Second World War* has at last been completed with the publication of Michael Howard's study of strategic deception. Between 1939-45, British authorities demonstrated an unparalleled mastery of this art, which may well have been a necessary cause for the success of operations HUSKY and OVERLORD alike. Michael Howard's study, therefore, will interest students both of deception and the
Second World War. It is intelligently conceived, elegantly written — and ten years overdue. This is not Sir Michael's fault; the work was ready for publication in 1980. Senior British officials and politicians, however, deferred its appearance, partly to strangle discussion of deception in its cradle. This hope proved forlorn. During the 1980s the study of deception became an academic growth industry. In particular, several analyses of Britain's experience during the Second World War were published (the most notable being the first-rate collection of articles in Michael Handel, ed., Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War, while the "Hesketh Report," the official study of the brilliant deception campaign which covered the invasion of Normandy, became widely available among scholars — although it has never been released by Her Majesty's Government.

All this has reduced the impact and the interest of Howard's work. In 1981 it would have dominated the field. Now it cannot. The book, indeed, contains little new about the most important of the events with which Sir Michael deals — deception in northern and western Europe during 1943-45 and in the Mediterranean during 1943. It lacks both the narrative detail of the Hesketh Report and the analytical depth of the best of the scholarly literature, such as the works of Tom Cubbage and Michael Handel. Howard's book does not possess revolutionary significance nor can it stand alone; but it does stand with credit. This is the study of strategic deception during the Second World War which newcomers will find most useful as an introduction to the field. It must be read by specialists, since it provides by far the best extant examination of the role of deception in Burma, the Middle East and the Mediterranean (especially regarding the early days of "A" Force). The book meets all of the main criteria required for any serious study of deception. It clearly demonstrates, for example, the mechanics of the practice. Howard shows how this rested on the unique combination of "Ultra," the "Double Cross" system and the Abwehr. Material derived from codebreaking informed Britain of what deceptive picture the enemy was likely to buy, and of the degree to which it was doing so; security allowed Britain to smash the enemy's intelligence services and control much of the information that it received; mediocre collection and assessment services ensured that the foe received deceptive material without recognizing it as such. At least regarding deception, either excellent or incompetent intelligence services might have served Germany better than mediocre ones. The former would not have been fooled so easily — if ever; the latter might not have discovered the deceiver's lure, and therefore never have swallowed their hook. Howard also recognizes that the records both of the practitioners and the prey of deception must be studied in order to determine how — if at all — the spider's web entrapped the fly. He might have conducted more research into German files; he has, nonetheless, provided the most thorough and convincing assessment in the literature of how British deception affected the enemy's strategic perceptions and actions. Finally, Sir Michael appreciates that deception may not have affected even the most foolish of the enemy's strategic decisions. Only in his discussion of the events of 1942 does Howard assign greater casual significance to the effect of strategic deception than the evidence can sustain. Otherwise, he recognizes
that German stupidity was not always caused by British intelligence — although it often was.

J.R. Ferris
University of Calgary


These books offer the reader interesting insights into the different approaches of academics and journalists to the discussion of security intelligence matters, and, taken together, provide complementary reviews of Canadian security intelligence during the last fifty years. Cleroux, the journalist, concentrates on domestic questions via the history of the RCMP Security Service and then CSIS during the last twenty years, while the academics only deal with domestic matters to the extent that they are connected with the international aspects of espionage. Given the lack of an offensive foreign intelligence agency in Canada, the RCMP and CSIS provide a common theme in both books; another is the “branch plant” status of Canadian agencies within the Western alliance.

Both books are organized thematically and chronologically, which can sometimes lead to a lack of clarity, but such a structure is more or less imposed by the nature of the material, that is, the record of events is not simply continuous and has to be reconstructed from a patchwork of material. Similarly, some themes reappear at irregular intervals and a purely chronological treatment could not analyze them sufficiently; for example, the impact of Anglophone dominance of security intelligence, and the problems of mounting prosecutions when sources might be compromised or “evidence” does not meet due process criteria.

Cleroux examines the activities of the RCMP in Quebec in the 1970s, the resulting McDonald Commission, and the subsequent legislation. The early management problems within the new CSIS, including the initial failure to “civilianize,” the turf wars with the RCMP, the Atwal case and the resignation of the first CSIS Director are all discussed. There is a critical review both of the overall government performance in the area of security screening and of the performance of the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) in its role as appeals tribunal. It is argued that the SIRC has proved too ready to accept automatically CSIS objections to witnesses answering questions, a point echoed in the Report of the Special Committee of the Commons on the review of the CSIS Act.¹ Similarly, Cleroux’s criticism of the SIRC report on