Mockaitis ascribes the failure of other powers involved in counterinsurgency to pay attention to the pre-1945 British experience to their belief that insurgency was a post-1945 phenomena linked to Communism, and the fact that Britain’s earlier experience was never finalized into a coherent doctrine, with no extensive body of official literature until the 1960s. The doctrinal vacuum regarding counterinsurgency within the British Army was not surprising given the institution’s general disdain for doctrine and the reluctance of officers to attempt to build their careers on such a specialist field. In addition, the decentralized military structure, while being a key advantage in the fighting insurgents, inhibited the collection and transmission of experience, and thus the formation of doctrine.

The strength of British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 is Mockaitis’ examination of the lesser known pre-1945 internal security operations, which reveals the uneven development of the principles of counterinsurgency which became so much clearer during the post-1945 campaigns, providing insight for both the seasoned researcher and those studying the topic for the first time. Simply put, it is the best single volume available on the subject.

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The study of revolutions has been approached in a wide variety of ways and the books reviewed here show two of them. Both are fairly interesting and worthy in their own ways but whether either adds a great deal to a better understanding of revolutions is a different matter.

It is well to begin this review with the collection of essays edited by Schutz and Slater because its scope is broader and its contents more diverse. Its emphasis is on the nature and extent of regime illegitimacy in states with revolutions. In this regard, although the introduction contains a fairly brief discussion about the relationship between regime illegitimacy and various types of revolutionary movements, its most important feature is an analytical framework of movement types in the context of regime illegitimacy. The types given are: collapse of monarchical legitimacy and revolutionary change;
Islamic resurgence and the revolutionary legitimacy of religion; revolutionary legitimation in the countryside; regime illegitimacy and revolutionary mobilization; anticolonial revolutionary nationalism; anti-Marxist insurgencies; and, ethnonationalist movements. The type headings do not always clearly identify the types and none of the movement types is discussed at any length in the introduction.

Prior to the presentation of the case studies that exemplify the types of revolutions found in the analytical framework, four essays are included that deal with different approaches to the study of revolutions. These approaches are: historical (Gerard Chaliand); the effects of indigenous factors in the dynamics of revolutionary change (T. David Mason); the effects of external causes on revolutionary behavior (William T. Foltz); and, the part played by East-West relations on revolutionary movements (Zaki Laidi). The case studies are by Edmund Keller (Ethiopia), John Voll and Fred R. Von Der Mehden (Islam), Henry Dietz (Peru), William M. LeoGrande (Central America), David Rosenberg (the Philippines), Stephen M. Davis (the ANC of South Africa), As'ad AbuKhalil (the Palestine Liberation Organization), and Marina Ottaway (Angola’s UNITA).

If the reader is developing the impression that the collection of essays lacks tight organization, that is a fair conclusion. The merits of the volume are primarily individual, not collective. The essays about the four approaches are interesting and thoughtful, and each of the case studies is well done, although their relatively short length precludes the presentation of extensive analysis and detail. Specialists undoubtedly will find the case studies deficient in one respect or another, but the book appears to be aimed less at scholars and more at an educated, general audience. At this level, the book succeeds moderately well as it presents a great deal of information in a straightforward, readable manner. But does the collection ever become something more than the sum of its individual parts and assist in the development of a greater theoretical understanding of revolutions? No, it does not.

A large part of the book’s problems stem from its introduction. First, there is only a sketchy discussion about the importance of regime illegitimacy for revolutionary movements that raises more issues and questions than it answers. Second, the editors fail to explain why their concentration on regime illegitimacy promises to be of greater theoretical relevance than if they had chosen to focus their attention elsewhere. Presumably they consider their focus to be especially valuable but they do not explain why this is so.

Third, the analytical framework is not only presented to the reader in almost a perfunctory manner but the principles determining its construction are barely explained. How does the reader know that the various types included in it are exhaustive? Perhaps other relevant types were omitted. Equally, it is not self-evident from examining it that the types are mutually exclusive. In brief, the analytical framework is neither entirely convincing in itself nor does it appear to be the result of careful thought. Indeed, it almost appears to be a tree designed to be hung with an assortment of ornaments or in this case, to give form to a number of widely different essays. True, it may
be well-constructed and analytically useful but the case for this has not been made.

Finally, regime illegitimacy as a spur to revolutionary movements strikes this reader as being too broad to be very analytically useful. After all, regime illegitimacy virtually by definition is an element in all revolutionary situations. It is nearly in the class of using "the desire for power" as an explanation for revolutions. At any rate, if it is to become the basis of a convincing and useful analytical framework, it will need a far better explanation/discussion than it receives in this book. As it stands, the book edited by Schutz and Slater contains some admirable parts but they are never integrated into a strong collective whole because the analytical framework is so loose. But this is not a difficulty with the book by Farideh Fardhi. And it makes sense to begin the review of this second book by briefly comparing it with the edited volume by Schutz and Slater.

It is instructive to compare these books, one so broadly focused, loosely integrated, and diverse in material and the other almost exactly the reverse. Several points of comparison will be made here. The first is that Fardhi carefully restricts her attention to only one type of revolution, urban-based, and two revolutions, those of Iran and Nicaragua. With Fardhi, the focus is clear, precise, and deliberately narrow; there are no questions about the integration of the elements of her study. However, the narrow focus, while allowing Fardhi to treat her subject with care and in some detail, makes the book of less general interest than Schutz and Slater's.

Another point of note is that the Schutz and Slater framework contains no urban-based type although it does contain one that specifically focuses on the countryside. Indeed, Fardhi's two revolutions that are so nicely compatible in many respects would fit in entirely different categories in the Schutz and Slater framework, Nicaragua in the regime illegitimacy and revolutionary mobilization type, and Iran in the Islamic resurgence and the revolutionary legitimacy of religion type. Because Fardhi makes an excellent case for considering them together and the framework omits urban-based revolutions, its utility receives no support from Fardhi's work. But it is time now to examine her book more carefully.

As stated in Fardhi's introduction, her study relies on a "comparative historical approach," the essence of which is "to compare in detail a small number of cases within an explicit theoretical framework" (p. 1) which has the effect of acting "as an important check on theoretical explanation." (p. 2) So her study is not an attempt to create new theory but rather to refine one that already exists, in this case an adaptation by the author of one developed by Theda Skocpal in States and Social Revolutions. The Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions were chosen for study both because they pose several problems for Skocpal's explanatory framework, and Fardhi identified a number of similarities between them.

Skocpal's explanatory framework and Fardhi's questioning and modification of the framework are well discussed in her first chapter, which is
interesting in its own right and necessary for what follows. Chapter Two, “Peripheral State, Prominent Classes, and Revolution” discusses similarities in pre-revolutionary Iran and Nicaragua. For example, both had regimes that were highly personalist yet bureaucratic, corrupt, and with poor nationalist credentials. Both also had a weak middle class and relied extensively on militaries that were committed to the leaders of the regimes. But for all their similarities, Farhi also notes important respects in which they differed.

Chapter Three, “Urbanization and Political Protest,” discusses how the two revolutions occurred in situations of crisis for the national governments. The crisis at the top first allowed discontented domestic groups to wear away the governmental capacity and will to employ effective coercion, and later led to the destruction of the old regimes and the establishment of new regimes both more highly centralized than before yet based on greater mass support. The author also shows how and why the revolutions did not originate from the countryside.

The fourth chapter, “The Role of Ideology,” lays out the basic ideologies of the pre-revolutionary regimes and how their successors developed their own ideologies often in deliberate opposition to those that were replaced. Of course, the new ideologies of Iran and Nicaragua were not identical and led in part to different political, economic, and social consequences. The results of the revolutions are discussed in her fifth chapter, “Revolutionary Outcomes,” which explains how the revolutionary outcomes resulted from differences in their ideologies, the organizational and social strengths of the new regimes, the economic positions of the states in the global economy, and their geographic-strategic locations. The outcomes are effectively contrasted and discussed. Finally, there is a conclusion that succinctly restates the major points developed earlier and briefly comments about the effects of Farhi’s research on Skocpal’s explanatory framework.

The reviewer feels under no obligation to pronounce which of the books is “best.” Apart from their general subject, relatively short length, and capable writing, they differ so greatly in purpose and execution that their overall quality is hard to compare. The edited volume by Schutz and Slater will appeal most to persons interested in one or more of its topics and authors. And Farhi’s book, although of less interest to a general audience, will be of great interest to scholars whose work touches on major aspects of her well crafted but narrowly focused study.

One last topic remains for this reviewer and that is to give his opinion on a matter raised in this review’s first paragraph, i.e. to state which of the books adds the most to a better understanding of revolutions. His judgment here is ironical in a sense. The Schutz and Slater edited volume presents a new analytical framework while Farhi’s study is content to examine and modify an existing explanatory framework. Yet the latter work, despite its narrow scope and modest intent, adds more to a scholarly understanding of revolutions than the more ambitious work. This reviewer’s critique of the Schutz and Slater analytical framework need not be repeated here. But perhaps this evaluation owes as much to this reviewer’s preferences in scholarship as to how much the
two books add to the development of theory. Time and the scholarly community will have the final say. That both books will find audiences is a safe conclusion.

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This book on post-revolutionary Iran's relations with the superpowers and its Arab and non-Arab neighbors provides a wealth of information on continuity and change in Iran's international relations. Most of its contributors are well-known academics and media analysts of the Middle East. The book consists of eleven chapters organized in six parts.

The first section, with articles by Miron Rezun and Roger Savory offers an historical perspective as background for the internal and external causes of post-revolutionary Iran's "irrational" behavior in the international arena. Both articles, while providing insightful information, suffer to some degree from certain weaknesses, inaccuracies and debatable claims. For example, Rezun emphasizes Iran's alleged historical desire to dominate East Asia through the "east-west" expansion of the Trans-Iranian Railway under the last Shah. He argues that this expansion was intended to redirect "the flow of Afghan trade away from the Soviet border back to the markets of South Asia and the Middle East." (p. 13) One must question the significance of the "Afghan trade" as justification for an eastward railway expansion. Moreover, Iran's limited eastbound railways were mostly related to industrial and inter-city transportation, and they actually did not extend to the Afghani border.

Rezun also asserts that for centuries "Iranian clergy [have acted] as the most vocal opponents of unpopular monarchs." (p. 15) In fact, however, since the sixteenth century when the Safavids established Shia as the official religion of the state, Shiite clerics have sometimes been supportive of imperial courts and at other times, passive and apolitical. Occasionally, they have raised voices of dissent, most notably with the opposition to the last Shah led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

Roger Savory is more focused and comprehensive in his chapter on how Iran, caught between two colonial powers — Russia and Britain — followed a policy of "equilibrium," playing one against the other, while at times trying to find a "third power." He identifies and elaborates on the political and economic "imperatives" of Iran's foreign policy. However, he