in the 1980s. Though he may seem to have exhausted the conservative vocabulary in his treatment of previous disorders ("the malevolence of the mob" in Bristol in 1831, "The malevolence of the people" in Liverpool in 1919), he recognizes that there were just grievances, and that the system was imperfect. But now? His story, because it skates so lightly over the important questions in the past, offers no lessons for the future, nor even any means of evaluating the possibilities of British traditions adapting to increased public violence. His chapter on Northern Ireland is, inexplicably, devoted almost entirely to the period before the commitment of troops. It is on the great public questions involved that his lack of interest in the mass of research already carried out by others is most incapacitating. It is hard to believe that, had he read Gerry Northam’s *Shooting in the Dark*, he could have been so offhand about the issues raised by the militarization of the British police. Could it be worth militarizing the police to avoid a return to the old dependence on the army? He seems to accept the inevitability of both paramilitary policing and military action Gibraltar-style, though most of us would presumably hope that the one would preclude the other. If that is a naïve idea, we need to be told more convincingly than this.

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Many of the books that deal with British counterinsurgency approach the topic through the use of case studies, often beginning with the success against the Communists in Malaya, drawing out the similarities in later campaigns and how the Malaya “model” was used or amended in Kenya, Cyprus or elsewhere. Thomas Mockaitis, in his admirable and comprehensive *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, broadens the debate considerably by abandoning the case study approach and investigating the question of why the British alone among the great powers faced with insurgencies were so successful and adaptable to the challenges presented by this type of warfare. According to Mockaitis, the answer lays in the fact that the British had been conducting internal security operations very similar to counterinsurgency for at least 30 years prior to the emergency in Malaya. As a result of this experience, spanning operations in Ireland, Burma, India and Palestine, they developed methods for defeating insurgents and, more importantly, principles upon which these methods were based.

Mockaitis identifies three principles as the bedrock of the British approach: minimum force, close cooperation between the military and the
civilian administration, and tactical flexibility on the part of the army. This overall strategy appears to cascade downward from adherence to the “golden rule,” as it were, the principle of minimum force, then flowing logically from one requirement to another. Simply stated, to locate the insurgents and engage them with minimum force, the security forces must have information about the insurgents’ whereabouts and activities. To obtain this, the government must establish an effective intelligence network using local sources. To ensure the loyalty of the target community and assist in the gathering of intelligence, the security forces must therefore protect the target community from the insurgents and refrain from using excessive force or retaliation, while assuring the law is enforced fairly. With accurate intelligence the security forces can engage the enemy with small units, minimizing the threat to the innocent and taking the fight to the enemy. To be successful, these small units must be led by competent junior officers and allowed the freedom to take the initiative. To secure the long-term support of the target community their “hearts and minds” must be won over to the government side, their genuine political grievances addressed and immediate economic needs satisfied. To make it all work at ground level, tight administration of the target area is required through an effective civil authority working in close cooperation with the security forces. To find the administrative and military solutions in each distinct area, both structures must be of a de-centralized nature to allow the local civil and security leadership to get on with the job.

But the three principles developed unevenly, and in no campaign before Malaya were they all effectively combined into a single coherent strategy. Hard lessons were learned in the disastrous campaign in Ireland (1919-21), the incident at Amritsar (1919), in Palestine during the Arab Revolt (1936-39) and the Jewish insurgency (1945-47) and in conflicts elsewhere. Even in the post-1945 period, despite a wealth of knowledge gained in these internal security operations, the British often persisted in dealing with each insurgency on an ad hoc basis, although following well-established principles. Even during the “textbook” case of the Malayan campaign, Mockaitis reminds us, the Malayan authorities were too slow to apply the lessons of the past. It was a full two years before the campaign of repression (1948-50) was abandoned and an effective strategy put in its place. Only two years later, the government of Kenya did much the same during the initial phase of the fight against the Mau Mau insurgency (1952-53). In both campaigns the army relied in the early period on ineffective large-scale sweeps due to a lack of accurate intelligence, which were generally wasteful in manpower and demoralizing for troops due to lack of results, and meted out collective punishment, alienating the target community. Mockaitis concludes that incidents of brutality did occur in the course of post-1945 campaigns, especially in Kenya, but it was never systematized as it was under the French in Algeria (1954-62), and usually occurred at the hands of locally raised units, such as the Kenya Police Reserve, and not by members of regular British battalions. That the military also went out of its way to avoid injuring civilians and separating combatants and non-combatants is well illustrated by Mockaitis in his description of the development of air support for internal security operations, starting in 1920 in Iraq.
Mockaitis ascribes the failure of other powers involved in counterinsurgency to pay attention to the pre-1945 British experience to their belief that insurgency was a post-1945 phenomena linked to Communism, and the fact that Britain's earlier experience was never finalized into a coherent doctrine, with no extensive body of official literature until the 1960s. The doctrinal vacuum regarding counterinsurgency within the British Army was not surprising given the institution's general disdain for doctrine and the reluctance of officers to attempt to build their careers on such a specialist field. In addition, the decentralized military structure, while being a key advantage in the fighting insurgents, inhibited the collection and transmission of experience, and thus the formation of doctrine.

The strength of *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60* is Mockaitis' examination of the lesser known pre-1945 internal security operations, which reveals the uneven development of the principles of counterinsurgency which became so much clearer during the post-1945 campaigns, providing insight for both the seasoned researcher and those studying the topic for the first time. Simply put, it is the best single volume available on the subject.

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The study of revolutions has been approached in a wide variety of ways and the books reviewed here show two of them. Both are fairly interesting and worthy in their own ways but whether either adds a great deal to a better understanding of revolutions is a different matter.

It is well to begin this review with the collection of essays edited by Schutz and Slater because its scope is broader and its contents more diverse. Its emphasis is on the nature and extent of regime illegitimacy in states with revolutions. In this regard, although the introduction contains a fairly brief discussion about the relationship between regime illegitimacy and various types of revolutionary movements, its most important feature is an analytical framework of movement types in the context of regime illegitimacy. The types given are: collapse of monarchical legitimacy and revolutionary change;