this book — Clutterbuck has produced a volume that stands the test of time. The book is deserving of a place as an academic reference work or inclusion in the personal collection of those authorities who specialize in the fields of political violence and criminal justice.

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Military intervention in politics has brought about some of the most dramatic, and often catastrophic changes in the history of states. Political scientists have accordingly studied with some care the impact of *The Man on Horseback*, as S.E. Finer called his seminal book on the subject. As both military technology and social organization have become more sophisticated, the risks of such intervention have certainly not diminished. Britain, however, has usually been thought to be comparatively immune to the threat. It certainly has had no remote equivalent of Generals Mola and Franco. The rather sensational title of Anthony Babington’s book is therefore misleading. He is not concerned with military intervention as it is normally understood, and anyone who reaches for this book looking for guidance about whether the threat is increasing or diminishing, or changing in nature, will be surprised to find that the one occasion on which the British army came closest to direct political intervention, the Curragh incident of 1914, is not even mentioned in it.

What Babington is concerned with is military aid to the civil power, a much less alarming — indeed quite constitutional — matter, though one that involves the temporary collapse of law and order, and sometimes major civil violence. In Britain it has always been fraught with difficulties caused by ingrained aversion not only to the army but also to the precise codification of emergency powers. Babington tells rather flatly a tale which is widely familiar: how the British refusal to tolerate the idea of a professional police led repeatedly to the use of troops to control rioting crowds, often with bloody effects. “Peterloo” was the nadir of this process, though the Bristol riots of 1831 showed the equally disastrous results of military forbearance. Eventually, the growth of modern police forces steadily eliminated the need to call on military assistance. With the odd exception of Ireland, which Babington seems uncertain whether to treat as part of Britain, all was well — until the horrors of Brixton in 1981.

We may sympathize with Babington’s evident inability to grasp the reasons for “the malignity of the mobs and the viciousness of their weapons”
in the 1980s. Though he may seem to have exhausted the conservative vocabulary in his treatment of previous disorders ("the malevolence of the mob" in Bristol in 1831, "The malevolence of the people" in Liverpool in 1919), he recognizes that there were just grievances, and that the system was imperfect. But now? His story, because it skates so lightly over the important questions in the past, offers no lessons for the future, nor even any means of evaluating the possibilities of British traditions adapting to increased public violence. His chapter on Northern Ireland is, inexplicably, devoted almost entirely to the period before the commitment of troops. It is on the great public questions involved that his lack of interest in the mass of research already carried out by others is most incapacitating. It is hard to believe that, had he read Gerry Northam's *Shooting in the Dark*, he could have been so offhand about the issues raised by the militarization of the British police. Could it be worth militarizing the police to avoid a return to the old dependence on the army? He seems to accept the inevitability of both paramilitary policing and military action Gibraltar-style, though most of us would presumably hope that the one would preclude the other. If that is a naïve idea, we need to be told more convincingly than this.

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Many of the books that deal with British counterinsurgency approach the topic through the use of case studies, often beginning with the success against the Communists in Malaya, drawing out the similarities in later campaigns and how the Malaya "model" was used or amended in Kenya, Cyprus or elsewhere. Thomas Mockaitis, in his admirable and comprehensive *British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60*, broadens the debate considerably by abandoning the case study approach and investigating the question of why the British alone among the great powers faced with insurgencies were so successful and adaptable to the challenges presented by this type of warfare. According to Mockaitis, the answer lays in the fact that the British had been conducting internal security operations very similar to counterinsurgency for at least 30 years prior to the emergency in Malaya. As a result of this experience, spanning operations in Ireland, Burma, India and Palestine, they developed methods for defeating insurgents and, more importantly, principles upon which these methods were based.

Mockaitis identifies three principles as the bedrock of the British approach: minimum force, close cooperation between the military and the