

From Security Threat to Protection of Vital Interests: Changing Perceptions in the Dutch Security Service, 1945-91

by
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INTRODUCTION

Very little has been published on the Dutch Internal Security Service, (*de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, BVD*). There is no readily available English-language publication. Many of the English-language books and articles on counterintelligence and security focus on the major western countries. Yet a closer look at the Dutch security service may be timely. Before the breakdown of the Eastern European regimes the BVD began a major reorganization to meet new challenges. To understand the magnitude of the reorganization the history of the Dutch security service and intelligence community since the Second World War must be examined. In a truly democratic society a security service can only be understood within the context of its socio-political environment. In a time when the public at large and politicians are in doubt about the threats to security, if any, it can be instructive to look back at an earlier period and study the historical reasons for the establishment and functioning of security services.

This article will examine the perceptions of security threats in Dutch society at two levels: first, that of the larger society and politicians; and second, that of the security service itself. The latter has proved to be difficult, since only recently has the BVD become more open. Since 1986 the "historical" records of the security service, which in practice came to include records over thirty years old, could, under certain conditions, no longer be withheld from public scrutiny. However, since files on persons more than five years old will to a large extent probably be destroyed after 1993 — whereas policy files will be kept — research has focused on the personal files while they are still available. An official history of the BVD is being written but it will not be published for a few more years. Therefore, the article has taken the statements of the Minister of the Interior in parliamentary debates as an indication of the perceptions and intentions of the BVD itself. As will be seen, there has been a closed parliamentary committee on the BVD since 1952. However, this has not altogether hampered open debate. As time has progressed, the BVD has been scrutinized more and more in the open, both inside and outside the Dutch Parliament. Furthermore, there have been occasional interviews given by successive heads of the BVD, occasional leaks to the press and occasional investigations by the press. The BVD has not encountered major scandals that could have led to more disclosures.

It is, of course, not possible to present a full-fledged survey of the history of the BVD. The focus of this article will be on the perceptions of the security threat of both Dutch society at large and the BVD, and on the implications of the relationship between both for societal and political support for the BVD.

Nevertheless, since there have been no English language publications on the BVD to date, some information has been added in an attempt to make this article a little more “the” history of the BVD than just “a” history.

THE DUTCH INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SYSTEM BEFORE 1945

Before the Second World War intelligence and counter-intelligence in the Netherlands was conducted by GS III, a section of the General Staff of the Netherlands Army. GS III had been established shortly before the outbreak of the First World War. During the Great War its main task was counterespionage to secure Dutch neutrality. GS III counted only a dozen officers and was always short of money. Therefore, GS III made an arrangement with foreign intelligence agencies operating in the Netherlands whereby they were free to gather information as long as they stayed within the law, did not harm other agents and — most important of all — shared their intelligence with GS III.

At this time, security was the task of the regional attorneys-general and — in the larger cities — the local police forces. Fear of a socialist revolution in November 1918 caused GS III to integrate security into its activities. However, the chief police commissioners in the larger cities were adamant that security should remain the task of the local police forces. Therefore, it was decided to establish a Central Security Service (*Centrale Inlichtingendienst*, CID), which would coordinate the security functions of the local police forces. The CID was integrated into GS III as GS III-B, with GS III-A becoming the external intelligence department. It came under the responsibility of both the ministers of Defence and the Interior, the latter having jurisdiction over the local police forces.

The changing international political climate, and an increasingly rigid policy of neutrality by the Netherlands government kept GS III absorbed by policy and organizational concerns in the second half of the 1930's. All of this helped to prevent the preparation of a stay-behind net that could function after the German invasion of the Netherlands in 1940.¹ Consequently, when the Dutch government-in-exile in London tried to establish contact with their occupied homeland they had to start almost from scratch. For communications they were dependent upon the British secret services, MI6 and SOE. It was within this context that the disastrous *Englandspiel* developed, where the German *Sicherheitsdienst* and the *Abwehr* ran a radio and double-agent deception against the SOE from spring 1942 until April 1944, which cost the lives of over fifty Dutch agents.

After the detection of the fiasco the Dutch secret service's structure in London was changed. By the time the first parts of the Netherlands were liberated in September 1944 there were three major services: the Intelligence Service (*Bureau Inlichtingen*, BI), the Bureau Special Operations (*Bureau Bijzondere Opdrachten*, BBO) and the Police Outer Service (*Politiebuitendienst*, PBD). They were the respective counterparts of the Dutch sections of MI6, SOE and MI5. The PBD became MG Section IIIA, when the Military Authority (*Militair Gezag*, MG) took charge in the liberated areas of the Netherlands.²

1945-1949: THE REALIZATION OF THE SOVIET THREAT

The Netherlands were liberated mainly by the First Canadian Army. On the basis of the so-called legal agreement of 1 September 1944 Canadian Field Security could arrest and detain persons in the liberated parts of the Netherlands. At first only MG Section IIIA was entitled to assist Canadian Field Security. However, the Shock Forces (*Stoottroepen*) of the Forces of the Interior, formed out of the resistance groups in the liberated southern areas of the Netherlands, had its own counterintelligence section, which operated largely on its own. When in spring 1945 larger areas of the Netherlands were liberated several resistance groups continued their existence as arrest teams and counterintelligence groups. The Canadian military authorities were disturbed by the lack of coordination in this field and complained about the poor qualities of MG Section IIIA.

Therefore, in May 1945 the Dutch authorities established a central Bureau of National Security (*Bureau Nationale Veiligheid*, BNV) as the sole agency assigned to obtain information on former German secret service personnel and their agents. MG Section IIIA was discontinued and the BNV took charge of the latter's functions with regard to political screening of army personnel and Dutchmen wanting to go abroad. When the legal agreement between the British and the Dutch governments expired on 15 July 1945, BNV took over the detainees and Dutch personnel from Canadian Field Security. Until September 1945 some Canadian Field Security units and CI-specialists continued to render their services. Thereafter, British personnel took over their duties.³

The BNV was also charged with the task of informing the Dutch government about the dangers of revolutionary agitation. To this end BNV established Bureau B, also called *Bureau Extremism* or — after its head — *Bureau Crabbendam*. Bureau B was in fact the successor of the prewar CID. In a short time it was sending summaries about right- and, more especially, left-wing extremism to the Dutch civil and military authorities.

At the end of 1946 BNV was dissolved. Its historical task of countering German secret service activities in the Netherlands had almost been fulfilled. Its current assignment of mapping political extremism was taken over by the Central Security Service (*Centrale Veiligheidsdienst*, CVD), which was established by secret royal decree. It came under the responsibility of the prime minister who was also responsible for the External Intelligence Service, the successor of the wartime BI.

The Dutch authorities had viewed Bolshevism with utter abhorrence from its inception. Only in 1942 had they recognized the Soviet regime. Attempts by the communists to form a united front union and to win seats in the government failed completely. Unlike other Western European nations the Netherlands were spared communist ministers in the immediate postwar years, though in the first postwar national elections in May 1946 the communists obtained over 10 percent of the votes. These elections proved also that the Dutch population had rejected attempts at a national realignment, which was propa-

gated by some political leaders who had gained prominence during and shortly after the war. The electors instead favored a return to prewar ways, which is to say, a compartmentalization of Dutch society into Catholics, Protestants, liberals and social democrats.⁴

The communists remained almost completely isolated within Dutch society. Opinion polls in the second half of the forties showed a strong barrier between communists and non-communists on almost every major political issue.⁵ The Dutch translation of Communist defector Victor Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom* was a bestseller for many months. Political strikes organized by the communist party (CPN) to prevent the shipment of troops to Indonesia served only to underline their political isolation.

Shortly after the war the successive Dutch security services came to realize that before 1939 Soviet espionage had been much more extensive than was previously understood. It became known that the Netherlands had had their share of illegal residents in the persons of Max Friedman, Ignace Reiss and Walter Krivitsky. Between 1935 and 1937 Krivitsky used his alias of Dr. Martin Lessner to conduct espionage in Western Europe from his antique shop in The Hague.⁶

Through Krivitsky the Dutch learned that there had been an important Soviet network in the Netherlands, which could only be fully unravelled after the war. One of its best agents had been the Dutch artist Henri Christiaan Pieck who had recruited the code specialist of the British Foreign Office, John Herbert King. Pieck had also been in contact with Bill Hooper, a member of the British Passport Control Office in The Hague, who was in fact a triple agent working for the British, the Germans and the Soviets.

It was also revealed that the Netherlands had played their part in the *Rote Kapelle* (Red Orchestra).⁷ The Dutchman Daniel Goulooze had been a contact man for Moscow in Western Europe since 1937 and had been in charge of several wireless transmitter sets. Until his arrest in November 1943 he had been in contact with KPD members in Berlin and with Comintern members in Belgium, France and Great Britain. In June 1942 Nikodemus Kruyt was dropped into the Netherlands for the Russians by SOE with a W/T set and made contact with Goulooze. It has been alleged by Richard Deacon that it was through this latter radio contact that permission was obtained for the Dutchman George Behar, later known as George Blake, to travel on an escape route to Britain, as one of 14 Soviet agents smuggled through to Britain during the war.⁸

Information about the Gouzenko case convinced the Dutch authorities that Soviet espionage had not ended with the Second World War. However, the single most influential event that stressed the need for internal security against the communists was the communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. The already large percentage of the population who thought measures against communism were necessary rose overnight from 70 to 80 percent.⁹ Parliamentary leaders were not slow in reacting. In early March they came together and reached a consensus on measures which, without forbidding the CPN, prevented it from practising some of its normal functions as a party,

especially participating in some of the more sensitive parliamentary committees and providing aldermen in the local councils.¹⁰

Little is known about Soviet activities in the immediate postwar years. There are, however, some indications that Soviet agents took an interest in compromising data about the wartime pasts of some leading Dutchmen. The communist newspaper *De Waarheid* also used such data when convenient, especially during elections.¹¹

1949-1967: A CLEAR AND COLD WAR

In August 1949 the *Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst* (Internal Security Service, BVD) was established by confidential royal decree. The decree defined the BVD's functions as collecting information about all persons who tended to, were or had been involved in activities dangerous to the state of the Netherlands or to friendly countries; gathering information about politically extremist movements; the furtherance of security measures in all vital and vulnerable government and private institutions and industries; and the maintenance of liaison with friendly foreign security and intelligence services.¹²

The BVD came under the minister of the Interior despite postwar efforts by the ministry of Justice to get the responsibility for the security service. The reason for not placing the BVD under the Justice minister was the fear of creating a new Gestapo. Therefore, intelligence and executive functions (investigation, arrest and detention) were separated, the former being given to the BVD, the latter to the police. However, the BVD could call upon designated officials with the local police, the so-called *Politie Inlichtingendienst* (Police Intelligence Service, PID), which was comparable to the Special Branch in the UK. Until then the police in the Netherlands were divided into a state police (*Rijkspolitie*) which covered the smaller towns and the countryside and was the responsibility of the minister of Justice, and the local police in the larger cities, which was the responsibility of the Interior minister. Today, the designated officials of the local police do much of the practical BVD work. As a policeman such an official has executive powers, and as a BVD official he has intelligence functions. In theory both types of functions should not be confused. Critics of the BVD and PID have always maintained that this theoretical framework is setting rather high standards for the local policemen.¹³

In this period the external and internal enemies were clearly known: the Soviet Union with its East European satellites and its fifth column, the communist party in the Netherlands. The communists still had their own union, which in 1950 counted for 14 percent of organized laborers, but it was not recognized by the government. It played no role of importance in the fifties and was dissolved in 1964. The communist party also dwindled from 10.6 percent of the votes in 1946 to around 3 percent in the late fifties and early sixties.

In fact, throughout this period there was a general consensus in the Netherlands on the major political objectives, and, until the early sixties there were no major labor disputes. The Labour Party and, more especially, some converted communists within its ranks were among the most virulent anti-

communists and defended the existence of a security service like the BVD. Leaders of the Labour Party tipped off the BVD about oppositional groups within the party and about journalists who had information they did not want to become public.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the BVD was often on the look-out for labor unrest. It was an integrated part of its regular reports. The BVD established close links with both employers and the "bona fides," (i.e. the socialist, protestant and catholic) unions.¹⁵ Security plans against communist agitation were adopted for major industries in the early fifties.¹⁶ And in the same vein, the government established a stay-behind network under the name of O and I (Operations and Intelligence), separate from the BVD, whose members held responsible positions in important concerns.¹⁷ At the end of this period the ministry of Defence carried out a study into the possibility of a coup in the Netherlands, but concluded that such an event was extremely unlikely.¹⁸

Besides communists, Trotskyists also held the continuous attention of the BVD. In the sixties the BVD also turned its attention to Maoist groups that had links with the Chinese embassy in The Hague. In 1964 the communist party divided over which course they should follow: Moscow or Peking. Some of the Maoists left the party and started small Maoist groups. The remainder of the communist party turned away from close links with Moscow. Finally, during the fifties and sixties the BVD also watched leftist student organizations, surveying their contacts with East European students and organizations. The BVD was interested in the political orientations of students because of the government jobs they would likely occupy after their studies. The BVD also observed right-wing extremists, especially certain neo-nazis. However, these groups were so small and weak that they posed little threat.¹⁹

Besides material security, political screening for both government positions and vital industries (especially those that held defense orders) was a major function of the BVD. By 1975 one out of every three of the 221,000 positions with the national government required political screening. Political screening was the BVD's most heavily criticized task in the Dutch parliament, especially from 1960, when some members of the Labour Party used the debates on the budget for the Interior ministry year after year to give voice to their concerns about the impact of political screening on the individual's rights. Academics also protested political screening for teaching and research professions at the universities, believing that it conflicted with academic freedom.²⁰

Parliamentary control of the BVD had been delegated in 1952 to a standing committee on the BVD, which consisted of the parliamentary leaders of the main political parties. They were obliged to remain silent about any information they received in this committee. Compared with other nations this was a very early effort to establish a structural form of parliamentary control over the security service. On the other hand, the reasons for doing so resulted partly from the demand for more secrecy. As a social democratic parliamentarian stated, the security service could not be freely debated in parliament since the enemy was listening in.²¹ This applied primarily to the communist party, which was excluded from the committee. A standing committee of the parliamentary leaders suited the political culture of the fifties and early sixties, when

the people of the Netherlands were compartmentalized according to denomination and persuasion, and compromises between the different groups were made between their leaders in back-room politics. However, by 1965 the shady character of the standing committee was giving way.

The committee fulfilled several functions. Late in 1963 the president of the standing committee gave an oral report after the committee had looked into complaints about telephone taps that had stirred Dutch public opinion. In 1966 the committee's functions also came to include the external and military intelligence services. In 1967 the committee, for the first time, sent a written report to the second chamber.

Established almost simultaneously with NATO, the BVD also became the National Security Authority. Western cooperation and the Cold War gave added value to the strategic importance of the Netherlands. The Dutch security authorities soon realized that Soviet agents were interested in oil shipments through the Netherlands. Another object of Soviet interest was construction schemes for ships and submarines. Next to the Soviets in importance were Czechs and East Germans who spied for East European countries in the Netherlands.²² In 1951 the first East European espionage ring in the Netherlands was publicized.²³ Czech spies had tried to obtain information on Fokker aircraft factories and about the attitude of the Netherlands towards other countries. In 1961 combined efforts by a KGB and East German agent to obtain information from a BVD secretary were uncovered.²⁴

After 1954 both the BVD and non-communist politicians became extremely worried about the peaceful coexistence concept of the Soviets. They noted that the military Soviet threat had diminished, but they thought the Western world was more helpless against a Soviet propaganda threat. Against this background, a former tutor of BVD personnel — together with some other West Europeans and with the support of Louis Einthoven, the head of the BVD — established in 1961 the International Documentation and Information Centre, (Interdoc) in The Hague. It was set up to inform Western public opinion leaders about the dangers of communism and to start East-West exchange-programs aimed at raising doubts among Eastern European intellectuals about the validity of the communist system.²⁵

The Dutch government, however, was reluctant either to propagandize the West or to counter East European propaganda. As the long-time minister for Foreign Affairs and later NATO-secretary Luns said in the mid-fifties:

When we uphold the principle of freedom of speech within the law in our free society, we do this because we are convinced that the repartee and the critical sense of our citizens are the best defence against alien propaganda. These are stronger weapons than restrictions of freedom. Silent covert propaganda has furthermore a certain success through its romantic connotation. Within the limelights it is brought back into the spheres of reality and relative unimportance.²⁶

1968-1980: THE THREAT OF TERRORISM

Around 1967-68 major upheavals in the social and political structure of the Netherlands occurred. The social compartmentalization, with its accompanying authority structure, disintegrated. This was accompanied by a rapid secularization. For the first time since the establishment of the compartmentalized system at the end of the First World War, the confessional parties lost their majority in parliament. The so-called non-system parties made major breakthroughs as they came to comprise about one quarter of the electorate. System parties could no longer depend on stable sub-electorates of their own, but had to compete for floating voters. In this situation a younger generation within the Labour Party opted for a policy of confrontation to enhance their own party's electoral attraction.

The polarization of Dutch political culture made this period prime for all kinds of action groups. Frustration among the action groups set in when the Labour Party formed the government (1973-77) and had to show responsibility. When in 1977, the Labour Party stayed outside the government, despite a major electoral success, the hopes of leftist action groups ebbed away.

As an internal threat the communist party subsided almost completely. After 1975 it received 2 percent or less of the votes during national elections. From 1976-77, however, it was again oriented toward Moscow.

The government still showed little trust in Soviet intentions. Since 1971 the Soviet government had repeatedly asked for a consulate in Rotterdam, but each time these requests were turned down.

The international scene saw changes, too. At the end of the sixties the Vietnam War led to criticism of the US. The junta in Greece and the colonial wars of Portugal also helped to raise doubts about the NATO alliance. At the time of the Labour dominated government Dutch membership in NATO became hotly debated.

Further, the flow of migrant workers and other aliens from the Mediterranean began to grow. Among them opposition groups with grievances against their mother countries took shape, while antidemocratic organizations like the Moroccan Amicales and the Turkish Grey Wolves also became active.

In this period the Netherlands was confronted with their first major terrorist acts.²⁷ They started in August 1970 on the eve of President Suharto's visit to the Netherlands with the one day occupation of the Indonesian embassy and the killing of a Dutch policeman by South Moluccans. South Moluccan soldiers had made up a large part of the Dutch colonial army in Indonesia. After Indonesia gained its independence South Moluccan soldiers and their families came to the Netherlands in the early fifties expecting to return soon to a free Republic of the South Moluccans. This hope did not materialize, but the South Moluccans remained hopeful. In the 1970s a number of second generation South Moluccans tried to realize the dreams of their law-abiding parents by such forceful means as the embassy attack. In 1975 and 1977 South Moluccans took over for several weeks an Indonesian consulate and primary school, and

hijacked two trains. In 1978 a South Moluccan "suicide squad" occupied a county hall. These were the most traumatic terrorist attacks the Dutch population experienced. The train hijacking in 1977 was relieved at the cost of the deaths of 6 hijackers and 2 hostages.

Aside from the South Moluccans, other groups carried out terrorist attacks in the Netherlands. In 1971 and 1972 El Fatah and Black September claimed responsibility for attacks on oil and gas installations. In 1974 two Palestinians blew up a British plane at Schiphol airport. In September 1974 members of the Japanese Red Army took over the French embassy for almost a week with the objective of securing the release of a comrade from a French prison. After they succeeded, they left in a French plane. In 1979 the British ambassador to The Hague Richard Adam Sykes was murdered. In the same year Armenian organizations claimed responsibility for the murder of the son of the Turkish ambassador and for an attack on the Amsterdam office of Turkish Airlines. The German terrorist organization Red Army Faction (*Rote Armee Fraktion*, RAF) found sympathy among such Dutch groups as the Maoist *Rode Jeugd* (Red Youth), which existed from 1969. In 1976 fifteen of its members received guerrilla training in South Yemen from George Habash's People's Liberation Front of Palestine and from the resident members of the RAF. One of the Red Youth's members cased an Air France plane bound for Israel but was arrested in Tel Aviv. After she gave information to the Israeli authorities the group decided to dissolve itself. Although some members continued their activities in successor organizations, they "choked," as they said themselves, in the liberalism of the Dutch state.²⁸ Unlike the RAF in Germany they could not portray the Netherlands as a police state. In 1977 three members of the RAF were caught after shoot-outs with the police. The next year two customs officers were shot dead, probably by RAF terrorists.

During the 1960s the BVD lost much of the sympathy it had received from the Labour Party in the 1950s. Therefore, around 1970 the government took some measures to enhance democratic control over the BVD, to assure the lawful character of its operations and to establish procedures for lodging complaints against the service. The political screening issue also re-surfaced. In 1969 a decree concerning political screening for positions with the national government was published. An advisory committee was established for applicants who believed they had reason to complain about the negative consequences of their political screening. The criterium of an anti-NATO attitude became the subject of debate around 1975. By 1975 there were about 70,000 positions within the national government for which political screening was thought to be necessary, among them all positions with the ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office. Until then, however, the minister of the Interior had refused to publicize which functions with other ministries demanded political screening. By 1980 their number had declined to 52,000 or a little over 20 percent of all government jobs, a number that was reduced to about 40,000 during the 1980s.

In the 1970s legislation was passed that affected the BVD. In 1971 an act on privacy protection became law. It provided that the chief of the BVD needed

the signatures of 4 ministers to place a telephone tap for a period of three months: those of the prime minister, and the ministers of the Interior, Justice and Communications. For listening in on other conversations using technical means three ministerial signatures were sufficient; the one of the minister of Communications was not necessary in this case. In 1972 the confidential royal decree of 1949 was finally published, as it was no longer considered sensible to conceal the existence of the IDB.

During this period the Dutch security service continued to see internal and external threats to the Netherlands. In 1970 the minister described the following as antidemocratic groups: communists, Trotskyists, anarchists, fascists and national-socialists.²⁹ In an interview in 1971 the then head of the BVD, A. Kuipers, said that there were not only small isolated leftist groups:

We are dealing with a situation in which certain views provide the fuel for the engine of a power apparatus of unknown magnitude. I am speaking about the power of the Soviet bloc, which can in fact crush our political freedom. Whether the Soviets will do this is a matter of efficiency.³⁰

He thought it more likely that the Soviets would try to obtain this goal by local revolutions than by war.

At this time the outlook of the BVD seemed to have become tainted by their prolonged shoulder-rubbing with the communist party. The BVD fell victim to the ill-founded optimism of the communists that the communist utopia was never far away.

There was, however, some cause for real concern by the BVD in so far as the change from a politically stable electorate in the fifties and early sixties — neatly compartmentalized into different groupings — to a system of political fluidity and a lively scene of action groups made it easier for the communists to mix among politically active citizens. Other political parties and the unions were still difficult for communists to penetrate but the peace movement offered some chances, especially from 1977 onward during the campaigns against the so-called neutron bomb. The fear of Dutch citizens being influenced by propaganda from the East, already present in the fifties, seemed to materialize at last.

The right-wing groups were still very powerless, but nevertheless the BVD continued to watch them, as Kuipers said, “relentlessly.”³¹ To date, little is known about the role the BVD played during the late sixties at the time of the so-called Provo and hippy youth culture. However, there are indications that at the Special Branch level the overreaction against this type of anti-establishment demonstration was no less than that exhibited among the regular police forces.³² The establishment of draftees’ unions, which among other things objected to guarding nuclear sites, fell primarily within the domain of the military counter-intelligence services, although the BVD was also involved in watching these developments.

The BVD was also very active in surveillance among guest workers and Greek refugees. Whereas the BVD’s intentions might have been virtuous, these

activities caused considerable disquiet. Some feared that the BVD was informing native secret services about its findings. Aliens who were asked to cooperate with the BVD sometimes became very upset because such requests reminded them of earlier experiences with the secret services of their native countries.

In this period Soviet espionage efforts were thought to be concentrating on military information, including mobilization plans, the contents of military depots, army communications and codes, and the NATO tasks of the Netherlands Army. NATO's Central Region command centre (Afcent), which had been established in the southern part of the Netherlands in 1967 after De Gaulle ousted NATO, was considered to be a key target for the Soviets, just as the Soviets were thought to be influencing the anti-NATO mood of the mid-seventies.

In 1975 it became known that between 1972 and 1975 the Pakistani Abdul Quadr Khan had spied on the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in Amsterdam and the British-German-Dutch Uranium Enrichment Consortium in Almelo looking for information on the ultracentrifuge-process. Thereafter, it became possible for Pakistan to take a decisive step on the way to making its own atom bomb. Khan's success was due to laxity both in vetting by the BVD and in security within the research institutes.³³ The general public in the Netherlands, however, was very disinterested in intelligence and counterintelligence, and soon forgot the Khan-scandal.

The range of terrorist acts, especially those carried out by South Moluccan youths in 1975 and 1977, however, were more disastrous for the standing of the BVD in the Netherlands. The organization, steeped in the Cold War, was unprepared for such indigenous terrorism. It took the minister of the Interior until 1979 before he could declare in parliament that a list of vital objects and different measures for safeguarding them was being drawn up. These vital objects were defined as targets on which an attack would lead to a serious disruption of social life, endanger people or the environment, or lead to political or diplomatic repercussions.

Nevertheless, there were successes in countering terrorism. Some attacks were prevented, in some cases through tips given by the BVD. For instance, in 1975 three right-wing extremists were caught in the act of trying to place a bomb in a subway; ten South Moluccans suspected of planning the abduction of Queen Juliana were arrested; and four Palestinians were arrested in Amsterdam only hours before they planned to hold up of the Warschau express. The BVD was especially successful against some Palestinian terrorist threats, so that in spite of the strongly pro-Israel stand taken by the Dutch government during the 1973 Yom Kippur War no terrorist threats materialized in the Netherlands. However, even though the BVD had been unprepared for terrorism, it did provide a new justification for the existence of the service.

1980-1985: THE CALM BEFORE THE CHANGES

Due to the threat of modern Soviet weapons systems, especially the SS-20s, and overestimating the potential of the Soviet economy, the Dutch govern-

ment felt compelled to follow the other Western nations and increase the power of deterrence. The peace movement opposed to the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles, which had been preceded by the campaign against the neutron bomb in the late seventies, took on a massive shape. Already in the late 1970s the percentage of Dutchmen who thought the Soviet Union was the greatest military threat was surpassed by the percentage of those who thought the modernization of nuclear weapons was. The term "Hollanditis" was coined to describe this outlook. Parts of the peace movement were financed and guided from Eastern Europe, a development that was facilitated by the pro-Soviet turn of the CPN.³⁴ Some elements in the peace, the anti-nuclear and the squatters movement practised violence. The autonomous groups tried to create a counterculture in their squatter dwellings, with their "proletarian shopping" and slogans like "Your constitution is not mine" (*Jouw rechtsstaat is de mijne niet*). On the other side of the political spectrum, racist and neo-fascist groups grew in following, won seats in some representative bodies, but nevertheless never posed a real threat.

During the early 1980s the BVD suffered from cuts in government spending. Between 1971 and 1981 the BVD budget had risen from about \$12 to \$35 million (Canadian). During the 1980s it stabilized at between \$30 and \$35 million (Canadian) with a growing percentage being spent on material expenditures and a diminishing amount on personnel.

In the 1980s the prevention of terrorist acts became the main task of the BVD. In this period the threat of terrorism subsided somewhat. In July 1982 an attempt to assassinate the Turkish consul-general in Rotterdam by the Red Armenian Army failed when a police unit stationed there for his protection intervened and arrested one of the perpetrators. A month later three IRA terrorists who were planning to kill the British military attaché in The Hague were arrested in Paris after a tip from the Netherlands. There were continuous warnings, among others by Interpol and Western intelligence organizations, against possible terrorist attacks, especially against Jewish and American targets but few of the threats materialized.

Instead, the Netherlands seems to have become a safe haven for international terrorists. The borders between Germany and the Netherlands and between Belgium and the Netherlands can be passed without many difficulties. The Dutch judicial system, compared with that of other nations, goes quite far in protecting the rights of the defendant. The RAF continued to receive support from small Dutch groups like *Rood Verzetsfront* (Red Resistance Front) and *Rood Revolutionair Front* (Red Revolutionary Front). These groups were more or less the successors of the Red Youth and Red Aid. Autonomous groups claimed several minor bomb attacks on targets related mainly to the Amsterdam housing policy.

After the South Moluccans in the 1970s, immigrants of Surinam, which after its independence in 1975 experienced a military coup five years later, reminded the Netherlands in the 1980s of their colonial past. During the period shortly before and after Surinam received its independence, the BVD cooperated with the Surinam Central Intelligence Agency. But from 1980 on, rivalry

between pro- and contra-military government groups among Surinam people, preparations for political violence in Surinam on Dutch territory and narcotics trafficking between Surinam and the Netherlands caused the BVD to watch closely some Surinam groups in the Netherlands.

In 1981 the chief of the BVD, P. de Haan, said in a television interview — the first with a head of the BVD — that the CPN was still being watched as such. The interview took place when the minister of the Interior was on vacation. Upon his return he became upset, and, as a consequence, the BVD was ordered in 1982 to abandon its systematic observation of the communist party. Trotskyists and anarchists remained under surveillance, however. And the BVD watched developments in the fledgling racist parties. In the same television interview de Haan even took the unprecedented and never imitated step of revealing the name of a person who was under actual surveillance: Glimmerveen, leader of one of the racist parties. The neo-nazi group that grew around the widow of a leading Dutch nazist of the Second World War was also infiltrated by the BVD.

The BVD remained interested in violent and Eastern European led elements in the peace movement. The movement, however, had such political momentum, that the two largest parties, Labour and the Christian Democrats, were unwilling to give the BVD political cover on this issue. This drove the BVD into the arms of both the religious and non-religious right. Information about the communist penetration of the peace movement was leaked to newspapers and broadcasting corporations on the right of the political spectrum, which did much harm to the legitimacy of the service.³⁵

This era saw the beginning of a host of exposures of informers and agents, which contributed to the public opinion that the BVD was an amateurish organization. Such was, for instance, the case in 1984 of the Canadian John Wood (aka John Paul Gardiner) who tried to find out which peace activists were willing to use hand grenades. The criticism of the use of informers concerns especially the PID, the Special Branch agents. Late in 1990 a policeman who between 1972 and 1983 had been a member and later chief of the PID in a large industrial city near Amsterdam, belatedly blew the whistle and said that there had been only minimal guidance by the Chief of Operations of the BVD in The Hague. According to him telephones had been tapped illegally, and houses and offices had been burgled. When something went wrong, the local policeman was the fall guy. PID men were overstressed and were left without psychological aid.³⁶ Articles inspired by him drew reactions from former PID men that were just as sour about their former employer.³⁷

1985-1991: THE ATOMIZATION OF THE ENEMY

Following Gorbachev's coming to power and his professed policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* the last vestiges of a sense of an immediate military Soviet threat disappeared among the Dutch population and its policymakers. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the bloodless revolution in Czechoslovakia and the revolt in Rumania generally met with sympathy. Given the persistence of anti-German feelings following the Second World War, the reunification of both

Germany was viewed with surprisingly little concern within the Netherlands, especially since the economic restructuring of Eastern Germany has proven to be more cumbersome than had been expected. There is a growing awareness of the dangers of the revival of nationalism and ethnic conflicts. Whereas Eastern Europe is falling apart in separate states and smaller entities, the prospect of a united Western Europe is near. In 1992 the internal boundaries within the European Community will be abolished.

The peace movement has crumbled, taken by surprise by the speed with which international disarmament agreements between East and West have been concluded. The contention of consecutive governments and the political right that negotiations on disarmament should be conducted from a position of strength seems to have proven itself. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the publication of details of some of the nastier sides of the East German regime, some in the peace movement have now conceded that funding for the peace movement and attempts to influence it did indeed come from the East.³⁸ Appeals from the new political leaders of countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia to establish some kind of link with NATO have prevented demands for the abolition of the alliance, although the military threat from the East has subsided. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall the prestige of NATO even rose with the political left where an *Alleingang* by a strong united Germany was feared. Some of the former protagonists in the peace movement openly declared that the Gulf War was a just war. After the mass demonstrations in the early 1980s there was, compared to other European nations like Spain and Germany, little protest against the Gulf War.³⁹

Domestic sources of dissent have also subsided. The use of nuclear energy is no longer hotly debated. The squatters movement has lost sympathy since the housing policy in the larger cities has taken on acceptable shapes in the eyes of most people.

Four radical parties that wished to combine their individual, declining strengths — the communist, pacifist, radical and evangelical parties — have established a new party, the Green Left, which has behaved so “decently,” that it has been asked to join the Standing Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services by the leaders of the other parties in the House of Commons. Until now, however, it has declined to do so.

More and more often short-term alliances are forged from a substratum of relatively isolated single issue groups left over or established after the days of the flourishing political activism. Political violence can spring up unexpectedly from these groups. This was seen with the so-called *RaRa* Group (Radical Anti-Racist Action, the abbreviation meaning Guess Who), which from September 1985 until April 1988 repeatedly set on fire the stores of a firm that conducted business with South Africa, and groups that sabotaged Shell gas stations for the same reason. It re-emerged in November 1991 with an attack against the house of the State Secretary in charge of refugees policy.

Such groups are difficult to detect because they are small, tight-knit, and security-conscious. It cannot be denied that people in these groups have profited

in some ways from past experiences with the police and security services. They are also opposing the security services more actively. Outposts of the military security services have been burgled, documents have been stolen and security personnel have been photographed. Groups like "Jansen and Janssen" (named after two cartoon figures) have published details about the failures of the BVD to recruit informers and printed the names, addresses and telephone numbers of agents and personnel.⁴⁰ Instructions have also been given on how to expose and interrogate informers and agents. In the few instances in which this has been done psychological and some physical violence has been used.

The hard core of the Dutch groups from which political violence can be expected has been estimated at around 1500 in 1986.⁴¹ They have experienced a rapid turn-over since many think the social control exerted within their group is too oppressive and because it is easy to quit such groups in the Netherlands. In 1986 the hard core of the Red Revolutionary Front was arrested following tips from the BVD.

Whereas domestic acts of political violence have been on the increase — probably as a result of the growing political isolation of its instigators — the Netherlands has been spared widespread acts of terrorism perpetrated by foreign groups. The IRA and ETA remained the leading overseas terrorists in the Netherlands. The IRA selected victims to be shot among (persons thought to be) British soldiers visiting Dutch cities near the German border. The ETA has claimed several bomb and grenade attacks on Spanish targets in The Hague and Amsterdam. A connection still exists between the political fringe groups of the left and foreign terrorist groups like the RAF and the IRA. Dutch groups provide shelter and logistics for these external terrorists.

The role of the BVD during this period was reiterated as the protection of the democratic order, national security, and other vital interests of the state, and furtherance of the security of government services and private industries that the government considered vital for the maintenance of social life. Furthermore, political screening for confidential positions with the government or vital private companies was, for the first time, explicitly defined as a task.

At this time measures were taken to establish greater control over the secret services. In 1987 an act on the Intelligence and Security Services was passed so that for the first time infringements made by the security services on the constitutional rights of Dutch citizens found a legal basis in an act passed by Parliament. From 1988 on a report by the minister of the Interior on the BVD was included in the memorandum on the budget of his ministry. In spring 1991 the minister for the Interior promised to work out ideas that would enable parliament to exert more control over the BVD, including having the BVD draw up annual reports. The minister also announced that annual threat analyses would be produced and the next year the first analysis was published.⁴²

In order to raise its own legitimacy and to break through its isolation from the rest of society, the BVD has sought to improve its public relations. In October 1989, after the KGB KR (counterintelligence) agent Gennadi S. Karpenchenkow was expelled, details were publicized of a 17-year long

surveillance operation against KGB officers who posed as representatives of the *Sovfracht* and spied in the port of Rotterdam while attached to a ship-broker's firm.⁴³ In November 1990 a television news program broadcast two programs on the BVD which promised to open its doors and its files. It was meant to be an eye-opener for the Dutch population. The programs focused on Eastern European espionage, underscored that technical espionage was becoming more important and that exposed spies should be expelled. According to the BVD, one-third of the 76 official Soviet representatives in the Netherlands were spies and each of them had recruited three or four Dutchmen, one of whom was a paid agent. Videos were shown of the surveillance of the Soviet agent Alexandr Boykow and the arrest of *Stasi* spy Gunther Beiniker. In an effort to counterbalance the one-sided picture of it being an anti-left vigilante organization a video of a small neo-nazi group was shown.⁴⁴

Neither press nor politicians reacted favorably to this sudden openness. The newspapers thought the BVD's *glasnost* only underscored its reputation as a dozing organization still sleepwalking through the Cold War. The Dutch Foreign Office was upset by the suggestion that about 25 Russians should be expelled, and some members of parliament felt the BVD had only used the media to make it more difficult for parliament to criticize the security service.⁴⁵

The BVD has indeed adopted another policy toward using exposed spies for political legitimacy purposes. Whereas before they turned exposed agents and used them in counterintelligence operations, they now seek political rewards for publicized exposures. For the same reason, an overview of 38 exposures since 1951 of Eastern European agents was drawn up in November 1990.⁴⁶

After the negative reactions to the public relations offensive, the minister of the Interior ordered the BVD to stop it. Meanwhile, two long-term projects of interest to historians had set in. A BVD employee was given the task of writing a history of the BVD in the Cold War under scholarly supervision.⁴⁷ And a project to destroy BVD records older than five years and no longer relevant to the service in 1991 was announced. The state archivist and historians did not share a common opinion as to which BVD records were of historical interest and should be saved from destruction. Meanwhile, the minister has postponed the destruction until late 1993.⁴⁸

In 1990 the BVD was reorganized. A private counselling organization had written a damning report about the BVD's organization. According to the report it lacked a strategic concept, a clear formulation of activities and products, clear criteria for the input of personnel and means, satisfactory progress reporting, adequate planning of priorities and enough steering information. Functional compartmentalization had led to fragmentation of the organization. There was too much top and middle management, whereas actual control and guidance were lacking. Finally, the BVD had become isolated from the rest of Dutch society.⁴⁹

Operational and social dislocation had only been prevented by the loyalty, sense of responsibility, moral consciousness and enthusiasm of the

BVD employees. And even this idyll of superhuman behavior was shattered, when Doctor van Leeuwen, head of the BVD since February 1989, wrote in the internal magazine *Het Spionnetje (The Spy-mirror)* that a considerable group of people were no longer motivated, only a minority did a good job, and compartmentalization had become a state of mind.⁵⁰ Moreover, the BVD headquarters had to cut its personnel from 637 in 1990 to 580 in 1993.

The combination of an expansion of the number of possible targets, the need for greater flexibility and a cut of personnel has forced the BVD to accept three major changes. First, it no longer concentrates primarily on threats but takes the vital interests that have to be protected as its starting point. Second, in deciding which vital interests to protect and how to do this, it takes into consideration the capacities of these interests to resist possible threats. Third, on the basis of the defined vital interests the BVD has adopted a project organization.

Vital interests were redefined as the democratic order, national security "and other vital interests of the state," and the maintenance of social life. With regard to the democratic order the following objects were specified: the principle of equality before the law, freedom of speech, the legitimacy and the integrity of state organs and authorities and the democratic process. With regard to national security maintenance of the national sovereignty stands out: the protection of state secrets, and guarding against secret political influence by other states or organized crime. Finally, the reorganized BVD will pay much attention to the protection of the vital economic aspects of Dutch society, such as the protection of high-technology, security of automated databases, and non-proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons.

Whereas in government as a whole, there existed a managerial ideology that distanced it from society, the boundaries between state and society have become more blurred in the vision of the BVD management. Several reasons account for this outlook. Global developments, like the disruption of the Soviet economic empire, the relative decline of the US economy and the rise of Japan, have underscored the prime importance of a nation's continuous ability to generate economic growth. The success of the containment of the Soviet Union has reminded politicians and officials that an economic gap can be used to press one's own will and value system on other nations. For the same reasons, technological espionage has gained importance over political espionage.

On the other hand, the growing dependence of both public and corporate administrations on automated systems has created a kind of vulnerability society did not know before. Again and again, hackers and spreaders of computer viruses remind the authorities that it is very difficult to reduce this vulnerability. Since 1985, dozens of Dutch government institutions have been victims of computer crimes. The protection of automated data, especially in the sensitive areas of politics, defence and finance, has broadened the role of the BVD, which was originally restricted to state and military secrets.

The 1980s has seen a growing awareness of white collar crimes. Combined with the experience of organized crime this has brought home to the

authorities the possibility and, to a certain extent, the reality of corruption of government officials.

The vulnerability of the environment is another element that proves how easily social life can be disrupted. The potential use of bacteriological and chemical weapons as the poor nations' atom bomb has heightened the need to control the activities of private firms in this field.

The existence of diffuse and rapidly changing targets for political violence has forced the BVD to accept a very low threshold for attacks on the democratic order, national security, society and other vital interests of the state. It is enough to bring the BVD into action when attacks are either systematic, secret, deceptive or improper. Even before that there is the so-called scan stage.

The reorganization report updated the threats to vital interests to include terrorism, sabotage and other violent acts; ideologies and acts of intolerance, often combined with secret policies; the influence of organized crime on government and vital social organizations; espionage; abuse of vital technologies and automated databases; theft of high-tech and important economic information; and, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Until 1990 the BVD was organized mainly in accordance with perceived threats and related operations. (See Figure 1) The reorganized BVD wants to do away with such compartmentalization, and favors an orientation toward vital interests and clients over a fixation on threats. In the words of the head of the BVD: "To me it does not matter whether one is influenced by the KGB or by the mafia."⁵¹

The reorganized BVD has three main directorates (D2, D3, and D4) charged with collection, processing and analysis. Within these three directorates project teams can be created in accordance with current needs. D1 gives direction and can assign projects that involve multiple interests to one of the directorates. Each directorate has a planning bureau of its own, which evaluates the progress, quality and efficiency of the projects. Additionally, there is a general quality manager who can evaluate projects throughout the entire organization.

The orientation on its clients should enable politicians to reformulate vital interests and criteria for threats when necessary, and should enable both politicians and BVD management to set priorities. The central question in the near future will be whether, given the lower threshold for BVD activity and the broadening range of possible threats, the BVD will be able to cope with the resulting flood of incoming information and to detect crucial indicators and relevant new threats. Moreover, politicians and the BVD will have to define the national interests to be protected narrowly, and to set clear priorities to prevent a situation where multiple terrorist threats overstretch the capacities of the BVD to deal with demands from private enterprises. The BVD simply cannot be everybody's guardian angel. Political screening is also affected by changes in the BVD's task environment. With the BVD's increased attention to automated systems, a new range of government positions will be classified as confidential.

The extension of BVD functions may create problems with other organizations, primarily the police. This is enhanced by the existence of the *Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst* (Central Criminal Information Service, CRI). The CRI was established in 1972 to coordinate and assist in investigations carried out by the decentralized police. It also functions as the national bureau for Interpol. One of CRI's departments is the *Bijzondere Recherche Zaken* (Special Investigations, BRZ), until 1991 called the *Bijzondere Zaken Centrale* (Special Cases Center, BZC). The BRZ is the national information center for terrorism as a criminal act. One of its functions is to prevent terrorist crimes. Another department is the *Fraude Centrale* (FRC), which counts among its functions environmental and computer crimes. In the past the BRZ and the BVD have fought turf battles. In May 1991 an advisory committee produced a report that called for closer collaboration.⁵² Although the BRZ and BVD accepted these conclusions, it remains to be seen how willing they are to act more cooperatively.

However, not everyone may be in favor of this closer collaboration. In recent court proceedings over political violence or terrorism the judge has been reluctant to accept evidence that has originated with the BVD. The amalgamation of the activities of BVD and BRZ may create a situation that all postwar Dutch governments have wished to avoid, namely the combination of intelligence and executive functions.

The BVD could also have conflicted with the *Inlichtingendienst Buitenland* (External Intelligence Service, IDB). Whereas its choice of vital interests as a starting point seemed to imply a defensive strategy, the BVD has adopted a more forward strategy once the threats to these vital interests have been established. More openly than before, the minister of the Interior and the head of the BVD have declared that the first line of defence against security threats is at the source.⁵³ The BVD is on the lookout for liaisons in foreign countries in imitation of its competitor the CRI. Not surprisingly, the government decided in February 1992 to dissolve the IDB.

Terrorism remained the primary objective of the BVD in this period. Threats were anticipated from Hezbollah, ETA, the IRA, Kurds (especially the Kurdish Labour Party, PKK) and Armenians. Some fear a renewal of South Moluccan terrorism, as the 80-year old president-in-exile of the South Moluccan Republic finds it difficult to appoint a successor. The BVD scored some successes against the IRA and more than once in this period the British government had reasons to thank the Dutch minister for the Interior.⁵⁴

It was realized that it was no longer easy to identify countries from which security threats could be expected. Poland and Hungary seemed to have reduced their espionage activities, but the same could not be said about others, including the Soviet Union, Rumania and Bulgaria. In this period the Dutch were once again reminded that Czech intelligence had an interest in the Netherlands. In 1987 it became known that two Czech engineers working with the Physical Dynamic Research Laboratorium had provided their government with information in the period between 1968-82. In mid-1990 two Czech diplomats were expelled after they had tried to obtain military and political intelligence. In 1985 a communist secretary working with a patent office was exposed as a spy who

provided East Germany with patent-applications for tank equipments. GRU-interest in military technology did not diminish; in 1989 an Amsterdam dentist who, since 1981 had given information on advanced military technology to the GRU, was arrested. In 1988 Valentin Velichko working for the KGB X(technology)-line was expelled. Soviet agents seemed to turn their attention to younger generations, especially students and people working in the high tech industry. However, the shift from political to technical espionage has reduced Eastern European coordination of intelligence activities. Technological espionage is by its nature more competitive, and countries do not easily share technical and economic intelligence.

Besides Eastern European countries, Libya, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were identified as principal threats. Iraq, for instance, had placed orders for its supergun with Dutch industries. Continuing interest in the Netherlands by Pakistan surfaced again. In 1985 Abdul Quadr Khan was tried for exporting an advanced oscilloscope to Pakistan, which enabled it to develop further its atom bomb, but was acquitted in his absence. In late 1988 BNB surveillance of a Dutch friend of Khan's led to the discovery that he had returned to the Netherlands, whereupon Khan was expelled.

During this period shi'ite fundamentalism emerged as a new target among the antidemocratic groups. When Teheran's call for the killing of author Salman Rushdie met with sympathy in some quarters of the Dutch Muslim community, the BVD counted them next only to remaining left- and right-wing groups in importance.

At the time of the Gulf crisis Iraqis living in the Netherlands complained that the BVD was trying to extract information from them. However, both the BVD and the minister of the Interior went out of their way to prevent the involvement of Iraqis and Muslims in criminal activities. They helped to create a climate in which Jews and Muslims in the Netherlands suddenly held round table conferences and showed respect for each other's positions. This approach was in accordance with the BVD's belief that creating and maintaining national security is also helped by educating the public, not only by making them aware of threats, but also by helping them to see threats in the right perspective.

Complaints by Iraqis about approaches made by the BVD were an extension of earlier complaints by refugee Palestinians, Turks and Moroccans about efforts undertaken by members of the Special Branch to enlist them as informers or agents among such ethnic groups in the Netherlands. Some members of parliament have recently asked for an investigation into the question of whether these recruiting efforts have abused refugees who are awaiting the granting of a permit of residence.

It is undeniable that because of changes in its task environment the BVD has broadened its range of activities and targets, and has lowered its threshold for action. This puts the organization in a paradoxical position regarding its legitimacy. Since the possible threats have become more complex and more diffuse, the BVD has tried to demonstrate to each category of its political constituency and each segment of Dutch society that the assets with which that

category sympathizes most are being put to appropriate use. For instance, the BVD has, to a certain extent, been able to pacify the political left by referring to activities with regard to right-wing extremism. On the other hand, the vague demarcation of its tasks, both in the 1987 law and in ensuing policy documents, has produced no goodwill in parliament. Since the BVD's responsibilities now include both national security and societal security, it will probably have to accept some kind of social oversight in addition to the present political and official oversight. This will become all the more necessary since the trend toward more openness will likely be counteracted in the near future by further exposures by the small groups that deny the legitimacy of the BVD. Until 1991 the minister of the Interior had refused to accept some form of public oversight, despite the growing demands by members of parliament that the government create an oversight committee, modelled on the Canadian Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC).

Another legitimacy problem for the BVD has been created by the crumbling of the Eastern European regimes. It is difficult to convince politicians who have always associated the BVD with the Soviet threat that, even though this threat has diminished considerably, the ensuing unstable multipolar era makes it even more necessary to maintain a security service as an early warning system. Moreover, after the disclosures about the activities of the East German *Stasi* some elements in the Dutch population came to believe that the BVD was the Dutch equivalent of this despicable organization.

Now that many countries are emphasizing technological intelligence, and the ideological barriers between West and East Europe seem to have broken down, one can ask whether it makes much difference which country (friendly or otherwise) is stealing the "table-silver," as the head of the BVD calls it? Whereas the threat of terrorism has led to closer cooperation between the Western European countries the new emphasis on economic and technological intelligence may drive them apart.

Another threat to Western cooperation is the relative economic decline of the United States. The lessening of a military threat from the East leaves more room for trade disputes between the United States and Western Europe which in the end may even have consequences for cooperation in the field of security. Whereas in the fifties, when large amounts of American capital flowed into the Netherlands, the BVD openly shared information with the CIA; however, now it is already beginning to share on a more piecemeal basis. With the lessening of an East European threat, intelligence itself may come to be looked upon as an economic commodity.

Nevertheless, at present it is possible that an integrated European security service may become established. To date there have been some efforts to foster closer cooperation between European security services. One form of cooperation is the so-called Club of Bern, where heads of the European Security Services have met with each other since 1971 to exchange information on espionage and terrorism. However, the most promising attempts to establish an integrated European security service seem to be TREVI and the Schengen Information System (SIS). TREVI is the informal conference of European

Community ministers in charge of police, justice and security. It began as a Dutch initiative in 1975 to exchange information between member states of the European Community on terrorism and political violence. Since 1985, TREVI has expanded its functions to include the exchange of information on drug trafficking, organized crime, fraud, and policies regarding refugees. From December 1986 on, it has produced terrorist threat analyses every six months. And in 1989 it adopted a secretariat of rotating composition. It has also actively furthered common visa and asylum policies in the European Community.

The Schengen agreement, which was concluded in May 1985 between France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, was meant to be an experiment that could be extended later to the whole European Community. It anticipated the abolition of the borders between the concluding states, and wished to replace the checks on aliens and criminal activities done at the internal borders with control at the external borders and inside the member states. An alien registered under the Schengen system by any country must be expelled outside the Schengen area. This will prevent the present practice of "asylum shopping" and the casting off of aliens between the Schengen countries.

The Schengen Information System, which contains data on both persons and commodities for investigative purposes, can be used by the security services of the member countries. At its start it will contain data on approximately 800,000 people, but will have a maximum capacity of data on 5.5 million people. The SIS will contain details not only on aliens but also on persons of interest to police, intelligence and security services. Strong political resistance to the ratification and execution of the Schengen agreement exists in the Netherlands, since it seems to do away with many of the guarantees of individual rights and the democratic control to which the Dutch are accustomed. It seems that the liberalization of the traffic of persons is obtained at the cost of a monitoring system. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Dutch government will fail to execute the agreement.

During the negotiations the governments of the Schengen countries also tried to further harmonize drug, visa and refugee policies. These efforts met with too much national resistance, although in practice some harmonization will probably take place since none of the countries wants to become the weak link in the Schengen system.

EPILOGUE

In February 1992 the BVD published its first threat analysis.⁵⁵ The service took 15 threats into consideration: right-wing extremism, organized crime, state terrorism, ideologically motivated terrorism, separation terrorism, nationalistic terrorism, political violence, violence among minorities, espionage, proliferation of mass destruction arms, political interventions originating or supported from Dutch soil, sabotage of military objects, threats to vital industries and spearheads of the Dutch economy, and computer crime. However, the service's priorities have changed. Terrorism is no longer considered to


be the threat it once was, with the exception of the IRA and ETA organizations. The BVD is still vigilant against political violence. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is now considered to be a major threat. The BVD is also concerned by possible interventionist activities directed against Balkan states and the Philippines. Finally, the BVD is expected to focus even more on computer crime.

The threat analysis shows that in a short period of time the BVD has come a long way from the days of Cold War. However, from reactions among politicians and journalists it is clear that their threat perceptions do not coincide with those of the BVD. Some think that the BVD, which has already been cut substantially in the past years, should be reduced even further, now that its Cold War tasks are thought to be no longer necessary. They have also asked whether all the threats named by the BVD should be tasks for the service. Finally, the BVD's expectation that Islamic fundamentalist developments in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries might lead to agitation and conflicts among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands has attracted considerable debate. The publication of the threat analysis coincided with a political debate about the integration of minorities in the Netherlands, and about attacks made on members of ethnic groups and their properties. Many Dutchmen believed that the BVD was attacking Islam and its believers as a whole, although the wording of the report did not justify such an interpretation.


All this serves to prove that there is no societal and political consensus as to the risks that threaten Dutch society and its political order. The multiplication of possible threats almost guarantees that whenever another risk analysis is published it will coincide with one of the issues raised by the BVD's critics. Whether this will lead to more difficulties for the service or whether it will reinforce the arguments advanced by the BVD remains to be seen. Meanwhile, support for the BVD will probably be as uncertain as the BVD's task environment. One way of trying to survive during this period of uncertainty will be to broaden the political control over the BVD and even to add societal control over it. Another way will be to stimulate a national debate on security requirements. It will be interesting to see whether the reorganization of the BVD has gone far enough to enable the BVD to meet these demands.

Figure 1

BVD structure before 1990



BVD structure after 1990



Endnotes

- * Since summer 1990 there has been a Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association (NISA) in which scholars and (former) members of the Dutch intelligence and security service participate. One of its activities is to discuss impending publications. This paper has been object of such a debate and has profited from it. I especially thank Dick Engelen for his comments. Dick is both an official of the BVD and treasurer of NISA. He is preparing the official history of the BVD between 1945 and 1970.
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 3. For the history of the BNV see Louis Einthoven, *Tegen de stroom in. Levende vissen zwemmen tegen de stroom in, alleen de dooie drijven mee* (Apeldoorn, 1974), pp. 185-99.
 4. The principal book explaining the Dutch political system of compartmentalization is Arend Lijphart, *Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek* (Amsterdam, 1979)
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 9. G.T. Witte, "Nederland, de SovjetUnie en de Koude-Oorlogstemming 1917-1947," *Spiegel Historiae*, 23, nr. 4, p. 172.
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