intelligence reporting from the Residencies and assessments from Moscow Centre. Indeed, Gordievsky was to learn that many of his colleagues "viewed RYAN with some scepticism . . ., but none was willing to challenge the assessments" disseminated from the Centre. RYAN created a vicious circle where residencies around the world were "required to report alarming information even if they themselves were sceptical of it. The Centre was duly alarmed by what they reported, and demanded more." Reports were necessary even if there was no intelligence to impart. Andropov's accession as General Secretary gave an added impetus to the operation. The London residency, for example, was instructed to regularly determine the number of cars and lit offices (in and out of working hours) at all government buildings and military installations involved in "preparations for nuclear war," and to immediately report any deviation from the norm. Such tasks disguise the intense collection effort which is required to determine just what the norms are in the first place, and what these norms -- if they exist -- really mean. Some residencies were told that an "important sign" of British preparation for nuclear war would be "increased purchases of blood and a rise in the price paid for it" at blood donor clinics. It is truly astounding that the world's largest intelligence service can be so ignorant of Western society in the midst of the information age, attaching sinister significance to an everyday event. Fortunately, by the summer of 1984 following Andropov's death, cooler heads prevailed and RYAN drew to a close. This operation ably demonstrates, however, both the strengths and weaknesses of the KGB: a coordinated, all-out massive collection effort by a gargantuan state organ hampered by fear and suspicion of the West's intentions, ignorance about the target societies, and a reluctance to acknowledge the mounting evidence that Western preparations for a first strike were non-existent.

*KGB: The Inside Story* is an excellent, far-reaching work concerned with the inner sanctum of its foreign arm, the FCD. It should become a standard reference for anyone who makes the KGB's foreign operations a serious area of study.

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The shadowy world of espionage is almost by definition one of undetermined truths which feeds upon rumor and partial stories. By the same token, the functionaries within this *sub rosa* world of intrigue apparently symbiotically thrive within an atmosphere of misinformation and ill-defined forms. Their trade is that of smoke and mirrors employed to simultaneously create illusions and stalking horses, and calculated to distract adversaries with
fool's gold while at the same time provide themselves with keys to informational treasures.

Frequently, this is seen as a two-sided game indulged in only by three major players, namely the USA and Great Britain on one side through the CIA and the SIS, and the Soviet Union on the other side serviced by the KGB. However, almost without exception, all nations have a security intelligence agency and the orientation of individual governments usually determines the extent to which its own service(s) focus internally and/or internationally. Bearing this in mind, the number of organizations engaged in this nebulous realm of clandestine conflict would more accurately be measured in dozens rather than single figures.

The advent of Glasnost and the thawing of the Cold War are not likely to diminish the complexities of national self-interest, and treaties such arms reduction agreements will need to be independently monitored for peace of mind. In addition, sporadic incidents such as the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior and the collapse of BCCI will almost certainly continue to illustrate the complexities of covert international affairs.

Nigel West's book, Games of Influence, fills a very important gap in the corpus of generally available background information, with regard not only to the more popularly known intelligence agencies, but also several of the other very serious competitors in the "Great Game," such as the French, Israeli and former East German services. In much the same way that Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball's The Ties That Bind (1985) provides a short and concise sketch of the historical background and inter-relatedness between the American and major British Commonwealth intelligence services, West's Games of Intelligence provides a similar type of reference work for the major contenders in the clandestine international intelligence game. However, West interestingly also addresses the question of the cost and effectiveness of these organizations from a number of perspectives. In addition to a checklist for measuring the performance of intelligence services, the author has included a number of interesting extras, such as organizational schemata and lists of defectors and detected operatives, as well as a helpful annotated listing of works written by former service members.

As with most books containing extensive disparate detail, there are some small errors such as a reference to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1978 when in fact until 1984 its functions lay within the duties of the RCMP's Security Service. Also the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) are referred to almost interchangeably while their actual relationship is very similar to that of MI5 and MI6. But in total these are very small inaccuracies and do not detract from this very engagingly written and interesting work, which is refreshingly more current in its material than most. Indeed, the potential reader could do considerably worse than access this book.

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