

style than of content. Providing a copy of the constitution and annotating it with footnotes might have made the reading easier.

Perhaps the best chapter of this book is the conclusion. In seven pages Osterling restates, in a concise and understandable manner, what it took him the first 335 pages to state in a rather complex and confusing manner. Colombia's inherent violence is demonstrated quite accurately: "violence in Colombia has taken many forms and has special characteristics. The interparty violence of the earlier part of this century up to the 1950s appears to have been replaced by various forms of common crime, guerrilla warfare, and the most brutal murders committed by the narcotraffickers." Each of these types of violence has its own variations of ideology, tactics, culture, and economy. Generalizations regarding violence in Colombia are virtually impossible. Osterling, through a highly detailed description of the nation's entire political system, from the *cabildo abierto* to the president's office, has succeeded in showing how Colombia has attempted to deal with the situation. One could only wish it had been presented in a more coherent and readable manner.

James Zackrison  
Washington, DC

Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990.

Winston Churchill once described the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," an apt description for one of the world's largest and most secret organizations, the former USSR's Committee for State Security, or KGB. This state institution and its predecessors represented a fearful and foreboding service with long roots in Soviet and Tsarist society, and is one of, if not the most, studied Soviet state organs in the West. Any mention of the KGB conjures up images of clandestine meetings between agents and their controllers, as well as a host of names that have been popularized in the West by scholarly works and espionage novels. Among these famous names are the Cambridge Spies, Igor Gouzenko, Oleg Penkovsky and John Walker, to name but a few among a veritable rogues gallery.

From this labyrinthine world of secret intelligence rises a new book, *KGB: The Inside Story* co-authored by Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky. Given the era of *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and the demise of the Cold War, *KGB* is a very authoritative work which breaks new ground in the study of the KGB's foreign operations. It is an extremely well researched and timely book.

Christopher Andrew is a respected historian at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, who has written extensively about the intelligence world: author

of *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community*, (1985) and co-editor of the journal *Intelligence and National Security*. Oleg Gordievsky spent more than 20 years in the KGB, finishing as Resident-designate (or head of station) in London before escaping to the West in 1985. During his service Gordievsky was tasked to prepare a classified history of the First Chief Directorate (or FCD, responsible for foreign intelligence) thus granting him access to material that he would not otherwise have expected to view given the compartmented nature of the KGB. Gordievsky certainly appears to be a knowledgeable and reliable source who adds to the book's credibility – an important aspect when using human sources for such “inside story” accounts. He was a penetration agent for Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) since 1974, after becoming decisively disillusioned about the Communist régime following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The book's introduction relates what must have been one of the most ironic moments in his career when Gordievsky – an agent for SIS – prepared intelligence briefings for Mikhail Gorbachev's perusal prior to the latter's first visit to Britain in 1984. Gordievsky recently joined the staff of *Intelligence and National Security* as Consultant Editor.

*KGB: The Inside Story* describes the evolution of the USSR's internal security apparatus from its antecedents in the sixteenth century to the Gorbachev era, including the ebb and flow of the KGB's struggle with its two principal enemies or “Main Adversaries,” the US and the UK, as well as its relationship with Eastern Europe, the Third World and China. Other directorates and sections of the KGB are discussed in terms of their interaction with the FCD. Throughout its history, the KGB has enjoyed stunning success (with the “Magnificent Five,” the KGB sobriquet for the Cambridge Moles based on the movie title *The Magnificent Seven*) and dismal failures (including some “active measures” – designed to influence public opinion – and assassination attempts which have backfired). *KGB: The Inside Story* is engrossing and readable, although on occasion the depth of detail adversely affects the book's flow.

Although *KGB* is written by Andrew, Gordievsky's contributions are akin to a very strong supporting character in a play who weaves in and out throughout the work to clarify here or identify there, depending on the scene. Through Gordievsky the identity of the “Fifth Man” in the Cambridge ring is finally revealed. The search for the Fifth Man has been the subject of many mole hunts in the UK, devoting precious resources chasing false trails, the result of which damaged the self-confidence and effectiveness of the Security Service, or MI5, even though some *bona fide* agents were exposed. The mole hunt mania during the 1980s must have been thoroughly enjoyed by the KGB, as its members could watch with delight while the security services spun around in a vortex bent on self-destruction in addition to casting suspicion on innocent men. Ironically, the name of the Fifth Man had been previously suspected and alluded to in other works such as *Conspiracy of Silence*, but it fell to Gordievsky to provide the clinching evidence based on his research for the classified history of the FCD. Although this man was the last to be

publicly identified, he was able to penetrate a greater variety of establishments within the UK government, including the Foreign Office, Treasury, the Government Code and Cypher School (the predecessor of the Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ), and SIS. As a result of his penetrations, it is not surprising that he was spoken of with “awe, admiration and respect” in Moscow Centre. Moreover, Andrew and Gordievsky describe how each of “the five” were seduced by the USSR, “not by the brutal reality of Stalin’s Russia but by a myth-image of the socialist millennium: a worker-peasant state courageously building a new society free from the social snobbery of the British class system.” The authors’ other revelations have included something which as remained “unknown and unsuspected” in the West for many years: the role of President Franklin Roosevelt’s advisor Harry Hopkins as an unsuspecting agent of influence.

One consistent aspect of past Soviet governments – and thus by extension the KGB – has been a predilection for relating world events or challenges to the supremacy of the Soviet state in terms of conspiracies perpetrated either by “enemies of the people,” “anti-Soviet plotters,” or “Trotskyist-Zinovievite monsters” to a degree verging on paranoia. Conspiracy theses became so pervasive that they contributed to the coloring of the leadership’s interpretation of the intelligence it received. During the Great Patriotic War for example, Stalin tended to view warnings of a German attack with skepticism, even though there was mounting evidence of an assault from signals intelligence, human intelligence via agents, and the German Ambassador himself as testimony of either a British conspiracy, German disinformation, or a combination of the two. The conspiracy mania did not finish with Stalin’s death, and vestiges of it endured for the length of the Cold War, culminating in what could be the ultimate manifestation of Soviet paranoia, Operation RYAN.

During the early 1980s, relations between the two superpowers reached a low ebb following the election of Ronald Reagan’s first Administration. Hardline speeches denouncing the USSR as an “evil empire,” and reinstating the MX missile and B-1 bomber programmes among other things, gave rise to great concern in the Kremlin. The Chairman of the KGB at the time, Yuri Andropov, became convinced that the philosophical underpinnings of the Reagan Administration’s policies were predicated on a desire to allow the US to successfully launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. As the authors relate, during a secret address to a KGB conference in May 1981, Andropov declared that the US “was actively preparing for nuclear war.” In order to have all the necessary intelligence and thus warning of these non-existent preparations, both the KGB *and* the GRU – Soviet military intelligence – were directed to cooperate in a worldwide intelligence collection effort of unprecedented scale under the codename RYAN, a Russian acronym for *Raketno-Yadernoya Napadenie*, or “Warning of Nuclear Rocket Attack.” The danger of this operation stemmed not only from a false premise, but from the manner by which a serious lack of knowledge about the societies in the target countries (The US and its NATO allies) which tended to taint both

intelligence reporting from the Residencies and assessments from Moscow Centre. Indeed, Gordievsky was to learn that many of his colleagues "viewed RYAN with some scepticism . . . , but none was willing to challenge the assessments" disseminated from the Centre. RYAN created a vicious circle where residencies around the world were "required to report alarming information even if they themselves were sceptical of it. The Centre was duly alarmed by what they reported, and demanded more." Reports were necessary even if there was no intelligence to impart. Andropov's accession as General Secretary gave an added impetus to the operation. The London residency, for example, was instructed to regularly determine the number of cars and lit offices (in and out of working hours) at all government buildings and military installations involved in "preparations for nuclear war," and to immediately report any deviation from the norm. Such tasks disguise the intense collection effort which is required to determine just what the norms are in the first place, and what these norms -- if they exist -- *really* mean. Some residencies were told that an "important sign" of British preparation for nuclear war would be "increased purchases of blood and a rise in the price paid for it" at blood donor clinics. It is truly astounding that the world's largest intelligence service can be so ignorant of Western society in the midst of the information age, attaching sinister significance to an everyday event. Fortunately, by the summer of 1984 following Andropov's death, cooler heads prevailed and RYAN drew to a close. This operation ably demonstrates, however, both the strengths and weaknesses of the KGB: a coordinated, all-out massive collection effort by a gargantuan state organ hampered by fear and suspicion of the West's intentions, ignorance about the target societies, and a reluctance to acknowledge the mounting evidence that Western preparations for a first strike were non-existent.

*KGB: The Inside Story* is an excellent, far-reaching work concerned with the inner sanctum of its foreign arm, the FCD. It should become a standard reference for anyone who makes the KGB's foreign operations a serious area of study.

Frederick Parkinson  
NDHQ, Ottawa

West, Nigel. *Games of Intelligence: the Classified Conflict of International Espionage Revealed*. New York: Crown, 1990.

The shadowy world of espionage is almost by definition one of undetermined truths which feeds upon rumor and partial stories. By the same token, the functionaries within this *sub rosa* world of intrigue apparently symbiotically thrive within an atmosphere of misinformation and ill-defined forms. Their trade is that of smoke and mirrors employed to simultaneously create illusions and stalking horses, and calculated to distract adversaries with