

The Internal Settlement: A Counterinsurgency Strategy

by
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INTRODUCTION

Internal settlements are especially applicable to Southern Africa where the independent settler colonies of Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa had/have locally born settler elites facing insurgencies from the majority black population and international economic sanctions. This article examines **cooption through internal settlements as a political counterinsurgency strategy**. It will discuss why and when internal settlements occur, who is involved in them, what their goals are and why they failed to achieve them.

It will concentrate on internal settlements in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, under white settler regimes, but the article is also relevant to Central and possibly South America, Northern Ireland, and East Asia. Internal settlements are particularly suited to settler regimes and pariah states — often these two groups have overlapping membership.¹ Settler regimes are found where a particular ethnic or racial group has entered an area and established control over the indigenous population. Settler states exist throughout Latin America wherever a white minority or mestizo rules over a majority black, Indian or mestizo population.²

Internal settlements have a very poor track record of achieving the goals that their authors set for them and thereby serving as a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare strategy. Because of the desire to retain power, there is always a strong temptation among ruling settler elites, especially those that are international pariahs and face economic sanctions, to resort to them in an attempt to see sanctions lifted or to avoid their implementation.³

There are abundant theoretical studies on counter-insurgency strategy and methods, most of them having been written since the early 1960s. This extensive literature deals both with the military and the political and socio-economic aspects of counterinsurgency warfare. Much of it is based on Asian cases: the defeats of the Communist insurgency in Malaysia and the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, and the victory of the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong against first the French and then the Americans.⁴ There is a less extensive literature dealing with revolutionary warfare in other areas of the Third World — Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East — but this deals mainly with military aspects of COIN warfare or with the political aspects of revolutionary war such as mobilization.

There is a considerable amount of literature on the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa from 1961-74, but most of it is written by those who are sympathetic to the guerrillas or at least antagonistic towards Lisbon.⁵ Only the South African journalist Al Venter wrote well in English from a pro-Lisbon perspective. But Venter concentrated on narrow military aspects of counterin-

surgency or repeated Portuguese claims uncritically. Thus there is a lack of rigorous analysis of the shortcomings of Portuguese internal political COIN strategy in Africa. Davidson does a fair job of criticizing Portugal's lack of development of an African elite and in exposing Portuguese attempts to divide the leadership of the PAIGC⁶ in Guinea-Bissau. But no critical study has emerged explaining why Lisbon failed to develop such a strategy in response to the insurgencies of the 1960s. Lacking such an inside account, this author can only speculate logically and theoretically on the reasons why such a strategy was lacking. In the last decade two publishing houses, Galago/Lemur Press and Ashanti Publications Ltd., have published many works on the Rhodesian and South African militaries and the bush wars in Rhodesia and Namibia.⁷ There has also been a number of accounts of domestic Namibian and Rhodesian politics that dwell extensively on the internal settlements that occurred in those two countries.⁸ But the internal settlement as a strategy of white settler and other regimes in COIN warfare has not been analytically examined. Internal settlements are settlements which involve internal black leaders, which bypass the external black leaders connected with the armed struggle, and which fall short of true majority rule but should be placed more precisely in the category of power-sharing.

THE POLITICAL SETTING

In Rhodesia the whites were never more than six percent of the total population and were only about three and a half percent during the bush war from 1972 to 1980. In Namibia the white population was once ten percent of the total but through emigration and population increase among blacks had decreased to about five percent at the time of independence. The whites are at present about 17 percent of the total population of South Africa but are declining as a share of the overall population. South Africa had extensive economic and cultural ties to Rhodesia which increased after Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965. South Africa was the military occupation power in Namibia from 1915-20 and again from 1971 to 1989, and the mandatory power between those two periods. Hence, Namibia was a *de facto* colony of South Africa and was at times treated like a fifth province.

Blacks did not have the vote in Namibia before 1978, only a small percentage held it under a qualified franchise in Rhodesia before 1979, and while some Africans had the vote under a qualified franchise in the Cape Province in South Africa until this was eliminated in 1936, coloreds or mixed-race South Africans retained the vote until the mid-1950s. South Africa had the oldest liberation movement in Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) founded in 1912, but it did not embark on a liberation struggle until the 1950s and did not use violence or "armed struggle" until December 1961, some nine months after the beginning of Angola's armed struggle. This first phase of armed struggle was crushed by mid-1963, and it was not effectively resumed until the 1980s. In Rhodesia political organization began in the mid-1950s and armed struggle began in the summer of 1967 but did not become sustained until December 1972. In Namibia the first armed attack occurred in August 1966 but a real insurgency did not begin until 1975 when Portugal lost control of Angola.⁹

The bush wars in Rhodesia and Namibia followed the same basic pattern as those in lusophone Africa of: peasant mobilization, guerrilla attacks, mining of roads and ambushes, followed by the putting of the black population into closed villages and organizing civilian convoys as defensive measures, and the use of heliborne and airborne quick reaction forces by the defender. That is up until the internal settlements. A major difference however was that whereas Portugal had to contend only with an arms embargo, which often was very loosely enforced due to American bases in the Azores and Portugal's membership in NATO,¹⁰ Rhodesia had to contend with comprehensive economic sanctions voted by the United Nations in 1966 and toughened in 1968. These sanctions forced Rhodesian sanctions busters to sell cheap and buy dear, particularly when it came to buying arms. South Africa did not have to contend with economic sanctions until 1985-86 and then only with relatively minor ones. But there was always the threat of sanctions hanging over Pretoria because of its illegal occupation of Namibia. When the combined military, political and economic costs of fighting colonial wars became too great for the metropolises of dependent settler colonies they simply granted independence to the countries and turned over power to the liberation movements that fought them. This was even true in the cases of Kenya where the British had defeated the "Mau Mau" insurgency and in Angola where the three liberation movements were more of a nuisance than a threat. Because of the greater stake of the ruling white elites in the independent settler colonies a different strategy had to be followed by the latter. When the military situation had deteriorated or threatened to deteriorate to an intolerable level internal settlements were attempted.

Rhodesia, Namibia (formerly South West Africa) and South Africa like Algeria, Angola, Kenya and Mozambique before them were/are settler colonies. They differ from this latter group however in that they were (South Africa still is) governed by local whites or a neighboring settler colony rather than being governed from Europe. That is why they will be referred to as **independent settler colonies** in this article to differentiate them from the **dependent settler colonies** farther north.

Internal settlements are political settlements that bring internal black leaders into the government at the center but fall short of genuine majority rule and bypass the external leaders conducting the armed struggle. The internal leaders can be either primarily traditional ethnic leaders as was the case in the Turnhalle settlement in Namibia from 1977-83, or they can be political leaders formerly connected with the armed struggle as was the case in the Zimbabwe Rhodesian settlement of 1978-79. Moreover, they can be a mixture of these two types such as, for example, the second internal settlement in Namibia, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), which lasted from June 1985 to December 1988. To see how such internal leaders are created it is necessary to examine how the armed struggle affects black politics in settler regimes.

During the armed struggle there are five main political roles for blacks: armed struggle advocate; conciliator; nationalist proxy; nationalist collaborator; and traditional collaborator. The strategy of the whites is to convert armed

struggle advocates like Robert Mugabe and Sam Nujoma¹¹ into conciliators like Joshua Nkomo, James Chikerema, Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Andreas Shipanga.¹² Once this has been achieved they move to attempt the conversion of the conciliators who want a negotiated solution into partners in an internal settlement or nationalist collaborators. The last group was the source of partners for the Turnhalle settlement.

Nationalist proxies are those who serve as authorized or de facto representatives of the banned external leaders. Abel Muzorewa filled this role in Rhodesia from December 1971 until he went into exile in 1975. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Inkatha filled this role briefly from 1975 to 1980 for the African National Congress. It was later taken over in South Africa by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Chief Minister Enos Mabuza of KaNgwane homeland. This role was unnecessary in Namibia because SWAPO, although severely harassed, was never banned.

Nationalist collaborators become collaborators when they have been marginalized in the struggle. The Frontline States in January 1977 recognized the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people.¹³ This was as a result of the failure of the Geneva Conference the month before and the decision to escalate the armed struggle. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) endorsed this decision at its July 1977 summit.¹⁴ This left Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole with little choice but either to join the government or to retire from politics as neither had a guerrilla army. Shipanga eventually joined the TGNU in 1985 because boycotting the internal elections of December 1978 had not gotten his party anywhere and there was very little political space between SWAPO and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) of the Turnhalle settlement. He could either remain an irrelevant political commentator or he could attempt to be a player within the government.

Traditionalist collaborators become such usually before they join an internal settlement, which they do because they stand to gain more power through the settlement. Chief Jeremiah Chirau, who was a signatory to the Salisbury agreement that created the internal settlement in Rhodesia, had been a Senator-Chief in the Rhodesian senate, a deputy minister in the Rhodesian cabinet from April to December 1976 and the head of a party created by the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of the heads of ethnic delegations to the Turnhalle conference were promoted when the traditional ethnic leaders refused to attend. The Bureau for State Security (BOSS) actively recruited ethnic leaders to attend the conference with a carrot and stick approach.¹⁵

From this examination it can be readily seen that although white settlers are slow in granting to blacks political rights, they are willing to do so grudgingly in order to attempt to hang on to more power than would be the case if they continued in their intransigence. It can also readily be seen that the relationship between internal and external nationalist leaders is an important factor in settler strategy for creating an internal settlement. A Rhodesian-style settlement can only occur when a popular internal nationalist organization operates independently of the external leadership on both a tactical and a strategic/policy basis.

This normally only occurs when the internal group is representing more than one external movement.

WHITE GOALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

Whites have three goals in giving up some power to blacks in forming an internal settlement.¹⁶ First, they hope to either end or avoid economic sanctions by satisfying the demands of the West for majority rule. Second, they hope to gain black support for the regime by exploiting ethnic divisions and bringing leaders with popular support into the government and then holding elections. Third, they hope to cause defections from the ranks of the guerrillas by bringing leaders formerly connected with the armed struggle into the government and by seeming to grant majority rule. Only in Rhodesia was the latter a serious goal because of Sithole having been a former leader of ZANU and Muzorewa having been the political figurehead when many of the guerrillas went into exile for training.¹⁷ They hope to achieve some or all of this without giving up real power by remaining in control of the army, police, civil service, judiciary and economy. No African internal settlement has achieved any of these three goals, although the second internal settlement in Namibia gained the DTA enough support in the 1989 independence elections to prevent SWAPO from being able to write the constitution on its own or form a government without coalition partners.¹⁸

The achievement of these goals is interrelated. A settlement that is seen by the West to have genuine popular support and causes guerrilla defections is more likely to gain recognition and a lifting of sanctions than one that is seen to have little mass support. Likewise, a settlement that gains foreign recognition and mass support is more likely to cause guerrilla defection among demoralized fighters than is one which lacks popular support and is unrecognized. However, even foreign recognition and guerrilla defections will not create support for leaders who are regarded as mere puppets of the whites. Rhodesia's internal settlement came very close to achieving recognition and a lifting of sanctions by both Britain and the United States as a result of the perceived popularity of Bishop Muzorewa and the perceived unwillingness of the external leaders to test their popularity in democratic elections.¹⁹ By comparison the Turnhalle settlement never came close to gaining foreign recognition and a lifting of sanctions because of the nature of the Turnhalle conference and the barring of black political parties as opposed to ethnic delegations from attending.

WHY INTERNAL SETTLEMENTS FAIL

Internal settlements fail to achieve their goals for a number of reasons. First, the internal leaders may lack political support before entering into the settlement. This is true of many of the ethnic leaders from the DTA, of Andreas Shipanga of the TGNU, of James Chikerema, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Chirau of the Rhodesian internal settlement and of the township councillors involved in South Africa's National Council fiasco of the late 1980s. It is also true of most of the colored and Indian politicians involved in the tricameral parliament after January 1985. Second, popular internal leaders may lose

support because they are perceived as puppets for not standing up to the whites during the internal settlement. This occurred with Muzorewa who was continuously being forced to make concessions in the name of white morale.

Third, the terms of the settlement may also be seen and understood to give the blacks no real power. The terms of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian constitution were quickly made clear to State Department officials by Africanists who got hold of the constitution and analyzed it.²⁰ Fourth, the security forces and police remain under the control of the whites and continue to act in the repressive manner that they have grown accustomed to. Fifth, the participation of the external leaders may be perceived by the West as necessary for any successful settlement in order to bring political stability and end the war. Finally, the external nationalists can use their influence in international forums, such as the Commonwealth, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, to gain a majority in the United Nations General Assembly to support them and to threaten Western countries with diplomatic consequences if they recognize the regime. Normally the Frontline States start by recognizing the external nationalists as the only legitimate representative of the majority population; this is followed by an endorsement by the OAU; and then lobbying by OAU members within the Commonwealth and the UN.

Thus, in order to create a successful internal settlement whites need to negotiate generous terms that grant real political power to popular internal leaders and give them control of the military and police. However, the whites resort to internal settlements precisely because they hope to be able to avoid doing these things. It could be argued, however, that from their point of view if they made these concessions they would be getting the lesser of two evils and making the lesser evil viable. The British were able to defeat the Communist insurgency in Malaya in part because they allowed that country to become independent Malaysia. The whites in the southern tip of Africa were attempting to do what Britain and France had done in the 1960s farther north: safeguard their interests and perpetuate their control through the creation of a class of neo-colonial rulers dependent on them. However, this strategy was viable only when it preceded armed struggle. It was the successful answer to riots and demonstrations, not to sabotage, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. This strategy succeeded to the point that it did in Namibia because the South African Defense Force (SADF) managed to keep SWAPO's insurgency confined to Ovamboland and some sections of Kavangoland on the northern border. In Rhodesia where the insurgents of the two guerrilla factions roamed throughout most of the country the population had already been "subverted" when the internal settlement was negotiated. And this "consciousness raising" continued during the course of the settlement.

THE COURSE OF THE SETTLEMENT

Internal settlements have a number of phases. The first phase is the negotiation of a settlement which takes place after the government announces that it is willing to negotiate. This usually occurs only after the government has ascertained through secret approaches that it has partners for a negotiation. In

the case of Namibia the Turnhalle discussions took about two and a half years because of the consensus rule adopted which gave any single delegation a veto. There were ten different ethnic delegations to the Turnhalle talks.²¹ The negotiations at the Multiparty Conference for the TGNU took from November 1983 until June 1985 and consisted of at least five parties which remained until the finish.²² In contrast, the negotiations for the Rhodesian internal settlement lasted only three months, from mid-December 1977 to mid-February 1978, probably because they involved only four parties, one of which was of little real importance and most of the negotiating was conducted bilaterally between the Smith government and Muzorewa's UANC.

Second is the implementation phase during which preparations are made for internal elections, the constitution is written, and the black internal leaders become used to governing alongside the whites. In Namibia this was complicated by the fact that a South African administrator-general remained the ultimate power throughout the internal settlements. In Namibia the Turnhalle conference broke up in November 1977 and elections were held thirteen months later in December 1978. During this time the DTA alliance was organized under the leadership of a white defector from the ruling National Party of SWA and voters were persuaded or coerced into registering for the elections. In Rhodesia the Salisbury agreement was signed on 3 March 1978 creating an Executive Council consisting of the four signatories which ruled the country until elections were held in April 1979. Black co-ministers were appointed alongside all of the existing white ministers in the government. During these thirteen months elections were organized, lobbying was conducted abroad on behalf of the internal settlement, a constitution was written based on the Salisbury agreement, and a campaign was initiated to win popular support for the settlement and to encourage guerrilla defection by means of an amnesty.

The next phase is the election itself and the transitional phase until the newly elected government takes power. Elections are held in order to demonstrate to foreigners that the regime does indeed enjoy popular support. The argument is made by the government that every vote cast is a vote in favor of the internal settlement because the voters had the option of abstaining or spoiling their ballots. During the election itself the military "escorts" thousands of rural voters to fixed and mobile voting stations set up on farms, at police stations, and at other centers. White employers are encouraged through the media, both electronic and print, to give their servants not only time off to vote but transportation to the polls. Many urban stations are located at factories or mines which serves to persuade workers that their jobs may be in jeopardy if they do not vote.²³ After the election is over the winners make the transition to power in the new parliament and help the whites to lobby for a lifting of sanctions.

The final stage comes after the new government has taken power (with the whites still in control of the military, police, civil service, and judiciary). The armed forces attempt to find a military solution to the insurgency, and the diplomats attempt to win foreign recognition while foreign diplomats playing a mediatory role attempt to arrange an all-parties conference involving the new government and the external nationalists. In the case of Namibia a diplomatic

solution was negotiated over the heads of both the internal settlement government and SWAPO by Pretoria, Luanda and Havana. In the Rhodesian case an all-parties conference began at Lancaster House in London under British supervision in early September 1979, about thirteen weeks after Bishop Muzorewa took office as Zimbabwe Rhodesia's first — and only — prime minister.

WHITE CONTROL IN AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT

Internal settlements are intended to be an exercise in power-sharing usually disguised as majority rule. The whites give the blacks control of the legislature, parliament or the national assembly, while shifting the focus of power to other venues.²⁴ In Zimbabwe Rhodesia this was done through the creation of a number of small (three to four man) commissions to control the security forces, police, civil service and judiciary. The majority of the members and the chairman of each commission were all whites chosen from among senior figures in the existing service under criteria that were ostensibly nonracial but which in fact limited these slots to whites. This was done by requiring that commission members for the military, police, and civil service held a particular grade in their respective service (colonel or group captain and deputy or under secretary) at a time when only whites were allowed to attain those grades.²⁵

For the judiciary this disguised racism was even more cynical: commission members were required to have either served as a judge for 10 years or practiced law for 10 years in a country with Roman Dutch law and where the official language was English. Since only Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa used Roman Dutch law and English this eliminated the possibility of blacks who had gained their law degree in Britain or by correspondence while in detention and who had practiced in Britain or in Africa from serving on the commission.²⁶ All of these provisions were entrenched in the constitution and could only be changed by a vote of 78 members of parliament out of 100 when the whites had 28 reserved seats.²⁷

In Namibia the real power was shifted to the ethnic authorities at second tier level. Under the internal settlement Namibia became a confederation with a decentralized government. The central government was responsible mainly for defense, foreign affairs and foreign trade. Since the whites were given control of the main cities and the mines and farming area in the center of the country the blacks were left with the periphery in an imitation of the homelands scheme — grand apartheid — in South Africa.²⁸ The whites could keep the hospitals and the schools segregated in their ethnic area, the parks and airports would be named after Afrikaner and NP heroes, and the restaurants would retain the right to bar blacks.²⁹ Gradually, this began to change under the second internal settlement but only very slowly. But because the Pretoria-appointed administrator-general remained the ultimate authority in Namibia until independence, many of the gains for blacks under the internal settlements remained illusory, particularly in the northern operational area bordering Angola which was under martial law.

In the 1983 South African tricameral constitution there was an important distinction made between "own affairs" and "general affairs."³⁰ The former

consisted of matters that affected only one race (or population group in official jargon) and the latter affairs that affected the entire population. The former were left to each of the three houses to control individually whereas the latter were controlled by a group consisting of representatives from all three houses known as the President's Council (not to be confused with the earlier advisory body with the same name that existed during the early 1980s).

However, it was the responsibility of the President's Council to determine if a matter was "own" or "general." The whites had a built-in majority in the Council which reflected their demographic ratio in comparison with the coloreds and Indians within the general population. If all of the coloreds and Indians voted together as a group they only needed a handful of white votes to gain a majority. However, the representatives of each house to the Council are elected by a simple majority in each house and there is no provision for automatic representation of the opposition. State President P W Botha made sure that the Council was always packed with loyal NP MPs who would not dream of combining with the colored and Indian MPs. Thus were the coloreds and Indians given representation that remained meaningless. This was in contrast to the situation which prevailed in the Cape before Union in 1910 and up until 1936 when African and colored voters could combine with whites to elect MPs pledged to serve their interests.³¹

Under the Indaba proposals each background group was given a veto over "own affairs" defined as those matters pertaining to a group's culture, language, or religion.³² A majority in the particular background group was necessary to pass legislation dealing with these matters. In addition, a 60 percent majority in both chambers of parliament was necessary to pass all but budgetary bills. And most matters of real substance such as defense, foreign affairs, foreign trade, police, railroads and buses, posts and telecommunications, prisons, internal affairs, and even such minor matters as museums and art galleries, remained under the control of the central government in Pretoria under the Indaba agreement. Natal would have retained control of those powers previously granted to the provincial councils plus agriculture and education. The whites, who made up only 8 percent of Natal's population, could by combining with the Indians, 10 percent, thwart the will of the other 82 percent in the few areas left to the province!

The Indaba organization never attempted to sell the proposals as majority rule; they used the more modest term of power-sharing, which accurately describes the internal settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia — but not the South African tricameral constitution.³³ The Rhodesian settlement gave Bishop Muzorewa a real decision-making role at Lancaster House where he combined with General Peter Walls and Finance Minister David Smith to defy Premier Ian Smith. In Namibia there was power-sharing, but it was dominated by the whites. The DTA was led by a white, Dirk Mudge, who was a former leader in the ruling National Party. In the tricameral settlement the National Party disdained to share any real power with the coloreds and the Indians.

THE EFFECT ON THE INSURGENCY

Besides failing in their goals internal settlements can also have a negative impact on the war by causing the insurgents to escalate their military and/or diplomatic efforts. In Rhodesia there was a lull in the fighting for about a month after the signing of the Salisbury agreement in March 1978. The fighting resumed in April with a new intensity and continued to escalate in scope and area for the remainder of the war as the Patriotic Front attempted to liquidate the internal settlement.³⁴ In Namibia the reaction was not quite so immediate, but by 1981 one-third of the farms in the Outjo district of the operational area had been abandoned due to insurgent activity and guerrillas had penetrated as far south as the Otavi-Grootfontein-Tsumeb triangle in northern Namibia — but well south of Ovamboland. The SA Commander-in-Chief estimated that SWAPO had between 8,000 and 10,000 guerrilla recruits in training in 1980.³⁵ This activity led Pretoria to invade southern Angola and to occupy it in 1981 in Operation PROTEA. A similar escalation failed to occur following the initiation of the TGNU in June 1985, probably because SWAPO was militarily incapable of it and because after the failure of the Turnhalle settlement the TGNU was not considered by SWAPO to be a political threat.

In South Africa the announcement of the 1983 tricameral constitution and of the black local authorities led to the formation of the UDF in August 1983 as a virtual legal internal wing of the ANC. A year later the UDF led a boycott of the colored and Indian elections which kept the voter turnout in both cases below 20 percent. Immediately following the elections rent boycotts in the Witwatersrand area — the reef — led to the beginning of the unrest which continued in South Africa through 1987.³⁶ The declaration of a national state of emergency in June 1986 led to a dramatic drop in the number of “unrest”-related incidents by the beginning of 1987, but the rate of violence had little to do with either the passage of legislation dealing with the National Council in parliament or the Indaba in Natal. Those internal settlement attempts were probably inspired by the violence, but they had little effect on its course.

SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL SETTLEMENTS

None of the attempted internal settlements in South Africa got beyond the negotiation stage except for the tricameral parliament, for which there was no negotiation; it was instituted after elections in August 1984 with the new colored and Indian houses of parliament holding their initial sessions in January 1985. However, because the Indians and coloreds are minority black communities outnumbered by the whites, there was no provision for a black state president and the real power remained located in the white House of Assembly. The apartheid nature of the new tricameral parliament also prevented the white liberal opposition from combining with the two black houses to outvote the government, although occasionally joint sessions were (and still are) held with all three houses together in one chamber. The National Council was to be purely advisory in nature and to consist of homeland leaders, government ministers, tricameral leaders, and ten elected blacks — one from each of South Africa's development regions. The plan was condemned not only by the extra-parlia-

mentary opposition but also by popular homeland leaders like Buthelezi and Mabuza and by the leader of one of South Africa's two associations of township councillors. The scheme, although passed by parliament in 1987 and again in a modified form the following year, collapsed in 1989 before the general election of that year.

A possibly more successful internal settlement was negotiated from April to November 1986 in Durban, Natal mainly between the Natal Provincial Council and KwaZulu/Inkatha. This was known as the KwaZulu/Natal or KwaNatal Indaba after the Zulu word for negotiation.³⁷ An agreement was reached on 28 November 1986 to merge KwaZulu and Natal under a consociational government consisting of a consociational executive and a bicameral legislature, the lower chamber to be elected by proportional representation on a one person-one vote basis and the upper chamber to consist of five equal ten-man groups representing Africans, Afrikaners, English speakers, Indians and those not wishing to identify with any particular group. However, under the new 1983 tricameral constitution the white elected provincial councils were due to be phased out and replaced with multiracial executives appointed by Pretoria. This occurred in July 1986 leaving the white delegates to the Indaba with no official authority. The government in Pretoria declined to allow the Indaba agreement to be implemented on the advice of the local National Party which condemned it as straight majority rule. The Indaba formed a publicity bureau which lobbied the public and government for support for the Indaba. This ended in early 1990 after the De Klerk government publicly accepted the idea of a national convention to negotiate a new constitution involving all races.

Because of the opposition of the ANC and its internal UDF and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) allies there is a question whether the Indaba could have succeeded as an internal settlement even if Pretoria had permitted it to be implemented. A low intensity civil war broke out between Inkatha supporters and UDF supporters in the Natal Midlands in September 1987 which continues to this day, and which in July 1990 spread to the reef in the southern Transvaal. The Indaba publicity organization promised to hold an all-races referendum on the Indaba before implementing it — and to not implement it unless it received a majority among each race. The UDF and COSATU could possibly have mobilized sufficient strength to win a no vote in the referendum unless they decided to boycott it and thereby grant victory to the pro-Indaba forces by default. The UDF and ANC were opposed to the Indaba because it was a regional rather than a national solution, because it was power-sharing rather than majority rule, and because it embraced capitalism rather than socialism.

The possibility for an internal settlement between the government, Inkatha and "system" (councillor and tricameral) parties still exists if negotiations involving the ANC should fail. But because the government has conceded that racially based group rights should have no place in the constitution, a collapse is much less likely than if this concession had not been made. The European Community lifted its ban on new investment in South Africa in December 1990 and President Bush announced the lifting of American eco-

conomic sanctions against Pretoria in July 1991. Because the government knows that Inkatha's support is confined mainly to Natal and the worker hostels on the reef this eliminates the second reason for an internal settlement. And unlike Muzorewa and Sithole in Rhodesia, Buthelezi cannot even make a credible claim to having influence among the guerrillas of the ANC or the Pan-Africanist Congress. Thus, in a short period of time Buthelezi will be able to fulfill none of the purposes of an internal settlement.

Thus it is likely that the internal settlement is part of South Africa's past, from the P W Botha era of 1984-89. However, the South African government/National Party has embraced alliance or coalition politics. The NP was impressed by the performance of the DTA in the Namibian election where it gained a majority among non-Ovambos. De Klerk seems convinced that he has a good chance of defeating the ANC if he forms an electoral coalition with "moderate" black parties such as Inkatha, the new United Christian Party formed by Zionist church Archbishop Mzilikazi Masiya, and the Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA) of missionary John Gogotya. The NP, with its new multiracial membership policy, can probably absorb Indian and colored supporters of the tricameral parties directly without having to make an alliance with their parties.³⁸ The same holds true for the bulk of white Democratic Party supporters.³⁹ There are about two million Zionist church members in South Africa, Inkatha claims to have 1.9 million paid up members, and FIDA claims to have 600,000 members.⁴⁰

De Klerk may well be in error in his optimism. Almost certainly the ANC will win the first majority rule elections in South Africa. Almost certainly the first post-apartheid leader will be an African, and no African outside the ANC can compete with Mandela and Tambo in terms of popularity. However, De Klerk and Buthelezi may reasonably hope to replace the ANC as the ruling party in the future if the ANC fails to manage South Africa's numerous economic, social and political problems and if South Africa remains a democracy. De Klerk's optimism is fortunate for the liberation struggle in South Africa. If Smith had had similar optimism before 1980 the war may have ended in Rhodesia much sooner. The same is true of P W Botha in Namibia.

South Africa is in transition from the "total onslaught/total strategy" thinking of the Botha era to majority rule and, hopefully, nonracialism. The internal settlement was a strategy pursued by the securocrats of the Botha era in Rhodesia, Namibia, and even South Africa itself. It is only natural then, that as long as securocrats like Adrian Vlok and Magnus Malan remain in the cabinet that the internal settlement will have a place in the political strategy of the settler elite. The news of government funding of Inkatha only confirms this rather obvious point. While it is quite possible that De Klerk has given up on the internal settlement, it appears equally likely that he still envisions a role for the most obvious internal partner, Inkatha, as a grindstone on which to wear down the ANC through internecine violence. This merely serves to confirm that the same political dynamics that applied to Rhodesia and Namibia also apply to South Africa, although they are moderated by the weakness both of the armed struggle and of external sanctions.

CONCLUSION

The type of regime, or more precisely, the location of the regime's ultimate rulers, determines the degree of resistance to the armed struggle and the final strategy pursued against it. Non-settler colonies are not worth fighting a protracted internal war over. Dependent settler colonies may be worth fighting for in the eyes of the settlers who live there, but because they do not rule, this is irrelevant. So, when the going gets tough, the "tough" get going — back to Europe. Independent settler colonies are fought over the hardest because the rulers have the most to lose from majority rule and thus are more willing to fight and less willing to give up power. Thus, Southern African white settlers have had to find internal black leaders to strike a deal with.

The primary purpose of this deal is to lift or avoid international sanctions aimed at changing the racial policies of the minority settler government. The blacks may include former nationalist leaders who have been side-lined due to their lack of a viable guerrilla army during the period of armed struggle. Thus, the internal settlement is the product both of white policy and black politics.

The role played by black politicians in relation to the armed struggle largely determines what role they will play in support or opposition to the internal settlement. Those opposed to, or lacking the necessary wherewithal for, the armed struggle, and still desiring an autonomous political role will join the internal settlement along with more traditional black puppets. And the degree of unity of the external nationalists will largely determine the international response to the internal settlement and the amount of credibility that it can muster. If the nationalists are divided into two or more groups and in need of an internal proxy to represent them legally they are creating the conditions for future white cooption of that proxy. A single guerrilla movement can have a much less autonomous internal proxy, and thus one less subject to cooption.

Internal settlements have failed because they normally follow the pattern of "too little, too late." Although internal settlements involve major changes to the whites, as far as the blacks are concerned the changes are relatively minor and far less than what either the external nationalists or the West, which has imposed or threatened sanctions, have asked for. They are a sign that the whites are fast losing their grip on power but don't quite realize how quickly. But because it seems at the time that there is little cost in undertaking internal settlements they will probably continue to be undertaken by other settler regimes elsewhere.⁴¹

Internal settlements fail, and will continue to fail in the future, because of the impossibility of reconciling two contradictory goals: the desire of the whites to maintain not only the economic but also the political status quo and the desire of the majority population and the international community that the majority truly rule. The closer internal settlements come to fulfilling the latter purpose the closer they will come to winning for their designers the prizes sought: popular support, international recognition and an end to pariah status, and guerrilla defection.

The lessons of internal settlements in Southern Africa are also applicable to the military/civilian juntas created in Central America in the 1980s.⁴² The ruling oligarchies and militaries in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras wanted American support for their COIN campaigns against leftist guerrillas. As a result "reformist" coups took place and civilians from the Christian Democratic party were brought into the ruling juntas followed by elections. What has occurred in El Salvador is what would have occurred had the Muzorewa government won international recognition and the lifting of sanctions. The other lessons of Southern Africa still apply to Central America and possibly to other locales.

This article adds to the existing literature on counterinsurgency an understanding of how the international community or a dominant regional power (South Africa, the United States) can have an effect on the political strategy of the regime facing revolutionary change even though it need not render any aid to the insurgents.

Endnotes

1. Pariah states are states with few international contacts and lacking membership in most interstate organizations. The ultimate pariah state was Rhodesia which was not recognized by a single other state, even though it had *de facto* diplomatic, military, and trade ties with South Africa. The secessionist states of Biafra (June 1967 - January 1970) and Katanga (July 1960 - January 1963) are also good examples of pariah states. The only existing "states" in a similar situation today are South Africa's "independent" homelands of Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Taiwan is a relative pariah and Israel is a pariah in the Third World but not in the West.
2. This is *de facto* the case in Brazil, and even more the case in Paraguay and Bolivia which have historically been ruled by the military. It is also the case in Central America north of Nicaragua.

The two juntas that were formed following a military coup in El Salvador in October 1979 are examples of an internal settlement. The first junta collapsed after a few months when the reformist politicians involved in it realized that the real power resided with the military. The second junta was formed with Christian Democrat leader Napoleon Duarte who had been robbed of the presidency in 1972 by military intervention after it was apparent that he had won the elections. Duarte fronted for the military in the early 1980s and was elected president in 1983. But, although he won genuine popular support initially, he was unable to end the insurgency by leftist guerrillas and make peace. His reign in power collapsed in the late 1980s when he was followed as president by Alfredo Cristiani the candidate of the far-right ARENA party whose leader was linked to the death squads by many journalists. Duarte's Christian Democrats had been associated with corruption while in power and had lost popular support. Internal settlements may figure in the future in Guatemala and Honduras. There is a long tradition in Latin America of civilian politicians serving as a facade for military rule.

3. Settler elites are the leaders of the ruling political parties in settler colonies and the leading members of the settler business community. For example, in Rhodesia the settler elite consisted of the leadership of the Rhodesian Front and the leading businessmen, in South Africa it is the leadership of the National Party and the heads of the leading corporations such as Anglo American, Sanlam, etc. The settler elite always consists of members of the dominant ethnic group or groups.
4. These include the theoretical writings of Mao Ze Dung and Nguyen Giap; the memoirs of leading French and American government and military figures who fought in Vietnam

or who were involved in the decision-making on the war; the memoirs of ordinary American soldiers who fought in Vietnam and of a few former Vietnamese participants who fought on both sides; and lastly a number of analytical studies of revolutionary and COIN warfare based on Asian cases. As the author is not an historian specializing in the Vietnam war or a South East Asian regional specialist he will leave it up to the reader to search out bibliographies on his own.

5. In this category are works by Basil Davidson, Gerard Chaliand, Kenneth Grundy, and John Marcum to name only a distinguished few. These include Chaliand, *Armed Struggle in Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky* (London: Zed, 1981) and *The People's Cause* (London: Longman Group, 1981); Grundy, *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa* (New York: Grossman, 1971); Africa Research Group, *Race to Power* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974); and Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution, Vol 1* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969) and *Vol 2* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).
6. Partido Africano para a Independencia de Guinea Bissau e Cabo Verde, the main liberation movement in Guinea Bissau led by Amilcar Cabral which began an armed struggle in 1963.
7. The former has published books on the following Rhodesian units: the Selous Scouts, the Special Air Service, the Air Force, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, and the Central Intelligence Organization. The latter has published several accounts of the South African interventions in Angola and of the counterinsurgency effort in Namibia.
8. The best are Martin Meredith, *The Past is Another Country, Rhodesia: UDI to Zimbabwe* (London: Pan, 1980); Andre Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia: Continuity and Change 1915-80* (Johannesburg, SA: Jonathan Ball, 1985); Robert Jaster, *South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy* (New York: Harvard University and University Press of America, 1985); and Alfred Moleah, *Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation* (Wilmington, DE: Disa Press, 1983).
9. This allowed the armed wing of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) liberation movement access to Namibia's northern border and their Ovambo kinsmen across the border.
10. See Africa Research Group, *Race to Power*, pp. 63-67.
11. The leaders of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and SWAPO respectively and both advocates of military victory.
12. Nkomo was the leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Mugabe's partner in the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe. He conducted negotiations unsuccessfully with Smith in August 1975 and again from January to March 1976. He then became a firm advocate of the armed struggle. Sithole was the first leader of ZANU until he was replaced by Mugabe for being insufficiently militant in 1976. Muzorewa was the head of the umbrella ANC from December 1974 to October 1976 when the Patriotic Front was formed and the ANC became the United ANC (UANC). Chikerema was the leader of the minor FROLIZI guerrilla party which carried out only two actions and existed only on paper when it merged into the ANC in 1974. Shipanga was the former information minister of SWAPO who, after being imprisoned as a suspected South African spy by SWAPO, went into exile in Sweden before returning to Namibia in the mid-1970s where he formed his own party, SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D).
13. The Frontline States are: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe (since 1980) and Namibia (since 1990). They were formed in October 1974 in order to coordinate diplomatic initiatives on Rhodesia and later on Namibia and South Africa. The original four were: Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia with FRELIMO representing Mozambique before independence. Angola joined the group following its independence and the OAU recognition of the MPLA government. Zimbabwe joined in 1980 following independence as did Namibia in 1990.

14. The OAU has a Liberation Committee that decides which liberation movements will win official OAU recognition as genuine. Since the formation of the Frontline States in 1974 the Liberation Committee has followed the recommendations of those states.
15. David Soggot, *Namibia: A Violent Heritage* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 188-93; and Du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia*, pp. 285-88. BOSS interfered in the ethnic politics of the Herero, the Nama and the Rehoboth Basters.
16. Throughout this article the term "whites" shall refer to whites who have not actively sided with the liberation movements. In Rhodesia and Namibia only a mere handful of academics and the odd rancher supported the liberation movements. In South Africa there came to be a rather large number of whites supporting the African National Congress and its internal allies starting in the mid-1980s. But before that the whites siding with the ANC consisted almost solely of communists and a few eccentric liberals like Mary Benson, Helen Joseph, Patrick Duncan, and Alan Paton.
17. Muzorewa never had any operational connection with the guerrillas but some were recruited in the name of the ANC when he was its leader. Sithole lost direct control of ZANU during late 1975 but it took Mugabe some time to establish his leadership.
18. The Salvadoran internal settlement of the 1980s achieved the equivalent of the first goal by winning support in Congress for generous military and economic aid to the government of El Salvador and did gain some popular support for the regime in the early and mid-1980s.
19. This perception regarding ZANU was certainly true in the 1975-77 period but probably not correct during the internal settlement.
20. See Michael Beaubien, "The 'New' Rhodesian Constitution: Illusion of Majority Rule," *Southern Africa* (March 1979).
21. The whites were considered to be one ethnic group despite being divided by language and culture into Afrikaners, English speakers and Germans.
22. The DTA, SWAPO-D, South West Africa National Union, National Party of SWA, and the Rehoboth Basters.
23. See Claire Palley, *Zimbabwe Rhodesia: Should the Present Government Be Recognised?* (London: Minority Rights Group and Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1979); and Lord Chitnis, *Free and Fair? The 1979 Rhodesian Election* (London: Parliamentary Human Rights Group, 1979) for details on government coercion in Rhodesia. On Namibia see Justin Ellis, *Elections in Namibia?* (London: British Council of Churches and Catholic Institute of International Relations, May 1979); "South Africa's Sham Elections," *Focus*, 20 (Jan/Feb 1979); and Soggot, *Namibia*.
24. This occurred in Rhodesia and in Namibia but not in South Africa where the whites remained in de jure as well as de facto control.
25. The first black officers in the Rhodesian army were only commissioned in 1977.
26. Herbert Chitepo, a ZANU leader in exile who was assassinated in March 1975 by a Rhodesian agent, had served as attorney general in Tanzania after its independence. Byron Hove of Muzorewa's UANC had practiced law in Britain. Only Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela had practiced law in South Africa in the 1950s and one was in prison and the other head of the ANC in Lusaka. Blacks did not really begin practicing law on a large scale in SA until the 1980s.
27. See Beaubien, "The 'New' Rhodesian Constitution," p. 18, and Robert Alperin, "The Distribution of Power and the (June 1979) Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 1, vol 15 (January 1980).
28. The Namibian homelands had been drawn up by the Odendaal Commission in 1964.
29. See the chapter on the internal settlement in Moleah, *Namibia*.
30. On the provisions of the 1983 constitution see Laurence Boule, *Constitutional Reform and Apartheid* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984).

31. Unfortunately for the blacks, after Union the moderate party was the South Africa Party (SAP) and later the United Party (UP) which was always ready to sacrifice their interests to national (white) considerations. Jan Smuts, the former SAP prime minister and later UP prime minister acquiesced in the disenfranchisement of Africans in 1936 for the sake of party unity.
32. The KwaNatal Indaba was negotiated, but never implemented, in Natal in 1986 and will be explained in more detail below.
33. The description of the Indaba as power-sharing is taken from the first page of the speaker's manual issued by the Indaba organization for its publicists. Critics described the Botha government's approach to "power-sharing" as illustrated in the tricameral constitution as "sharing power without giving up any power."
34. ZANU called this escalation after the Shona word for the first rains of the year which wash the dust out of the streets.
35. Soggot, *Namibia*, p. 287.
36. The reef or Witwatersrand (white water ridge in Afrikaans) is the goldbearing area of the Southern Transvaal where Johannesburg, Soweto and many medium sized white cities are located.
37. Literally the word means "a meeting at which important matters are discussed" and corresponds to the English word parley which comes from the French verb to talk.
38. Democratic Party activist and former Inkatha Institute director Peter Mansfield wrote this in an op-ed piece, "Too Soon to Woo" in the *Sunday Tribune* of Durban, SA (11 November 1990) and suggested that the NP should avoid an alliance with Inkatha.
39. See *The Weekly Mail* of Johannesburg, SA (9-11 September 1990), p. 1 for predictions on the future of the DP.
40. Inkatha upped its membership claims from 1.8 to 1.9 million in late 1990 after it had converted from being a liberation movement to a political party in July. In April 1990 a Markinor poll that did not include Natal indicated that Buthelezi had only 2 percent support among blacks in the other three provinces. On Inkatha's level of support see Ian Phillips, "Inkatha's New Look," *New Nation* of Johannesburg, SA (20-26 July 1990), pp. 7-8; and Gerald Mare and Georgina Hamilton, *Appetite for Power: Inkatha and the Politics of "Loyal Opposition"* (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987). The estimate of two million members is based on attendance figures at the churches. On FIDA see Jo-Anne Collinge, "Fida's leader speaks....," *The Weekly Mail*, (23-29 November 1990), p. 33.
41. In addition to those Latin American countries mentioned earlier, is Northern Ireland where one million Protestant settlers from Scotland and England rule over half a million native Catholics. Britain has exercised direct rule over the province since 1972 and it is possible that a future British government, probably a Conservative one, might wish to turn over power to an internal settlement government in Belfast rather than see Ireland reunited. The primary partners for such a settlement are the moderate Catholic Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) and the nonsectarian Alliance party. However, since the Alliance party lacks mass support it might be necessary to include one of the less reactionary Unionist parties in the settlement. The SDLP has majority support among the Catholic population but it needs a credible Protestant partner with which to share power. This would enable the British to avoid the "external" nationalists of the Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army in seeking a settlement. However, London could bypass the external nationalists by dealing directly with Dublin in a manner similar to the way Pretoria dealt with Luanda in 1988. An internal settlement is mainly necessary so that the British government could disengage itself from Northern Ireland without being accused of selling out the "British" Protestants in the north by Conservative backbenchers.

Israel has its origins in a settler population that returned to its historical homeland and today has a settler — a Jewish — majority. Only the West Bank can be said to be a settler regime where less than 100,000 Jewish settlers and the Israeli Army rule over a million

Palestinians. A type of internal settlement was possibly attempted in the early 1980s with the creation of the Village Leagues. But the Leagues attracted the support of only about 1 percent of the Arab population and collapsed before the Intafada began in December 1987. The external nationalists — the Palestine Liberation Organization — clearly have the support of the vast majority of Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israel's attempts to change this simple fact are all doomed to failure.

42. The Christian Democratic party entered the Salvadoran junta in October 1979 following a coup and Jose Napoleon Duarte joined the junta in January 1980. In Guatemala a civilian government led by the Christian Democrats came to power in 1985. In Honduras ex-senior officers ran for election as civilians.