sides have also been further polarized by the US-Iraqi War. The Palestinians marched for Saddam Hussein and supported his use of conventionally armed Scud missiles against Israel. Some even called upon him to use chemical weapons. The conflicts and problems of the intifada will be further exacerbated as the massive numbers of Soviet Jews are settled in Israel and inevitably in the Occupied Territories.

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What importance does a Cold War book have in the post-Cold War period? Very little, it would seem. This edited volume of a number of papers delivered at a symposium sponsored by the National Defense University in November 1986, has declined in relevance by 1991. Intended as a guide to reassessment of the security policy of the United States in Latin America, most of the papers were of questionable value in 1986; today they provide little more than a review of flawed policies of the Ronald Reagan era.

One example of the anomaly is the earnestly held belief of many of the authors that Cuba and Nicaragua are equally committed to hard-line Marxism-Leninism. One casual comment by General Paul F. Gorman is typical. In his article on long-term strategy he says, “it is evident that the communist governments in Havana and Managua are given to ruthless suppression of dissent among their own people, regionally destabilizing militarization, support of international terrorism, subversion and criminality, and that their economic policies have enslaved those people to the Soviet Union.” (p. 339) Following the electoral victory of Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro in February 1990, the absurdity of the statement is obvious to all. But any serious student of Latin America would have laughed at the statement in 1986. This same Cold War rhetoric affects Dennis Caffrey’s “The Inter-American Military System,” Jaime Suchlicki’s “Soviet and Cuban Policy in Latin America,” William Ratliff’s “The Reagan Doctrine and the Contras,” and Gabriel Marcella’s “Latin American Military Participation in the Democratic Process.”

Inclusion of the culturally deterministic attack on Latin American national character by Lawrence E. Harrison in an article entitled “The Genesis of Latin American Underdevelopment,” lessens the credibility of the volume further, unless one would argue that it is better to expose Latin American stereotyping than to ignore it. Unfortunately, all too many North American citizens share Harrison’s view that “Canadians and Americans attach more
importance to work — and work harder — than Latin Americans.” (p. 36)
Since it is not explained, Harrison’s odd conviction that “US intellectuals are a major force against constructive cultural change in Latin America,” (p. 37) is puzzling, to say the least.

Hidden in the table of contents are articles of value. Margaret Crahan’s review of religion and politics in Latin America is an admirable synthesis, as is William LeoGrande’s article on human rights. LeoGrande argues for a permanent human rights component in United States security policy. Ambler Moss’ look at the future of United States-Panamanian relations to the year 2000 covers the key issues in the relationship and has value even though it was written before the invasion of Panama in 1989. William Perry’s article on Brazil’s strategic potential is an even-handed review of past Brazilian military and foreign policy and of possible future directions. Norman Bailey’s analysis of the “Security Implications of the Global Debt Crisis for Latin America,” is still valid.

Inevitably, a book based on presentations at a symposium and aimed at contemporary policy loses value with the passage of time. Dramatic changes since 1989 in Latin America (Paraguay, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Panama, to name a few of the most obvious) and in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have drastically altered perceptions of security in the Western Hemisphere. It is time for a new assessment.

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Canada’s interest in the Third World has traditionally been focused on the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. Although Canadian investors ranged more widely, Canadian governments concentrated on countries with whom we shared at least a linguistic bond. This meant that much of the Middle East and Western Asia, and parts of Southeast Asia were neglected. It also resulted in Canada assuming a very low profile in Latin America: Ottawa was not an important hemispheric actor.

The crisis that erupted in Central America in 1979 changed all that. Canadians suddenly expected their government to become an active player in an area where it had little prior experience. Moreover, they asked Ottawa to take strong positions opposing the policy of the United States. Jonathan Lemco explains how the Trudeau and Mulroney governments dealt with the pressure and elaborated a Central American policy.