

military and non-economic nature of Soviet aid, and strong Muslim feelings all undercut Moscow's influence. Whatever the perceived decisiveness of Soviet aid in 1977-78, its military assistance by mid-1988 was perceived as something of a "blunt instrument" by the author. (p. 283)

Gorbachev moved to encourage Ethiopia to effect a peaceful solution to its dispute with Somalia, especially since the latter was disillusioned by US military aid and Ethiopia was more susceptible to pressure for a settlement. Menigistu lost political credibility in the latter because of his inability to deal with drought, famine, and a generally deteriorating economic situation in the country. On the Soviet side, some Soviet commentators also criticized Moscow's past overreliance on military aid and attempts to upset the international political equilibrium. The Ethiopia-Somalia imbroglio may have thus given impetus to Soviet "new thinking" on regional conflicts even though not all quarters in Moscow agreed. Conservative critics within the Soviet military and party apparatus continue to believe in ideological rather than economic grounds for intervention. Menigistu only accepted Gorbachev's pressure when forced to do so. He might also have rejected the Soviets. The massive level of Soviet assistance to Ethiopia in 1977-78 did not preclude such development.

In conclusion, to return to my initial point more typical sentences and summaries would help the reader without detracting from the analysis in any way. Too much documentation and historical material may only obscure the points he seeks to make.

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Peretz, Don. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990.

Don Peretz's *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* is an examination of the causes, components, and results of the current conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the territories Israel seized in the June 1967 war. The study is written as an overview and structured in a clear direct style similar to the textbooks that Peretz has written. The book begins with a chapter on historical background, and then goes on to examine Israeli policies for coping with the uprising. This is followed by an assessment of the impact of the uprising on the Palestinians within the territories, the domestic impact on Israel itself, and the international repercussions of the intifada.

The picture that emerges from this study is of two societies in bitter conflict. The Palestinians are subdued but not defeated or even totally intimidated. They therefore continually probe for new ways to resist the occupation, while adapting to alternating Israeli responses. This makes the occupation dynamic, with each side testing and refining new strategies for dealing with

the other. It has also meant that the Israelis have devised progressively tougher strategies to control the Palestinians. Peretz discusses both the effectiveness and the level of brutality inherent in these methods many of which are part of "Iron Fist" strategy. These include deportations, detention without trial, group punishments, destruction of houses, curfews, and beatings.

Peretz also considers both non-violent and violent Palestinian reaction to the Israeli control measures. The case of non-violence activist Mubarak Awad is examined, as is the intra-Palestinian debate over the effectiveness of these tactics. Peretz states that many of the tactics of the intifada are non-violent and that Awad's challenge for a totally non-violent struggle was initially taken seriously by many Palestinians. The Israelis, for their part, took Awad seriously enough to deport him despite considerable international outcry. Non-violence however is no longer a burning issue because of the escalation dynamic and the continuing mystique of throwing stones. A central question that remains for the Palestinians is how seriously to escalate beyond throwing stones.

In considering the impact of the intifada on Israel, Peretz maintains that the economic and labor consequences have been fairly limited. While sales of Israeli goods to the Occupied Territories have declined, this has by no means crippled the Israeli economy. The most significant problems are political, with polarization occurring between key elements of the Israeli public over how to respond to the intifada. Yet Peretz also points out that many Israelis believe that the crisis has largely been created by their media. Also, according to public opinion data cited by Peretz, over half of the Israeli public in 1990 believed that insufficient force was being used by the National Unity Government to crush the intifada.

The final aspect of the intifada that Peretz examines is the international reaction to the process. This chapter notes how Iron Fist policies have blackened Israel's image with the US, Europe, and Jewish communities throughout the world. The intifada also forced the Arab states to re-focus their attention on the Palestinian problem. Ties between Egypt and Israel were severely strained, while King Hussein felt compelled to renounce formally his claims over the West Bank in favor of PLO claims. While these were all setbacks for Israel they were nevertheless manageable.

The book was written as an overview rather than a detailed research study. Key aspects of the intifada are often not examined in depth, but this was never the author's intention. Indeed, most of Peretz's footnotes are from the *Jerusalem Post International Edition* as well as mainstream American newspapers. Still, Peretz has a good ability to comment briefly and intelligently on one key aspect of the struggle before moving on to the next. This study therefore accomplishes the author's purpose.

It is also interesting to note how dramatically these problems have intensified since this book was published. The indecisive national unity government in Israel has been replaced by a narrowly-based Likud government, and the political extremist Rehavam Ze'evi, noted for his desire to expel all Arabs from the territories, became a member of the Israeli cabinet. Both

sides have also been further polarized by the US-Iraqi War. The Palestinians marched for Saddam Hussein and supported his use of conventionally armed Scud missiles against Israel. Some even called upon him to use chemical weapons. The conflicts and problems of the intifada will be further exacerbated as the massive numbers of Soviet Jews are settled in Israel and inevitably in the Occupied Territories.

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Fauriol, Georges, ed. *Security in the Americas*. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1989.

What importance does a Cold War book have in the post-Cold War period? Very little, it would seem. This edited volume of a number of papers delivered at a symposium sponsored by the National Defense University in November 1986, has declined in relevance by 1991. Intended as a guide to reassessment of the security policy of the United States in Latin America, most of the papers were of questionable value in 1986; today they provide little more than a review of flawed policies of the Ronald Reagan era.

One example of the anomaly is the earnestly held belief of many of the authors that Cuba and Nicaragua are equally committed to hard-line Marxism-Leninism. One casual comment by General Paul F. Gorman is typical. In his article on long-term strategy he says, "it is evident that the communist governments in Havana and Managua are given to ruthless suppression of dissent among their own people, regionally destabilizing militarization, support of international terrorism, subversion and criminality, and that their economic policies have enslaved those people to the Soviet Union." (p. 339) Following the electoral victory of Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro in February 1990, the absurdity of the statement is obvious to all. But any serious student of Latin America would have laughed at the statement in 1986. This same Cold War rhetoric affects Dennis Caffrey's "The Inter-American Military System," Jaime Suchlicki's "Soviet and Cuban Policy in Latin America," William Ratliff's "The Reagan Doctrine and the Contras," and Gabriel Marcella's "Latin American Military Participation in the Democratic Process."

Inclusion of the culturally deterministic attack on Latin American national character by Lawrence E. Harrison in an article entitled "The Genesis of Latin American Underdevelopment," lessens the credibility of the volume further, unless one would argue that it is better to expose Latin American stereotyping than to ignore it. Unfortunately, all too many North American citizens share Harrison's view that "Canadians and Americans attach more