clear that nearly everyone knew that they were participating in a falsehood. The soldiers he speaks of soon realize that they have been lied to and he paints a picture of young Soviet draftees as sheep pushed to slaughter and being slaughtered by rulers who didn’t care, weren’t told the truth and didn’t want to hear it anyway. He offers no explanation why the war continued for half its time under Gorbachev except to observe that wars are much easier to start than they are to finish.

If perestroika can be compared to a river, the Afghan war was surely one of the streams that fed it. The lies and the suffering were one thing; they were bad enough but there was one thing worse. There had been greater suffering and plenty of lies in the Great Patriotic War but, at least when that was over, people could say what it had been for.

The book is typical of the revisionism going on in the USSR today. The publishers do not indicate whether the book was published in the USSR but it doesn’t matter if it wasn’t because similar things are published all the time now. The Soviets are picking through the trash of the past trying to find out how they got to the precipice. Bocharov gives the Western reader an impression of the limitless disgust and shame that the contemplation of their country’s past causes the contemporary Soviet citizen freed at last to read and speak a few words of truth. It is not a surprise that so many of them are seeking an answer in the pre-Bolshevik period when things seem to them, after seventy years of Communism, to have been cleaner and simpler.

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*Note: the opinions expressed in this review are those of the author and are not to be taken as those of the Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada.

Robert Patman notes that his study was originally written as a doctoral dissertation. It is a densely detailed, rich, but occasionally “massive” one, not always a “good read,” especially for those not as familiar with the regional politics of the Horn as the author is. But detail is supplemented with useful and valuable chapters on the concepts of intervention and disengagement.

The author asks why the Soviets shifted support exclusively to Ethiopia and away from Somalia in the Ogaden conflict of 1977-78. If it could
project military forces into a distant area like the Horn of Africa why partially disengage when interests were fully established? Patman also seeks to answer the question of whether intervention is successful in a long-term sense, and how apparent early success may cloak long-term disappointment because military power does not provide lasting influence. He distinguishes the motive for intervention in a long historical section on Soviet interests in the Horn from the opportunity to do so; Brezhnev’s belief that the global correlation of forces was moving in Moscow’s direction, aided by enhanced Soviet military power at all levels. He then has a brief postscript on Gorbachev’s “new thinking” as it applies to Horn policy.

Intervention occurs when a state projects itself into the affairs of another for some moral or legal objective. The means used, military or economic, are only the means — not the policy goals. Intervention constitutes a sharp break with existing forms and is directed at changing the structure of authority in the target society. A state or combination of states tries to impose its will on a nation perceived as weaker, to realize some political, moral, or legal objective within a limited period of time.

Patman then discusses the requirements for intervention. These include possession of recognizable power, the possible dependency of one state on another, various issues in the target state’s structure of authority, etc. The superpowers are restrained from some forms of intervention by their mutual fear of nuclear war but this very fear may be manipulated by one superpower over another, giving it a greater scope for intervention. But rarely are optimal conditions present — low risk and minimal cost. Decisions to “go in” must always rest on some political judgment of the costs of intervening versus non-intervention. But the path to intervention may not always be consciously thought out and the further step to disengagement is rarely a smooth one.

Brezhnev’s conception of the changing correlation of forces affected Soviet perceptions but local conditions betrayed Moscow — it was unable to bring about a reconciliation between Ethiopia and Somalia who had incompatible claims on the Ogaden, ethnically Ethiopia, but also claimed by the Somalis. The idea of a Marxist-Leninist confederation failed and the Soviets were ejected by Somalia, giving all-out support to the Ethiopians. Soviet calculations that its military assistance to Somalia would provide it leverage proved ill-founded. Interests there had to be sacrificed and Ethiopia’s claim to territorial integrity (popular in the region) upheld.

Patman contends that the Ethiopian-Somalian situation for Moscow was a classic example of power without influence. Soviet military power to intervene did not lead to commensurate influence over Somalia. The Soviets had demonstrated an enormously enhanced ability to move large military armaments over long distances but could not overcome Somalian nationalism. Influence is ultimately a two-way street — a client or target state is not without leverage over the intervening party. Aid to Ethiopia enraged the Somalis because it challenged what they regarded as the rationale for Soviet-Somalian ties. The Somalis accused the Soviets of disloyalty and ejected them. In the Ethiopian case the forces of nationalism, the exclusively
military and non-economic nature of Soviet aid, and strong Muslim feelings all undercut Moscow's influence. Whatever the perceived decisiveness of Soviet aid in 1977-78, its military assistance by mid-1988 was perceived as something of a "blunt instrument" by the author. (p. 283)

Gorbachev moved to encourage Ethiopia to effect a peaceful solution to its dispute with Somalia, especially since the latter was disillusioned by US military aid and Ethiopia was more susceptible to pressure for a settlement. Menigistu lost political credibility in the latter because of his inability to deal with drought, famine, and a generally deteriorating economic situation in the country. On the Soviet side, some Soviet commentators also criticized Moscow's past overreliance on military aid and attempts to upset the international political equilibrium. The Ethiopia-Somalia imbroglio may have thus given impetus to Soviet "new thinking" on regional conflicts even though not all quarters in Moscow agreed. Conservative critics within the Soviet military and party apparatus continue to believe in ideological rather than economic grounds for intervention. Menigistu only accepted Gorbachev's pressure when forced to do so. He might also have rejected the Soviets. The massive level of Soviet assistance to Ethiopia in 1977-78 did not preclude such development.

In conclusion, to return to my initial point more typical sentences and summaries would help the reader without detracting from the analysis in any way. Too much documentation and historical material may only obscure the points he seeks to make.

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Don Peretz's Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising is an examination of the causes, components, and results of the current conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the territories Israel seized in the June 1967 war. The study is written as an overview and structured in a clear direct style similar to the textbooks that Peretz has written. The book begins with a chapter on historical background, and then goes on to examine Israeli policies for coping with the uprising. This is followed by an assessment of the impact of the uprising on the Palestinians within the territories, the domestic impact on Israel itself, and the international repercussions of the intifada.

The picture that emerges from this study is of two societies in bitter conflict. The Palestinians are subdued but not defeated or even totally intimidated. They therefore continually probe for new ways to resist the occupation, while adapting to alternating Israeli responses. This makes the occupation dynamic, with each side testing and refining new strategies for dealing with