with the local population in providing security. They will not achieve results if they only make occasional visits to villages after an act of terror has taken place. The guerrilla must be isolated as a result of this intimate relationship between the security forces and the people, for this will provide the intelligence which can be used to destroy the organization which supports him. One then turns the guerrilla to work against his old comrades, undermining their belief in their cause and strengthening your supporters’ belief in your cause.

These premises may well be familiar to readers of Frank Kitson or Robert Thompson but they are no worse for that! I recommend this book to all readers interested in unconventional warfare and to all students of the subject who will find this a useful and easily understood handbook of experience.

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It is the habit of many historians, as part of the standard investigation of a country afflicted by violence or instability, to perform the usual post-mortem to discover the underlying political, social and economic sources of the conflict. It is more unusual for someone to avoid the attractions of this form of historical “ambulance chasing” and examine why a country did not experience structural political instability.

Robert H. Bates in *Beyond the Miracle of the Market* provides an interpretation of the contemporary political history of Kenya spanning the period from the Mau Mau insurgency to the presidency of Daniel arap Moi during the 1980s. He examines why Kenya, unlike many of its East African neighbors and many West African counterparts, proceeded along a different path in its post-colonial development, and enjoyed a comparatively stable politico-economic environment.

According to Bates, the difference lies in the manner in which Kenya came to independence and the key role played by the politics of agriculture. The end result of the Mau Mau insurgency (1952-56) and the run-up to independence (1963) was the capture of power by the prosperous producers of cash crops in Central Province, resulting in a government which favored the accumulation rather than the redistribution of agriculturally-generated wealth. Public policy, therefore, tended to treat export agriculture as a valuable national resource to be carefully nurtured rather than consumed. In contrast, in neighboring Uganda and Tanzania those who seized power after independ-
ence committed their governments to enhancing the consumption possibilities of the less fortunate regions of the country by taxing and exploiting the more favorably endowed, contributing to political friction and instability.

In terms of political power, the dominance of the agricultural gentry (mostly of the Kikuyu tribe) institutionalized a conservative political and economic agenda, particularly during the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (1963-78), a Kikuyu. Under a single-party system ideological struggle gave way to factional struggles, while power over the instruments of coercion suppressed organized dissent. A parallel theme investigated by Bates involves the interrelationship between agriculture and politics. The politically-dominant agricultural gentry created economic institutions designed to enhance economic growth and efficiency of the market, which provided the framework for the struggle for the distribution of the gains. Economic institutions became the battleground for special interest and factional politics. This battle occurred, not only at the elite level; the agrarian foundation of Kenyan politics also reached down to the regional and local levels.

Yet, in the period after the death of President Kenyatta in 1978, the agricultural gentry gradually lost control of the political structure after the rise to power of the vice-president, Daniel arap Moi. The new president, a member of the minority Kalenjin tribe, joined in coalition with other Rift Valley and western tribes. To secure its regional base, the Moi government seized the economic resources from the centres of export crop production and distributed them to less favored regions through the control of the agricultural institutions. During intermittent droughts and food crises, Moi and his associates used this power over food to reward political friends, discredit political enemies and slowly consolidate control of the political structure. Thus, the political centre-of-gravity shifted from Central Province (Kikuyu land) to the west of the country (non-Kikuyu). President Moi, however, in following the path of economic redistribution in an effort to fortify a populist image, has brought Kenya to the point where it is beginning to look like its more unstable neighbors.

As Bates writes the book from the standpoint of a political-economist, the terminology used and the statistics examined, especially in terms of micro-economic data, does prove difficult at times for the non-specialist. Still, it is important for those who study the origins of political conflict to make the effort to examine work outside of the orthodox political-security field to gain an alternative perspective.

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