Problems of Accommodation in Bicommunal Societies

by
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THE NATURE OF BICOMMUNALISM

This article will analyze political problems of societies divided into two predominant social groups and indicate several policy implications for politicians and administrators.[1] Bicommunal societies appear to be especially prone to ethnic violence or ongoing constitutional crises and, at both national and subnational levels, seem to have far more than their share of troubles. Among the best known national examples are Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Cyrpus, Czechoslovakia, Fiji, Guyana, Israel, and Sri Lanka. Subnational units such as Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom, have also experienced major problems of constitutional impasse as well as low-intensity conflict.

Although detailed theoretical discussion of bicommunalism will be avoided, several brief conceptual points require emphasis.[2] Unless otherwise indicated the term "bicommunalism" refers to societies where two principal groups, ordinarily comprising at least three-quarters of the population, exhibit significant social separation.[3] In most bicommunal socieites the two main groups typically comprise a higher percentage of the population, but the possible impact of social dualism upon political processes may make it useful to include socieites with slightly lower percentages.

Bicommunalism should be defined by social separation rather than by political distance or conflict, because it is political strife that is oridinarily to be explained. In other words, it is necessary to separate a possible cause from the effect. In all ethnically divided societies, the relevant groups perceive themselves as distinct and are so perceived by others. Because people are ordinarily born into their ethnicity, ethnic differences may evoke all of the emotion and intensity associated with family, kinship and fundamental self-identity. Social divisions can revolve around language, religion, other cultural differences as well as race.[4] Social separation can be determined by such criteria as degree of intermarriage, segregated living patterns, as well as social attitudes of distrust and distance. Although the durability of ethnic passions often confounds efforts to achieve accommodation, ethnic identities nevertheless can spontaneously evolve and change through assimilation, division and other ways. For good or ill, ethnic identities can also sometimes be manipulated.

The term "bicommunal" should not be interpreted too rigidly. Each ethnic group itself will invariably display various patterns of differentiation such as class or subethnic divisions. Additionally, in most bicommunal systems there are other ethnic groups. Canada, for example, has significant German, Ukrainian, Italian, native peoples and other minorities. Likewise, some highly fragmented political systems (e.g., Lebanon, South Africa, and the erstwhile Soviet Union) have a bicommunal overlay. The prevalence of the phenomenon

suggests that an examination of the dynamics underpinning bicommunalism may offer insights into the conflicts within these societies. This is particularly true where the formal political system is structured to reflect the bicommunal ethnic structure of society.

Thus, Soviet politics could be conceived, at least in part, as the interplay between the dominant Russian cultural group on the one hand and separatist ethnic movements with common aspirations on the other. The grievances of many large minority ethnic groups against Russian dominance has generated significant resentment towards government policies viewed as discriminatory. The encouragement of the Russian language at the expense of local languages, for example, was a source of tension. These underlying resentments and fears still exist to a significant extent.[5]

Similarily, an understanding of political violence in South Africa may be enhanced by reference to the special problems created by bicommunalism. There is significant debate concerning the issue of whether solutions should be along bicommunal, majoritarian or some other lines.[6] Bicommunalism has been a crucial factor in Lebanese politics, despite the importance of fragmentation within the Christian and Muslim communities. Of course, in all of these countries issues other than bicommunalism may have exerted more influence on intergroup politics. The impact of international politics in Lebanon and economic issues in the Soviet Union, for example, have also been central to the problems of these societies. This serves to underscore the importance of identifying the manner and extent to which bicommunalism may contribute to ethnic conflict or militate against finding political accommodation.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN BICOMMUNAL SOCIETIES

Societies in which just two ethnic groups predominate are prone to structural rigidity. So long as the most significant political issues are defined primarily by relationships between the two ethnic groups, there is limited opportunity for interethnic group coalitions or cooperation.[7] In situations of conflict and perceived threat, the dominant political parties are likely to represent the ethnic communities. Because no other ethnic parties exist with sufficient strength to allow for shifting coalitions, the party system may be frozen into a bicommunal pattern.

In multicommunal societies, on the other hand, there can be shifting alliances that bring excluded groups into a new ruling coalition. In democratic multiethnic societies, political expediency may encourage the formation of interethnic group alliances. Because alliance membership can shift, there may be an incentive to be less harsh, because today's opponent is a potential ally or potentially in control of government when one's own group is out of power.

The structural contrast between multiethnic India and bicommunal Sri Lanka helps illustrate this point. The intensity of some of the ethnic hatreds in India are surpassed in few countries, and yet the world's largest democracy has managed to survive in the face of these intense ethnic hostilities as well as severe

economic pressures. Part of this survival capacity is undoubtedly due to the ability of the central government to manage conflict through tradeoffs, concessions, decentralization and other techniques made possible by such diversity. By contrast, Sri Lanka faces a stark conflict between two principal ethnic groups, with Mulsims, comprising about seven per cent of the population, being too small to serve as a coalition partner. The fact that Tamils tend to be concentrated in geographical regions complicates efforts to create party coalitions through electoral techniques.[8]

Political institutions may serve to reinforce social separation and prevent political accommodation. Electoral processes and constitutional frameworks, for example, may deny the minority the ability to have any meaningful form of representation. Protestant domination of the Northern Irish government prior to British Direct Rule in 1972 was facilitated by a parliamentary system in which virtually all power was concentrated in the hands of the party in control of the lower house. The combination of British indifference, the absence of meaningful judicial review, as well as a system of party responsibility within the Protestant Unionist Party, were among the institutional reasons for Catholics having virtually no effective representation within the system. The relationship between political and social structures is usually reciprocal. In the case of Northern Ireland, political institutions that helped exclude Catholics from meaningful participation also created a disincentive for Protestant accommodation. The resulting Catholic alienation and Protestant indifference contributed to the social gap between the two groups. Thus, political institutions in Northern Ireland helped reinforce bicommunal social separation.[9]

In bicommunal systems policy disputes are more likely to be perceived in zero-sum terms. Any gain by one side may be perceived as a loss by the other. In multicommunal societies, on the other hand, tradeoffs can more easily be made. Furthermore, compromises by political leaders may be more easily hidden. In bicommunal societies decisions on contentious issues are likely to be especially stark. Even where efforts to compromise have been made, psychological predispositions by members of the public are likely to make even equitable outcomes seem unfair and slanted toward the other group.

From a psychological perspective ethnic resentment is likely to be especially intense in bicommunal societies. Hostile attitudes and stereotypical thinking will not have been subject to the possible diluting effects produced by the existence of other competitors. As indicated above, it is less likely that the opposition group will have ever been perceived as an ally. Multiple generations may have been inculcated with a folklore of "us-versus-them" in which ancient fights and grievances become a central part of the political culture of each group. In the absence of significant broker groups or shifting alliances, either past or present, there exist few other domestic targets of hostility to help dissipate communal animus. The cases of Cyrpus, Northern Ireland, and Israel are especially stark examples of this point. Of course, intense feelings may exist in multiethnic societies as well, but the narrowed focus of bicommunal social structure may help harden and intensify hostilities to a greater degree.

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In bicommunal political systems birthrates can produce intense conflict if the minority group out of power threatens the majority, even in the long term, with becoming a political majority. The issue of a high minority birthrate is magnified in democratic political systems where numbers are the primary variable determining poltical control. One factor in the breakdown of the Lebanese political system was the unwillingness of the dominant Christian community to acknowledge that the Muslim community may have surpassed them in numbers. This acknowledgement would have required a new political arrangement in which Christians would have to relinquish substantial political control. To be sure, other issues have been crucial in determining the instability of that political system.[10]

Northern Irish Protestants have been a sizable majority since the founding of the Northern Irish political system, but they have nevertheless felt that a higher Catholic birthrate could jeopardize their political control. One frequently hears comments in Northern Ireland to the effect that "Catholics breed like rabbits," suggesting not merely a hostile stereotype but also a political fear. Concern with the higher Catholic birthrate contributes to the psychological predisposition of Protestants to view themselves as under siege.[11]

Internal migration can also produce extreme emotional reactions in bicommunal subnational and sometimes national political systems. Especially where democratic political processes are followed, such migration can threaten the political control of the dominant group. The perceived threat to fundamental values can be a contributor to conflict as in the case of Sinhalese migration into areas viewed by Tamils as Tamil territory.

Democratic electoral processes provide a psychologically seductive rationalization for the majority psyche when the majority dominates the political system. In Northern Ireland prior to Direct Rule in 1972 it was common for members of the Protestant majority to claim that the political system was fair despite the fact that it was "a Protestant state for a Protestant people." In actuality the Northern Irish Parliament and government were almost completely dominated by the Unionist Party representing the Protestant majority.[12] "We've got the majority and we're entitled to govern," was a typical comment that still has appeal to many in the majority community. Similar comments can sometimes be heard by members of the Anglophone community in Canada: "Why can't the French just accept the fact that they lost [militarily to the British in 1760]? Why can't they just realize that they're in the minority?"

In societies where the dominant group is indigenous or where it arrived "first," (e.g., Fiji, Malaysia, Ireland as a whole), democratic ideals may sometimes be similarily qualified to the advantage of the politically dominant group. Among members of the community in political control, the principles of democratic politics are often skewed in a way that limits the rights of the other side. Outwardly democratic structures may provide a ready though dubious justification for behavior that discriminates against the other community.

Bicommunalism may aggravate the problem of "outbidding" in electoral politics. To the extent that bicommunalism increases fears and animosities among the rank and file, politicians seeking to displace incumbent members of

their community may have a greater incentive to accuse competitors of being soft on the opposition group. Moderate politicians are especially susceptible to charges of selling out their own community. In conditions of heightened ethnic tensions, progressively more radical politicians may win office by appealing to growing fears and anger. Eventually leaders committed to the politics of separation or violence can acquire an increased following if the electoral process fails to produce stability and policy benefits for each side.

THE ROLE OF SECONDARY MINORITIES

In bicommunal societies, conflict between the two main communities can spill over into smaller ethnic groups. In Sri Lanka, the massacre of Muslim minorities has been an unfortunate additional cost of the violent conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils.[13] The political wrangling in Canada surrounding the Meech Lake Accord provides a less violent example of this spillover effect. The Accord, which would have defined Canadian constitutional arrangements in more starkly bicommunal terms, was defeated in part by the resistance of a native Canadian legislator in the Manitoba parliament. He and his supporters did not want the interests of Canada's indigenous groups to be submerged in a bicommunal political arrangement and sought explicit constitutional recognition of the rights of native people. In the wake of the Meech Lake debacle Canada has witnessed a clash between Mohawk Indians and government authorities of the French community in Quebec. The increased political activism of indigenous peoples in Quebec (and elsewhere) is very probably stimulated in part by the demands of French Canadians for greater autonomy.[14]

Bicommunal disputes at the national level may generate secondary conflicts at subnational levels. The interplay between different levels of conflict remains a fascinating area for further research. It should be noted that secondary ethnic group conflict is not manifest in all bicommunal societies. In Northern Ireland, for example, there are no significant minority groups that might complicate or mitigate ethnic political conflict between the Protestant and Catholic communities.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIVE SIZE

Bicommunalism may make more rigid the attitude of the community having political control. Where a clear majority dominates, as in Northern Ireland, there will be little incentive to compromise because there is no chance of an electoral shift of power. There tends to be an attitude of disdain toward the minority. It seems probable that the smaller the minority group, the easier it is psychologically and practically for government leaders to justify the notion of absolute majority rule and favoritism. Barring some cataclysmic event such as a major war with a common enemy, there is a reduced incentive for the dominant group to accommodate the demands of the weaker community.

In minority dominant bicommunal systems, the dominant community may have a particularly great fear of compromise, because the loss of power

could relegate it to being permanently out of power. In South Africa these fears may have helped contribute to the development of an ideology of racial superiority, although bicommunalism was undoubtedly more of a contributing than a determining cause of this attitude. Below it will be shown that majorities may perceive themselves as a minority in a broader international context and consequently possess the fears and rigidities of ruling minorities.

In bicommunal systems in which the two major groups are in approximate numerical balance, there may be a greater tendency for the politically dominant group to avoid complete discrimination. This pattern is somewhat analogous to the balance of power idea in international relations. Fiji, Malaysia and Guyana are examples of such cases, and according to R.S. Milne discrimination is at least somewhat restrained because political elites recognize the dangers of too harsh treatment of the other group.[15] The relative balance in size creates a greater threat of retribution if the group holding political power abuses it by excessive repression and favoritism to its own members. Psychologically, rough numerical balance may create a greater sense among the majority that the opposition group is entitled to a certain degree of influence. Similarly, when the two groups are in approximate numerical balance, the group that does not have control of government may feel more confident in asserting its demands for equal treatment, or at least less discriminatory treatment, than might otherwise exist.

On the other hand, fear of electoral defeat could in some cases harden the attitude of government elites in nations where there is rough balance between the two groups. This pattern would be especially likely when the groups have a history of significant violence, thus augmenting fear of reprisal. Also, rigidity could be expected where members of the other group have denied the legitimacy of the governing group's right ever to govern. Unless a transfer of power were mandated externally or appeared inevitable, the tendency of the group in control of government would probably be to resist transfer of power at all costs. The cases of Israel and Ireland, if the Catholic voting population approaches fifty per cent, illustrate this point, though the positions of the participants and the issues involved in the cases are obviously much more complex than can be analyzed here.

GEOGRAPHICAL COMPLEXITIES

There is often a geographical dimension to the problem of bicommunalism. Where the weaker group is concentrated geographically there are potential demands for autonomy or independence. Canada and Sri Lanka, for example, face movements for secession or autonomy by the principal minority groups. Other patterns of separatist demands may also occur, such as efforts to merge with neighboring states. The Irish nationalist demand for unification between northern and southern Ireland illustrates this type of dynamic. The desire for *enosis* or union with Greece by members of the Greek Cypriot majority contributed to the invasion and occupation of the northern part of the island by the Turkish military in 1974.[16] These latter forms of demands are likely

to make their opponents especially prone to rigidity and even violence, because issues of national identity and survival are at stake.

Where the minority group is geographically concentrated as in Canada or supported by external political forces as in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus, there may be a tendency among its leaders to be more assertive in their politically demands. Although the minority may be numerically inferior, it possesses other assets of political power. If it is in control of a federal state or province it will possess a number of advantages. Its leaders will have more practical experience, and they will hold more administrative and political resources. Also, they will present a more credible threat of secession. In a similar manner, where the minority is supported by an external ally such as the Turkish minority in Cyprus by the government of Turkey, they may have access to multiple resources of political power, e.g., military strength and diplomatic clout. In these cases, minority leaders may behave as if their group were in approximate numerical balance or even in the majority.

THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE MINORITIES

National majorities in control of government may become more recalcitrant in dealing with the minority if they simultaneously perceive themselves to be a minority within the broader international context. For example, the majority Sinhalese of Sri Lanka are outnumbered by the minority Tamils if the fifty million Tamils of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu are factored into the calculation. The majority population and its leaders tend to exhibit a siege mentality in such conditions.[17] This fear may make them less willing to compromise and more extreme in their treatment of the minority.

The Protestant majority of Northern Ireland is outnumbered about four to one if the population of the entire island is considered. Protestants perceive that they could be a permanent minority in the Republic of Ireland, whose culture and basis laws contain elements they regard as a threat. The historical Protestant slogans of "no surrender" and "not an inch" both reflect and reinforce the intensity of this feeling. The fact that there are no significant ethnic groups in the Republic of Ireland other than Catholics and a very small Protestant community confronts Northern Irish Protestants with the perception of being at the mercy of their ancient antagonists should a united Ireland be established.[18]

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BICOMMUNALISM

Despite the apparent difficulties faced by societies dominated by two main ethnic groups, it should not be assumed that they are inevitably ungovernable. Bicommunal societies such as Belgium and Canada have maintained relative political stability in the face of severe strain. Likewise, subnational bicommunal political systems can develop viable political processes and accommodations as illustrated by the case of New Brunswick, Canada.[19] To the extent that Mayalsia can be considered the practical equivalent of a bicommunal society, the post-independence history of that country also suggests the possibility of developing coalitions in Third-World settings.

Of course, the most viable examples of ethnic accommodation occur in economically advanced areas, and the long-term prospects for even these cases may be uncertain. Recurring constitutional crises may be the likely fate of bicommunal societies.[20] An extended discussion of policy implications and options is beyond the scope of this article, but several broad issues will be considered.

As the experience of Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and other cases suggest, creative action is necessary prior to breakdown. The further impasse and conflict proceed, the more radical the steps that need to be implemented. The earlier measures are introduced the less extreme they probably have to be. A frequently heard comment by analysts of ethnically divided societies is that reforms were too little and too late.

Regional autonomy constitutes one of the most common strategies for minimizing ethnic conflict and may be especially important in bicommunal political systems. After increasing fragmentation of parties along ethnic lines and the rising salience of the language issue, constitutional change in Belgium from 1967 to 1971 radically devolved power to the Dutch and French speaking areas, through transfer of powers to regional governments and modification of the parliamentary system to establish linguistic committees for handling issues unique or sensitive to the Dutch and French speaking areas. The upshot of these changes has been to produce a much greater degree of decentralization. Although these changes appear to have averted constitutional breakdown, they have created other problems such as administrative inefficiency, and greater potential contention on remaining national issues.[21] In Canada's federal system, accommodating increasing nationalist sentiment in Quebec seems a necessary component of efforts to save the national political system.

Where the minority group is in control of its own geographic area, provisions need to be made for the fair treatment of smaller minorities within these areas, whether these minorities are members of the dominant national group or other small ethnic communities. This may be especially difficult where violence has emerged or where central government leaders lack support from members of their own communities. One of the challenges for central leaders negotiating demands for autonomy is to ensure protection of secondary minority groups. Failure in this area weakens the legitimacy and authority of national governments and therefore the potential for success in rallying support from all sectors of society.

Voting techniques such as transferable vote mechanisms can help create the potential for coalition or for the emergence of centrist parties. But the ability of electoral measures to help overcome division after breakdown has occurred is problematic. In Northern Ireland, for example, Protestants quickly learned how to manipulate voting procedures introduced under British auspices intended to boost moderate forces such as the Alliance Party. Imaginative electoral and other structural techniques can be important, but they cannot in themselves overcome serious breakdowns in legitimacy and government authority.[22]

Multinational solutions may sometimes provide an environment and structural flexibility that could enable bicommunal societies to achieve accom-

modation. These can include directly interested countries as in the case of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. In this instance the government of the Republic of Ireland was given a consultative role in the politics of Northern Ireland, creating the potential for greater acceptance of government policy by the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland. The resistance of majority Protestants and continuing excesses by the security forces have been among the reasons for the limited success of this agreement. Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka, with the approval of the government of Sri Lanka, provides a more negative example of this approach. Obviously, cooperation by interested international governments is most likely where these governments have friendly relations or where they have compelling mutual interests such as the threat of domestic terrorism.

An extreme type of cooperation by interested governments is a condominium arrangement, where two countries share governance of the same geographic area. Historical examples of these systems such as the Sudan and the New Hebrides are not encouraging. For a variety of administrative and political reasons such as the need for responsibility, accountability and the divergent interests and internal politics of the cooperating governments, this technique does not seem to offer much hope as a long-term solution.[23]

Separation and integration strategies are among the more obvious as well as the more problematic of solutions. Partitioning a country in order to create two new political systems, or ceding an area to a contiguous country seems at face value to create an easy answer to the problems of conflict and impasse in bicommunal socieities. As Donald Horowitz and others have pointed out, however, a number of obstacles to successful separation exist.[24] Among these is the fact that populations are seldom neatly divided, and new minorities will be created in the breakaway areas. Furthermore, the risk of international war between the affected countries may be increased. Nevertheless, given the apparent problems of accommodation in bicommunal societies, separation may sometimes be the superior alternative, especially where there has been much violence, little history of cooperation and where the separating region is relatively homogeneous. Unfortunately, these kinds of outcomes are probably most likely to result from civil war or military intervention, as suggested by Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

Integration into international regional organizations such as the European Community may ameliorate some tensions, especially economic disparities, but domestic social policy may still be a source of contention. Regional organizations that acquire the legal and political clout to help protect minorities would be of real benefit, but outside of Europe few such organizations exist. In any event, the capacity to force hostile and unwilling communities into cooperative political arrangements seems limited in any circumstance.

Third-parties such as the United Nations, disinterested national governments, or non-governmental organizations such as the Vatican or international accommodation-seeking private groups may sometimes serve an important role. The main difficulty is the reluctance of sovereign governments to sanction such participation and the inability of these bodies to impose accommodation

and order where elites and mass publics do not want to cooperate. Where motivation for settlement and compromise exist, these bodies may serve as temporary facilitators or separators, but they cannot impose trust and reasonableness. International administrative devices might also help break the structural deadlocks. An example is making one member of the supreme court a tie-breaking national from a neutral country. These measures cannot in themselves produce accord but may be part of a broader package.

Even where political leaders in both communities want to achieve accommodation, potential difficulties will be formidable. Often the greatest challenge comes from the rank and file and from political competitors within a politician's own group. Political leaders seeking accommodation need to be unusually adept at calming resentment and persuading compatriots of the reasonableness of their position. The critical goal is to develop policies that will give other politicians and succeeding leaders incentives to maximize accommodation.

CONCLUSION

Bicommunal societies seem to be especially prone to constitutional crises or political violence. With just two major groups there is little likelihood of shifting coalitions. Other ethnic groups large enough to alter the balance of power do not exist. Opponents may be locked into permanent opposition status, complicating the process of achieving political compromise. Psychologically, bicommunalism may elevate levels of antagonism and distrust. Animosity cannot be easily diffused by focus on other ethnic groups or by alternating patterns of alliance and opposition.

It is not suggested that bicommunal societies inevitably produce political breakdown. As noted, there exist positive instances of two dominant groups cooperating. Despite inflexibilities created through bicommunal social structure, political mechanisms such as decentralization and transferable vote electoral processes may help if implemented in timely fashion. Furthermore, relationships can evolve. Technological and economic change, relationships with foreign governments, including wars, can alter ethnic relations producing cooperation, assimilation and other forms of adjustment. On the other hand, these same kinds of issues may be more likely to produce political crises in bicommunal societies than in nations with a more diverse spread of ethnic groups. Outcomes are more likely to appear stark and to be perceived in zero-sum terms.

Of course, other issues may be more important in defining a country's politics than bicommunalism, and in no society will bicommunalism be the sole variable determining political outcomes. Nonetheless, problems produced by having two primary ethnic groups creates difficulties that challenge the most astute of political leaders seeking accommodation.

Endnotes

1. The conceptualization of bicommunalism modifies and elaborates on one proposed by Ivo Ducacek in "Dyadic Federations and Confederations," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18, no. 2 (1988), p. 5. The term "bicommunal" seems more useful than the term "bipolar," which suggests distance and opposition that may not always exist.

2. For further theoretical analysis see ibid., and David E. Schmitt, *Bicommunalism: An Interim Conceptual Assessment*, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 30 August 1985.

3. As post-independence events in Nigeria suggest, multiethnic societies may acquire bicommunal political structures and processes, especially where ethnic groups are regionally based. However, analysis of conditions under which multiethnic societies may polarizate into two political groups is beyond the scope of this paper.

4. A useful discussion will be found in Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), chapters 1-2.

5. Of course, the degree of resentment varies among the various republics. I am indebted to my Soviet specialist colleague, Professor Minton Goldman, for his insights into the various nuances of Soviet ethnic relations.

6. See, for example, the debate in Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., *Negotiating South Africa's Future* (New York: St. Martin's, 1989). The chapter by Theodor Hanf provides an especially interesting theoretical analysis.

7. See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale, 1977), p. 56.

8. For a useful comparison of the experiences of Sri Lanka and Malaysia see Donald L. Horowitz, "Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict Management," in Joseph V. Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 459-71. The entire chapter is of direct relevance to the issues discussed in the present article.

9. There were, of course, other causes of Protestant domination. For further discussion see David E. Schmitt, *Violence in Northern Ireland* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1974).

10. An analysis of some of the critical background issues in Lebanese politics will be found in Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

11. An analysis of Northern Ireland from the standpoint of the impact of bicommunalism can be found in David E. Schmitt, "Bicommunalism in Northern Ireland," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18, no. 2 (1988), pp. 33-45.

12. A useful discussion of Protestant Unionist rule during this period will be found in Patrick Buckland, *A History of Northern Ireland* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981).

13. For an excellent analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka consult Kenneth Bush, "Ethnic Conflict in Ski Lanka," *Conflict Quarterly*, 10, no. 2 (1990), pp. 41-58.

14. For a brief overview of the 1990 conflict involving the Mohawks in Quebec see Gerald Alfred, "The Mohawk Crisis and Native Sovereignty in Canada," *The Cornell Political Forum*, 1990.

15. "Bicommunal Systems: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18, no. 2 (1988), pp. 101-113. For further analysis see also R.S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981).

16. An account of the background to this event will be found in Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978).

17. See Bush, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka."

18. Analysis of basic ethnic attitudes in Northern Ireland can be found in Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations* (2nd ed.;

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London: Oxford University Press, 1972). The contemporary positions of various leaders are analyzed in Padraig O'Malley, *The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today* (2nd ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).

19. An excellent comparative study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland will be found in Edmund A. Aunger, *In Search of Political Stability: A Comparative Study of New Brunswick and Northern Ireland* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981).

20. See Ducacek, "Dyadic Federations," p. 31, Daniel Latouche, "Problems of Constitutional Design in Canada," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18, no. 2 (1988), pp. 131-46, and Peter Leslie, "Bicommunalism and Canadian Constitutional Reform," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 18, no. 2 (1988), pp. 115-29.

21. A useful discussion will be found in Martin O. Heisler, "Hyphenating Belgium: Changing State and Regime to Cope with Cultural Division," in Montville, ed., *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*, pp. 177-95.

22. Further elaboration of electoral and structural techniques will be found in Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, ch. 15.

23. I wish to thank my colleague Professor William Miles for sharing his insights on Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides. The local quip that the arrangement was more pandemonium than condominium illustrates the problems experienced under joint British/French control.

24. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, ch. 6.