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terparts while the West was fascinated with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms prior to recent events in Tiananmen. Attempting to explain the complex internal relationships between the new Ministry of State Security, the Central Committee's Investigation Ministry and the older Ministry of Public Security in the 1980s, the authors note that the revamped Chinese intelligence community targeted economic as well as scientific and political subjects and began to draw on the resources of national universities and newly-established think-tanks, perhaps a reflection of their greater access to Western concepts and techniques as well as their politically fashionable pragmatism.

Neither Deacon's book nor Faligot and Kauffer's are academic texts supplemented by Chinese glossaries for technical terms or detailed footnotes, although the French work does include 255 biographical notes to help the reader keep track of the cast of Nationalist and Communist Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, Soviet, and Western characters. Regrettably, the transliteration of Chinese names and terms suffers at times in both books. On the other hand, both volumes are written by journalists who have published a number of studies of national intelligence services and have been able to draw on their previous work to illustrate international influences, particularly Soviet, on the development of both Nationalist and Communist Chinese security organizations. Given the relative scarcity of open material even in Chinese on China's intelligence services, both books are welcome introductions to the subject, but my hope is that future studies will bring to bear a greater degree of academic precision to this area of increasing importance to Western interests.

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Collier, Richard. *Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II*. New York: St. Martin's, 1989.

Early in *Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II*, Richard Collier sets out two main stories about the craft of combat reporting during World War II. First there was the story of "the war correspondent as intrepid individualist, long on courage and short on introspection," fuelled by the legends of earlier reporters. The second was the "eternal and implacable enmity of the armies," from the Crimean War through the first shots of World War II, toward war correspondents. Collier tells the first of these stories exceedingly well. His exploration of the second, however, will leave many readers wishing for more.

Collier, himself a reporter for two years during the war, brings the sensitivity and insight of a participant to his work. He focuses on a handful of correspondents: Richard Dumbleby of the British Broadcasting Corporation;

Quentin Reynolds of *Collier's* magazine; Martha Gellhorn, also of *Collier's*; and Clare Hollingworth of the London *Daily Telegraph*. Through these and other reporters, Collier weaves the triumphs and trials of the men and women who covered the war for the news organizations of the Allies into a narrative almost novel-like in its pace, drama and humor.

See, for example, Collier's telling of how Quentin Reynolds breached the nearly impregnable French information bureaucracy. Reynolds informed the head of the Information Ministry's Foreign Press Section, Pierre Comert, that he was cabling President Franklin Roosevelt for help in speeding his accreditation to the French military. "DEAR UNCLE FRANKLIN," the message read, "AM HAVING DIFFICULTY GETTING ACCREDITED TO FRENCH ARMY, THIS IS IMPORTANT. WOULD YOU PHONE OR CABLE PREMIER REYNAUD AND ASK HIM TO HURRY THINGS UP? IT WAS GRAND OF YOU TO PHONE ME LAST NIGHT. PLEASE GIVE MY LOVE TO AUNT ELEANOR. QUENT." "'You,' Comert breathed finally with unfeigned awe, 'are a nephew of the President?' Reynolds said nothing, merely smiled enigmatically. 'Ah, but of course,' Comert reasoned. Quentin Reynolds, Quentin Roosevelt. A family name, *sans doute*.'"

Collier is equally adept at describing the more serious challenges reporters faced in gathering and telling the story of the war. On 15 April 1945, as the Allied armies were moving across Germany, Richard Dimpleby followed up a hunch and went with the British Second Army as it accepted the surrender of a German camp near Bergen-Belsen. Dimpleby was the first Allied reporter to view the horror that was a German concentration camp. "I have seen many terrible sights the last five years," he would eventually tell his listeners, "but *nothing, nothing*, approached the dreadful interior of Belsen." Even though Dimpleby was sitting on one of the most important stories in history, his superiors at the BBC were reluctant to air his descriptions. "It was the BBC who refused to believe it, or to broadcast it, insisting on confirmation from other sources, so that Dimpleby, in rage and anguish, telephoned the newsroom with an ultimatum: unless his report went through, he would never again broadcast in his life."

So far, Collier has told an important story in an entertaining and moving way, and for this alone the book is valuable. How much more valuable it would be, though, if he were to analyze in a more direct and powerful way the larger question of control of information in democratic societies.

Throughout the book, as in the two examples previously cited in this review, Collier describes incidents when reporters and information officials came into conflict or when a reporter's editors either changed the nature of the dispatch or refused to use it altogether. He even tells of how many reporters came to censor themselves, as happened in the infamous slapping incident involving US General George Patton. Since American censorship, Collier says, "covered only military security, the story was thus wide open." But British correspondents did not file the story; "for them, it was an American 'family affair.'" Quentin Reynolds and several other American reporters investigating the story, even gathering signed statements from eyewitnesses,

and they approached General Dwight Eisenhower with their findings. Eisenhower had no power to stop them, but did not need it, for the reporters had decided not to file the story. "Our conclusion," they told him, "is that we're Americans first and correspondents second." By the time the story broke four months later in the United States, it rated no more than a small notice. "The Machine," as Collier called the American information bureaucracy, "had triumphed again."

One wishes that Collier, with his knowledge and insight, had tried to answer the questions that he indirectly raises. What are legitimate security interests? When is censorship justified, and when does it become excessive and self-serving? What are the responsibilities of a reporter in wartime? What is the relationship between a reporter and the military? Between a reporter and his or her superiors? What are the reasons for and consequences of "The Machine's" triumph? These are the types of questions that a small but growing body of literature has been asking about other military and national security situations, most prominently the Vietnam War, the Falklands campaign, the American invasions of Grenada and Panama, and inevitably, Operation DESERT STORM. To have at least partial answers to these questions regarding World War II would be a significant contribution to this important field of inquiry.

Again, Collier has told one aspect of his story marvellously well, so well in fact, that we wait for him or someone else to tell the rest of it in a similar fashion.

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van Creveld, Martin. *The Training of Officers: From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. New York: Free Press, 1990.

The title of this recent work from the author of such well-known studies as *Technology in War* and *Command in War* is slightly misleading. This is not, as van Creveld explains in the opening chapter, a look at how men and women in modern armed forces are trained from their enrolment and commissioning to retirement. Instead, it concentrates on the education of those middle-ranking officers potentially destined for future senior command appointments — that is, on the nature of modern staff schools, colleges, and related institutions. Given the subtitle, it is hardly surprising to find that he is not always impressed with recent trends — least of all in the United States, the focus for a penultimate chapter of recommendations for radical improvement.

But before dealing with the current situation, the author considers it necessary to explain how the modern system of staff training arose. As he convincingly argues, the skills involved in leading armies in war have for most