Endnotes


Although the development of Asian intelligence traditions can easily be traced back over two millennia, very little has been published in Western languages about how this inheritance, combined with more recent influences, has helped mould the characteristics of modern Asian security organizations. Both Richard Deacon and Roger Filigot and Rémi Kauffer's volumes are popular histories of the Chinese intelligence services clearly aimed at filling this gap as Western involvement with China and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole becomes increasingly intimate.

Building on his earlier work on the Japanese, Deacon begins his examination of the Chinese intelligence community by looking at the classical influences of Sunzi's *Art of War* (*Sunzi Bingfa*). Well-informed by his Chinese collaborators, Deacon goes beyond the *Bingfa* to include a discussion of the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*Sanguo Yanyi*), one of Mao Zedong's favorite classical novels. Based on a thirteenth century literary adaptation of an historical work, the *Sanguo Zhi* or *Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms*, the *Romance* is a handbook of interstate political behavior according to the Chinese world view. While it may seem overly literary for modern intelligence professionals, any examination of the classical allusions to Chinese politics can only help improve our perception of non-European intelligence organizations, regardless of their ideological veneers.

The weakness of Deacon's historical overview, however, is its lack of solid examples of how Sunzi's theories were translated into practice. Chapter 2, for instance, includes a brief description of the "spy-system" supposedly established by the eleventh century statesman Wang Anshi. (pp. 42-43) The *baojia* system which Deacon refers to, went far beyond being simply a means of maintaining social control by imposing shared responsibility for illegal activities. The system actually was one of several measures aimed at raising a popular militia to supplement imperial forces in aggressive campaigns against the steppe empires as well as in frontier defence. Imperial China's perennial struggles with these kingdoms produced some of the finest contem-
porary military handbooks and encyclopaedias which elaborate on the Bingfa in considerable detail. The 1054 work, the Wujing Zongyao, or Essentials of the Military Classics, explains the application of spies and informants in military operations, as well as specific counter-intelligence measures to be undertaken for the defence of fortified cities and towns along the frontier.

Considering the more recent development of Chinese intelligence services, Deacon provides an interesting account of the role of Morris Cohen (1889-1970), a Canadian salesman who became closely involved with the formation of the Nationalist army by coordinating arms supplies and cadet training in Canada for Sun Yat-sen in the 1920s. Later, under Chiang Kai-shek, Cohen continued to arrange arms deals for the Nationalists and may have been instrumental in enlisting support for the movement by "leaking" details of Soviet plans for China to the US as part of Chiang's "China Lobby" efforts. He remained an important Nationalist functionary until he was captured and interned by the Japanese in Hong Kong in 1942. He was repatriated to Canada after the war, and travelled between China and Taiwan until his death in England at the age of 81.

While Deacon's book, perhaps influenced by his Taiwanese informants, has a classical point of departure, Faligot and Kauffer begin their investigation with the dawn of the Chinese republican era. Introducing a prodigious amount of information, their book is built around a dramatic account of the career of the godfather of the Chinese communist security apparatus, Kang Sheng (1898-1975), and his role in the formation of Maoist China from his early abortive efforts in Shanghai in the 1920s where his plans were disastrously influenced by the whims of Stalin's Comintern through the vagaries of Chinese factional politics during the Cultural Revolution in the 60s and early 70s.

Although their French sources give much of their anecdotal material a distinctly European flavor, Faligot and Kauffer's work offers considerably more detail than Deacon's. One dramatic example is the mystery surrounding the death of the former PLA defense minister, Marshal Lin Biao. In September 1971, it was revealed that Lin was killed in a plane crash in Outer Mongolia following the failure of his attempted coup d'etat against Mao Zedong. While Deacon (pp. 382-85) relies on Taiwanese accounts to sustain the notion of a coup, Faligot and Kauffer (p. 390) go a step further arguing that Lin Biao and his wife Ye Qun were actually gunned down in a restaurant in Beijing by members of the elite 8341 detachment controlled by the security service.

While a great deal is said about the historical connections between China's intelligence services and their Soviet, American, and Japanese counterparts in both books, very little is mentioned about current connections. For example, Richard Yardley's contribution to Chinese cryptography during his sojourn at Chongqing, the Nationalist wartime capital, is discussed in some detail by Faligot and Kauffer (pp. 145-47), but no mention is made of the modern US-Chinese monitoring stations in northwest Xinjiang adjacent to the Soviet Union. They do, however, outline the sometimes absurd entente cordiale that existed between Chinese intelligence and their European coun-
terparts while the West was fascinated with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms prior to recent events in Tiananmen. Attempting to explain the complex internal relationships between the new Ministry of State Security, the Central Committee's Investigation Ministry and the older Ministry of Public Security in the 1980s, the authors note that the revamped Chinese intelligence community targeted economic as well as scientific and political subjects and began to draw on the resources of national universities and newly-established think tanks, perhaps a reflection of their greater access to Western concepts and techniques as well as their politically fashionable pragmatism.

Neither Deacon's book nor Faligot and Kauffer's are academic texts supplemented by Chinese glossaries for technical terms or detailed footnotes, although the French work does include 255 biographical notes to help the reader keep track of the cast of Nationalist and Communist Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese, Soviet, and Western characters. Regrettably, the transliteration of Chinese names and terms suffers at times in both books. On the other hand, both volumes are written by journalists who have published a number of studies of national intelligence services and have been able to draw on their previous work to illustrate international influences, particularly Soviet, on the development of both Nationalist and Communist Chinese security organizations. Given the relative scarcity of open material even in Chinese on China's intelligence services, both books are welcome introductions to the subject, but my hope is that future studies will bring to bear a greater degree of academic precision to this area of increasing importance to Western interests.

Paul C. Forage
University of Toronto


Early in *Fighting Words: The Correspondents of World War II*, Richard Collier sets out two main stories about the craft of combat reporting during World War II. First there was the story of "the war correspondent as intrepid individualist, long on courage and short on introspection," fuelled by the legends of earlier reporters. The second was the "eternal and implacable enmity of the armies," from the Crimean War through the first shots of World War II, toward war correspondents. Collier tells the first of these stories exceedingly well. His exploration of the second, however, will leave many readers wishing for more.

Collier, himself a reporter for two years during the war, brings the sensitivity and insight of a participant to his work. He focuses on a handful of correspondents: Richard Dimbleby of the British Broadcasting Corporation;