The Afghan-Soviet war was not only tragic and pivotal for its protagonists, its complexity and inaccessibility threaten to leave it largely a mystery. Facts were hard to come by. They were easy to distort and the number of manipulators were legion: the Soviets and the Kabul Regime, Zia's regime in Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf governments and their surrogates on the scene, the seven Peshawar based resistance parties and their hundreds of commanders operating inside Afghanistan; and a remarkable number of ad hoc press bureaus, information agencies, and personal reporting services operating both near and far from Afghanistan. Most had axes to grind, all were constrained by logistics, a difficult terrain, and a jumble of political and ideological blinders. Fragmentation applies as much to what we know about the war as it did to the way the mujahideen fought it.

It is encouraging, therefore, to find a book that attempts to discuss one major aspect of the war, its Afghan refugees, from a wide variety of perspectives offered by informed, often closely involved observers. Quality ranges widely and thematic lines tend to blur. The latter problem is aggravated by the volume's title. The subject is not the relationship between Afghan culture and nationalism, a successful study of which would be of great value. It does deal extensively with the culture of the refugees, especially those settled in Pakistan, but there is no serious attempt to deal with the perplexing question of Afghan nationalism.

The format also leaves definitions incomplete and conflicting assessments of relationships unresolved. Apart from the guidance offered by Akbar S. Ahmed in a short forward, the editors furnish no introduction or summation to sort out issues or point to conclusions. The reader is left to put things together. Most of the 20 short essays reward the effort.

Disagreements on details notwithstanding, the contributors reach significant areas of consensus, eg. Pakistani acceptance and support of 3 million refugees has been reinforced by the value that Muslims attach to the muhajir tradition of righteous flight. Yet the hospitality has little apparent bearing on the prospects for permanent assimilation. Encounters between Afghans and Pakistanis have tended to dramatize differences more than similarities. The drawing of distinctions has had special pertinence for Pushtuns. Several authors interpret interactions even between fellow tribal members as sharpening differences of political perspective — Afghan Pushtuns tend to see themselves as part of a ruling "majority" while Pakistani Pushtuns form a peripheral minority in Pakistan. The difference has limited the common interest in building a Pushtunistan as a possible aftermath of the war.

Much attention is paid to the social costs of the war as reflected in refugee experience. The evidence presented indicates that increased social fragmentation outweighs the apparent evidence of unity in the conduct of jihad. Strains have been put on value systems, particularly Pushtunwali,
which have imbalanced behavior in the directions of bellicosity and repression of women. Written shortly before the Soviets withdrew, these arguments anticipated the difficulties the resistance has faced in achieving unity or even coherence while efforts at resettlement and rebuilding have stalled.

Other developments which have since become glaringly evident were not foreseen: the fecklessness of the Peshawar resistance parties and their political as well as material dependence on Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the impact of Pakistan’s determination to control the process and results of a mujahideen victory, or the extent of the demoralization and confusion caused by Iranian and Arab intervention. An impression emerges that the contributors underestimated the damage the war wreaked on Afghanistan’s prospects for restoration and recovery.

Nevertheless, a variety of significant points are made. Weinbaum anticipates the shrewdness of Soviet manipulations leading up to the Geneva accords and Collins gives an informed and balanced assessment of motives and tactics in Soviet conduct of the war. Anderson offers a particularly incisive analysis of the disadvantages of landlocked states. Dupree details the burdens and achievements of Afghan women in the camps. Kushkaki makes clear the disabling costs to young refugees of educational deprivation. Pawal points to the integrative role of nomads for the Afghan economy. Majrooh draws behavioral distinctions between Afghan intellectuals with Islamic roots and those without. These and other insights make this anthology a useful point of departure for attempts to understand the post-Soviet plight of Afghanistan.

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Former US Ambassador to the Philippines during the fall of Marcos, Stephen W. Bosworth describes this work as “a seminal account of the origins and development of the communist-led New People’s Army.” This reviewer finds no reason to disagree with this assessment. There has been a flood of articles and books on the Philippines since the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 and this work deserves a place among the best. Jones spent five years in the Philippines as a free lance journalist and his credits include such diverse publications as *The Washington Post, The Guardian,* and *U.S. News and World Report.*

This work is both a personal account of interviews and experiences with the leaders and members of the communist insurgency and a history of the origins and development of the three organizations which it fostered, the