

the special forces such as Rangers and Seals, the airborne troops, and the naval gunners and aviators who occasionally got into the act, left something to be desired. Some of their problems stemmed from the fact that few of them had good radio communications with any of the others, and none of them had suitable maps. When it was all over, the Pentagon handed out awards and promotions with astonishing generosity. But the officer who commanded the most successful unit of all, the 2nd battalion, 8th Marines, received neither award nor promotion. Evidently, the Defense Department had, and liked, its own version of the old rule that no good deed shall go unpunished.

The author, Major Mark Adkin, is an Englishman who at the time of the Grenada episode was serving as an officer of the Barbados Defence Force. There he was well positioned to see and to judge those events he saw. Though his book does not answer all questions about this event now eight years in the past, it answers a good many of them. Major Adkin is to be thanked for this.

Frank Uhlig, Jr.
U.S. Naval War College

Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia. *Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View*. London: Pinter, 1989.

Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View is a misentitled book. What Ms. Gamba-Stonehouse presents is "An Argentine View," which is also in need of exploration.

The author gives the reader some valuable insights into the world as seen from Argentina, which is surely different from looking at it from the top down, geographically speaking. Her point of view offers a fresh look from this unique angle. And there are many statements worth pondering. For example, "Historically Argentina has felt that the most effective way of gaining recognition as a dominant power in South America was to offer an alternative to U.S. influence . . ." (p. 43), an opinion shared by this reviewer. Gamba-Stonehouse states that both Argentina and Brazil seek outlets through west coast countries to directly reach the Pacific (p. 65) and she down plays the military significance of the water routes around the tip of the continent. (p. 64) The author believes that the United States strategically divides North and South America at the northern boundary of the Amazon Basin (p. 3) and she makes a convincing argument to support this statement. She points out that the deterioration of communications between the United States and the region in recent years is due to the withdrawal of military aid and implementation of human rights policies of the Carter Administration (p. 4), hardly a fresh observation but worth restating. Through her research and writing, the reader will also gain an appreciation of how close Argentina and Chile came to war in 1978.

Spring 1991

However, some of the book's assertions are more contentious. Gamba-Stonehouse implies that the evolution of the current balance of power within deep South America was imposed or at least condoned by the large nations upon the small ones. For example (p. 10), "The creation of Bolivia and Paraguay provided a convenient set of buffer states between the most powerful countries . . ." This reviewer believes the existence of these buffer states is due to their tenacious desire for independence in spite of the actions of the larger nations and not because of them. Moreover, the author sees a Chilean, long-term, master plan to achieve control of the Pacific West Coast. In the reviewer's opinion, this ascribes to Chile a continuity of military acquisitions and political stability to which it could only dare dream. Gamba-Stonehouse also measures military strength differently from this reader. For example, she concludes that "Peru achieved military dominance over Chile . . . in 1977." (p. 35) Peru may have amassed more hardware but this is not the same as achieving military dominance. The authors' observations that the Soviet Union may eventually seek bases in the southern cone has been overtaken by events in Europe. (p. 57)

The author concludes that the possibility of Bolivia acquiring an outlet to the sea "sometime in the future has a good chance of success." (p. 66) Even though Gamba-Stonehouse gives no time frame for this prediction, it is bold. This book will challenge readers to re-examine their understanding of the "Southern Oceans."

Robert L. Scheina
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Goodman, Hirsh, and W. Seth Carus. *The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989.

[Editor's Note: This review was written several months before the recent Gulf War.]

This excellent and up-to-date book, written under the auspices of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, focuses on the conjuncture of two questions which are central to an analysis of the Arab-Israeli military balance at the outset of the 1990s. First is that which pertains to a net assessment — for the present and for the emerging future — of the conventional military balance between Israel and its primary foe, Syria. What shape would an Arab-Israeli war take if it erupted today, and who would prevail and how? Second is the question of the future impact of emerging new military technologies which, not only in the Middle East, promise to revolutionize conventional warfare. Which side will be advantaged or disadvantaged by these developments?