

Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey

by
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Spring of 1991 the Kurdish issue has been in the headlines on a daily basis. In March, in the wake of Iraq's defeat in the Second Gulf War, the Kurds of northern Iraq rose up in rebellion against Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. The remnants of Hussein's army suppressed the revolt, putting some two million Kurds to flight, seeking refuge along the Turkish and Iranian borders. American, British and other coalition forces, and the United Nations, have been drawn into the region to protect and care for the refugees, while Kurdish leaders try to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with Saddam Hussein. The tragic situation has focused Western attention as never before on the Kurdish people and their conflicts with the states of the region.

The Kurds are a stateless, largely Sunni Muslim, Indo-European-speaking people whose traditional homeland is concentrated in the rugged, mountainous area of the Middle East where Turkey, Iraq, and Iran converge. Approximately half of the Kurds in the world live in Turkey. Much smaller numbers also inhabit Syria and the Soviet Union, while a diaspora has now spread to several other Middle Eastern states as well as western Europe and North America.

In August 1984, the Marxist-nationalist *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan* (PKK) or Kurdish Workers Party led by Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan resurrected its guerrilla war of independence in southeastern Turkey that had supposedly been smashed by the Turkish military after it had come to power in September 1980. Despite repeated, subsequent claims that this PKK insurgency had been brought under control, clashes continued to occur on an almost daily basis. By the spring of 1990, they had escalated to such a degree that for the first time anti-government demonstrations broke out in more than a dozen small cities in southeastern Anatolia. The Turkish government felt compelled to issue an unprecedented decree which censored the press, authorized internal exile, and provided for the evacuation of villages for security reasons.¹

Many Turks, including their government, feel that the PKK and other Kurdish separatists have been receiving aid from various states and groups which desire a weakened Turkey. The former President of Turkey himself, Kenan Evren, was reported to have declared in October 1981, for example, that the Kurdish problem stems from foreign incitement.² In his "Statement" of August 1989 on the escalating PKK guerrilla operations, General Necip Torumtay, the Chief of Staff in Ankara, asserted that the PKK "receives important support from foreign powers."³ Commenting on Torumtay's "Statement," a knowledgeable Turkish source concluded: "As long as separatist camps remain open in Syria,

Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, and as long as they receive indirect support from European countries, Turkey will have to counter a resurrection of armed terrorism every year.⁴ The purpose of this study is specifically to analyze these allegations and to assess the significance of transnational sources of support for the contemporary Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

In making these charges the Turks undoubtedly have been influenced by their historical memories of European imperialist schemes to weaken and divide the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Since its birth in the early 1920s, the Turkish Republic has perceived Kurdish national awareness as a mortal threat to its own territorial integrity. This position was set by the Republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Turks suspected that the British had supported Sheikh Said's Kurdish revolt in eastern Turkey during 1925 to weaken the Turkish claim to the vilayet of Mosul in Iraq, which was largely inhabited by Kurds. A Kurdish revolt against Turkey would vitiate Turkey's claim that it would best represent the Kurds of Mosul. Since then, the Turkish view has been that the Mosul-Kirkuk area of Iraq was taken from Turkey at a time of political weakness.

The Turks, however, were not able to produce any credible evidence to substantiate their suspicions. On the other hand, the Kurdish revolt was crushed in part because the French gave the Turks permission to use the Baghdad railroad that passed through Syria for troop transport.⁵ Similarly, during the Kurdish revolt around Mt. Ararat in 1930, although the Kurds did receive some help from the Armenians (see below), Iran allowed Turkish troops to pass through its territory and surround the insurgents. Iran and Turkey later legalized their agreement by making minor border adjustments in 1932.⁶ In addition, under the Treaty of Sadabad in 1937 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq all agreed, in part, to cooperate on the Kurdish question.⁷ This collaboration included measures to prevent cross-border communication and support among the Kurds and, in general, sought to forestall any joint, transnational Kurdish action that might challenge the present international boundaries.

Inside Turkey itself, the country's rulers have been committed to eradicating anything suggestive of a separate Kurdish identity. Even the Kurdish language has been constitutionally "prohibited by law" for use "in the expression and dissemination of thought." (Article 26, of the 1982 Constitution). The US State Department has described the situation in the following manner:

Although millions of Turkish Kurds are fully integrated into the political, economic, and social life of the nation, the [Turkish] Government's pursuit of full assimilation has led to the proscription of publications of any book, newspaper, or other material in the Kurdish language. Neither are materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and ethnic identity permitted, and there have been instances of arrests of entertainers for singing songs or performing in Kurdish . . . The foregoing limits on

cultural expression are a source of genuine discontent to many Turks of Kurdish origin, particularly in the economically less developed southeast, where they are in the majority.⁸

Nonetheless, Kurdish agitation has continued in Turkey and abroad, thereby sustaining Turkey's anxieties about foreign interference in the Turkish-Kurdish dispute. The essay now examines the alleged sources of transnational support for the Kurdish insurgency, on a region-by-region basis.

THE MIDDLE EAST

A 1989 commentary on the situation by an independent Turkish weekly declared:

Countries neighboring Turkey in the Middle East, Iran, Iraq and Syria, have been used for years by terrorists as secure grounds for training activities, arms supplies, cross-border attacks and establishing political or military headquarters.⁹

Turkish intelligence sources have charged that PKK bases have existed just across the border in all three of Turkey's southern neighbors. In Iran, these camps supposedly have been located at Selvana, Rezhan, and Ziveh; in Iraq, at Sinhat, Kishan, Nirve, Lolan, and Deryasor; and in Syria, at Kamisli and Resulyan.¹⁰ A closer analysis of these three states indicates, however, that Syria has given the PKK by far the most covert support, while Iraq at least has made the most attempts to cooperate with the Turks, even giving Turkey *carte blanche* to pursue the PKK into northern Iraq on four different occasions since 1983. Iran's role in this matter has fallen somewhere in between these two extremes.

SYRIA. Syria has provided a haven for Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, since before the Turkish coup of 1980. After that event, the Syrian government permitted the remnants of the PKK to reassemble and reconstitute themselves on Syrian territory and in the parts of Lebanon they controlled. The first three PKK "congresses" also took place there. To this day, Ocalan continues to live in Damascus.

There are probably a number of reasons for this situation. Smoldering animosities concerning the Turkish annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta) province in 1939, as well as current problems dealing with the waters of the Euphrates River, which first flows through Turkey before reaching Syria, have long kept Turkish-Syrian relations cool. When completed in the 1990s, Turkey's giant Ataturk Dam is projected to be able to divert half of the more than 26 trillion liters of water that flows into Syria.

In addition, disagreements exist over Cyprus, Israel, and the PLO leadership. The memories of the harsh Ottoman rule that lasted into the early years of the twentieth century also probably play a background role. Furthermore, one should mention the grandiose ambitions of Syria's leader, Hafez Assad, to occupy a dominant position in the region. What is more Assad's brother, Rifat, is said to be a good friend of Ocalan. Rifat reportedly gave Ocalan

an armored green Mercedes as a symbol of his trust and friendship, and has also helped bring together the PKK and the small Turkish terrorist group, Acilciler, headed by Mıhrac Ural.¹¹

In July 1987, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal signed a security protocol with the Syrians in Damascus. Under its terms Syria agreed to stop permitting the PKK to raid Turkey from Syrian borders and to remove the PKK camps from its territory. For its part Ankara agreed to supply Syria with no less than 500 cubic meters per second of water per month. A request for the extradition of Ocalan, however, was refused.

Further Syrian intransigency soon became evident as the PKK camps were simply moved to the Syrian-controlled parts of the Bekaa Valley which were supposedly beyond Syrian legal control. "There is still evidence that Syrian territory is being used in many of the PKK attacks which are still taking place," concluded a Turkish report, based, in part, on the testimony of captured PKK agents, some of whom were Syrian nationals.¹² Reportedly at another high level meeting between the two states in Mardin during June 1988, Syria again rejected a request for Ocalan's extradition, apparently wanting to keep him as a "trump card" for the future.¹³ By the fall of 1989, Turgut Ozal, now President, was even threatening to cut off Syria's water supply, but such action was seen as highly unlikely because of its international implications.

IRAN. The profound ideological differences between secularized Turkey and Islamic Iran notwithstanding, the two states have been able to maintain surprisingly friendly relations. This is because both have calculated that such a policy would serve their respective interests.¹⁴ As a result, Iran has never served the role of PKK safe house to the extent played for so long by Syria. Nevertheless tensions exist. During the First Gulf War, both Iran and Iraq armed the other side's Kurds as fifth-column allies. Thus Teheran supported the Iraqi Kurds who harbored the PKK. Turkish incursions against these Kurds in pursuit of the PKK inevitably drew Iranian disapproval. What is more Iran refused to allow the Turkish military to pursue the PKK across its borders as the Iraqis did. As one observer noted: "The Turks could reasonably complain to both Iran and Iraq that by arming the Kurds they risk[ed] destabilizing the whole Turkish-Iraq-Iran triangle."¹⁵

In the summer of 1989, a Turkish source charged that, in addition to the PKK camps that had been in Iran for sometime already, a new one had been established at Ucneviye north of Urumiye with support from the Eastern bloc and Cuba.¹⁶ According to Fatih Tan, a PKK repentant (former PKK fighter now working for the Turkish government), the PKK camps in Iran consisted of about twenty-five militants under the command of Ocalan's brother, Osman Ocalan. Supposedly some eighty PKK guerrillas had infiltrated into Turkey over the Iranian border in April 1989. Most of them had been trained at the Resistance Camp of Ahmet Kesip and the Orencik Martyrs.

Another report indicated that the two PKK mobile radio stations that had been established clandestinely were believed to be in Iran.¹⁷ In addition, further

data indicated an “extensive PKK force deployment from camps in Iranian territory to the . . . buffer zone between Iran and Iraq.”¹⁸ Some 200 PKK guerrillas were now based at the Basiyan region where the borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq form an inverted triangle. They were “located in such a way that the terrorists may immediately pull back into Iran . . . preventing any cross-border attacks of Turkish troops.”¹⁹ Despite these problems, one Turkish study still concluded that “since November 1984 there have been only a few PKK attacks originating from Iran . . . Teheran was generally careful to restrict the PKK’s activities in Iran.”²⁰

IRAQ. As noted above, Iraq has permitted Turkey to pursue PKK guerrillas into its territory. This has occurred on at least four different occasions since 1983. Thus, although Iraqi bases have been invaluable to the PKK, they were not enjoyed with the permission of the host government.

According to a Turkish report in 1989, after the First Gulf War the Iraqi government regained control of its northern (Kurdish) areas; PKK camps were maintained there as well camouflaged “tent camps” in mountainous places which are very hard to reach. As of the summer of 1989, such camps were supposedly to be found in Kishan, Duruk, Urah, Gulkan, Besili, Sutuni, Zivek, Artis, Nazdur, Birri, Kiru, Barzan, Hayat, Ikmalah, S. Yunis, and Durjan.²¹

Despite its cooperation with Turkey, some Turkish officials have charged that Iraq discretely supplied weapons to the PKK in return for information about Massoud Barzani’s Iraqi-based Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP). One Turkish officer declared in 1987: “The Iraqi regime has an interest in the border region where they cannot enter because of Barzani forces. They [Iraq] give weapons and ammunition to the PKK in order to receive information on activities of Iraqi Kurds. The PKK while on one hand receives support from those Kurds on the other sells them out for its own survival.”²²

Another report seconded this claim: “Baghdad is now reported supplying the PKK with guns and ammunition in exchange for information. The feeling is the PKK is telling Iraqi troops where Barzani’s camps are.”²³ If these reports of Iraqi duplicity are valid, they help explain why the Iraqi KDP broke its alliance with the PKK at the end of 1987.

FIRST GULF WAR (1980-88). The Mosul-Kirkuk area in northern Iraq is inhabited by some 2,500,000 Iraqi Kurds, who became virtually autonomous during that war given Iraq’s desperate need to concentrate on its fight for survival against Iran. The possibility that Turkey might try to occupy this oil-rich area in the aftermath of an Iraqi collapse contained immense international implications.²⁴ Given Turkey’s great need for oil, perceived interest in suppressing any possible Kurdish state that might be created in northern Iraq following an Iranian victory, and the PKK’s longtime usage of northern Iraq as a sanctuary for raids into southeastern Turkey, Turkish military action seemed plausible.

Of immediate concern, however, was the strategic pipeline which carried a million barrels of oil a day from Kirkuk to Iskenderun in Turkey. This

pipeline met one-third of Turkey's oil needs, and also provided some \$300 million in Iraqi rental fees. The Turkish authorities warned Iran against striking it following threats by Khomeini's government to do just that in its attempt to launch an offensive into northern Iraq. Iran's refusal to guarantee the integrity of the pipeline was described by a Turkish official as "unfortunate" because his country could not remain a spectator if its "crucial interests" were harmed.

In August 1987, Turkish border officials in Hakkari province intercepted a special operations company of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps near Semdinli and took into custody ninety-five prisoners. Turkish officials claimed that the Iranians were trying to sabotage the pipeline, but the Iranians protested they were merely trying to attack a hostile Kurdish guerrilla camp in northern Iraq. After diplomatic discussions the Turks repatriated the prisoners.

Thus the pipeline issue led to speculation in the Turkish press concerning a possible Turkish military operation to save it from Iranian forces and their Iraqi Kurdish allies, Barzani's KDP, which, as pointed out above, supported the PKK until the end of 1987. Turkish military sources stated privately they were studying possible options, including the military one.

Huseyin Avni Guler, a former Turkish intelligence officer, and Hasan Isik, a former Turkish foreign minister, claimed to have evidence that the United States was encouraging Turkey to undertake military action in the eventuality of an Iranian attack against Kirkuk and the pipeline. Such a move would prevent Iran and possibly Syria from occupying the area and thus depriving Turkey, a NATO ally of the United States, of its use.

Most observers, however, felt that such Turkish action was highly unlikely given Turkey's vulnerable frontier with the Soviet Union, serious problems with Greece, and continuing occupation of northern Cyprus, not to mention the certain opposition of both Syria and Iran. In the event, of course, Iraq did not collapse, and, with the end of the war in the summer of 1988 and the reassertion of Iraqi authority in its Kurdish north, the entire question became moot. In the wake of the Second Gulf War, the Kurdish situation in Iraq has gained international attention, but remained uncertain as this essay went to press.

WESTERN EUROPE

In recent years a Kurdish diaspora of some 500,000 has formed in western Europe due to a variety of political, economic, sociological and educational factors. Over 400,000 Kurds now live in West Germany, 60,000 in France, 10,000 in Sweden, 5,000 in Belgium, and others in Britain, the Netherlands, and Italy. Turkish sources have complained that "various extremist organizations and the PKK have used European territory as their play-ground, recruiting new militants, establishing liaison with the East Bloc, transferring militants to Turkey, etc."²⁵

Indeed the Socialist government in France has helped to establish and fund the Kurdish Institute in Paris whose Director is the Turkish Kurd, Kendal Nezan. In October 1989, this Institute sponsored an international conference on

the human rights situation and cultural identity of the Kurds. The Swedish government has given official recognition to the Kurdish National Union and helped to finance the publication of over twenty books in Kurdish for adults and children. The Swedes also have permitted the establishment of associations for Kurdish teachers, doctors, and writers. From 13-15 January 1989, Stockholm hosted a policy-setting conference of nine Kurdish organizations (including the anti-PKK, Turkish-Kurdish alliance of some six organizations called *Tevger*) from eight different European states.

In June 1987, the European Parliament passed what was considered to be a strongly anti-Turkish resolution, "On a political solution to the Armenian Question." Not only taking the Armenian side on this issue, the Parliament went on to chastise the Turks for their Kurdish problem, as well as many other alleged sins: "The European Parliament . . . believes that the refusal by the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the Genocide against the Armenian people . . . and the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question . . . are insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the possibility of Turkey's accession to the [European Economic] Community."

When the PKK killed some thirty civilians in the southeastern Anatolian village of Pinarçik just two days after this resolution was passed, Turkish President Evren, with some merit, accused the European Parliament of having encouraged the PKK's actions. In truth, however, what probably best explains the gratuitous, anti-Turkish action of the Parliament and its erection of what it termed "insurmountable obstacles" to Turkey's membership in the EEC, was the desire to keep Turkey out of that organization for economic reasons.

Manifesting a militancy that until now had been rare outside of their traditional homeland, groups of Kurds briefly occupied Turkish offices in West Germany and the Netherlands, and the Iraqi Airways office in Paris during the autumn of 1986. The following March Kurdish groups occupied a number of Turkish Airlines offices in various west European cities and demonstrated in front of numerous other offices.²⁶ Summing up the situation, Siyamend Othman, an official of the Kurdish Institute in Paris wrote in 1987: "It is my personal opinion (and fear too) that this [traditional Kurdish quiescence] might not remain the case for much longer since the interviews I have conducted with the leaders and cadres of Kurdish organizations incline me to think that the Kurds, particularly those of Turkey, are beginning to get desperate for attention."²⁷

Indeed an underground conflict among Turkish Kurds in western Europe has apparently left at least twenty persons dead in the late 1980s. According to the police, the bloodshed has been caused by the PKK, many of whose supporters have been living in exile in western Europe since the Turkish military coup of September 1980. The violence seems to be aimed at eliminating defectors, attacking ideological foes, extorting money, and striking at collaborators. A number of violent incidents have occurred at *Newroz* celebrations. For several years nine Turkish Kurds were held in Sweden under what was termed "commune arrest" because of killings there in 1984 and 1985.²⁸

Because of this situation, Sweden labeled the PKK a "terrorist organization" in 1984 and refused entry to its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Nevertheless

its members were allowed to remain in the country, while Huseyin Yildirim, until recently the PKK spokesman in western Europe, continued to live in Stockholm.

Following the assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme on 28 February 1986, Stockholm Chief of Police Hans Holmer was convinced that it was the work of the PKK. Various motives, some rather bizarre, were offered. Most plausible was that the Swedish government, as mentioned above, had branded the PKK a "terrorist organization" and denied its leader an entry visa. Another claimed that Palme had been working on a secret plan that envisaged autonomy for the Kurds in Turkey. He had been killed because he had asked for some concessions from the PKK which amounted to the Kurds falling under a Swedish mandate. Still another claimed that Iran had paid a large sum of money to the PKK to do the deed because Palme had opposed arms sales to Iran.²⁹

Several PKK members were arrested in January 1987 in connection with the murder, but released shortly afterwards due to lack of evidence. Indeed the reputed PKK scenario seemed most far-fetched because Palme was a well-known supporter of such causes as that of the Kurds. Even more, of course, to assassinate a statesman of the stature of the Swedish Prime Minister would obviously backfire in terms of the Kurdish cause. In other words, to use the PKK's own terminology, to murder Palme inherently would not be a successful act of armed propaganda.

The eventual arrest, conviction, and release on appeal of a common Swedish criminal for the deed demonstrates the confusion of the Swedish authorities on the Palme matter. In retrospect the reputed PKK connection smacks of a disinformation campaign (possibly by the Turks) to smear the PKK in an ex-post-facto manner.

In June 1987, the West German Interior Ministry issued a report which stated: "The orthodox communist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was in 1986 by far the most active and most militant extremist organization among the Kurds." The report added that in a publication in West Germany the previous year, the PKK had referred to itself as "the force that has taken up the struggle against the fascist Turkish occupation" and declared that it was committed to "revolutionary violence" in pursuing its goals. Six months later, the Federal Criminal Office in Wiesbaden called the PKK "a dangerous organization" and declared that during the previous year (1987) in West Germany it had been "involved with carrying out at least one murder, two attempted murders, three cases of assault, and four other serious incidents, including robbery, blackmail and coercion."³⁰ The Office also stated that there were at least 1,000 Kurdish extremists in West Germany trying to overthrow the Turkish government. "Although their primary targets are the Turkish government and fellow Turks [Kurds], West German citizens and institutions who cooperate with the Turkish government . . . are also in danger."³¹

A Kurd who felt that such activities discredited the Kurdish cause wrote: "The Palestinians have their Abu-Nidals; the Armenians an Asala, and we, alas, seem to have to cope with [the] PKK."³² During a crackdown in Cologne in July

1987, West German police rounded up several Kurdish activists and confiscated money and other valuables worth more than \$437,000.

In addition, the West German authorities claimed that the PKK was operating through legal organizations to provide cover for their illegal activities. As of July 1988, for example, such fronts included, the Kurdish National Liberation Front (ERNK), the Patriotic Kurdish Workers Party, Kurdish Patriotic Women's Union, and Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Union. Indeed, although he was probably exaggerating, Yilmaz Ciftci, a PKK spokesman in Athens told the *Cyprus Weekly* that his party's political arm, the ERNK, "is a massive organization with committees for youth, women's and workers' sections and the liberation army."³³ A Turkish report declared that there were PKK branches in the following West German cities: Mainz, Offenburg, Russelsheim, Oldenburg, and Dortmund.³⁴ In 1989, the PKK was publishing a sophisticated newspaper in West Germany called *Serxwebun* (Independence), while the ERNK was producing one of similar dimensions known as *Berxwedan* (Defense).

In the spring of 1987, the PKK began to urge Kurdish supporters living in West Germany to donate the clothing, armaments, and communications gear necessary to equip guerrillas. Specific suggestions included overcoats, raincoats, durable sport shoes, hand-knit wool socks, warm gloves of thin material, undershirts of semifine material, non-nylon shirts, binoculars, radio receivers, compasses, bayonets, and cash.³⁵

On the other hand the PKK apparently has been falsely accused of the murder of a West German consular affairs attaché, Siegfried Wielsputz, who was shot to death in Paris on 4 January 1988. A leaflet denouncing alleged West German mistreatment of the Kurds and signed by the ERNK was found on his body. The ERNK, however, denied responsibility and denounced the murder as a "cowardly act." Siyamend Othman, a Kurdish spokesman, added that "no Kurd of any organization has ever attacked a Western diplomat. We do not think this has anything to do with Kurds."³⁶

An ERNK spokesman even went so far as to suggest that "the Turkish National Intelligence Organization and the CIA were behind the plot."³⁷ Twelve days later a West German charter plane blew up near Izmir, Turkey, killing all sixteen people aboard. Once again, the ERNK was supposedly to blame, but as with the Wielsputz murder and the Palme accusations, it would seem that there was a campaign to discredit the Kurds in general and the PKK in particular.

Despite the opportunities offered by Europe, in October 1988, Ocalan decided to make a complete about-face in his European strategy and denounced Europe as "a battleground for foul-play." Arguing that, "if we saved ourselves there [and] . . . saved also some of our concepts," it was done "with much pain,"³⁸ and asserted that there was no difference between the fate of the Kurds in Europe and in Turkey. In the one they were being assimilated in the Turkish cities, while in the other they were being Europeanized.

The PKK leader declared that Europe's "intention is to corrupt the PKK." He now believed that Europe "will first corrupt the ideological-political-

military structure [of the PKK] and then turn the PKK into a tool for their imperialist aims in the region." The intention of the "Brussels Circle" was to protect the territorial integrity of Turkey, a fellow NATO member. The only way for the Kurds to avoid this trap was for all the militants based in Europe to return to the "war-zone," undergo serious party and military training, and struggle against Turkey. One of the factors that apparently brought on this tirade was what Ocalan saw as an European attempt to pacify the PKK by promising it financial aid and political asylum, if it would "abandon the resistance . . . and create a more moderate organization which could be accepted." His former associate in Europe, Huseyin Yildirim, had taken the initiative in trying to establish such a more moderate PKK and indeed was now a rival for the leadership of the Kurds in Europe. Nevertheless, it would seem likely that the PKK will continue to use Europe as a safe house and platform for its programs.

THE SOVIET UNION

The Turks and Russians have been enemies for centuries. Until the creation of the Turkish Republic after World War I, no state had benefited more than Russia from the decline of what Tsar Nicholas I once referred to as "the sick man of Europe." Hassan Arfa, for example, the Chief of Staff of the Iranian army (1944-1946) and the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey (1958-1961), wrote:

During the Russo-Turkish wars of 1829 and 1853-55, the Russians tried to bring the Kurds to their side, promising them a kind of autonomy and organizing a Kurdish regiment under Russian officers. In 1877, when the Turkish armies were fighting the Russians around Erzurum and Van, the sons of Badr Khan revolted in the Hakkari, Bhutan and Badinan districts . . . It seems that such ideas were inculcated in them by the Russians.³⁹

Once Turkey reversed this decline and became a member of the NATO alliance, however, continuing Russian ambitions to reach the Mediterranean and the Middle East's oil through Turkey had to be more subtle. Clandestine support of the Turkish Kurdish separatist organizations either directly or through the Syrians, the main Soviet ally in the Middle East, would be one obvious method to further this long-standing goal.

In February 1985, the trial of several Kurdish guerrillas featured evidence of direct Syrian support for them. At that time it was said that the Syrians were not acting alone but had "the backing and encouragement of a super-power."⁴⁰ A Turkish foreign ministry official declared:

We have good reason to believe that the Russians are paying the bill for these guerrillas. It is easy for their agents to find a few hundred unemployed young men who will do this kind of thing for the sake of adventure. It only costs a few million dollars a year. They use the so-called Kurdish Labor Party as a front. It has a completely Marxist program. They can't foment terrorism

anywhere else in Turkey now, but in the southeast they can keep the fires burning in the hope of heating them up in the future.⁴¹

One PKK defendant, Abdurrahoman Kandemir, told a martial law court in Diyarbakir: "Our aim is to establish a Communist Kurdish state. This state is to be a member of the Warsaw Pact."⁴² Other PKK members on trial testified about Syrian and Soviet involvement and support for their cause, and of having been trained in Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese guerrilla camps.⁴³

A report in a prominent American Armenian weekly declared that: "The Syrian intelligence service is providing both haven and assistance to a variety of international terrorists." The account added that: "Heading the list of radical groups now enjoying the protection of the Syrian rulers are the Kurds." All of this "enjoys the indirect support of the Soviet Union, which through its assistance to Syria pursues a policy of destabilizing the region, particularly Turkey."⁴⁴

Under interrogation PKK members have related how Palestinians with Soviet training instructed them in camps under Syrian control after 1980. One account told how a Palestinian, who used the code name "Lt. Abu Haldun," trained PKK members at the Palestinian Cephe Nidal camp. The contact supposedly was facilitated through the Soviet consulate and cultural center in Damascus. Nayif Hawatmeh's Soviet-financed Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine also gave the PKK excellent training facilities at this time.⁴⁵

Abdulkadir Aygan, a PKK repentant, has spoken about a field inspection in PKK training camps after 1981 in which the inspectors were officers from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Cuba. Aygan has also described his extensive military training in Damascus after his escape from Turkey in 1982 and his brief stays in southern Cyprus and Greece. His roommate at that time was the personal translator of Ocalan; this individual told Aygan about the PKK leader's routine meetings with officials from the Soviet consulate in Damascus.⁴⁶ While interesting, such testimony, of course, is suspect because there usually is no independent way to verify it. It also is possible that the repentant is simply telling his interrogator what he wants to hear in exchange for leniency.

In a similar vein, therefore, is the testimony of Mehmet Ermin Karatay, the former PKK provincial leader in Mardin who was captured by security forces on 10 March 1989. He told officials that several Syrian representatives and diplomats from Eastern Bloc states based in Damascus participated as guests when the PKK recently held military exercises in the Bekaa Valley. He also declared that the Soviet Union had put pressure upon Syria not to honor its 1987 protocol with Turkey to prevent PKK raids from Syrian territory. He told Turkish officials that,

We were being transported by Soviet trucks to the Turkish border. Suddenly the trucks were stopped by Syrian patrols and we were detained. Ocalan received news of our detention and immediately contacted the Soviet officials. In 24 hours, we were released and helped to infiltrate into Turkey.⁴⁷

A 1979 CIA report on the Kurdish problem and the role played by the Soviets was more circumspect. "The Soviet-Kurdish relationship, if tenuous, is relatively old." The Soviets "probably first established contact with the Kurds in the early 1920's. Little resulted, however."⁴⁸ According to Gwynne Dyer, writing in 1973, the Soviets gave financial aid to the Kurds, among others, through the so-called International Minority Movement Front in Odessa as early as 1928.⁴⁹ During the Dersim (Tunceli) revolt in 1937, "it was alleged by the Turkish government, but never satisfactorily established, that arms had been supplied to the Kurdish rebels by the Soviet Union."⁵⁰

In 1958, the Soviets started a clandestine radio station, *Bazim Radyo* (Our Radio) which broadcast communist propaganda to Turkey from Romania and East Germany. A second station, "the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party," began broadcasting from East Germany in 1968. Although this radio propaganda was mainly aimed at fomenting discontent among the Turks themselves, the Turkish Kurds were not ignored. This second station's commentary of the day on 9 November 1985, for example, declared that: "The oppression of Turkish Kurdistan is continuing . . . This means that the CIA, or in other words the United States, is supporting the oppressive and hunger policies being implemented by the fascist and chauvinistic Evren-Ozal dictatorship in Turkish Kurdistan." The station claimed that the US desire to protect its bases in eastern Turkey, "is why the United States is supporting the hunting down of patriots by the dictatorship's forces in Turkish Kurdistan." The commentary concluded that: "The only way to put a stop to these developments is for all patriots and democratic forces, Turks and Kurds, to oppose the dictatorship's special cooperation with the U.S. imperialists."⁵¹

The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946 is one of the best examples of the Soviet willingness to use Kurdish nationalism against the territorial integrity of one of the states on its southern boundary, in this case Iran. In 1941, British and Soviet troops had occupied Iran to prevent it from supporting Nazi Germany. After the war this joint occupation was lifted, but the Soviets used their position to encourage an Azerbaijani Republic in northern Iran and the rump Mahabad Kurdish Republic in northwestern Iran. The Soviet intention probably was to divide Iran and in time incorporate some of its lost provinces.

Although a Kurdish nationalist, Qazi Muhammad, the leader of the Mahabad Republic, had been "groomed to assume the leadership of a pro-Soviet Kurdish movement that would be tied to the Communist-nationalist effort in Azerbaijan." The Soviets "promised that military equipment including tanks, cannon, machine guns, and rifles would be sent." In November 1945, the Russians delivered a printing press. "Soon afterwards publications in Kurdish began to appear."⁵²

Although there was no communist-style social revolution, "Soviet influence was there . . . its strength related to the calculation by the Kurdish leaders that their cause would be bound to succeed if they anticipated Soviet desires and obeyed the advice of Soviet officials. Collaboration was extended willingly." Soon after the Kurdish Republic was established, "there arrived in Mahabad two consignments of about 5,000 Soviet weapons including rifles,

machine guns, and pistols . . . No tanks or artillery pieces had yet been delivered in spite of previous promises, but in their place the Russians provided 'tank destroyers', bottles of petrol equipped with wicks."⁵³

Sensing the weakness of the Mahabad Kurds, the Soviet agent "Ibrahimov preached to them the advantages of Kurdish union with Azerbaijan until such time as the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey could be liberated to make possible the formation of a larger, more viable Kurdish state." Nevertheless, in March 1945, "Captain Salahaddin Kazimov of the Soviet army arrived in Mahabad to help organize and train the national Kurdish army." Within a month "nearly all persons connected with the Kurdish Government or army could at appropriate times appear looking like Soviet officers in khaki with boots, riding breeches, and caps."⁵⁴

Anglo-American pressure eventually forced the Soviets out of Iran, and with the removal of its sponsor, the Mahabad Republic quickly collapsed. Qazi Muhammad was hanged, while the rump state's military leader, the Iraqi Kurd, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, managed to escape to the Soviet Union. The "Red" Mullah, as he was then called, lived there in exile from 1947-58, and seemed to be proof of the Soviets' willingness to exploit Kurdish nationalism for their own purposes.

In the late 1950s, however, Barzani was allowed to return to Iraq where in time he led a lengthy rebellion with considerable but indirect *American*, as well as Iranian, aid because those two states sought to chasten Iraq. This Kurdish insurrection was only terminated when Iran, with tacit American support, reversed its policy and stopped supporting the Iraqi Kurds after signing the Algiers agreement with Iraq on 6 March 1975.⁵⁵ In light of his earlier association with the USSR, it is ironic that when Barzani died in the United States in 1979, he had come to be seen by some as an agent of US imperialism.

Although used by both, Barzani, of course, was neither a stooge of the Soviets nor the Americans. Rather he was a traditional, tribal Kurdish nationalist leader who took aid from whatever source he could. The American willingness to use and then drop Kurdish nationalism in his case illustrates how the Soviets have no monopoly on this score. Indeed, Kurdish sources have argued that the United States opposes Kurdish nationalism in Turkey because it is a valuable US ally and member of NATO. Turkey provides radar stations and large military installations near the Soviet border. These bases became all the more important for the United States once the Iranian alliance was lost in 1979-80. Furthermore, Turkey's southern border with Syria is important for detecting Syrian military movements against Israel.⁵⁶

Similarly, the Soviets are often tempted to support the Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere as a method ultimately to weaken the United States, as well as promote their own expansion southward. The Soviets must be cautious, however, so as not to antagonize the governments in Ankara, Baghdad, and Teheran with which the Soviets have important relations to protect. Sarcastically, therefore, "many Kurdish intellectuals are beginning to compare the Soviet Union to a doctor whose interests require the patient (Kurdistan) to remain alive

but not completely cured so that he may be used one day for research.”⁵⁷ Indeed, Archie Roosevelt, Jr. tells how, because of past memories of Russian and Soviet depredations, “Kurds . . . still frighten their crying children into silence by threatening them with the word ‘Russian.’”⁵⁸ The CIA Report concluded that, as of 1979 at least:

while the Soviets have aided the Kurds occasionally in the past, there is no evidence that they are currently doing so. Indeed, Moscow has done its best to stay aloof of the present round of Kurdish unrest. In any event, since the early 1970s, Soviet state-to-state relations with all the countries involved have consistently taken precedence over the needs and interests of the Kurds . . . Despite claims in the Turkish press . . . Moscow has been careful to distance itself from the Kurdish separatism.⁵⁹

Similarly a joint appeal in 1985 by the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SPTK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq declared:

It is also high time, for all that are interested and concerned with the Kurdish question to divorce themselves from the absurd extreme notions of seeing communism and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and CIA and U.S. backing, on the other, behind every movement in Kurdistan. A much more balanced and objective analysis can be achieved by concentrating on the indigenous factors, by scrutinising practices and policies of the respective regimes, and by considering it as an independent phenomenon, instead of always searching for foreign hands behind the scenes.⁶⁰

This, of course, does not mean that the Soviets would fail to fish in troubled waters. As the CIA Report warned: “Should Turkey enter a period of economic and political instability, Moscow might be tempted to try to exploit the Kurdish issue . . . but it would act only with extreme caution.”⁶¹ Coming as it did from the intelligence service of the Soviet Union’s superpower rival, this assessment constituted strong evidence that the Soviets probably were not the key factor behind the Kurdish guerrilla war in Turkey as some had asserted. Given the remarkable demise of communist rule in eastern Europe during the fall of 1989 and liberalization in the Soviet Union itself, this conclusion would seem all the more likely to be valid, at least for the present.

THE ARMENIANS

Most observers have considered the Kurds and Armenians to be “inveterate enemies,”⁶² whose irredentist claims against Turkey are mutually incompatible. Much bloodshed had occurred between the two in the past, and during World War I, the Kurds, who suffered terribly themselves, played a notorious role in the Armenian massacres. As a result, G.R. Driver, the noted English authority of the early twentieth century, went so far as to conclude immediately after the War, that an independent Armenia would lead to “a war of extermination between the two races as neither will submit to the yoke of the

other."⁶³ Nevertheless, if for no other reason than their sharing of a common enemy (Turkey), an alliance between the two is not inconceivable today. The purpose of this section is to analyze traces of this collaboration.

During the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I, the Kurdish delegation headed by General Sharif Pasha and the Armenian delegation led by Boghos Nubar Pasha agreed to cooperate. The two presented a joint proposal for a Kurdish and an Armenian state whose exact borders remained to be determined. The Kemalist revival of Turkey, however, frustrated their plans.

In August 1927, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnaks)⁶⁴ sent an agent, Vahan Papazian, to Lebanon. There he participated in the foundation of Khoybun, a new Kurdish nationalist organization which eventually launched a major Kurdish uprising in the area of Mt. Ararat under General Ihsan Nuri Pasha. This Kurdish rebellion in Turkey was crushed completely in 1930, but only after the Turks made considerable efforts to suppress it. The observations of Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the late Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, on this matter are especially interesting.

An explanation should be given as to why Dashnaksutyum supported the Khoiboun. The chief reason was that the Dashnakyans themselves were not capable of organizing any armed movement on Turkish territory and therefore made use of the revolt of the Kurdish population directed against Turkey, whom the Dashnakyans regarded a sworn enemy . . . Besides, the Dashnakyans supported the Kurdish revolt, hoping it would weaken Turkey and create a suitable opportunity for the future struggle of the Armenians. In case an independent Kurdish state were formed, new prospects would arise for the future struggle of Dashnaksutyum both against Turkey and against the U.S.S.R. The independent Kurdish state was to become a base of the Dashnakyans for creating a great and independent Armenia.⁶⁵

During this era, Mevlanzade Rifat acted as the liaison between the Kurds in Khoybun and the Armenians. This individual was the Kurdish author of an anti-Turkish, propagandistic account of an apocryphal Young Turk meeting in 1915 where a decision was supposedly taken to exterminate the Armenians. Presumably such "revelations" were expected to facilitate an Armenian-Kurdish alliance. A certain Dr. Tutunjian, the head of the Dashnaks' Central Committee in Syria, served as Rifat's Armenian counterpart. In addition, as noted above, the Soviet-sponsored International Minority Movement Front in Odessa gave financial aid to the Armenians, Kurds, and anti-Kemalists Turks in 1928.⁶⁶

In the 1980s, association between the Kurds and the Armenians has taken various forms. A "declaration" of cooperation between the PKK and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was announced in a press conference in Sidon, Lebanon on 6 April 1980.⁶⁷ ASALA members reportedly joined PKK guerrillas and other Kurdish groups when they fought against Turkish troops trying to rout them out from their northern Iraqi sanctuary in May 1983 and again in October 1984.⁶⁸ Commenting on this seemingly

anomalous Armenian-Kurdish cooperation, *The Economist* speculated: "It may be that a tactical alliance between Kurds and Armenians, said to have been concluded some three years ago, is in operation on the ground . . . Armenian brains and world-wide links combined with Kurdish military experience would produce a formidable guerrilla liberation movement."⁶⁹

Yilmaz Guney, the famous Turkish Kurdish film maker, called for Armenians "to join the struggle of the Kurds and the Turks in the interior to topple the present dictatorship."⁷⁰ Monte Melkonian, a dissident ASALA leader, stated in an interview that "to reestablish the political line of the [Armenian] struggle," he envisaged "forging alliances with certain liberation movements, notably in Turkey and with Kurds."⁷¹ The so-called "Armenian World Congress" asserted in 1983 that to "combat . . . Turkish colonialism" it was "necessary to forge an alliance between the Armenian and Kurdish peoples."⁷² Similarly Patrick Devedjian, a well-known French Armenian lawyer who has defended many of the Armenians accused of killing Turkish diplomats in France, stated in 1985 that the Armenians could start "another Vietnam . . . The Turkish border is very permeable . . . This could mean an alliance with Kurds."⁷³

For their part, "various Kurdish groups based in Britain expressed their desire 'to collaborate' with Armenian militants against Turkey" in a conference held in London in May 1985.⁷⁴ Celal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, stated in October 1988 that: "Concrete cooperation exists between the Kurds and the Armenians at the present time." Using the phrase "rapprochement between the Kurds and the Armenians," the Iraqi Kurdish leader added: "We have decided to continue our struggle in a joint way in the future . . . We now have very close relations with all the Armenian organizations in the world."⁷⁵

In the summer of 1987, the Turkish press claimed that ASALA combatants were among the PKK guerrillas who recently had carried out murderous raids in the Mardin area of southeastern Anatolia. Some of the attackers reportedly had spoken in Armenian. One Turkish villager was even quoted as saying: "I am almost certain Kurds led the assault and left to Armenians to massacre the innocent villagers."⁷⁶ The following spring it was reported that the PKK was recruiting Syrian Armenians for communications purposes so that they could use the Armenian language for secret messages.⁷⁷

Given the paucity of results over the past decade, however, one must tentatively agree with Melkonian's assessment that the claims of Armenian-Kurdish cooperation have been "more . . . a tactical ploy than strategic alliance."⁷⁸ Indeed, Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish interests stopped in the mid-1980s, and ASALA itself apparently disbanded after a series of murderous internal splits.⁷⁹ This assessment, of course, does not preclude the distinct possibility that ASALA combatants did support the PKK in the early 1980s and that certain Armenians living in Syria and Lebanon probably still do.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States has been the main ally of Turkey since the late 1940s when the Truman Doctrine helped Turkey to stand up to the Soviet threat against

the Straits and northeastern Anatolia. Over the years this close alliance has successfully weathered several crises. Until the Kurdish refugee crisis developed after the recent Gulf War, the Kurdish problem in Turkey, however, had threatened to create new difficulties between the two allies.

During the First Gulf War some Turkish officials felt that the United States "might also be involved in one way or another" with the PKK insurgency. The argument was made that PKK destabilization activities along Turkey's southeastern border "would eventually force Turkey into the Gulf War or at least ease its attitude in face of the use of bases for this. Thus America too is seen among the countries which benefit out of separatist activities."⁸⁰

A number of other theories also have been suggested for explaining the reputed support of the United States for the Kurds. The first is that the US "seeks an autonomous Kurdish state which it could use as a base for Rapid Deployment Forces." A second notion is that to prevent a possible Soviet advance into the Kurdish region, "America may believe that it is necessary to create a natural barrier, a barrier of flesh, made up of Kurdish recruits." Finally, it is alleged that the US is trying to divide Turkey so that it can take "control of its overall economic and political mechanism." Although these theories may sound paranoid to most Americans, many reputable Turks honestly seem to believe that "Washington is openly playing a game which endangers Turkey's domestic security and sovereignty in the southeast region."⁸¹

Several other actions by the United States have further fuelled this sentiment. In February 1988, for example, the Turks complained that a "U.S. State Department" report referred to a Kurdish minority in Turkey, while also criticizing that state for the human right violations it had committed against the Kurds.⁸² This was followed by what many Turks referred to as the "Schifter Blunder." According to Turkish sources, Richard Schifter, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, "went out of his way . . . to prove that the Kurds were a different population from the Turks, linguistically and culturally," when he declared: "We believe that although they [the Kurds] are not included in the Lausanne Treaty, they are a national minority by international standards."⁸³

The Turks also regarded the visit of the Iraqi Kurdish leader, Celal Talabani, to Washington on 9 June 1988, as "yet another example of US hypocrisy."⁸⁴ Talabani, had just recently signed an accord with the PKK. While in Washington, he met with several officials from the Departments of State and Defense and held a press conference at the National Press Club where he disclosed that he had discussed Turkey's position against the Kurds with these US officials. He also declared that if Turkey cooperated with Iraq, it would be his right to do so with any other group working against Turkey. He further faulted Turkey for saying that the PKK was only killing women and children.⁸⁵

The Turkish reaction to Talabani's visit to Washington was bitter. Foreign Ministry spokesman, Inal Batu, claimed that Ocalan and Talabani "had joined forces under a joint strategy and the latter had been given audience by US State Department officials." *Milliyet* correspondent Mumtaz Soysal saw the

visit as US support for an independent Kurdistan in case of a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf. *Tercuman* foreign relations writer Fahir Armaoglu viewed it as "an indication to the separatists that if they do as told, they will be supported." Oktay Eksi in *Hurriyet* stated that Talabani was "openly an enemy of Turkey" and "an ally of the other side," and he wondered what "the real intention of the United States . . . is when it helps Armenian nationalism develop against Turkey and shows interest to Kurdish freedom movements."⁸⁶

Shortly after Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990, Talabani again journeyed to Washington. There was much critical speculation on the part of the Turks that the United States might favor a motion to give Talabani autonomy or even an independent state in northern Iraq in return for his support against Saddam. "In Ankara, officials at the defence and foreign ministries were seriously worried that such a development would endanger Turkey's own security After all, what Talabani was talking about was a separate state which would border Turkey . . . in an area which is currently being used by the separatist PKK organization."⁸⁷

Despite Turkish anxieties, however, the United States apparently ignored Talabani's offer of support against Saddam Hussein. In fact, to the contrary, the US went out of its way to court (successfully) *Turkish* support for the UN embargo of Iraq and the Coalition military operations that followed in 1991. The idea the United States has played some type of background role in supporting the PKK seems totally at variance with the facts.

CONCLUSIONS

In analyzing the reasons for the deteriorating situation in the Kurdish region, the Turkish government has stressed the element of transnational help for the insurgents, as well as the poor socio-economic conditions in the southeast. Although both of these points possess validity, they ignore the main reason for the Kurdish problem in Turkey: the official cultural suppression of the Kurds. Without the catalyst of this unfortunate situation, the transnational sources of support for the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey analyzed above would have fallen on barren ground. Speaking to the point, the Turkish writer, Aziz Nesin, declared at a meeting in Ankara in May 1989: "If these people cannot even say that they are Kurds and if they are being forced to accept the historical thesis saying they are Turks, there is no way to put democracy into practice in this country."⁸⁸

What then can be done? Even before the current crisis, the PKK had succeeded in calling the Kurdish problem in Turkey to the attention of the world. However, given the relative power of Turkey and its determination to defend its territorial integrity, it is not likely that the PKK will be able to achieve its ultimate goal of establishing an independent Kurdistan in southeastern Anatolia. Does this mean, therefore, as a senior Turkish military commander has warned that, "We must accept realities and be prepared for a long struggle. This is like the situation which the British face with the IRA and the Spaniards with the ETA [Basque] separatists."⁸⁹

This negative prognostication does not have to materialize if the Turkish government is able to manifest a greater sense of maturity and self-confidence. As then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal cryptically responded in 1989 to a question about the existence of a Kurdish minority in Turkey: "If in the first years of the Republic, during the single-party period, the State committed mistakes on this matter, it is necessary to recognise these."⁹⁰

If the authorities could now bring themselves to no longer view expressions of Kurdish cultural awareness as a mortal threat to the continuing existence of the territorial integrity of Turkey, it is likely that many of the disaffected Kurdish elements in that state could learn to accept their role as loyal Turkish citizens. Most of the Turkish Kurds already do. What they want is the simple, basic human right of cultural freedom.

It is necessary then to have the wisdom and strength of an Ataturk who, if he were alive today and thus could see what an impasse his Kurdish policy has led to, might trust more in the permanency of the institutions he had created and fear less the inherent logic of democracy by granting Turkey's citizens of Kurdish ancestry their most elemental cultural rights. This probably does not mean that a federal solution is necessary. But it does imply, as Erdal Inonu, the leader of the main opposition party in Turkey (and son of Ataturk's closest lieutenant, Ismet Inonu) has stated: "Everyone should express himself without fear in his mother tongue."⁹¹ Indeed, in the summer of 1990, Inonu's Party issued a major report on the issue which termed the ban on the Kurdish language "primitive" and an action "which serves to alienate the people." The report concluded that "the solution should be sought in a unitary, democratic and pluralist state."⁹²

Turkey's allies, the United States and the European Economic Community (which Turkey longs to join), should encourage and help Turkey to take these steps. If it does, Turkey hopefully will have become stronger both politically (because its Kurdish problem at least will have become more manageable) and economically (as a member of the EEC). In the meantime, while the Turkish government finds a way to permit Kurdish cultural expression within the limits of a unitary Turkish state, it would help if others would be more understanding of the dilemma faced by that state, as well as more willing to grant the positive accomplishments of that state's nationalities policy to date.

Endnotes

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66. See Mevlanzade Rifat, *Turkiye Inkilabinin Ic Yuzu* [The Hidden Face of the Turkish Revolution] (Aleppo, 1929); and the penetrating critique of this work in Gwynne Dyer, "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 12 (January 1976), p. 101; and Dyer, "Correspondence," pp. 379-82; see also Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, NY: Caravan, 1985), p. 102.
67. ASALA was a notorious, left-wing Armenian terrorist group that was responsible for numerous bombings and murders of Turkish officials and citizens, as well as others, during 1975-84. It had ties to radical Palestinians such as Abu Nidal and George Habash, as well as Syria. For an analysis see Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause", pp. 41-54. This and the following data were taken from a dissident ASALA source, "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement," *The Armenian Reporter*, 17 Jan. 1985, p. 2.

68. See the reports about this joint Kurdish-Armenian cooperation in "Secret Army Indicates a Loss of 22 Members in Border Skirmish," *The Armenian Reporter*, 16 June 1983, p. 1; and "Turkish Military Battling Kurdish Rebels: Government States Armenians Are Fighting Alongside Kurds," *The Armenian Weekly*, 3 Nov. 1984, pp. 1, 12. Also see claims that "Syria has recently trained Armenian and Kurdish rebels in a joint camp . . . The two ethnic groups are fighting together now," in Uli Schetzer, "Ethnic Kurd Population Persists in Guerrilla War," *International Herald Tribune*, 8-9 June 1985.
69. "The Common Enemy," *The Economist*, 18 June 1983, pp. 55- 56.
70. Cited in Siyamend Othman, "The Guney File," *Armenian Review*, 37 (Autumn 1984), p. 48.
71. "Monte Melkonian Explains His Break with ASALA; Interview," *The Armenian Reporter*, 12 Jan. 1984, p. 4.
72. Armenian World Congress, *Official Documents of Second World Armenian Congress* (Lausanne: Armenian World Congress, 1983), p. 24.
73. Florence Avakian, "Exclusive Interview: French-Armenian Activist & Lawyer Patrick Devedjian Speaks on the Armenian Question," *The Armenian Reporter*, 6 June 1985, p. 2.
74. Mehmet Ogutcu, "Separatists Gang Up in London," *Turkish Daily News* (International Edition), 10-16 May 1985, p. 1.
75. Cited in *Hurriyet*, 10 Oct. 1988.
76. "Turks Claim ASALA Combatants Fighting Alongside Kurd Separatists," *The Armenian Reporter*, 30 July 1987, p. 1. ASALA itself has called for "a Common Front in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean to counter-act the aggressive Turkish expansionist policy." See "World Conference on the Armenian Question and Turkish Expansionism," *Armenia* (ASALA organ), No. 138; 16, 7th, (1987), p. 1.
77. *Tercuman*, 8 Apr. 1988.
78. Cited in *The Armenian Reporter*, 17 Jan. 1985, p. 2.
79. For an analysis of these events see Michael M. Gunter, *Transnational Armenian Activism* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990), pp. 19-24.
80. These quotations were taken from *Briefing*, 17 Aug. 1987, pp. 6-7.
81. These quotations were taken from "US Support for Kurds Annoys Ally," *Briefing*, 20 June 1988, p. 14.
82. The Turks apparently were referring to U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987*, 100th Cong., 2d sess., 1988.
83. Cited in *Briefing*, 20 June 1988, p. 12.
84. The following discussion is based on *ibid.*, pp. 11-14.
85. *Ibid.*
86. *Ibid.*
87. Cited in "The Point at which Interests Diverge," *Briefing*, 20 Aug. 1990, pp. 7, 8.
88. Cited in "Time and Effort Needed to Restore Democracy," *Briefing*, 9 May 1989, p. 12.
89. Cited in Sam Cohen, "Turkey's Kurdish Campaign Heats Up," *Christian Science Monitor*, 11 Mar. 1987, p. 11.
90. Cited in "Ozal Puts Up Brave Performance in Strasbourg—But Brussels Still Says 'No,'" *Briefing*, 2 Oct. 1989, p. 4.
91. Cited in *Hurriyet*, 24 Feb. 1989.
92. For the following citations, see "The Southeast Report: What Does It Say?" *Briefing*, 23 July 1990, pp. 4-5.