nage when detected or feared is uniquely threatening. No one suggests that it can be dispensed with, but outside the Cold War and similar situations sensible states have tended to use it with caution, as something of a last resort when open sources or long-range technical collection is not appropriate. Targets like terrorists are still naturals for espionage, but arguably its large-scale recrudescence, with everyone spying on everyone else, is the last thing needed for the new European security system of the 1990s. The movement towards a more open world should be accompanied by more reliance on open sources. If the Pollard case has been a reminder of the political downside of "gung-ho" espionage it may have served a useful purpose.

But that may be a facile judgment. No "outsider" can yet know how much use Pollard's material was to the Israelis, or how much the case really affected US-Israeli relationships. Though Blitzer argues to the contrary, the effects on US policy and on the main lines of the American-Israeli intelligence relationship may not have been very great. Perhaps it was in the end another bold Israeli coup. Blitzer himself indicates that the permanent effects may indeed be domestic American ones, including the withdrawal of some Jewish government employees' security clearances because of family connections with Israel. If true, it would be a sad outcome to a depressing story.

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In January 1991 a multinational coalition went to war in the Persian Gulf region. By the beginning of the second week of the war to liberate Kuwait, the multinational air forces had control of the air over the theatre of war, and the Iraqi armed forces were the daily recipients of all sorts of deadly aerial munitions. The SCUD proved to be a nuisance, and an easy target for the Patriot anti-missile missile. The invisible Stealth fighters and the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles took death and destruction to Saddam Hussein's palace doorstep. Laser-guided bombs delivered the results of their successful use by video to the television sets of the world. In Baghdad, CNN's Peter Arnett reported on the start of the war, and later taped an interview with the Iraqi leader — it aired on the same night that President George Bush delivered the State of the Union message to the Congress. On the same day, CNN aired the words of peace protesters from Baghdad, and General Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf told how the operational plan of the United Nations' forces was right on schedule. If this situation was not strange enough in its own right, the story of this war was made all the more unreal by the very notable absence of the Soviets as a force arrayed against the US.

Amid all of this "hurly burly," — to use the descriptive term that
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appeared in an editorial in the Economist— one wonders what sort of deceptions were going on. It would be foolish to doubt that both sides were using CNN and other television resources to play a wide audience. In some instances it was easy to sort the lies from the truth. We heard Hussein telling how he had decimated Tel Aviv, but could see the reporters describing how the Patriot missiles were destroying the incoming SCUDs. Much will be written in the years ahead about what impact — for good and evil — the television coverage had on the war and on the practice of deception.

Fortunately, when historians tackle that task they will have at hand a fine book that provides frames for reference. The use of deception in terms of East-West rivalry is the focus of Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Context, which is a collection of sixteen good papers brought together by David Charters and Maurice Tugwell.

The stated aim of this book is to improve on the store of knowledge about deception in four areas. The circumstances in which deception has been used by the East and the West in the world’s political arena, and the results of such activity are explored. In addition, the proclivity of both the Eastern and Western political systems to use deception in international relations under conditions short of war, and the relative vulnerability of the respective political systems to the use of deception by the other is given close analysis.

The Eastern approach to deception is dealt with in ten papers while the Western approach is covered in six. Both of these two parts of the book contain excellent introductions that provide a good entry into the individual papers. For new readers in this area the book also contains an overarching survey of deception theory. This part of the book draws heavily on Barton Whaley’s “Toward a General Theory of Deception.” As is often the case in this sort of collection, some of the individual papers show a higher degree of scholarship and insightful thought. But, on the whole, the separate submissions are interesting and informative.

Now that the “Cold War” is over — and we all have our fingers crossed on that thought — it will be interesting to see how the new alliances of enmity that will surely spring up will use deception. Along the maturing Islam versus Infidels axis, we wait to see how both sides will conduct their clever business of deception in the 1990s and beyond. This fine book will serve as a milepost on the road of scholarship on this very important subject. With the knowledge it gives us about the past we will be better able to understand what unfolds in the future.

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Endnotes