readers may find the approach rather insular. Nevertheless, that it is the work of an expert in the field shines through from first to last page.

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Endnotes


7. This role is well-illustrated by the case of U.S. v Younis 681 F. Supp. 891, 896, 909; 859 F. 2d 953 (1988).


J.J. Pollard was an unusual thing — a spy for a smallish power against its Great Power protector. He joined American naval intelligence as a civilian analyst in 1979; volunteered to spy for Israel in 1984; then relayed American intelligence on Israel’s opponents, including sensitive satellite imagery and Sigint; and was caught in late 1985, after seeking and being denied asylum in the Israeli Embassy. The Israeli government cooperated in the subsequent investigation, in which Pollard and his wife pleaded guilty in exchange for plea bargains that the prosecution would not seek the maximum penalties. In the event he got life imprisonment and she got five years. Pre-sentence interviews given by Pollard to Blitzer, the Washington Correspondent of The Jerusalem Post, seem to have contributed to this severity, and in agreeing to them the American authorities may have deliberately given Pollard rope with which to hang himself.

Having got into the story through these interviews, Blitzer here gives as much of it as he has subsequently been able to piece together in America and Israel. It seems to be competently done. There is some journalese (“It was very
hot and muggy at that second meeting" - in Washington in July), but there is less hype than in similar accounts of other American spy cases. No doubt many secrets are still concealed, but what appears in the book sounds authentic.

The personal details behind the story are as sad and baffling as usual. Pollard was Jewish with strong pro-Israeli sympathies, and subsequently claimed that US naval intelligence was not implementing government policy for supplying intelligence to Israel. He seems in any case to have been an unstable and impressionable young man, given to leaking information to cut a dash. His original incentives were a mixture of Israeli patriotism, the excitement of clandestine operations, and the need to be stroked, but he and his wife also came to enjoy the money. There was the usual assumption that they were cleverer than the system. They seem to have been handled rather greedily, as a short-term bonanza rather than a long-term asset. Detection by the Americans and disowning by Israel came as a great disillusion, and the attempt to appeal to Israeli opinion through the pre-sentence interviews misfired. In all, a not untypical espionage story of getting the worst of all worlds, apparently predictably. Yet at the end one is still left reflecting on the accidents of circumstance and psychology that make some people spies, terrorists and criminals, and others more or less honest citizens.

The main interest of the book is however as a case of spying superimposed on the long-established American-Israeli intelligence connection. Most intelligence has an international dimension of some kind. Small powers are the clients of big ones: big ones in return need unique information or special facilities. Given some broad political alignment, as between the Western Allies during the Cold War or in the current cooperation against terrorism, intelligence becomes an international exchange market, trading in rather special information. Normally there is a rather subtle balance between the degree of this cooperation and the extent of any covert collection going on at the same time, especially against collaborating intelligence agencies. This is a case study of what happens when the two get out of kilter.

It therefore illustrates the general problem of intelligence control. The Israeli decision — by a small, "special" unit, engaged in scientific intelligence collection — to accept Pollard's walk-in was subsequently disowned by the Israeli government, who could hardly do otherwise. One obvious conclusion is the need for political approval of sensitive operations, but this sounds easier than it is in practice in unstable and leaky political systems. The temptation to run with an unexpected opportunity must have been strong. Ministers establish "special" units to circumvent the bureaucratic caution of large organizations — in this case the Mossad, who refused to touch Pollard with a barge-pole — and expect results. Perhaps the main conclusion is that, in intelligence as elsewhere, the cult of special units, fluid organizations and immediate results can be damaging. Bureaucratic though they may be, the big battalions are not always wrong.

It is tempting also to argue that the case supports the idea of limits to the use of espionage — that spying on friends doesn't pay in the end. Other types of less provocative intelligence collection may be more allowable; but espio-
nage when detected or feared is uniquely threatening. No one suggests that it can be dispensed with, but outside the Cold War and similar situations sensible states have tended to use it with caution, as something of a last resort when open sources or long-range technical collection is not appropriate. Targets like terrorists are still naturals for espionage, but arguably its large-scale recrudescence, with everyone spying on everyone else, is the last thing needed for the new European security system of the 1990s. The movement towards a more open world should be accompanied by more reliance on open sources. If the Pollard case has been a reminder of the political downside of "gung-ho" espionage it may have served a useful purpose.

But that may be a facile judgment. No "outsider" can yet know how much use Pollard's material was to the Israelis, or how much the case really affected US-Israeli relationships. Though Blitzer argues to the contrary, the effects on US policy and on the main lines of the American-Israeli intelligence relationship may not have been very great. Perhaps it was in the end another bold Israeli coup. Blitzer himself indicates that the permanent effects may indeed be domestic American ones, including the withdrawal of some Jewish government employees' security clearances because of family connections with Israel. If true, it would be a sad outcome to a depressing story.

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In January 1991 a multinational coalition went to war in the Persian Gulf region. By the beginning of the second week of the war to liberate Kuwait, the multinational air forces had control of the air over the theatre of war, and the Iraqi armed forces were the daily recipients of all sorts of deadly aerial munitions. The SCUD proved to be a nuisance, and an easy target for the Patriot anti-missile missile. The invisible Stealth fighters and the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles took death and destruction to Saddam Hussein's palace doorstep. Laser-guided bombs delivered the results of their successful use by video to the television sets of the world. In Baghdad, CNN's Peter Arnett reported on the start of the war, and later taped an interview with the Iraqi leader — it aired on the same night that President George Bush delivered the State of the Union message to the Congress. On the same day, CNN aired the words of peace protesters from Baghdad, and General Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf told how the operational plan of the United Nations' forces was right on schedule. If this situation was not strange enough in its own right, the story of this war was made all the more unreal by the very notable absence of the Soviets as a force arrayed against the US.

Amid all of this "hurly burly," — to use the descriptive term that