

work deserves a larger audience than it is likely to receive. Nevertheless, at its core, this is a book by a scholar for other scholars.

Third, was there a good reason for the book to be published in a second edition? The question is difficult to answer. The second edition adds little of consequence to what appeared in the first edition. Only the second preface and a supplementary reading guide, 1971-88, are new and neither is unusually important. Furthermore, Dunn has not revised his eight analyses using the relevant material published since the first appearance of his book. They could have been strengthened had this been done. And apart from matters of scholarship, revising the analyses also was desirable in order to remove a number of statements that read today are curious, to say the least. For example, this reviewer had a strange sense of time displacement when he found Dunn speculating about Mao's future policy shifts and was informed that Portugal remained committed to its armed struggle to retain its African colonies. Naturally, if this work was a genuine classic, it would be folly to tamper with it but that is not the case. These analyses could and should have been moderately revised for the new edition. As things stand, they are a mixture of the highly insightful and the obviously out-of-date in the second edition.

It also should be noted that the author has largely ignored those revolutions that have occurred since his book was first published as well as the general studies of revolution that have appeared since 1972. In regard to the former, he mentions the revolutions in Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and Iran but confines his thoughts about them to a single paragraph. And as for comparing his work with more recent studies or even discussing them, he writes little apart from devoting a page of his second preface to favorable comments about Theda Skocpal's *State and Social Revolutions*. This has the effect of reinforcing the impression that the book is intended just for fellow scholars because most readers, unfamiliar with the extensive literature on revolutions, will find it impossible to place Dunn's book in the context of other studies on the subject.

In conclusion, although this is an admirable book in several respects, the new edition adds little of value to the original. Thus, persons who have access to the first edition can safely ignore the second. But regardless of which edition is available, anyone who believes it is important to think intelligently about revolutions should make an effort to read this book.

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Murphy, John F. *State Support of International Terrorism. Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.

It has become fashionable among American commentators to decry the role of law in combatting international terrorism.¹ Viewed in this light, Professor Murphy's book is a welcome antidote, as he explores the extensive code of

international law already in place and makes suggestions for improvement. Readers who have followed Murphy's impressive writings on the subject over the years will find many familiar points. This repetition may be explained by the fact that the present work originated in a report to the American Bar Association (p. vii). Rather less excusable is the fact that Professor Murphy has not since troubled to add a bibliography to his report.

The theme of the book is international terrorism which has received some form of state backing. As Murphy explains (p. 23), state involvement may vary in degree from the direct employment of state officials and state planning or guidance ("state sponsorship") to the furnishing of arms, training, finance or rhetoric ("state support"). He announces at the outset that "[t]he thesis of this book is that state support of terrorism is illegal and immoral, whatever state engages in such actions." (p. 2) However, this "thesis" might be better described as an unproven assumption, since it is not without its difficulties. First, there is "the definitional quagmire" (ch. 1) — that it is a Herculean task to devise an acceptable, all-embracing formula, especially one which does not emphasize the political, rather than the criminal, nature of the acts. Second, even if a workable definition were forthcoming, not all forms of state involvement in "terrorism" would necessarily warrant any form of legal sanction. Third, the extent to which terrorism may be legitimated either by the laws of war (especially the Geneva Protocols) or general moral considerations is not examined. The solution to these difficulties offered by international law and Murphy is to adopt a functional approach (p. 20): to focus upon particularly heinous aspects of terrorism (such as hijacking and hostage-taking) where consensus to take counteraction can be established.

As it is received wisdom among experts that good intelligence is vital in combatting terrorism, this is the first area to be examined by Murphy. (ch. 3) Many of the problems discussed here (in a purely American context), for example, the criteria and source of authorization for intervention, the range of conscionable techniques and the extent of judicial and legislative oversight, are hardly unique to the task of monitoring terrorists. Perhaps more relevant is his examination of the special problems posed by the political character of terrorism, which has obstructed progress towards international police and security cooperation in the past. As Murphy reports (pp. 50-52), this veil seems to be slowly lifting, especially in Interpol. However, further reference to Western European experience, particularly in the context of the TREVI arrangements,² would have been welcome.

Even assuming efficient intelligence-gathering, we cannot expect to detect and prevent all acts of terrorism. Therefore, Murphy presents a range of escalating responses permitted by international law, starting with a whimper ("quiet diplomacy") and ending with a bang ("armed force").

Quiet diplomacy, public protest and international claims are described together. (ch. 4) Quiet diplomacy has had its successes (such as the 1973 US-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking) and, should it falter, can be bolstered by public protest through the "mobilization of shame." (p. 58)

Litigation provides a rather more adversarial, yet nonetheless peaceful, response in two ways. First, there may be international claims, though Murphy rather skates over the dubious tactics of the USA in the Nicaraguan case.³ He also fails completely to note that applications have been brought (always unsuccessfully) under the European Convention on Human Rights complaining that states have not sufficiently striven to curtail the activities of terrorists within their territories.⁴ Alternatively, there may be civil litigation against terrorists on the model of the (US) Alien Tort Statute. However, not only might such a jurisdiction provoke retaliatory legislation by foreign states, it may also create formidable evidential burdens for litigants without access to intelligence sources.⁵

The imposition of economic sanctions against states involved in terrorism would appear to be particularly apposite because they can be invoked with greatest venom by the rich countries which are most likely to be victimized by terrorists. Accordingly, Murphy describes how the strategy has fared both as a unilateral response by the USA and as a multilateral measure applied by the "Summit Seven". (ch. 5) On the whole, action by the latter (especially their Bonn Declaration on Hijacking, 1978) has achieved more impact but is "not . . . a resounding success." (p. 76) Murphy's solution is a sweeping "Draft Convention for the suppression of State-sponsored Terrorism" with an international tribunal which could mete out draconian sanctions to any guilty regime. This solution stands in total contradiction to the functional approach adopted elsewhere, and one must share Murphy's skepticism as to whether such an expansive convention could ever be secured or enforced.

If all else fails (as it sometimes does), we are left with armed force, and there ensues a discussion (ch. 6) about relevant rescue missions (such as at Entebbe in 1976) and attacks (for example, Libya, 1986). The rectitude in international law of these events essentially turns on the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter — in other words, were they acts of aggression or of self-defense? Perhaps not surprisingly, Murphy's interpretations are very sympathetic towards the actions taken in recent years by US personnel. Whilst some would disagree with many of his conclusions,⁶ it should be noted that the discussion is invariably clear, painstaking and fair.

It is perhaps indicative of prevailing US thinking that it is not until we reach "some concluding notes" (ch. 7) that there is a recognition that "[t]he political problems of dealing with state-sponsored terrorism can best be countered through the political process." (p. 114) However, this recognition should involve rather more than a commitment to use political techniques to increase the effectiveness of the repressive measures described hitherto. One searches in vain for an exhortation to the world's policemen⁷ not only to wield its undoubted armed and economic muscle but also to exercise its considerable political clout in attempting to deal with situations which give rise to terrorism. The demands of terrorists may often defy rational or reasonable solution, but it is as well to bear in mind this alternative approach.

In conclusion, this book presents a comprehensive survey of the treatment in international law of state involvement in terrorism. Non-American

readers may find the approach rather insular. Nevertheless, that it is the work of an expert in the field shines through from first to last page.

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Endnotes

1. See especially Judge A.D. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the law," *Foreign Affairs*, 64, no. 5 (Summer 1986), p. 901.
2. See F. Geysels, "Europe from the inside," *Policing*, 6 (1990), p. 338.
3. *Nicaragua v. U.S.*, 1980, I.C.J. rep. 14.
4. See Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, *Political Violence and the Law in Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), pp. 185-186.
5. A suggestion in the Baker Report (Review of the Operation of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Cmnd 9222), (1984) para 464) that civil claims against the IRA be encouraged was rejected: *House of Commons Debates*, Vol. 81, col. 1036, 26 June 1985, Mr. Hurd.
6. See Antonio Cassese, *Terrorism, Politics and Law: The Achille Lauro Affair* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
7. This role is well-illustrated by the case of *U.S. v Younis* 681 F. Supp. 891, 896, 909; 859 F. 2d 953 (1988).

Blitzer, Wolf. *Territory of Lies. The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard: The American Who Spied on His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed*. New York: Harper and Row, 1989.

J.J. Pollard was an unusual thing — a spy for a smallish power against its Great Power protector. He joined American naval intelligence as a civilian analyst in 1979; volunteered to spy for Israel in 1984; then relayed American intelligence on Israel's opponents, including sensitive satellite imagery and Sigint; and was caught in late 1985, after seeking and being denied asylum in the Israeli Embassy. The Israeli government cooperated in the subsequent investigation, in which Pollard and his wife pleaded guilty in exchange for plea bargains that the prosecution would not seek the maximum penalties. In the event he got life imprisonment and she got five years. Pre-sentence interviews given by Pollard to Blitzer, the Washington Correspondent of *The Jerusalem Post*, seem to have contributed to this severity, and in agreeing to them the American authorities may have deliberately given Pollard rope with which to hang himself.

Having got into the story through these interviews, Blitzer here gives as much of it as he has subsequently been able to piece together in America and Israel. It seems to be competently done. There is some journalese ("It was very