study of the middle range; that is the connecting links between policy, strategy, doctrine, and operational feasibility and capability. While this is touched on here and there, it is generally missing from the overall landscape.

Finally, even though several of the contributions project into the future and consider long-range policy and strategy, it appears that events of the last eighteen months have overtaken many of contributors' assertions and conclusions. These events include, for example, Operation JUST CAUSE, the unraveling of the Superpower concept, the evolution of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe, and of course, the victory of Violetta Chamorro in Nicaragua. Admittedly, it is expecting too much for contributions originally fashioned in 1987 to have foreseen events in 1990. A concluding contribution by the editors writing at a much later time, could have, at the least, identified signals and directions that were becoming more clear in late 1988 and early 1989. Also, such a contribution could have provided an additional element to the coherency of the volume and, at the same time, painted a broad picture of future developments.

Regardless of these problems, the editors have done a masterful job in bringing together authors with a wealth of experience and knowledge to produce an important book. This volume should appeal to both specialist and layman alike. For the specialist it is an excellent reference source and for the layman a comprehensive lesson in US and Soviet postures in response to Third World revolution and counterrevolutions. It is highly recommended.

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Books about the Vietnam War are generally of four kinds. The most popular are the various memoirs and novels of isolated experiences which make for wrenching drama and are full of pathos. A second kind are concerned with American war politics at home or on the diplomatic front. Other books, like Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History*, attempt to present detailed and comprehensive histories of the war. And in the last and smallest category are those that systematically analyze the conflict in order to draw lessons from it. In this last category would be Harry Summers' *On Strategy*, *The Army and Vietnam* by Andrew Krepinevich and, now, Joes' *The War for South Vietnam*.

But whichever category a Vietnam book falls into, it is likely to be ethnocentric. Most books about Vietnam are written by Americans, and American interest in the Vietnam conflict has, not unnaturally, been limited to questions about American actions there: how and why the United States became involved and how US foreign and military policy was conducted. American
authors and readers are more likely to ask "how did the United States lose" than "how did South Vietnam lose?" Thus, Joes' recent book on the obsessive subject of Vietnam distinguishes itself, not only by its analytical approach, but by its empathy for the South Vietnamese government, its people, and their cause.

Joes presents a concise but comprehensive account of the struggles of this short-lived state from its inception in 1954 to its final defeat in 1975. Along the way, two wars are chronicled and analyzed: first the counter-guerrilla war fought against the Vietcong and, later, the conventional war waged against the regular army of North Vietnam. His analysis of both these wars rests upon two important arguments: that the Republic of South Vietnam was a viable state and that the army of that republic was, or at least became, a viable fighting organization.

After a brief review of the historical and political developments which lay behind the North-South conflict, Joes devotes a chapter to "Fighting Guerrillas" and brings a wide range of military and political science literature to bear on the subject. Thus, unlike many historians and journalists enmeshed in the peculiar events of the war, Joes brings a comparative perspective to Vietnamese guerrilla warfare. References to and examples from China, Algeria, Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines are found throughout the book and help illuminate the strategic problems and errors of the South Vietnamese government. Indeed, this is the strength of the book. The author has synthesized most of the literature to date on Vietnam and added, for good measure, classic treatises on guerrilla and revolutionary warfare. The text is carefully and copiously footnoted.

In the second part of the book, Joes concentrates his analysis on the ARVN and the policy of Vietnamization. He attacks common assertions that the South Vietnamese population did not support the government or the army, that the Americans bore the brunt of the fighting, and that the ARVN was incompetent and craven.

Some of the ARVN's problems were simply exaggerated in their reporting. For example, the desertion rate of ARVN soldiers was misleading because the deserters often re-joined units closer to their homes or joined the territorial defense forces. Moreover, the ARVN desertion rate, as problematic as it was, still compared favorably to that of many other armies embroiled in civil war, including the Union and Confederate armies of the American Civil War. Other problems were caused, or left uncorrected, by the ARVN's behemoth ally whose advisors could not speak Vietnamese, contributed greatly to corruption, and never stayed on duty long enough to understand the Vietnamese people, their politics, or their war. Nonetheless, the South's military forces improved tremendously under American tutelage and, despite the corruption of the officer corps, was at least the equal of the NVA. The ARVN's ironic fate was that it learned very well how to fight in the mobile but expensive and wasteful style of the American army — a style the country could not support once American aid had been reduced by more than two-thirds.

In the end, Joes concludes that it was not the determination or rightness
of the North Vietnamese cause that doomed the South. Nor did the South lose because its government, army, and people lacked courage or conviction. The outcome was in no way inevitable. It was the result of faulty strategy, treacherous diplomacy, and some bad luck. In any case, Joes' analysis is insightful and provocative because his question is not “how did the Americans lose” but “how did the South Vietnamese lose?”

This is not a book for those whose viewing point or views are fixed. It is a book either for those who want a readable one-volume introduction to the war or those who want a brief but intelligent politico-military analysis of the war rather than a straight history. The book is also for those to whom the author has dedicated it: “the Vietnamese people, who have paid so much.”

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International relations scholars have, over the years, produced a number of theories aimed at explaining the occurrence of interstate war. We all agree that none of the existing theories is completely satisfactory in that even the most complete and rigorous cannot explain and predict all instances of war between states. Most attempts at improving our understanding have been directed toward the development of additional theories rather than toward improving and extending those we already have. The result of this, perhaps not surprisingly, is that we have too many incomplete theories and not enough evaluation, comparison, and synthesis of these theories to permit judgments regarding their relative usefulness. This lack of cumulation is perhaps the most serious obstacle to improving our knowledge regarding the causes of wars. Without some effort at building on existing ideas we will see only the continuing proliferation of underdeveloped and undertested theoretical frameworks.

Patrick James, in Crisis and War, presents one effort at contributing to the cumulation of knowledge regarding the causes of war. Rather than proposing a new theory he has subjected propositions derived from three different theories to empirical tests. His purpose is not just to confirm (or disconfirm); rather, his work is aimed at identifying the strengths of each approach in the hopes that these might be integrated into a more complete explanation.

To provide focus to the exercise James selected one theory from each of Kenneth Waltz’ three images, or levels of analysis. He examined the balance of power as a theory that focuses on the structure of the international system to account for war, the argument that war is a product of the externalization of domestic conflict as a theory that explains war as a product of features of nation-states, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory as a theory that