

Nicaragua Libre: Pragmatic Corporatism in the Revolution¹

by
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With the electoral defeat of Nicaragua's Sandinista government in February 1990, an interesting experiment in social transformation appears to have come to an end in Central America. The seizure of power by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in July 1979 marked Latin America's first and only revolutionary triumph in the two decades following the Cuban Revolution. The lapse of a further decade and the defeat of the Sandinistas have, perhaps, given sufficient distance from events to attempt an evaluation of the early post-revolutionary period. This article is an attempt to lay the groundwork for an appraisal of the Sandinista Revolution's political trajectory by examining the features of the regime in the early period of revolutionary consolidation.

SANDINISTA NICARAGUA

Sandinista Nicaragua proved to be a fascinating attempt by a small, poor nation to reorient its development away from peripheral capitalism towards a nationalist, government-directed economy under the leadership of a revolutionary movement with a socialist vision, while remaining within the international capitalist economic system. This project raised problems of balancing contradictory economic and social demands, developing new political institutions, and transforming social relations in favor of the working classes. At the same time, Nicaragua's position in the international economic and political arenas exerted strong pressures which continually forced the Sandinistas into political compromises and changes of policy that finally contributed to the electoral defeat of the revolution.

The Sandinistas' response to these problems of transition was the development of a strong state with controlled representation of interest groups. The reaction of observers was to brand the Sandinista Revolution as either a brave new experiment in popular democracy, or the imposition of a totalitarian ideology foreign to the political traditions of the Americas. Neither of these assessments appears adequate for an understanding of post-revolutionary Nicaragua. Far from being the introduction of an alien ideology into Latin America, the Sandinista regime represents an old political form given new dress.

The FSLN was never pluralist in the liberal democratic sense, nor did its leadership intend to institute a democratic government of that type. Neither was the regime a rigid totalitarian dictatorship foreign to Latin America's political experience. Rather, the state established by the Sandinista Revolution was, initially, a variant of corporatist interest representation, a political model common in the historical experience of Latin America, albeit with a significant

reorientation toward the so-called popular sector rooted in the particular conditions of Nicaragua. This corporatist character is seen most clearly in the features of the regime during the "period of consolidation" from 1979 to 1983. From 1983 on, the Contra war forced the FSLN into a stance of what might be described as "authoritarian republicanism", in which greater repression was implemented to aid the war effort, while a limited electoral opening was allowed for the benefit of international opinion — in essence, a greater degree of freedom in a more constricted realm of activity. The effect of this was to undermine the legitimacy of the revolutionary regime, while opening up the political process in a manner that the FSLN could not control as they had expected.² Because of the drift away from corporatist forms after the Reagan administration turned Nicaragua's political and social transformation into an arena of Cold War conflict, this article is limited to the 1979-83 period of consolidation in an attempt to explain some of the peculiarities which caused such a division of opinion over the nature of the new regime.

CORPORATISM — DEBATE AND DEFINITION

Corporatism as a political concept has generated a great deal of debate, yet the term is often used without clear definition. There seems to be basic agreement that "corporatism" refers to a mode of interest group representation linking society to the state in an attempt to avoid conflictual competition between interest groups; but beyond this there is often only limited agreement. This being the case, it may be most useful to understand corporatism not as a specific ideology or type of regime, but as a characteristic of certain political structures that make up the state. As one commentator puts it, "consider 'corporatist' those structures through which functional, non-territorially-based organizations officially represent 'private' interests before the state, formally subject for their existence and their right of representation to authorization or acceptance by the state, and where such right is reserved to the formal leaders of those organizations, forbidding and excluding other legitimate channels of access to the state for the rest of its members."³

A corporatist state is thus one in which certain structural features determine, or are used by the political elite to limit, the character of interaction under the regime, rather than adapting to the vagaries of unstructured group interaction. The corporatist vision "rejects the notion of open competition and the principle of government neutrality in favour of a more deliberate effort to organize and regulate public-private sector relations. The government assumes responsibility for directing the society, and private economic and social groups become its instruments for doing so."⁴ Within this idea of governmental direction there is a difference between regimes based on the willing collaboration of relatively autonomous interest groups with the state, and those in which the state subordinates interest groups to the extent that they become "little more than deliverers of government orders to their constituents."⁵ This difference is reflected in two distinct aspects of corporatism's function as "a set of structures which link society with the state."⁶ These are the "statizing" and "privatist"

functions of the structures of corporatism, the former referring to the “conquest and subordination by the state of organizations of civil society”, and the latter to the “opening of institutions of the state to the representation of organized interests of civil society.”⁷ These two functions can appear together as “bifrontal” corporatism in the authoritarian state, involving the interpenetration of the state and private sectors in the form of government regulation of and collaboration with private interests. A key feature of bifrontal corporatism is that the relations established by the structures are asymmetric in two senses: first, the state, though its institutions are “privatized” to some extent, maintains control over the private interests which seek representation; and second, the degree of representation and autonomy permitted to the dominant sectors and the popular sectors of the population are not equal.⁸

Examples of such corporatist structures can be found in a number of Latin American regimes in the twentieth century: Peronist Argentina, Vargas’s *Estado Novo* in Brazil, Peru during the first phase of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (i.e., 1968 to 1975), the Brazilian military government of 1964 to 1985, and Mexico under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party). All these regimes shared three basic characteristics despite their obvious differences: each was a “system of interest representation based on enforced limited pluralism”; each tried to “eliminate spontaneous interest articulation and establish a limited number of authoritatively recognized groups that interact with the governmental apparatus in defined and regularized ways”; and each organized such groups in “functional vertical categories rather than horizontal class categories”, thereby regulating relations with the state through authorized interest group representatives.⁹

Despite the stricture noted earlier, it is worthwhile recognizing that corporatism can have an ideological function. The ideological feature resides in its role in providing “new institutional arrangements with ample normative justification” for the rule by a state elite which prefers hegemony to coercion.¹⁰ This feature comes out in the cases where “modern political elites,” upon acquiring control of the state install corporatist systems, finding “state-directed, nonconflictual corporatist modes of participation a useful political device for their crisis response projects of guided development.”¹¹ A less benign interpretation of this ideological role, however, sees it as a system of “hierarchy, elitism, class stratification, and ‘benevolent’ paternalism” which “exists wherever a capitalist ruling class (with or without its imperialist allies) doubts its ability unilaterally to crush its opposition and thereby feels compelled to negotiate some sort of truce that gives certain groups or class fractions a stake in a social system the very stability of which guarantees bourgeois wealth and power.”¹² Interestingly, apart from the latter interpretation’s rather dogmatic assumption that “hierarchy, elitism, class stratification, and ‘benevolent’ paternalism” are vices found only in bourgeois regimes, all of these characteristics of corporatism describe the predominant features of the Sandinista regime in the period of consolidation.

Despite corporatism’s frequent identification with conservatism or reaction there is clearly no reason to exclude the possibility of revolutionary

strains of corporatism.¹³ The argument of this article is that Sandinista Nicaragua was, in fact, such a regime. The working definition of revolutionary corporatism in Nicaragua in the period of consolidation is:

A system of social and political organization in which the government undertakes to establish channels of controlled interest group representation based on functional units, the leaders of which are subordinated to the authority and interests of an autonomous governing elite which is not directly answerable to the populace, but which acts to fundamentally alter the structure and balance of socio-economic power to the advantage of the popular sector.

This revolutionary corporatism is the result of a strong state acting upon a weak society, the imposition of a new order upon class and sectoral remnants of the old.¹⁴ Because of this, there is, despite the centrality of social and political change, neither responsible democracy nor pluralism in the liberal tradition. Instead, the elite acts on its own conception of the interests of state and society, which are said to be those of the masses, and uses corporatist structures to control sectors of society, but also to allow for some expression of interests which may well be taken into account in policy-making though there is no mechanism available in the system to ensure this. It ought to be stressed that there is a definite authoritarian element in this concept of revolutionary corporatism: a characteristic of the revolutionary corporatist regime is the asymmetric relationship of power, just as in the bifrontal corporatism outlined above, in which the state retains control over the interest groups in the system, and the groups themselves are not equal in standing in relationships with the state.¹⁵

SANDINISMO, PLURALISM, AND TOTALITARIANISM

Although FSLN partisans often spoke glowingly of pluralism in Nicaragua, they did not necessarily have an understanding of the term familiar to supporters of liberal democracy, and herein lies some of the confusion over the nature of the Sandinista regime. In Nicaragua, during the period of consolidation, politics was underpinned by a belief that the "essence of pluralism is that it allows for a diversity of views that enriches political and social practice at all levels, not merely at the level of political parties."¹⁶ Although there were limits on competition, a plurality of interests was encouraged in all spheres of society, and the inclusionary character of the regime was a very significant feature.¹⁷

However, it should be noted that the conception of competition in this "pluralism" was somewhat limited by the qualification for participating in the "new project". One acute observer has pointed out that the Sandinistas seemed to accept two different meanings for pluralism: "on the one hand it was used to mean a sharing of power with the bourgeoisie, and a willingness to abide by the electoral rules; on the other, references were made to 'popular power' which argued that democracy was not about parliament but about grass-roots control of the political and economic process."¹⁸ Politics, "under popular hegemony", was reduced to the function of providing a debating forum in a system where the

mere existence of parties other than the FSLN was taken to prove the existence of a pluralist state.¹⁹

This conception of pluralism seems to be a peculiarly circumscribed one, implying the freedom of individuals to take part in political activity, but denying interest groups the freedom to compete for access to power. Debate is permitted, but it is separated from the exercise of political power, being restricted *ante facto* by the insistence on "popular hegemony in a project of national unity" overseen by a regime which "is fundamentally supported by the popular classes and prioritizes their interests and demands."²⁰ Furthermore, freedom within this hegemony was not as great as might be expected, even for the 'progressive' wing of the spectrum, as was shown by an apologetic justification advanced for the Sandinistas' closing of *El Pueblo*, a radical left paper: "If left-wing opposition to the government had no realistic hope of offering convincing alternatives, whose interests were being objectively served by the antics of the ultra-left?"²¹ Thus, the articulation of interests was valid only if socially useful.

In contrast to the "enforced limited pluralism" of corporatist organization, liberal democratic pluralism may be defined as a system in which autonomous interest groups are allowed to compete in a free, though certainly not equal, manner for the control or favor of a government apparatus that does not actively seek to subordinate their interests to its own; such competition takes place within a system of guaranteed individual rights and freedoms, facilitated by regular elections and the alternation of governing parties (or at least the reasonable possibility of such alternation through free and fair elections).²² The state in pluralist theory is a regulative structure, but it appears more reactive than active, and there exists the possibility that any one interest group may lose its hold on power in competition with others. In this sense, the Sandinistas were certainly not democratic pluralists when they came to power, for even their supporters conceded that they had no intention of allowing opposition groups to displace them as power-holders in the state, and they acted to ensure their domination of the "commanding heights of the state."²³

One of the arguments advanced as clinching evidence of the Sandinistas' pluralism has been that the Popular Militia was open to all Nicaraguans, and was less politicized than the Sandinista People's Army, thereby providing a counterweight to the FSLN-dominated security forces. However open the Militia was, it seems unlikely that it could serve as a serious counter to FSLN strength in light of two features of military structure: first, was the strict control over the Army maintained by the Sandinistas; and second, was the Army's control over the distribution of arms and ammunition to the Militia.²⁴ Although command of the militia arms by a regular army is hardly a contradiction of pluralism in liberal thought, this control does undermine the argument that the FSLN was pluralist *because* it did not reserve for itself the exclusive prerogative of organized force.

During the Sandinista' consolidation of power interest groups and their organizations in Nicaragua were clearly subordinated to the articulation of interests by the dominant elite. However, in contrast to totalitarianism the basis of Sandinista rule was collective leadership, national mobilization, and the

incorporation of interest groups into the new order. This differed from the typification of the totalitarian regime as one that seeks total control of the state, society, and individual by the process of political "atomization" of the populace through the destruction of all perspectives, viewpoints, and organizations outside those of the state and the dominant party.²⁵

INCORPORATION AND "POPULAR HEGEMONY"

It is evident that the core characteristic of the Sandinista regime, if it was indeed corporatist, should have been the establishment of political preeminence without an absolute monopoly of political activity or the destruction on opposition elements. Such a situation was, in fact, the central feature of the FSLN regime in the 1979-82 period. One vigorous critic of the Sandinistas points out that the FSLN leadership felt no need to "persecute passive members of the bourgeoisie or even to proscribe their political organizations, as long as FSLN hegemony [was] recognized."²⁶ Indeed, for the sake of stability in the period of consolidation the "Sandinist [sic] leadership had deviated from Cuba's Marxist-leninist model and had chosen instead to pursue a controlled form of pluralism involving an alliance between classes."²⁷

The underlying emphasis of the Sandinista regime in the early stages seems to have been the incorporation of diverse political elements into the revolutionary process rather than their outright destruction. The heart of this process can be found in the strategy of the FSLN's *Tendencia Insurreccional* (or *Terceristas*) to co-opt the forces of social and Christian democracy into the insurrection, while carefully maintaining the "political hegemony of the FSLN."²⁸ By incorporating non-FSLN groups, and ensuring continued dominance through consolidation of their hold on power, the Sandinistas established their primacy in the political arena without resorting to the actual liquidation of opposition groups. It is the structure of power and the state-society relationship which gave the Sandinista regime its corporatist character; these corporatist features were present, in embryonic form at least, from the beginning of the "popular insurrection."

The institutions and institutional relationships created or encouraged by the Sandinistas long showed corporatist rather than liberal democratic features. During the 1978-9 period of struggle, the FSLN pursued the leadership of the revolution through a number of means. These included armed struggle in alliance with armed and unarmed groups who were brought into the struggle under Sandinista leadership; the organization of several broad-based fronts to pursue the further incorporation of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes; and the creation of two institutions of government to assume power in the wake of Somoza's defeat: the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction (JGRN), and the Council of State. These two organs of government had two things in common: the FSLN exerted ultimate authority either overtly or covertly, and they were organized to represent interest groups by appointment not election.

The alliance of the Sandinistas with other groups and individuals was premised on the final command of the armed forces by the Sandinista leadership,

the National Directorate (FSLN-DN), which was ensured by the FSLN's better organization and the loyalty of high-level cadres to the DN. The ultimate authority of the DN was demonstrated in both formal and practical ways. In the first place, the members of the FSLN-DN, and only they, were designated *Comandante de la Revolucion*, a "formal ratification of the National Directorate as the ultimate political authority in Nicaragua."²⁹ On the practical side, the FSLN's final authority was demonstrated by disarming non-FSLN-dominated groups, such as the radical left Anti-Somoza People's Militia, politicizing the new military as the Sandinista People's Army (EPS), and easing non-orthodox Sandinistas from positions of power, e.g., Eden Pastora and Carlos Coronel.³⁰ The inclusion of other groups and prominent individuals was thus accomplished without the FSLN losing its leadership of the revolutionary struggle.

On the political side of the struggle, the FSLN used explicitly corporatist organizations to create a broad revolutionary front. The Group of Twelve, a popular front "cover for the FSLN *Terceristas*,"³¹ was organized to provide the Sandinistas with connections to the bourgeoisie, and was sold to representatives of the bourgeoisie as a means of representing their interests to the FSLN.³² The two organs of the Provisional Government established while in Costa Rica on 16 June 1979, were both openly corporatist in nature. The Governing Junta of National Reconstruction represented the FSLN, the United People's Movement (MPU) (an umbrella group of anti-Somocists dominated by the *Terceristas*), the Group of Twelve, and the anti-Somocist bourgeoisie. The Junta thereby provided the Sandinistas, the middle classes, and the masses with representatives in the executive branch of the government — though the FSLN actually controlled both the MPU and the Group of Twelve JGRN members, ensuring its power over the government.³³ The Council of State, "a more explicit expression of the FSLN's vision of future power structures", was even more clearly corporatist, its representatives being picked from political parties, the FSLN, unions, mass organizations, bourgeois organizations, and the educational and clergy associations.³⁴ These bodies represented corporate interests in the organs of government, but at the same time were subordinated to the FSLN by its ultimate control over a majority of representatives to them.

During the phase of consolidation, the corporatist organization developed even further. The JGRN, assuming leadership of the government, represented the interests of the various groups in the execution of policy, but it also clearly followed the guidelines laid down by the FSLN's National Directorate regarding national policy.³⁵ Neither the JGRN nor the many municipal juntas were elected; members of both were appointed to represent interest groups in proportions determined by the FSLN through negotiations with the mass organizations and political parties, and were responsible to the FSLN rather than to the public. Representation on the Council of State was also functional, proportionally determined by the FSLN, and not elective, but co-opted from above. Indeed, the Council served both major corporatist functions since the delegates represented organizations directly to the government, and acted as a conduit for policy-making from the insurrectionary organizations.³⁶ As one supporter of the FSLN made clear, despite the "pluralistic and multiclass

approach to revolution" exhibited by the structure and function of the JGRN and Council of State, "it was clear from the start that these formal organs were ultimately responsible to the National Directorate of the FSLN, which had created them in the first place."³⁷

The mass organizations which developed spontaneously or through FSLN encouragement also served as corporate interest groups with seats in the Council of State, giving these "sectors", rather than geographic areas, representation in the government. The "grass roots organizations were open to all persons corresponding to the social sector of each grass-roots organization", representing women, rural workers and peasants, youth, and the East Coast Indians.³⁸ These organizations also served as channels to and from the government as they were linked to particular sectors and to the FSLN.³⁹ The bourgeoisie's interests were represented to the government by several organizations in formal negotiations under the umbrella of the Higher Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP). Factory workers and management were organized into Economic Reactivation Assemblies (AREs) which provided forums for planning and representation to the FSLN, but which had neither democratic structures nor power.⁴⁰ The Sandinistas also attempted to unify the unions to provide a single corporate body within, first, the Sandinista Worker's Federation (CST), and later, in the Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee of Nicaragua (also known as the National Inter-union Council, CNI).⁴¹ All the corporate groups developed in subordination to the FSLN. Yet the very pluralism within the corporate structure suggests something other than simple totalitarianism at work, for there was argument and competition among the interest groups — and it is this rather circumscribed pluralism which was noted as the essential character of corporatism.

CORPORATIST STRUCTURES IN NICARAGUA LIBRE

The relationship of the FSLN government to various organizations in Nicaragua also exhibited corporatist characteristics in three major areas: relations between the government and the private sector; relations between the government and the unions; and the essentially undemocratic nature of most of the institutions of representation and their relations with the government.

State-business relations were forced by the government into controlled hierarchical relations rather than dealings between entities autonomous in their particular spheres. The Sandinistas needed the private sector to rebuild the economy but were unwilling to allow the bourgeoisie to gain control of the state.⁴² To ensure that the private sector remained subordinate to the government the FSLN took care to keep in its hands the coercive powers of the state and such central ministries as finance and development. The basis of the FSLN's economic policy was to allow the private sector to produce relatively freely, and to profit from production, but to ensure that control of the surplus remained in government hands. Jaime Wheelock, Minister of Agriculture and DN member, claimed that there was "no need to control production. In reality what we are expropriating are the surpluses."⁴³ By controlling credit and essential services,

and retaining the right to expropriate capitalists who did not follow the government's guidelines, the FSLN established its authority over the economy and offered the private sector a framework which provided limited freedom of action. Despite the Sandinistas' willingness to "define the ground rules to accommodate as many 'patriotic businessmen' as possible," they were "inflexible" toward those who refused to accept the reorientation of the economy in the interests of the working class.⁴⁴

To regularize government-business interaction, COSEP was recognized as the representative of business to the government in negotiations and given voice in both the JGRN and the Council of State. These arrangements were assisted in their functioning by the fact that the bourgeoisie was not politically united and had only an economic organization to speak for it with a unified voice, not to mention the government's willingness to arrest business leaders indiscreet enough to publicly voice their opposition to the Sandinistas' socialist vision.⁴⁵

While the FSLN openly formulated policies intended, in the long run, to encourage development of a non-capitalist society, it allowed the private sector the opportunity to join the process of social transformation rather than proceeding to destroy it by direct confrontation. The impetus behind attempting to incorporate the bourgeoisie was that of necessity. The economic situation required capitalist help for the reactivation of economic production, but the FSLN refused to allow the bourgeoisie to gain real political power. As Wheelock put it, the Sandinistas hoped to develop the "possibility that the bourgeoisie only produce, without power, that it limit itself to exploiting its means of production to live, not as instruments of power, of imposition."⁴⁶ The solution to the dilemma was to offer the business community opportunity for continued accumulation and to restrain the demands of the working class, mediating the conflict between the two and limiting their competition. As in the "statizing" corporatism defined by O'Donnell, the bourgeoisie was granted representation in the state even as it intruded on their traditional sphere of activity, subordinating their role to the FSLN's political hegemony and the economic interests of the working class (as articulated by the FSLN leadership).

The FSLN-union relationship was less than straightforward for some time. Early on the Sandinistas split over the revolutionary potential of the working class and its union organizations. The doubts that prompted the abandonment of proletarian-based revolution by the *Tercerista* and GPP (Prolonged Popular War) factions seem to have been reflected in the uncomfortable relations between the FSLN and the various union federations. In keeping with the FSLN's hegemonic policy, the government sought to subject the unions to the Sandinista interpretation of the workers' interests. This interpretation put the needs of the national economy first, requiring that the unions strengthen labor discipline and subordinate salary demands to the imperatives of reconstruction, a position formally adopted by the government-sponsored CNI.⁴⁷ These attempts took the form of restrictions on the right to strike, suppression of strikes, harassment of radical workers' leaders, wage limits, encouragement of FSLN-dominated unions, diversion of worker activism into bodies lacking real power, and so on.

The most extreme examples of the FSLN's attempts to dominate the unions in this period were the 1979-80 struggles with the ultra-left Workers' Front (FO) and the communist Federation of Trade Union Action and Unity (CAUS). In the midst of a strike at the San Antonio Sugar Refinery encouraged by the FO, the government closed down their newspaper *El Pueblo*, arrested its leaders, and attempted to break the strike.⁴⁸ Later, following a series of strikes led by the CAUS, the government arrested leaders of both the union and its patron, the Communist Party of Nicaragua, and the Managua offices of both were sacked at the end of a government-sponsored demonstration against the US.⁴⁹ At least one attempt was made to delegitimize a non-Sandinista union in labor talks, when the Ministry of Labor recognized a Sandinista Workers' Federation (CST) affiliate as "the only authorized partner in talks," despite the existence of a much larger CAUS-affiliated union. This attempt ended with the co-optation of the CAUS leadership, and official recognition of the union within the new Sandinista dominated CNI.⁵⁰

Other attempts to incorporate the unions were more subtle and, by and large, more successful. Organization of the CNI to provide a unified corporate negotiator for labor, following the failure of unification under the CST, also served the government's drive to regulate union activity, with the unions accepting certain limitations on their activities in return for a channel to the government. The general thrust of the Sandinistas' relationship with the unions was to encourage or force their acceptance of the government's economic priorities, even when these appeared to contradict the interests of the workers. In practical terms, the "new role set out for the unions through the CST was centred on production; they were to oversee the raising of productivity, and to win the argument for austerity and sacrifice, to translate the imperatives of national defence into the workplace."⁵¹ To further this new role for the unions the government even made an effort to involve the workers and their leaders in the reconstruction of the economy through both the AREs and consultation with the unions on matters of economic policy. In neither case did the government actually concede real power to the workers, but both efforts did give the appearance of worker involvement.

Within this strategy of designating unions to carry out the government's economic policies the Sandinistas were prepared to use incorporation when possible, intimidation when necessary, and co-operation when unavoidable. Yet, even with the formation of the CNI — a single national federation dominated by the FSLN through the CST — and the subsequent pressure on other unions, there remained an element of pluralism in the labor movement as the CNI itself was composed of six different union federations of varying political alignment, and "sectoral organizations" such as the Federation of Health Workers, the Teachers' Union, and the Union of Workers in Liberal Professions.⁵² Nevertheless, FSLN proclamations of trade union independence from the state were misleading, even from a leftist perspective, given that the working class was so small and undeveloped, and the unions were so weak, that it was "illusory to expect class-based organization to develop" within it.⁵³ Such weakness aided the government in its efforts to assimilate the workers' interests

into those articulated by the FSLN, ostensibly on their behalf. The process of regularization of union representation to the government within a framework of limited pluralism allowed the government to bring the unions into state structures rather than destroy them, while maintaining undisputed control of the state and subordinating the workers' interests to its own.

The impetus behind this subordination of worker interests was both political and economic, as a consequence of Nicaragua's dependence on the international market for capital and goods. The expansion of the area of state property increased the state's role in productive relations, and thus, the "role of the state as 'employer' and as direct appropriator of surplus,"⁵⁴ thereby requiring the state to control labor discipline, regulate productivity, and so on. Given Nicaragua's position in the international economic system, the state, in the role of appropriator of surplus, was forced to restrain labor demands to encourage capitalist productivity.⁵⁵ Whatever the socialist vision of the leadership, the economy's "fundamental laws of motion would be those of capitalism — accumulation, the creation of value, and subjection to the laws of the market."⁵⁶ This situation forced the government to sacrifice the interests of the workers, even in state industries, to the task of revitalizing the economy within a capitalist dynamic. Regardless of ideological preference, the incorporation of labor into a system of controlled interest articulation was an economic necessity, and corporatist forms seemed to have been the easiest way to get the unions' acquiescence. As Philippe Schmitter puts it, "state corporatism seems to be a defining element of, if not a structural necessity for, the antiliberal, delayed capitalist, authoritarian, neomercantilist state."

The corporatist thrust of the regime in this period of consolidation was also evident in the essentially undemocratic character of political arrangements. As mentioned earlier, the institutions of revolutionary government were openly corporatist in composition, and responsible, ultimately, to the FSLN-DN rather than any electorate. The Council of State, the JGRN, the municipal juntas, the CNI, and the mass organizations were also undemocratic in that their representation was based on co-option from above rather than election. Even the institutions of mass participation, the AREs, the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDSs), and the *cabildos abiertos* (open councils, local forums for public discussion) were not democratic insofar as they had no power to hold the government to account.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the leadership of the most pervasive organization in the country, the ubiquitous CDSs, "was chosen directly by the FSLN, and built from the top downwards, both nationally and locally."⁵⁸

The FSLN carefully maintained a separation of power and accountability in the organs of government, making bodies representative of the leaders of interest groups, chosen or acknowledged as such by the FSLN, and answerable to the FSLN rather than their own members or the population at large. In this way the DN maintained its dominance of not only the JGRN and the local juntas, but the Council of State and the organizations that had mobilized the populace during the struggle. The FSLN's control of the mass organizations is illustrated by its encouragement of popular mobilization against the bourgeoisie over the issue of decapitalization in early 1981, and their subsequent demobilization in

July to prevent a serious rupture.⁵⁹ Control of the mass organizations was facilitated by the fact that “the best leaders of the OP [*Organizaciones Populares*] tended also to be members of the FSLN,” whose principle of democratic centralism “placed those FSLN militants that worked in the OPs at the disposition of the party authorities.”⁶⁰

Some supporters of the Sandinistas have begged the question of democracy in the mass organizations, and in the FSLN itself, by asserting an organic link between the people and the organizations. These apologists often take it as self-evident that popular demands were made known to the FSLN through the mass organizations, were then articulated by the state to the acclaim of mass demonstrations, implemented as government policy, and followed by a voluntary demobilization of the masses. Yet there is rarely any discussion of the election of leaders of the mass organizations, the responsibility of FSLN cadres to the people in an institutionalized fashion, or of the FSLN’s own internal selection process.⁶¹ Without institutionalized responsibility and accountability some FSLN apologists were reduced to suggesting that the size of demonstrations was an indicator of the correctness of government policy.⁶²

The lack of institutionalized accountability allowed the FSLN to co-opt the leaders of the mass organizations without fear of their rejection by the rank and file. Thus, the interests of the various groups could be expressed in the forums of the CDSs, the AREs, or the unions, and the Sandinistas might even listen, but the executive and legislative bodies were free to act in the FSLN’s interests first and foremost. By controlling the leadership of the various interest groups, the FSLN ensured that all the interests in the country were subordinated to its own, and it remained accountable only to itself. The lack of accountability, together with FSLN control of the strategic heights of the state, gave the Sandinistas freedom to actively regulate interest group interaction and access to the state, while the existence of corporate representation gave them both input from the populace and channels back to it. Thus, the organs of government served the corporatist functions of limited pluralism and control for an autonomous governing elite.

The corporatist functions of the institutions of “popular democracy” are also interesting. On one hand, the mass demonstrations legitimized the hegemony of the vanguard party linked to the masses in a “dynamic dialectical relationship”, while managing to avoid making the FSLN actually answerable to anyone, and distracting attention from the fact that it was not a mass organization itself, having only 1,000 members by July 1980.⁶³ On the other hand, the “embryonic” and “evolutionary” nature of the party organization, a feature of its dynamic relationship with the mass organizations, allowed it to sidestep any questions of internal democracy. The justification for this continued “popular democracy” and the lack of formal channels of accountability was that “popular participation . . . begins in the socioeconomic sphere and progressively advances into the political-institutional terrain.”⁶⁴ This explanation lay very close to the logic advanced for other corporatist systems which rely on controlled participation and limited democracy to encourage the development of a consensual society.⁶⁵ Indeed, the FSLN’s program of national unity under popular he-

gemony bore a great deal of resemblance to corporatist ideals of national consensus, the elimination of conflictual competition, and the mediation of group conflict by a state which incorporates all social groups within it. The difference is that while many of the political structures created, and the relations which then developed, exhibited the features of corporatism, the period of consolidation *was* revolutionary in its reorientation of the corporatist program from "an elite response to crisis" to a restructuring of society for the benefit of the popular sectors.

The FSLN's incorporation of various sectors into the state has been referred to as "class coexistence without class conciliation"; incorporating both class and non-class sectors in the revolutionary project where their contradictions are known but "their development is subordinated and the attempt is made to orient them to the goals of national unity and national defence."⁶⁶ In essence, the traditional elite, such as it was in Nicaragua, was displaced by the FSLN, which established the state institutions as the source of social power in the name of the popular sectors. But the FSLN accepted the articulation of conflicting interests within certain limits rather than attempt to destroy groups that remained outside the state and party.

THE RISE OF THE CORPORATIST STATE IN A PERIPHERAL SOCIETY

What made the establishment of an inclusionary authoritarian regime possible, and perhaps necessary, were the conditions found in Nicaragua — conditions faced by numerous Third World countries.⁶⁷ The partial and uneven development of Nicaragua's economy meant that there was no hegemonic class; the Somoza regime had depended on the National Guard, American support, and the weakness of other groups for its survival. The level of development was such that the working class was embryonic, and the better part of this class was not industrial but rural,⁶⁸ meaning that there was no proletariat-based organization to assume the role of political elite in the wake of the revolution. The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, having acquiesced to Somoza for so long, was discredited as a whole by its association with the dictatorship, and lacked the unity or armed strength to impose its dominance on the state.⁶⁹ This lack of a viable political alternative to Somoza left the field open for the FSLN to form a broad alliance and take power. Once in place, with the army firmly under its control and the loyalty of the mass organizations that had mobilized the populace during the insurrection, it was able to establish itself as the centre of state power.

Once in power the Sandinistas were faced with the problem of reactivating the economy. They responded by accepting the necessity of capitalist accumulation, and by co-operating with elements of the bourgeoisie. The contradictions between the radicalized masses and the bourgeoisie forced the FSLN to take up the role of mediator between "contending social and economic demands in the name of the state" in order to ensure the productivity of the private sector.⁷⁰ The propensity of the FSLN to act as mediator between worker demands and employer expectations increased as the state itself became a major employer

through the confiscation of Somocist and, later, opposition property.

In other circumstances, perhaps, Nicaragua might have evolved along more conventional Third World socialist lines, with a sharper turn towards political and economic centralization, but Nicaragua's place in Central America and its insertion into the international capitalist economy limited the options available to the FSLN. Given its size, resources, and lack of a patron from the non-capitalist world (the Soviet Union's supply of arms being of little economic use), Nicaragua had little hope of establishing an autarchic economy, so the reactivation of the economy within the presumptions of a capitalist framework was necessary.⁷¹ The conflicting economic and political demands generated by Nicaragua's situation forced the strengthening of the state in the face of antagonistic classes. Rather than analyze Nicaragua under the FSLN in terms of a liberal pluralist/totalitarian dichotomy, it is far more useful to recognize that while the Sandinistas took up Marxist-Leninist terminology, and even a quasi-Marxist analysis of the world, the system of enforced pluralism that they adopted was a pragmatic compromise between socialist goals and the realities of Nicaragua's place in the world.

This effort at controlled pluralism should not be considered a drastic departure from Latin American political tradition, even in the Sandinistas' commitment to significant social and economic reforms. The Peruvian government during the *docenio*, the twelve years of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces 1968-80, began an attempt to restructure society along corporatist lines. It created many labor organizations that were to represent worker and peasant interests to the government in a controlled fashion, "production organizations" to "involve the masses in the economic decisions that effect them most directly," and a national syndicate, SINAMOS, to incorporate all classes in the political and economic processes and "regulate their involvement in the making and implementation of government policy."⁷² The longest ruling party in the western world, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), has long relied on corporatist structures and practices to ensure Mexico's stability despite its revolutionary origins and rhetoric.⁷³

In spite of its rhetorical commitment to Marxism, the FSLN might better be seen as upholding a tradition of "monist democracy" which stretches back to the Wars of Independence. It is premised on the maintenance of unity of interests in the greater interest of the nation, and rejects the competition of liberal pluralism as destructive and dangerous.⁷⁴ Yet, faced with international pressure, from both US hostility and the expectations of sympathetic observers, and domestic resistance the Sandinistas were eventually forced to deviate from even this position. In essence, the corporatist model collapsed under the strains of war and economic distress: the war aggravated the authoritarianism latent in both the state-directed corporatist model and the politico-military structure of the FSLN. At the same time, international opinion required more liberal political forms which undermined the strength of the regime, and triggered more authoritarian reactions to contain the opposition. This resulted in the regime's loss of both potency and legitimacy. Ultimately the Sandinistas proved unable to secure either the political support necessary to control the non-corporatist

political system required for international legitimacy, or the economic cooperation necessary for the success of the corporatist regime. Lacking the means to assure the continuation of the regime by either persuasion or coercion, the Sandinistas could no longer *enforce* the system of limited pluralism and faced the choice of honoring the results of the February 1990 elections or staging a coup and establishing the party dictatorship that they had so far avoided; to their credit they chose the former course.

Endnotes

1. The author would like to thank Cynthia Chalker, David Haglund, Catherine Legrand, Colin Leys, James Malloy, Maurice Tugwell, and the *Conflict Quarterly* referees for their comments on earlier drafts. This paper was completed while the author served as a Research Associate at the Mackenzie Institute on a Department of National Defence Military and Strategic Studies Internship; thanks are due to the Mackenzie Institute and D.N.D. for their support.
2. See for instance, Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, "The Construction of Democracy in Nicaragua," which approvingly notes that all presidential candidates were guaranteed seats in the assembly, a practice which "encourages opposition and minority parties to participate," in Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, eds., *Democracy in Latin America: Visions and Realities* (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1990), p.22. Needless to say, this guarantee also discourages electoral alliances and splits the opposition vote; UNO's victory in 1990 was the result of an electoral coalition formed despite the temptation to run presidential candidates independently. The opening up of the representational system, and subsequent loosening of control over political competition may explain the failure of a type of system which Philippe Schmitter notes proved remarkably resilient in Portugal and Brazil. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," in Fredrick B. Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds., *The New Corporatism: Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), pp. 101-2.
3. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Corporatism and the Question of the State," in James M. Malloy, ed., *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 47. This definition is closely based on that offered by Schmitter:

Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.(pp. 93-4.)

These two definitions might be considered "strong" definitions of corporatism; James Malloy prefers a "looser" definition: "state-controlled or sanctioned interest group representation in a system of state-enforced limited pluralism." This was noted in conversation with the author.
4. Gary W. Wynia, *The Politics of Latin American Development*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1984), p. 99.
5. Wynia, p. 99.
6. O'Donnell, p. 47.
7. O'Donnell, p. 48. Cf., Schmitter's distinction between "societal" and "state" corporatism, pp. 103-4.
8. O'Donnell pp. 48-9, sections 3-5.

9. James M. Malloy, "Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America: The Modal Pattern," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism*, p. 4.
10. Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 47.
11. Stepan, pp. 55-6.
12. Keith A. Haynes, "Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Development: The Corporative Theory of Howard J. Wiarda," *Latin American Perspectives* 58, vol. 15, no. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 135.
13. On corporatism's conservative nature see Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics* XXV, no. 1 (October 1972), esp. pp. 225-6. On corporatism as an "elite response to crisis" see Stepan, pp. 52-59. On the other hand, David and Ruth Collier develop an argument for the existence of "revolutionary corporatism" in Cuba, "Who Does What, to Whom, and How," in Malloy, *Authoritarianism*, pp. 499-500.
14. This idea is not a new one; Schmitter quotes Jean Malherbe, *Le Corporatisme d'association en Suisse* (Lausanne, 1940), on a similar point:

Corporatism appears under two very different guises: the revolutionary and the evolutionary. It is either the product of a "new order" following from a fundamental overthrow of the political and economic institutions of a given country and created by force or special "collective spirit"; or the outcome of a natural evolution in economic and social ideas and events.

Schmitter himself notes that state corporatism "more likely would be forged out of immediate *conjuncture* and impending collapse, strong leadership and repressive action, architectonic vision and inflated rhetoric." Schmitter, pp. 105-6. The difference between this writer's position and Schmitter's is that he appears to see corporatism as a reaction of capitalist elites to threats from subordinate classes, while here it is argued that a marxist oriented party adopted corporatism as a means of political and economic control after overthrowing the old order.
15. Curiously, while it might seem obvious that a putatively socialist party would privilege the popular sector (especially the poor and marginal groups) in a corporatist system of this type, in Nicaragua this may be less the case than is expected. Forrest D. Colburn argues that Third World socialist regimes often find themselves in the uncomfortable situation of having to give greater access and incentives to the export producing sector (whether nationalized, or still in traditional elite hands) in order to accumulate hard currency through trade, and makes the point rather strongly in the case of Nicaragua. See Forrest D. Colburn, *Post-Revolutionary Nicaragua: State, Class, and the Dilemmas of Agrarian Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 18-22, 124-131. It seems ironic that a characterization intended to apply to the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes of the Southern Cone could describe in some ways a regime that most observers would locate at the other end of the political spectrum.
16. Jose Luis Coraggio and George Irvin, "Revolution and Democracy in Nicaragua," *Latin American Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 33.
17. Coraggio and Irvin argued at the time that "all social sectors have been given the opportunity to participate in the new project, albeit under popular hegemony." The restrictions on competition in this situation were defended as being "consistent with the norms observed in advanced Western democracies" as "different classes, social groupings, and political parties are represented at every level." Coraggio and Irvin, pp. 25 and 26.
18. Mike Gonzalez, *Nicaragua: Revolution Under Siege* (Toronto: International Socialists, 1985), p. 32.
19. See for instance George Black, *Triumph of the People: the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London: Zed Press, 1981), pp. 260-1.

20. Vilas, p. 175.
21. Black, p. 339. See also Richard Fagen, who argues that the right to dissent was recognized "not as the abstract issue of how much discussion will be allowed, but rather what forms and channels of dissent are most compatible with the construction of a working consensus supportive of a new political-economic order." Richard Fagen, "The Politics of Transition," in Richard Fagen, Carmen Diana Deere, and Jose Luis Coraggio, eds., *Transition and Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986), p. 258.
22. Schmitter offers a definition of pluralism which parallels his definition of corporatism (see note 2):

Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories.

He also offers an extensive list of characteristics and assumptions associated with pluralism. Schmitter, pp. 96, and 100-101.
23. John A. Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder: Westview, 1982), p. 191; Henri Weber, *Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981), p. 76.
24. On the "open" status of the militia see Coraggio and Irvin, p. 26. See also Luis Hector Serra, "The Popular Organizations," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua: The First Five Years* (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 75. Jonas and Stein also praise universal conscription as the means which "opened the army to non-Sandinistas," and point out that the military "retains a structure separate from that of the FSLN" even though "top army officials are Sandinistas," p. 25. On the army's control of arms, see Gonzalez, p. 51. On the politicization of the armed forces (including the army, the militia, and the police) see Steven M. Gorman and Thomas W. Walker, "The Armed Forces," in Walker, *First Five Years*, pp. 91-117, see esp. 95-102.
25. See Leonard Schapiro, *Totalitarianism* (New York: MacMillan, 1972), pp. 118-9; and David M. Ricci, *The Tragedy of Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 155-6, citing Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York: Meridian, 1958), pp. 305-40.
26. David Nolan, *FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* (Coral Gables, Fla.: Institute of Inter-American Studies, 1984), p. 122.
27. Max Azicri, "A Cuban Perspective on the Nicaraguan Revolution," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 345.
28. Nolan, p. 125 and, citing Humberto Ortega, 76.
29. Black, p. 198.
30. Weber, p. 126; Jiri and Virginia Valenta, "Sandinistas in Power," *Problems of Communism*, XXXIV, no. 5 (September-October 1985), p. 17. Pastora's tale is well known, but Coronel appears to have been much more important in the Sandinista government; however, he was shifted in and out of the government. Although useful for his intelligence and ties with Fidel Castro, he was distrusted by the members of the National Directorate. See Arturo Cruz, Jr., *Memoirs of a Counter-Revolutionary: Life with the Contras, the Sandinistas, and the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), pp. 104-6, 133.
31. Weber, p. 47.
32. Nolan, pp. 72-3.
33. Weber, p. 51.
34. Black, p. 195.

35. Booth, *The End*, pp. 184-5.
36. Weber, pp. 111-113. Booth, *The End*, p. 187.
37. Thomas W. Walker, "Introduction," in Walker, *Revolution*, p.23. See also Dennis Gilbert, "The Bourgeoisie," in Walker, *First Five Years*, p. 168.
38. Serra, in Walker, *First Five Years*, p. 79. These groups were in the original Council of State, several others were added in 1981. John A. Booth, "The National Governmental System," in Walker, *First Five Years*, p. 37, Table 1.
39. Black, p. 239. Serra also notes the ties between the mass organizations and the FSLN in the overlap of FSLN membership and mass organization leadership; Serra, in Walker, *First Five Years*, pp. 76, 78, 85, & 86.
40. Weber, p. 115-7.
41. Weber, p. 124; Booth, *The End*, p. 195.
42. Black, pp. 204-5, citing Henry Ruiz, Minister of Planning and FSLN-DN member. Gilbert, "The Bourgeoisie," in Walker, *First Five Years*, quotes several FSLN officials on the economic and political roles of "the powerless bourgeoisie," p. 179.
43. Gonzalez, p. 33.
44. Black, pp. 205-6.
45. See for instance, Cruz, *Memoirs*, p. 120.
46. Jaime Wheelock, *The Great Challenge* (Managua: Alternative Views, 1984), p. 31.
47. Vilas, pp. 179, 183.
48. Gonzalez, p. 49.
49. Weber, p. 107; Gilbert, "The Bourgeoisie" , pp. 174-5. Gilbert notes that some COSEP officials arrested at the same time were released after international protests, while the workers remained in prison for another year.
50. Gonzalez, p. 49; Black, pp. 280-1.
51. Gonzalez, p. 49. See Serra, pp. 69-70, for a laudatory account, by an academic with close ties to the peasants' union and the FSLN, of the unions' work in supporting policy, which confirms this and notes the role of worker participation in the AREs as part of it.
52. Weber, pp. 107-8,
53. Gonzalez, p. 50. The significance of this is that without its own autonomous organizations the working class remains subordinate to the state elite.
54. Clive Y. Thomas, *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), p. 85.
55. Vilas, p. 182.
56. Gonzalez, p. 32.
57. For a comprehensive critique of these bodies in the early days of the Sandinista government see Weber, pp. 113-7. Jonas and Stein note that "elections of local officials was among the issues *further elaborated* in the Municipalities Law adopted by the Assembly in 1988." Jonas and Stein, p. 25 (emphasis added). Prior to the Constitution of 1987 the Mayor of Managua was a Presidential appointee.
58. Gonzalez, p. 45.
59. Vilas, pp. 204-7.
60. Serra, pp. 78 and 85. Serra also notes a tendency of cadres to "substitut[e] the party for the OPs, thereby impeding the formation and development of their organizational capacity and their ability to promote popular interests." This was especially true where "FSLN base committees within the OPs took on the functions of discussion, criticism and self-criticism, and decisionmaking [sic]" without involving the non-FSLN members. Serra, p. 86.
61. Serra is an exception to this, but his discussion is superficial; he does not outline the

democratic structures, give a chronology of their development, or outline FSLN structures. Serra, pp. 77-81. For examples of the tendency to assert the self-evident popular and democratic nature of the Sandinista regime see, for instance, Keith A. Haynes, "Mass Participation and the Transition to Socialism: A Critique of Petras and Fitzgerald," *Latin American Perspectives* 56, vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 1988), p. 117; and William I. Robinson and Kent Norsworthy, "A Critique of the 'Antidemocratic Tendency' Argument: The Case of Mass Organizations and Popular Participation in Nicaragua," *Latin American Perspectives* 56, pp. 137-8.

62. See, for instance, Black, p. 232; and Haynes, "Mass Participation," p. 116.
63. Gonzalez, p. 45.
64. Vilas, p. 45.
65. See, for instance, George D. Philip, *The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals 1968-76* (London: Athlone, 1976), pp. 124-32, on institutions devised by the GRFA, especially SINAMOS, the national syndicate.
66. Vilas, pp. 240-1.
67. See Thomas for an extensive discussion of the authoritarian tendencies, and the various pressures at their root, found in Third World regimes.
68. Vilas, p. 66.
69. See for instance Cruz, *Memoirs*, pp. 26-7, and 57 on the bourgeoisie's collaboration with the Somozas, and pp. 95-6 on its lack of cohesion. There were, of course, exceptions to the Nicaraguan elite's submission to Somoza, but these were exceptions, not a broad opposition until the final year of the dictatorship by which time it was too late to establish their legitimacy to anyone but the Americans desperately seeking a "Somocismo without Somoza" solution.
70. Coraggio and Irvin, p. 25.
71. Insofar as it remained constrained by capitalism's "laws of motion," Nicaragua's trajectory fits Schmitter's "macrohypothesis" that,
...the corporatization of interest representation is related to certain basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its existence and continually to accumulate further resources. (p. 107.)

This is not to overstate the case and argue that the Sandinista Revolution was a functional necessity for Nicaraguan or international capital, but to suggest that the options available to the FSLN in power were limited by Nicaragua's level of development and resources, and once the decision had been made to accept the dynamics of the international capitalist economy "state corporatism" ought not have been an unexpected outcome.

72. Wynia, pp. 236-7.
73. Wynia, pp. 258-62. See also Collier, pp. 499-500.
74. Glen Dealy, "The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America," in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change in Latin America* (University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 77-9. The continuing importance of this idea in revolutionary Nicaragua may be inferred from the stress on national unity in Sandinista pronouncements, as in the statement by Comandante Henry Ruiz: "People, Army, Unity: Guarantee of Victory"—that is the slogan at the core of this revolution." Quoted in Black, p. 192.

Schmitter would probably disagree with the phrase "monist democracy" as he defines a "monist" political system, paralleling his definitions of pluralism and corporatism (see above), which is based on corporatist-like features subject to control by and through a single political party. Schmitter, p. 97. While the argument might be made that the Nicaraguan system *tended* towards this, the argument here is that it was definitely *not* achieved whatever the ambitions of the FSLN might have been, and that the practical situation was of corporatist rather than monist character because of Nicaragua's conditions.