the field regardless of orders coming from Manila. Linn’s analysis provides a wealth of new information on both the US Army’s role in the conquest of the Philippines, as well as the nature of the Philippine Insurrection itself. Linn can also be credited with a clear writing style, which makes the book a joy to read. Nevertheless there are problems in his methodology and interpretation of the documents.

Linn contends that the conditions and methods of the insurgents were different throughout the Islands, forcing district commanders to develop their own methods, but concentrates his study on US Army counterinsurgency methods on four military districts on the Island of Luzon. Yet, the Army encountered resistance throughout the Philippine Islands and a better case could be built if districts were not chosen only from the Island of Luzon.

Linn states that each district commander adopted policies and actions to their own district, regardless of commands from higher headquarters. In comparing the methods used in each of the districts, four elements stand out which are common to all. First, each commander relied on constant scouting and sweeps in their areas to keep guerrilla forces on the move. The object of these operations was to wear down the guerrilla’s will to resist and to destroy their food supplies. Second, the Army developed extensive local contacts to aid in the gathering of intelligence on guerrilla locations and movements. Third, they used local forces to aid in the pacification efforts. These forces were to provide intelligence on enemy movements and to guard the towns and villages, allowing the Army to place more troops in the field looking for guerrillas. Finally, they used civil policies to win over the insular elite to aid in the pacification operations. Only in the second district under the command of Brig. Gen. J.F. Bell was a policy used that was different. Bell concentrated the people into easily defended areas to separate them from the guerrillas.

Finally, the book’s concentration is on the military actions of the district commanders and has little to say about civil policies. Yet, officers working in the field placed great stress on the use of education and self-government to win the support of the Filipino people.

Apart from these questions, Linn’s book should not be missed by anyone who is interested in how to combat a determined and well-led insurgency.

Brian Aldridge
University of New Brunswick


Peasant studies have matured since the 1960s when “class” served as a revolutionary icon and symbol of solidarity with the Third World. Students of traditional societies undergoing change have moved from the concept of the peasant as victim, whose only response to changes in his “moral economy” was the jacquerie, to the idea of the peasant as intelligent decision-maker, working
within an admittedly narrow range of options to preserve or improve his way of life. Noting that proportionately few peasants rebel, recent studies have concentrated on tactics of resistance. A related question has been whether relationships in the traditional village were cooperative and provided a safety net against disaster, or whether they were rife with Hobbesian or Marxian conflict. In the 1970s, a number of studies of Southeast Asia, where the peasantry is concentrated in wet rice culture requiring a high degree of social cooperation, came to similar conclusions about peasant resistance to change; petty resistance (what James Scott calls "Schweikian" tactics) was found to be more the norm than outright rebellion. This similarity did not stop Scott and Samuel Popkin from interpreting the same behaviour in opposite ways. Scott found Vietnamese peasants risk-averse and cooperative from the necessity of producing a basic subsistence level, while Popkin found them focused on individual self-interest and innovative so as to produce an increasing subsistence level.

Erick Langer's study of southern Bolivia provides a sophisticated and well-researched corrective to this concentration on wet rice culture. He tells a complex story of economic change in Chuquisaca Department, which is divided into four provinces with diverse ecological zones, different land tenure systems, different mixes of Indian, mestizo and Spanish population, and a varied collection of peasant responses. The whole region was dependent on the Potosi silver mines. Mine owners and merchants lived in Sucre (La Plata), the national and departmental capital, and all the regional commercial circuits depended on exports to the mines. In the 1890s the silver market collapsed, and Sucre lost both its economic base and its political influence. La Paz seized the national capital, and the Sucre elite were forced to exploit their haciendas to maintain their way of life. The four provinces made four different adjustments to the new situation, but the region suffered a decline from which it has yet to recover.

Since pre-colonial days, the Andean Indians had lived in a reciprocal world where they provided labor in exchange for goods dispensed by the elite. The conquest, and later, independence, merely replaced the elite; the reciprocity — the understood social contract — continued. The fin de siecle financial crisis changed all that, and labor conditions, and the social contract, deteriorated as a result. From the 1860s the Liberal Party, using tactics similar to the Dawes Severalty Act in the US, had attempted to turn the Indians into yeomen by assigning plots of land to individual families, making the land alienable, and changing the traditional Indian head tax to a property tax. After the silver bust, Sucre elites bought Indian land, increased their hacienda production, and attempted either to do away with traditional labor obligations in favor of money rent or to organize their holdings into modern agro-businesses. Peasant resistance varied, depending on the local economy, the state of Indian organization, and local land tenure practices.

In the northwest, Yamparaez Province, which included Sucre, was a heavily populated area of diverse geography, which ranged from high mountains to sub-tropical valleys, where the Indian communities competed with the haciendas for labor and land. Farmers produced tropical fruits, sugar cane, corn, as well as high altitude crops like potatoes, wheat and barley. Indians held land
in the various ecological zones to minimize disaster from local crop failures. Although Indians resisted the attempt to divide up communal holdings by failing to appear before the governmental commissions and by suits in the local courts, they failed to prevent the law’s application. The result was increasing debt and the loss of their land to the Sucre elite, who took them on as tenants. After the collapse of the silver market, haciendados increased the labor obligations of their tenants, and demanded rents in cash rather than kind and decreased their customary gifts of fiestas and clothing. These changes in customary obligations and reciprocity eventually undermined the entire social contract. Resistance began with organization and protest, but in 1927 widespread rebellion broke out as the Indians forged alliances with town mestizo merchants and tried to regain their lost lands. The rebellion was crushed, but the Great Depression and the Chaco War (1932-1935) led haciendados to return to traditional gestures of reciprocity. The revolt ended further loss of Indian lands, but the income of the haciendados stagnated. It still does.

Cinti Province, in the southwest, produced wine, cattle, and grain for the Potosi market. With a similar ecological diversity, Cinti nevertheless had many smallholders, but the haciendas incorporated the best land, including the vineyards and irrigated lands. Cinti Indians also held plots in different ecological zones, but they did not fall into debt and so kept much of their land. Traditional land tenure existed in the uplands and the cane plantations, but wage labor was the case in the vineyards. After the silver collapse, landowners attempted to rationalize production by squeezing tenants and ignoring reciprocal obligations. Peasants responded by striking, by absenteeism and refusal to cooperate. One owner was murdered. An agro-corporation attempted to end the traditional fiesta, defining it as simply an excuse for workers to get drunk. This caused a riot, and the peasants had their own fiesta. Rationalization failed, and customary client-patron relations returned when workers began emigrating to Argentina.

In Tomina Province, in the northeast, many mestizo smallholders produced for the Potosi market. Cloth manufacture and commerce in the small towns added to the region’s prosperity. Little money circulated, but barter and commercial credit induced reciprocal cooperation in place of the hacienda patron-client traditions. With the silver crash, the merchants failed, and the institutions holding the area together collapsed. The province descended into a long period of unrest and banditry. What may have been a nascent social movement degenerated with the onset of the Great Depression, and deserters from the Chaco War joined the bandits in “mere criminal activity.”

To the southeast, frontier Azero Province was distinctive, since the conquest of the Chiriguano Indians took 300 years. Military conquests and missionaries failed to subdue the stubborn tribe. Finally the government let settlers invade the area, and after 1890 the rapid encroachment of stockgrowers onto the Chaco either killed the Indians or reduced them to debt peonage. They fled in large numbers across the border into Argentina. Bolivians regarded them as traitors in the Chaco War, and the combination of settlement and the war completed the destruction of the Chiriguano culture.
Researched in many public and private archives, Langer’s study is a balanced and incisive account of the decay of the Chuquisacan economy after 1895 and the adjustment of elites and peasants to the massive changes. Langer concludes that the success of peasant resistance depends on the strength of community institutions and the relative importance of the peasantry in the rural economy. Yamparaeza and Cinti peasants were able to force the reestablishment of patron-client relations along traditional Andean lines. In Tomina, without the safety net of the hacienda, and Azero, where the recently reduced Indians were in debt peonage, community organizations were weak, and the peasants were unable to organize to resist change. Banditry and the collapse of traditional Indian culture were the results.

Langer’s most valuable conclusion is that the emphasis on peasant rebellion and revolution has masked rather than illuminated other significant forms of rural resistance. Resistance, he says, is a type of adaptation which can lead to mutual accommodation. Neither elites nor foreign capitalists alone determined the nature and speed of change in the southern Bolivian countryside. The peasants were important players too.

Marilynn M. Larew
University of Maryland at College Park.

Endnotes