

British referred to this as the “Turkish” solution but, whatever the critics may say, it was never pursued consciously and systematically in India or anywhere else. The object was to maintain order not to undermine it. This left the option of using maximum force and, as Charters points out, this was what Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was effectively asking for. But, even if the men and money had been available, subsequent experience in Algeria and Vietnam suggests that such a strategy could not have worked. For a time guerrilla bands might, in theory, have been broken down by the sort of torture applied by the French in Algeria and by the Argentine armed forces during the “dirty war.” But such a strategy would have undermined British democracy and was just as inconceivable as the idea of inciting the Arabs and Jews against each other.

The only solution, as the government rightly saw by 1947, was to withdraw and leave the Arabs and Jews to settle their own future. Charters suggests that the British were more successful in dealing with guerrillas in later campaigns in Malaya, Oman and so on. However, they succeeded only in rural wars and only when the guerrillas had the backing of a very small section of the population. Military analysts too often run the risk of suggesting that better military techniques might alter the outcome of an insurgency. So they might if it were very finely balanced but no technique, however good, can change the situation if the government lacks support. What British politicians and officers should have learnt from Palestine is that, if the population cannot be weaned away from the insurgents, then a retreat has to be organized with whatever dignity is possible.

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Linn, Brian McAllister. *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

Though there are many works on United States involvement in the Philippine Islands between 1898 and 1902, there are few which look at the United States Army’s counterinsurgency methods. Brian Linn’s book *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* fills this gap by examining the Army’s operations to pacify the Islands. Linn’s book is an informative and well-written work on how the US Army reacted to fighting an insurrection led by determined nationalists. His main thesis is that the different types of terrain and the different personalities of the nationalists forced US Army officers to adopt different policies and methods in their military districts in the Philippines. The book describes the conditions the Army encountered in four separate military districts on the Island of Luzon. Linn gives a thorough and detailed analysis of each district and the different forms of resistance used by the Filipino nationalists. Linn contends that these methods were used by officers in

the field regardless of orders coming from Manila. Linn's analysis provides a wealth of new information on both the US Army's role in the conquest of the Philippines, as well as the nature of the Philippine Insurrection itself. Linn can also be credited with a clear writing style, which makes the book a joy to read. Nevertheless there are problems in his methodology and interpretation of the documents.

Linn contends that the conditions and methods of the insurgents were different throughout the Islands, forcing district commanders to develop their own methods, but concentrates his study on US Army counterinsurgency methods on four military districts on the Island of Luzon. Yet, the Army encountered resistance throughout the Philippine Islands and a better case could be built if districts were not chosen only from the Island of Luzon.

Linn states that each district commander adopted policies and actions to their own district, regardless of commands from higher headquarters. In comparing the methods used in each of the districts, four elements stand out which are common to all. First, each commander relied on constant scouting and sweeps in their areas to keep guerrilla forces on the move. The object of these operations was to wear down the guerrilla's will to resist and to destroy their food supplies. Second, the Army developed extensive local contacts to aid in the gathering of intelligence on guerrilla locations and movements. Third, they used local forces to aid in the pacification efforts. These forces were to provide intelligence on enemy movements and to guard the towns and villages, allowing the Army to place more troops in the field looking for guerrillas. Finally, they used civil policies to win over the insular elite to aid in the pacification operations. Only in the second district under the command of Brig. Gen. J.F. Bell was a policy used that was different. Bell concentrated the people into easily defended areas to separate them from the guerrillas.

Finally, the book's concentration is on the military actions of the district commanders and has little to say about civil policies. Yet, officers working in the field placed great stress on the use of education and self-government to win the support of the Filipino people.

Apart from these questions, Linn's book should not be missed by anyone who is interested in how to combat a determined and well-led insurgency.

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Langer, Erick D. *Economic Change and Rural Resistance in Southern Bolivia, 1880-1930*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989.

Peasant studies have matured since the 1960s when "class" served as a revolutionary icon and symbol of solidarity with the Third World. Students of traditional societies undergoing change have moved from the concept of the peasant as victim, whose only response to changes in his "moral economy" was the *jacquerie*, to the idea of the peasant as intelligent decision-maker, working