sandwiched in at various places, are not really very helpful. Only someone with
a good knowledge of the subject would sift through the half-truths and self-
serving distortions by many of the interviewees to make some sense of the
situation in El Salvador. To the specialist, however, the book is indeed
enlightening in providing useful insights into the minds of US military and state
department officials, and of the Salvadorean military as well. Colonel Carlos
Reynaldo Lopez-Nuila is especially interesting when he comes up with notions
such as that the Frente Popular de Liberacion, a leading rebel force, “was or-
ganized and set up by the Jesuits.” (79). The authors themselves have some
equally odd ideas, as when they assert that the rebels at the height of the
insurgency had “poor support” from the people and were sustained only by
“extremely high levels of external support.” (246).

Yet the book does make some interesting points. It becomes quite clear
that the rebels came much closer to achieving a military victory in 1983 than
most observers realized, and that only massive US support turned the corner for
the government. It also shows that, to an extent, the United States military did
learn from Vietnam not to go out in the field and take over the war from the local
military, but to provide training and logistics instead.

The book ends on a triumphal note, confident that the war was being
won. The events of November, 1989 have cast doubts on that assumption.

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Breuer, William. Hitler's Undercover War. The Nazi Espionage Invasion of the

This popular account of Third Reich-sponsored intelligence operations
in the United States, 1935-1945, only partially fills a gap in contemporary
Intelligence Studies. Scholars and specialists will have to wait for a definitive
historical account of the significance of Nazi-inspired German espionage in the
US which can now be based on a vast collection of documents from German,
British, American and other national archives as well as memoirs and secondary
literature. Breuer’s book was evidently designed for a popular audience but it
has several virtues: it contains some important reference materials, including a
list of arrested, indicted spies in an Appendix (“Espionage Agents convicted in
the U.S., 1937-1945,” pp. 321-324) supplied to the author by the FBI, a
compendium of many of the more notable German spy stories of that era in the
US, and a handy bibliography.

First, the good news. The author has succeeded in telling the story of
most if not all the major Abwehr and S.D. operations during the pre-war and
World War II eras and many minor ones as well. In some respects, much of the
book, with considerable detail and with an eye to appealing to human interest,
reads like a narrative of material from the film script of a Grade B or C movie
from that bygone time. While his writing style is often economical and plain, at times he uses trite phrases. Some efforts to add a racy flavor fail and sacrifice necessarily sober historical judgements. One example is an introductory picture of a major character in the plot, the FBI Director: "John Edgar Hoover, a robust, iron-jawed supersleuth, had emerged in just a few years as a living hero of law enforcement." (p. 131) Still, sections of the many stories of strange spymasters and spies and their largely useless operations are a fairly good read. Breuer is effective in presenting biographical detail on the motley crew of agents and essential information on the counter-spies, the FBI, who rounded them up. Some of the better operatives did not follow the orders of their Third Reich masters, but instead turned themselves in which they arrived at an American Embassy or Consulate abroad or when they reached American shores. Some of these were used as double agents in a radio game. Hitler's one and only nuclear spy, in effect, Dutch-born Walter Koehler, a jeweller as well as an engineer, turned himself in in July 1942. Unlike more than a few of the German agents, Koehler had experience as a spy for the Kaiser in World War I, had lived in the US, and was well-educated. This agent, who never did produce nuclear secrets for Berlin, was an exception to the rule of a low level of competence, experience and knowledge.

Next, the not-so-good news. As for sources used, the appearance of a long list of secondary works, newspapers consulted, printed State Department documents and FBI records is deceiving. While Breuer has consulted the essential books on World War II intelligence studies such as Masterman, Kahn and others, he has not always used them carefully or critically. At the same time he has made uncritical, erroneous use of such flawed works as Farago's *The Game of the Foxes* and Cave Brown's *Bodyguard of Lies* and for his judgements on the FBI operations he has depended on dated, in-house apologias of the 1930s and 1960s and has not consulted the essential recent, critical works of Frank Donner (*The Age of Surveillance*, 1981), Richard Gid Powers (*Secrecy and Power*, 1987) and Sanford J. Ungar (*FBI*, 1976). The author's method of citing sources from the FBI documents he consulted makes it difficult to check their reliability. For example, in the notes we see citations of FBI press releases, with no source reference and, more importantly, in the "Miscellaneous Documents" in the Bibliography: "F.B.I. Interrogation reports, data on convictions for espionage (1937-1-45), and assorted documents relating to World War II Era espionage and sedition." Aside from this vaguely described FBI source, some standard diplomatic documents printed by the State Department and a few odds and ends, the author has not used the massive documentation available now from Japanese, German, American, British and other national government records in the National Archives in Washington.

Furthermore, the portrait of the United States' principal counter-intelligence service, the FBI, is too uncritical and hagiographical. To a considerable degree — and there was always a grain of truth to be found in the massive public relations effort of the Bureau which all too often in espionage invasions has been outnumbered and under-manned — this work's praise for its work is excessive and suggests an uncritical use of FBI-supplied documentation.
While the author’s flattering portrait of the Bureau is arguable, the erroneous analysis of the Third Reich and Hitler’s attitudes toward and espionage policy regarding the United States cannot be defended easily. In the essential historical background of the German intelligence operations, there are a number of weak analyses, misplaced emphasis and factual errors; most if not all of them could have been avoided if Breuer had carefully read David Kahn’s *Hitler’s Spies* (1978) and had consulted only one background policy and attitude history such as Gerhard Weinberg’s *World In The Balance. Behind the Scenes of World War II*, especially two chapters only, on Hitler’s image of the US and the German declaration of war on the US. Breuer provides his framework initially by quoting a Canaris statement of the 1930s that “The U.S. is the decisive factor” in a world war, but then he ignores the more essential facts that Hitler dismissed American economic and industrial strength, listened mainly to those who reinforced this presumption, and placed little or no faith in intelligence operations anywhere, much less in the United States.

Then there are factual errors. To point out just two of some importance and perhaps due to his dependence on the Cave Brown and Farago works cited above: these concern Abwehr chiefs Von Bredow and Canaris. Mistakenly, Breuer refers to “Colonel Fritz Bredlow” of the Abwehr (p. 31) who was murdered on the “Night of the Long Knives,” the author suggests, because of an “ethical” objection to aggressive espionage. In reality, this was Colonel (later General) Ferdinand von Bredow, briefly Abwehr chief (1929-32) who was murdered on that infamous night in 1934 but not for the reason stated. More important, the author repeats a now familiar Canaris legend when he states on page 309 that Admiral Canaris was “the motivating force in the Schwarze Kapelle [Black Orchestra] whose goal was the elimination of the fuehrer.” There is little hard evidence to support such a central role for the cautious, enigmatic Canaris in a conspiracy whose precise history remains mysterious.

Finally, while the author has provided some true spy stories and done so in an appealing manner, the reader often loses the forest for the trees. Some broad generalizations lack substance. The extent of Abwehr operations, for example, is exaggerated. What evidence is there to support Breuer’s sensational claim that “Canaris had spun a tangled web of global intrigue, surpassing by far anything of its kind history had known.” (p. 117)? Has the author taken into account Nazi party and SD operations as well? If any work on pre-1946 spying and sabotage requires a cogent conclusion or summary chapter, it is this one. But there is no such chapter here. The chronological narrative simply stops in the Spring of 1945 and the discerning reader will have to provide his/her own concluding queries to bring order to the colorful chaos: what patterns emerge? what difference did it make? what does it all mean? There is plot ore here for shrewd film writers to mine, but students of World War II espionage studies will demand more of this material; a timely, succinct analysis with perspective is still required.

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