

Summer 1990

Salvadorans to conduct effective counter-insurgency operations once the war reverted to an insurgency phase in the mid-1980s.

The authors conclude by relating the general to the specific; they argue that the general American failure to prepare for and understand small wars accounts for the specific failure of the United States to do a better job of training and preparing the El Salvadorean military for counter-insurgency operations.

In sum, this monograph is not only the work of insightful and thoughtful US military officers; it is also a work of courage. No governmental or military establishment likes to be criticized, and the US military is no exception to the rule. The officers who wrote this monograph did their careers no good by writing it. However, if anything is to be done about America's current woeful lack of preparation for small wars then some officers are going to have to speak out. To put the matter in a theological context: The old Christian hymn "Once to Every Man and Nation" contains the line: "Truth forever on the scaffold; wrong forever on the throne." If the US military establishment is to get the truths with respect to small wars "off the scaffold" then more officers are going to have to start speaking out as these officers did.

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Manwaring, Max, and Court Prisk. *El Salvador at War: An Oral History*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988.

This unabashedly partisan work is largely composed of interviews with United States military and diplomatic personnel and Salvadorean army officers. Some parts, however, have been previously published in such sources as *Current History* and *Foreign Policy*. A sprinkling of commentaries are by such opposition figures as Guillermo Manuel Ungo and the rebel commanders. It deals with the civil war in El Salvador from its inception in 1980 through 1986, under twenty-four chapter headings with such titles as: "The Converging Major Insurgent Actions," and "U.S. Support for El Salvador." There is a running commentary by the authors.

The tone of the book is set even in the dedication: "To those who read *Das Kapital* and raised the sound of warning. To those who read *Mein Kampf* and called a democratic world to arms . . ." And former US ambassador to El Salvador Edwin C. Corr assures us in the preface: "After you have read the ideas and thoughts of all the principals of all persuasions in this dynamic history I am confident you will concur that the United States is doing the job right in El Salvador." (xii). If this were the only book one read on El Salvador it would be small wonder that he would be right, as every conversation and narrative has been tailored to that purpose.

This book does not appear aimed at the general reader. There are many obscure references that are never explained and the authors' commentaries,

sandwiched in at various places, are not really very helpful. Only someone with a good knowledge of the subject would sift through the half-truths and self-serving distortions by many of the interviewees to make some sense of the situation in El Salvador. To the specialist, however, the book is indeed enlightening in providing useful insights into the minds of US military and state department officials, and of the Salvadorean military as well. Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez-Nuila is especially interesting when he comes up with notions such as that the *Frente Popular de Liberacion*, a leading rebel force, "was organized and set up by the Jesuits." (79). The authors themselves have some equally odd ideas, as when they assert that the rebels at the height of the insurgency had "poor support" from the people and were sustained only by "extremely high levels of external support." (246).

Yet the book does make some interesting points. It becomes quite clear that the rebels came much closer to achieving a military victory in 1983 than most observers realized, and that only massive US support turned the corner for the government. It also shows that, to an extent, the United States military did learn from Vietnam not to go out in the field and take over the war from the local military, but to provide training and logistics instead.

The book ends on a triumphal note, confident that the war was being won. The events of November, 1989 have cast doubts on that assumption.

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Breuer, William. *Hitler's Undercover War. The Nazi Espionage Invasion of the U.S.A.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

This popular account of Third Reich-sponsored intelligence operations in the United States, 1935-1945, only partially fills a gap in contemporary Intelligence Studies. Scholars and specialists will have to wait for a definitive historical account of the significance of Nazi-inspired German espionage in the US which can now be based on a vast collection of documents from German, British, American and other national archives as well as memoirs and secondary literature. Breuer's book was evidently designed for a popular audience but it has several virtues: it contains some important reference materials, including a list of arrested, indicted spies in an Appendix ("Espionage Agents convicted in the U.S., 1937-1945," pp. 321-324) supplied to the author by the FBI, a compendium of many of the more notable German spy stories of that era in the US, and a handy bibliography.

First, the good news. The author has succeeded in telling the story of most if not all the major Abwehr and S.D. operations during the pre-war and World War II eras and many minor ones as well. In some respects, much of the book, with considerable detail and with an eye to appealing to human interest, reads like a narrative of material from the film script of a Grade B or C movie