Clashing Soviet and American interests in the Third World have brought the world to severe crisis — if not global conflict — on more than one occasion. Cuba (1962), the Middle East (1967-1973) and growing Soviet boldness in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan have added a dangerous dimension to superpower rivalry, more perilous than the often routinized, predictable confrontation in Europe.

The east-west dimension of Third World studies presents serious methodological problems for the researcher and analyst. One must not only master the area in question but also U.S. and Soviet policy in the region in order to trace the extent to which the actions of one side are a reaction to moves, real or imagined, of the other. An excessively regional perspective tends to treat superpower involvement as irrelevant if not annoying, a distraction from the “real” problems of the area and exaggerated in importance. “Globalists” tend to ignore regional perspectives and focus on reputed “grand designs,” as Rubinstein argues Kennedy did in responding to Khrushchev in southeast Asia. After all, don’t regional actors use the superpowers, “the big influence of small allies?” How often are superpower intentions translated into effective influence in these areas?

Both volumes combine these perspectives in a judicious manner in describing Soviet Third World policy. Kolodziej and Kanet do a thorough job of integrating their many regional studies to stress the limits of superpower influence as well as making their own contributions. Kolodziej, for example, notes that the Soviet military role compensates for weaknesses at the economic and cultural levels. He also notes that both Washington and Moscow are often “prisoners at the initiative of local rivals” (p. 28) who, in some cases, are increasingly able to manufacture their own arms and are becoming more resistant to effective influence or control. Regional “facts of life” betray both superpowers. Duncan, for example, cites Cuba and Nicaragua’s anger with Chernenko when he declined to deploy a Soviet flotilla in the region as a show of solidarity after the U.S. mined Managua’s harbors. Simon argues that the Soviet air-naval facility at Cam Ranh establishes a strategic “presence” in southeast Asia but alienates ASEAN states that Moscow would like to court for commercial reasons. Weinbaum, in a particularly cogent study on Afghanistan, notes that whatever strategic advantage the Soviets gained in the Persian Gulf area they were responding to local events over which they had little effective control from the very beginning of their enhanced involvement in the late 1970s. In his concluding chapter Kolodziej contends that Moscow is learning from such mistakes and will practice a “Thermidor” or contraction of Third World involvements with
a more careful weighing of costs, risks and benefits than in the past. There will be more “articulated rules” for dealing with regional conflicts and “zones of non-coercive competition” are expected to grow. (p. 441) But he agrees with Rubinstein that the Soviet Union does best in a “militarized” Cold War and will inevitably be at a disadvantage when it tries to compete with the West on the battleground of socioeconomic development and human rights. (p. 443)

Rubinstein’s study is more deductive, with certain maxims or tenets of Soviet behavior illustrated by case studies. He concludes that Moscow has been “pragmatic and adaptive, forceful and forthcoming or equivocating and niggardly as circumstances dictate; purposeful and sensitive to the limits of what is feasible.” (p. 289) It is “intrusive, not expansionist” — seeking to weaken American power and prestige, not to absorb new territory. (p. 290) Soviet arms and encouragement of ferment have added fuel to already blazing local and regional conflicts; peaceful solutions remove the need for Soviet assistance. The Soviet Leninist model for seizing and holding power is attractive to Third World elites and Moscow likes to divert and discomfit the U.S. in areas far removed from Soviet power — to “leapfrog” over U.S. encirclement, as Khrushchev did in the Middle East.

But how can this be accomplished without the Soviets clashing militarily with Washington, or adding to the economic burden represented by an enhanced arms competition resulting in part from Soviet actions and American responses? Moscow must answer to many audiences, including domestic critics in a time of straitened resources at home. But in the past, when the Soviets had to choose between commitment to a regional client and cooperation or accommodation with Washington, they chose the former. “Is not a bird in the hand worth more to the Kremlin than two in the bush?” (p. 250) Rubinstein leaves open the possibility that withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and policies in line with “new thinking” might change Soviet “termite” behavior in the Third World, opportunistic boring from within and without.

The domestic context of Soviet Third World behavior is crucial but difficult to establish with any degree of precision, as continued high levels of military aid to Afghanistan, new shipments of advanced weapons to North Korea and Cuba and even the at least indirect Soviet role in the latest guerrilla offensive in El Salvador attest. But the propriety of the extent and consequences of this assistance has been questioned in the increasingly vigorous Soviet press. Kolodziej also raises the issue of condominium or duopoly-like behavior between the United States and Soviet Union when cooperating against common and growing perils: nuclear proliferation and conventional and chemical weapons enhancements in the Third World. Rubinstein mentions the possibility of a “deal” between the superpowers in the event of a joint intervention in an unstable Iran, although this is less likely now than it was in the early 1980s.

Finally, there is the Leninist model itself; will internal changes or modifications be reflected in Soviet advice and assistance to Third World
clients who have been acquired so laboriously over the years with great expenditure of blood and treasure? The two volumes under review provide rich data and valuable insights for policy makers and specialists in and out of government seeking to derive lessons from the past and guidelines for the future in Soviet behavior on such matters.

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No less an authority than Richard Clutterbuck has written the Foreword to this thorough review of the terrorist threat to diplomacy and diplomats. In his words, the book “provides the clearest and most comprehensive analysis of the subject I have seen . . . [it] badly needed writing . . . [and] should become a classic . . .” This is not the stuff of hyperbole, for as the reader will find, Andrew Selth’s work is deserving of introduction by the eminent Dr. Clutterbuck and lives up to the praise bestowed upon it.

Certainly the book is a must for both study and reference purposes. Students of history, international relations, and political violence will find it a valuable means of tracing the historical development and relationships of diplomacy and terrorism. Richly supported by examples of terrorist incidents, *Against Every Human Law* is a boon for analysts and researchers in need of a ready reference source. Selth has produced a book which should be on the shelf of every library that boasts reference sections devoted to the Social Sciences. Government, police, and military libraries would also be well-advised to afford it room on their shelves.

Selth has neatly organized the book into two discrete yet complimentary parts. The first section approaches the terrorist threat to diplomacy in the general sense, beginning with its historical background. It then illustrates clearly how diplomats and diplomatic facilities have come to serve as terrorist targets, and spends some time on the problems of state-sponsored terrorism and diplomacy. Following discussion of counter-terrorism measures related to internationally protected persons, which features broad strategic measures and tactical methods of response, the section concludes with an analysis of the continuing threat to diplomacy. Selth warns of the dangers of overreaction and of the need to ensure “that in responding to the threat of international terrorism, states do not hand to the terrorists and their sponsors a victory of their own making.”

In the second section the book focuses on terrorism and the Australian perspective. This section contains a fascinating insight to the evolution of