

Organization, Leadership and Revolution: Religiously-Oriented Opposition in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979

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INTRODUCTION

In February 1979 a popular revolution in Iran, widely supported by both secular and traditional forces, succeeded in overthrowing a monarchy and a system of government dedicated to modernization and Westernization by any means and at any cost.¹ Although many secular forces were involved in the opposition to the regime from the beginning, gradually the system's ruthless policies against public expression eliminated the development of any legitimate outlet for grievances and discouraged any active public participation in the formation of policies, thereby silencing many of its opponents. The only resistance the government failed to eradicate came from tradition-oriented and religious groups, and the mosque. Thus, gradually the leadership of the opposition was garnered by the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was still abroad, through his widespread organizational networks operating in thousands of small and large community mosques throughout Iran. Khomeini became the unifying element in the wide spectrum of the opposition to the system.

If experts on Iranian society were surprised by the sudden resurgence of religious sentiments, the domination of the revolution by the religious forces, and the final result — the Islamic Republic of Iran — the religious community was not. Religious leaders claim that the seeds of the revolution of 1978-1979 were sown in the June 1963 uprising. If they are right, one could make the analogy that, as the Tobacco revolt of 1891-1892 was a prelude to the Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911, the June 1963 uprising could well be considered the prelude to the revolution of 1978-1979.

This essay attempts to show that what was really missing from the 1963 uprising in Iran was a nationwide organization that could take advantage of thousands of independent community mosques and neighborhood Religious Gatherings (*hay'at ha-yeh mazhabi*) to mobilize the opposition and unite the diverse and often conciliatory leadership. Khomeini created such an organization after 1963. Khomeini's charisma and his nationwide organization succeeded not only in bringing down a regime assumed to be invincible, but also in installing an Islamic Republic strong enough to pass the test of time — its first decade.

THE 1963 UPRISING

On 22 March 1963, the Faiziyyeh Madrasa (seminary) and Mosque in Qum, the stronghold of the religious opposition, was attacked by the security forces. Many students were killed and the school was almost destroyed.² On 2 June 1963, the day of Ashura,³ Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a sermon at

Faiziyyeh, warning the Shah of the people's anger at his relationship with Israel and his "treacherous" acts committed in Faiziyyeh. On the same day Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, a controversial preacher, delivered another sermon in the Mosque of Sayyid Aziz Allah in Tehran, for the first time attacking the government directly and, in the tradition of early Islam, withdrawing public allegiance from the government by impeaching it in the mosque.⁴

Listening carefully to Falsafi's sermon, one realizes its political and ideological content. What he preached on that special day as a religious sermon was indeed an ideological speech, and in Alvin Gouldner's words: "a paradigm of a rhetoric that could mobilize men to deeds."⁵ Three days later the resistance spoken of in Falsafi's sermon materialized, brought on by Khomeini's arrest.

At 3:00 AM on 5 June 1963, Khomeini was arrested in Qum and taken to Tehran. Iran's major cities went through two days of bloody riots which claimed hundreds of lives. Thousands of angry demonstrators took to the streets in Tehran and in a selective fashion set fire to cinemas, banks, and government buildings; they even destroyed the traffic lights and telephone booths, which evidently they considered to be signs of modernization and Westernization. Many demonstrators wore white shrouds over their regular clothes symbolizing their readiness to die, and they died by the hundreds when government troops opened fire on them. Mourning ceremonies took place for these victims (martyrs), as well as 40th day commemorations as is the tradition in Shi'ite Islam. But this incident, though very dramatic, failed to precipitate a revolution in Iran. The revolution had to wait another fifteen years to develop and mature.

The major reason for the failure of the June uprising was the spontaneous nature of the rioting. In 1963 the religious institutions, though in operation, did not have a defined goal nor unified leadership. The 1963 uprising after Khomeini's arrest was a collective but unorganized and spontaneous action carried out by religiously-oriented shopkeepers and bazaaris, students and slum dwellers.

On 4 June 1986, during the annual ceremony commemorating the June 1963 uprising, Hojat al Islam Khamene'i, then President of the Republic, spoke of the significance of the 1963 event to the 1978-1979 revolution:

The June uprising was very important to our movement. That event determined the direction of the revolution, from a nationalistic or class struggle to a 100% religious revolution. The June uprising was not organized and Tehran was not prepared for the riot. The only factor that motivated people to pour into the streets was religious sympathy. The 1963 suppression of the uprising was not a failure of the revolution, but a realization of the shortcomings: a need for an organization and to educate the public. A movement needs organization, ideology and qualified leaders to take advantage of each suppressed

uprising and use it to develop the movement, otherwise movements will die as soon as they start.⁶

The government's brutal and uncompromising response to the 1963 uprising did stop the movement from becoming a revolution, but its policy to curb the 1978 revolution failed. What happened during these fifteen years that made a successful revolution out of a failed uprising?

ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP

The spontaneous uprising of 1963 was ruthlessly crushed by the Shah's security forces, and Khomeini was subsequently exiled. With Khomeini in exile and the remainder of the high clergy silent, the government assumed that the problem had ended. The government embarked on grandiose projects funded by mounting oil revenues which by 1964 reached \$555 million and continued to climb to approximately \$20 billion by 1975-1976.⁷ Although the Shah's land reform provided many peasants with title to their land, large landlords managed to find loopholes and retained their holdings. Some even exchanged their less fertile lands for shares in government-owned industrial plants, thus diversifying their assets and making more money. Millions of rural wage earners, whom land reform had bypassed, and former nomads whose migratory routes had been closed off, left rural areas, heading for major cities where higher wages, paved streets and high-rise buildings seemed attractive. Most of these immigrants found the capital city of Tehran, where most of the oil money was spent, a more desirable place to be. Tehran's population grew from 1,512,000 in 1956 to 2,720,000 in 1966 to reach just under 4,000,000 on the eve of the revolution.⁸

Those who remained in the villages and tilled their newly acquired lands did well initially, but the government's ill-advised policies soon put them out of business. To satisfy ever-increasing demands by the affluent urban population for more and better quality food, the government embarked on a massive importation of food from the USA and Europe and reduced its high price by subsidizing it. Thus, American rice sold for less than local rice at the market. The same was true for other agricultural products. Therefore, many farmers were forced out of business and eventually joined the swelling migration to the cities. Moreover, the introduction of capital-intensive technology to agriculture, and the formation of many large agro-business enterprises, both by Iranians and foreigners, reduced the need for farmworkers. This created a higher unemployment rate in rural areas and pushed many off the land to the already overpopulated cities, thus exacerbating the glut in the labor market.⁹

In addition to this unprecedented and unplanned urbanization, rapid economic development doubled the size of the salaried middle class and produced a fivefold increase in the working class. Massive oil revenues raised the GNP per capita fivefold from \$200 in the early 1960s to more than \$1,000 in the mid-1970s and inflated expectations for a better future by those benefiting from the economic growth. As the country's income increased the

disparity between the rich and the poor also increased. The import of sophisticated Western technology required the presence of thousands of foreign technicians who earned incredible salaries, filled night clubs, bars and discotheques, and demanded more Western culture and Western products. Despite all of this economic growth, the population was left to starve for political and intellectual development. The state monopoly over politics and the heavy hand of the notorious secret police SAVAK ensured that absolute conformity by Iranian citizens was maintained. The Shah and his family ran Iran as they managed their own households, with no form of accountability.¹⁰ The growing number of those who were unhappy with the regime — finding no legitimate outlet for their dissent — gradually turned to underground organizations.

On 8 February 1971, an armed attack by a small group of young leftists upon a gendarmerie post on the edge of the Caspian forests shattered the opposition's fearful silence.¹¹ This incident gave notice that secular opposition forces were joining the struggle. The opposition saw this struggle as a fight against dictatorship, corruption, exploitation, unequal distribution of reward and punishment, and domination of the economy, polity and culture by foreign powers. By the mid-1970s rising inflation had eroded the spending power of the middle class, and the government's unwarranted attack on the bazaar and merchants in the name of "anti-profiteering" turned both the secular and the traditional middle class against the regime. By 1976 U.S. President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy had drawn attention to the excesses of the Shah's regime and encouraged many secular, middle class politicians and lawyers to form organizations and join the opposition.¹² But the secular opposition was divided, small, lacked credible leadership, and had no grassroots organizations to carry out a nationwide movement. The time was ripe for the religiously-oriented opposition to take the lead in the revolution.

THE RELIGIOUSLY-ORIENTED OPPOSITION

After 1963, and especially during the 1970s, Khomeini gradually emerged as the dominant force representing all independent opposition groups — excluding the Iranian Left — advocating a radical and uncompromising program of action — "the Shah must go."¹³ A massive organizational structure already existed in Iran that included about 80,000 community mosques and 200,000 mullah's — religious functionaries who enjoyed economic and cultural independence from the government. In addition to the regular mullah's, thousands of volunteer organizers of processions and religious occasions were in direct contact with the population in different communities. By 1974 there were 12,300 religious associations and nearly 5,000 organizations in Tehran alone.¹⁴ The neighborhood organizations were often centered in the community mosques and were independent of each other and from the state. Every community mosque has always been an independent social and political institution, financed and administered by the community. In the 1970s Khomeini's organization

managed to pool all of these resources, centralize their activities, unite them behind Khomeini and for the first time give them direction.

During the revolution all of these diverse and widely scattered organizations came under an umbrella organization called the Coalition Councils (*hayat-ha-ye mo'ta-lefe*) which was responsible for coordinating the activities of the religiously-led opposition in Iran. These included distributing leaflets and pamphlets; planning demonstrations; communicating with Khomeini in Iraq; and collecting money from merchants and shopkeepers to finance the movement. The Coalition Council was also responsible for the reproduction and distribution of Khomeini's tapes and written materials, which were smuggled into the country by thousands of pilgrims visiting the shrine city of Najaf (Khomeini's city of exile in Iraq) every year.¹⁵

Some high *Ulama* living under the Shah's brutal system in Iran were hesitant to show their opposition, and were encouraged (threatened or co-opted) to compromise with the Shah. However, Khomeini's firm stand and the support he was receiving from the lower rank clerics and religiously-oriented underground organizations forced them all to follow his direction.

The program presented by Khomeini was the most radical at the time and proved to be the only one able to unite all of the opposition forces and neutralize the Left in Iran, who could neither challenge nor offer a better program.

ORGANIZING THE DISCONTENT

As a demonstration it was unique in the experience of modern Iran. At least a hundred thousand Iranians participated in the march —well organized and marshalled in their parade with almost military efficiency. The marshals themselves were young men, often moving on Honda motorcycles ahead of the route of march, organizing traffic, blocking cross streets, and preparing the right of ways. There were Walkie-Talkie radios, first aid groups, water and refreshment units, as well as cheerleaders. Groups in the march were drawn largely from the congregations of various mosques. All in all, it was an awesome display of political power on behalf of the Islamic opposition.¹⁶

At least four important factors contributed to the mobilization of the discontented during the development and process of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. These factors include: the historical affinity and alliance between the community mosque and the institution of the bazaar; the community mosque as a center of mobilization; the ideology of resistance to unjust authority which contains within it the Karbala paradigm and glorification of martyrdom;¹⁷ and the organization of the discontent. The rest of this essay will concentrate on this last point.

The importance of pre-existing organizational networks is stressed in almost all of the theories on social movements (excluding the mass society approach), especially those associated with the resource mobilization approach.¹⁸ This important factor, critical to understanding the process behind the mobilization of the revolution and especially its outcome, is missing from most of the books and articles written on the Iranian revolution. One major problem in describing the pre-existing organizational network in Iran is the lack of reliable information, which was due to the underground nature of the movement. What this essay presents here on the religious organizations is what is written by religiously-oriented scholars and the participants themselves (almost all in Farsi).

The Underdevelopment of Secular Political Organizations in Iran

The dictatorial and absolutist nature of the state in Iran prevented the formation and development of secular organizations as well as mass participation in politics and nation-building. The better-organized secular parties or organizations, such as the Tudeh party or the National Front, originated either when the state was weak and impotent, or during a short-lived, relatively democratic phase enjoyed just prior to and during the Mossadeq period (1950-1953). The Tudeh party emerged after the Second World War and the abdication of Reza Shah, and grew during the years the young king took to establish his grip on the throne.¹⁹ After the 1953 coup and the growing power of the state, the government outlawed the Tudeh party and all other political organizations. Many prominent Tudeh members were executed, some left the country, others joined the government, and the rest went underground. The effect of the government's repression was to lead the opposition to form secret societies through communal, religious and family networks, where public opinion was formed and informal politics were played out. Among these underground organizations, only those with access to community networks survived and developed as conditions changed.

It was Lenin who repeatedly emphasized the importance of organization for a successful revolution: "Give me an organization of revolutionaries, and I will overturn Russia."²⁰ The Left and other modern status groups in Iran, however, lacked the organizational privileges enjoyed by the traditional forces. Those who did organize were victorious in the revolution and thus, ironically, it was neither the Left nor the modern groups but the traditional forces who succeeded.

The Development of Religiously-Oriented Political Organizations in Iran

Community-based resources as a source of viable political opposition organizations in Iran have historical roots as far back as the Constitutional revolution (1906-1911). During the Constitutional revolution at least five secret societies emerged that played a significant role in both supporting and safeguarding the revolution.

Nazim al-Islam Kermani, a founding member of the most important of these organizations, The Secret Society, has described their recruitment procedure. The founding members were longtime friends and associates who knew one another through mosque-related activities and recruited new members through this informal network. Both the religious leaders and the bazaar merchants had close ties and interaction with associates in other cities and towns. This recruitment model was used to mobilize sympathizers and organize mass strikes in Tehran, Qum, Tabriz and other cities to force the reluctant Shah to grant the constitution. This successful model for revolutionary organization set a precedent for future revolutionary mobilization.²¹

Islamic Coalition Councils (*Hayat-ha-ye Mo'ta-lefeh-ye Islami*) (HMI)

The importance of pre-existing community organizational networks in revolutionary situations has already been stressed by many scholars. William S. Allen attributed the success of the German Nazi party to hundreds of pre-existing clubs, religious organizations, patriotic societies, economic and occupational associations, societies for interest groups, and drinking circles.²² Crane Brinton stressed that the pre-existing organizational network of literary societies, and to a lesser degree, masonic lodges, was responsible for the Jacobin rise to power in the French Revolution. These literary societies included representatives of all branches of the middle class — merchants, lawyers, doctors and rentiers — and were not merely men of letters.²³

During the development and process of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, hundreds of open and underground organizations from both sides of the political spectrum existed. If one were to identify only one religious group that qualified as a genuine coalition organization, it would be the Islamic Coalition Councils or the *Hayat-ha-ye-Mo'ta-lefeh-ye Islami* (HMI).

The HMI was formed by Khomeini in March 1963 in Qum. The group's political activities increased after the unsuccessful 1963 uprising. It functioned as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of the religiously-oriented opposition groups, including those formed in the 1970s that advocated guerrilla warfare. The first flyer written by the organization was distributed in Tehran on 16 September 1963. The flyer condemned the "illegal" election and called for a one day mass strike as a sign of sympathy and cooperation with strikes in other cities and towns.²⁴ Another important action taken by the HMI occurred on 27 October 1964, when it issued a statement condemning the granting of "capitulation" rights to Americans in Iran. The HMI managed to organize 500 youths from the bazaar and Tehran University to distribute 40,000 flyers in Tehran.²⁵

The central core of the organization was composed of twelve people representing three major religious gatherings (*Hayat-hay-i Dini*) in Tehran: the Society of the Bazaar of Darvazeh (*Hayat-i Bazaar-i Darvazeh*), represented by Mahdi Araqi, Habiballah Shafeeq, Habiballah Asqarowladi, and Aboulfazi-i Tavakkoli-Bina; the Society of Shaykh-ali Mosque (*Hayat-i*

Masjid-i Shaykhali), represented by Sayyid Assadallah Lajwardi, Haj Sadeq Amani, Mohammad Sadeq Islami, and Abass Modaressi-Fard; and the Society of Isfahanis Residing in Tehran (*Hayat-i Isfahanian-i Moqim-i Tehran*), represented by Ezatallah Khalili, Mahdi Bahadouran, Sayyid Mohammad Mirfenderesky, and Ala-addin Mir Mohammad-Sadeqi. The Council, according to Khomeini's order, elected five members to work as a liaison between the group and Khomeini. The five members elected by the group were Ayatollah Mortaza Motahheri, Doctor Sayyid Mohammad Beheshti, Hojat al-Islam Moha'adin Anvari, Ali Golzadeh Gafouri, and Shaykh Ahmad Molla'ie. Doctor Mohammad Javad Bahonar was elected as the coordinating officer, and Shaykh Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani became the speaker for the Council. Rafsanjani was also given the responsibility of forging an alliance with the Mujahedeen organization. The deal went sour and the connection was discovered by SAVAK when a member of the *Mujahedeen Vaheed Afrakhteh* confessed under torture. Rafsanjani was arrested for the last time and locked up for three years in the notorious Evin prison, where he was repeatedly tortured. He was freed when revolutionaries stormed the prison on the eve of the revolution.²⁶

The original members of the HMI were schoolmates from a religious high school in Tehran (Al-Ahmad) who had formed an organization called Shi'ites Groups (*Grooheh-i Shiayan*) in 1952-1953. The Shi'ites Group's first involvement in national politics occurred during the nationalization of the oil industry from the British by Mossadeq in 1953. The organization had three branches or departments: leadership, cultural and finance.²⁷ They carried out recruitment through the pre-existing networks of the community mosques, religious gatherings, and Quran reading classes from all over Iran. These neighborhood, grassroots organizations were connected along ethnic, family and occupational lines, linking together in an expanded network of interpersonal relationships all of the communities involved in the struggle.²⁸

In December 1964, some members of the *Ulama* in Tabriz, including Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba-i and Hojat al-Islam Sayyid Ahmad Khosrowshahi, both members of the Council, were arrested. In response to this government action the bazaars of Tabriz and Tehran closed for four days.

After the assassination of Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansur in January 1965, the government discovered the Council and arrested some of its members. Early in 1966, Hojat al-Islam Hashemi-Rafsanjani formed the second HMI by regrouping the remaining members and recruiting new ones. Some of the members in prison kept the organization active. Among them were Raja'i, Bahonar and Jallal-ad din Farsi, who later occupied senior positions in the revolutionary government.²⁹ Once out of prison, they formed the Refah Foundation as a front for their political activities, and Raja'i became principal of a religious high school for girls — also called Refah in Tehran.³⁰ The organization developed new strategies as the revolution evolved further. They published a newsletter, *Vengeance (Enteqam)*. The HMI's activities expanded to other cities, especially Qum, Isfahan, Shiraz, Dezful, Qazvin, Shahi, Kashan, Yazd and Tabriz, through the active organization of the community mosques. In Qum, for example, the HMI's

activities were managed through the Society of Religious Teachers of Qum (*Jame'i Modaressin-i Hozeh-ye Elmieh-i Qum*) under the leadership of Ayatollah Qaddusi.³¹ During the month of fasting (*Ramazan*) of 1978, thirty Friday Imams, who gathered at the home of Hojatal-Islam Morvarid in Tehran, to coordinate the Friday sermons and the ceremonies of the coming holidays, were arrested by the SAVAK and released the next day.³²

By 1975, religious councils had been set up all over Iran and at most of the government institutions as Quran reading classes. The Quran reading classes were used as the front for the nationwide underground organization which was run through the community mosques.³³ Even the most Americanized government institution, the Royal Airforce, was infiltrated. Mohammad Taheri, a cadet who was a member of the religious organizations within the Airforce, pointed out the existence of Quran reading classes at all of the major Airforce bases, including Dezful, Hamadan, Tehran, Mashad, Isfahan and Kish Island. The contact person for the Airforce cadets was a man known to the religious underground organizations as Sayyid Ali Andarzgu. Andarzgu, a preacher at the Shemiran Mosque, turned to guerrilla warfare as a member of the Fadayeen Islam. Andarzgu (real name: Shaykh Abass Tehrani) had joined the HMI in 1969. He was an active participant in Mansur's assassination. Never caught, he was sentenced to death *in absentia* by a military court. Andarzgu was also the HMI's contact with the PLO for smuggling arms into the country and sending volunteers to the training camps at Lebanon.

The HMI included many middle class organizations.³⁴ The largest and perhaps most important was the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), which was founded in 1961 by engineers and entrepreneurs, Mahdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi and a prominent clergyman Ayatollah Taleqani. Bazargan was sent by government (Reza Shah) scholarship to France. After graduation he taught at Tehran University's College of Engineering (*Daneshkadeh-i Fanni-i Tehran*). Bazargan, Sahabi and a few others infused the ideas of political freedom and equality into the receptive environment of the college. Due to their exposure to progressive Islamic and Western ideas, they were sensitive to students' demands and perhaps also affected by some radical students from the Left. A devoted Muslim influenced by Western ideas during his studies in France, Bazargan, like his counterpart, Ali Shariati, were two social engineers who wanted Western technology but opposed the infiltration of Western culture; they did not want the whole "package" of modernity.³⁵ Thanks to Bazargan, Sahabi, and others, Tehran University's College of Engineering became a hotbed of revolution. The number of guerrillas who died between 1963 and 1971 was estimated to be 139. Among these the largest group — thirty-six people or 26% — were engineers graduating from this college. They were mostly from a Marxist, Fadayeen organization; some were members of the Mujahedeen.³⁶

The Religiously-Oriented Guerrilla Organizations

The guerrilla groups from Tehran and other cities represented in this coalition included the Devotees of Islam (*Fadayeen-i Islam*).³⁷ The Fadayeen

organization was formed in 1945 by Sayyid Mojtaba Navvab Safavi in Tehran. It supported the nationalization of the Iranian Oil Company by Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1950s. The core group of Fadayeen was comprised of some forty or fifty members who were spread throughout Iran. The general membership was large, about 20,000 to 25,000 members in Tehran, and another 12,000 to 15,000 in various cities, especially Mashhad.³⁸

The Fadayeen was the earliest group who advocated an armed struggle. They were responsible for assassinating Kasravi, an anti-cleric lawyer in 1946, Abdul-Husayn Hazhir, a former Prime Minister and the Minister of the Court in 1949, General Ali Razmara, Prime Minister in 1951, and Dr. Abdul-Hamid Zangeneh, the Dean of the Law Faculty, also in 1951. The Fadayeen was less active after the 1963 uprising but worked loosely with the *Ulama*, especially with Ayatollah Taleqani. Some members in the Bokhara-i Group, which was responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Mansur, were members of the Fadayeen.

Another religiously-oriented guerrilla organization was the Abuzar Group (*Grouh-i Abuzar*) from Nahavand. This group started in the early 1970s as an anti-Baha-i group (*Anjuman-i Zed-i Baha-iyat*), which was connected to similar organizations in other cities. After the Anjuman was closed, the Abuzar group went underground. Each member went to a mosque and established Quran reading sessions. In 1972, some of the members were arrested, and the group became more radical. Under the influence of a preacher (Oshkouri), it took up arms and waged a struggle against the government. The Abuzar Group firebombed a cinema and a few government official automobiles. As well they carried out the "revolutionary execution" of a wealthy man (Mahmud mo'meni-Dakha) who practiced usury and charged the poor exorbitant interest. Finally, in February 1973, during an assault on the Qum police station, three members died and the rest of the group was discovered; six members were executed. The members of the Abuzar Group were mostly high school students, and the nine leaders were related by blood or marriage. In 1975, after the execution of its leaders, the remaining members again regrouped (within the HMI organization) and continued their fight during the revolution of 1978-1979.³⁹

A third guerrilla organization was the Mahdiyyun Group (*Gorouh-i Mahdiyyun*), which originated in Isfahan. It was formed in 1975 by ex-members of the Mujahedeen Khalq Organization. This group was composed of family and friends and contained two women. One died with her husband and newborn baby in an armed clash with the security forces, when their team-house in Tabriz was discovered by SAVAK in early 1977. The second woman, "martyr" Tayyebeh Va'zi-Dahnavi, was arrested and tortured to death. The membership of the Mahdiyyun Group consisted of people older and more diverse in age than those of the Abuzar Group. Among them was Tayyebeh's brother, Mortaza, who was a university student.

Another organization was the Dawn of the Revolution Group (*Gorouh-i Fajr Inqelab*), which was initiated in Tehran in 1973. In 1974, Hamid Reza Fatemi, one of the founders of the group, who was a student at the Ariamehr

University, was arrested and executed along with fourteen other members. This group claimed to have destroyed the Shams Brewery in Tehran, the office of a pornographic journal (*Movie Stars*), the office of the university security guards, and the first movie theatre ever built at Qum (The Golden Gate Cinema). Subsequently, the land on which the theatre had stood was bought by Ayatollah Shahab al-Din Najafi. The Shahabiyeh school, and a religious school with a library, a printing press, and a clinic for the clergy were built there.

A fifth group was the Party of Islamic Nations (*Hezb-i Mellal-i Islami*). It originated within the bazaar's theological college in the early 1960s. Among the leadership of the Party were such prominent religious leaders as Shaykh Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani and Mohammad Kazim-i Bojnurdi, the son of Ayatollah Bojnurdi. The Party's membership consisted of thirty-nine high school students, six teachers, five college students, three engineers, one *ruhani* and one high school graduate. They published thirteen issues of a newsletter (*Khalq*). In early September 1974, government security forces discovered the Party. They surrounded its members at their training camp in the Shahabad mountains (a suburb of Tehran), and arrested fifty-five guerrillas. A military court sentenced eight members to death, and the rest received prison sentences ranging from three years to life. Among the members who received prison terms, but who survived and were later given senior posts in the revolutionary government, were Bojnurdi (who became the governor of Isfahan), Hojjati Kermani (who was elected from Tehran to the first House of Representatives after the revolution); and Duz Duzani (director of the Revolutionary Guards, and later Minister of Information).

Another group, the Bukhara-i Group, was responsible for assassinating Premier Mansur in January 1965, for his role in presenting the Forced Law (known as the Capitulation Law) to the House. The Forced Law would extend diplomatic immunity to all Americans in Iran. This sensitive issue was exploited by Khomeini, who accused the Shah of selling the country to the Americans for the \$200 million loan he subsequently received. Among those arrested were Mahdi Araqi, Habiballah Asgar Owladi, Hojat al-Islam Anvari, and Haj Sadeq Amani, prominent members of the HMI. Mohammad Bokhara-i and three others were executed, five received prison sentences ranging from five to fifteen years, and four received life in prison. Among those who were sentenced to life imprisonment, Habiballah Asgar Owladi became Minister of Commerce in the post-revolution Raja'i government.⁴⁰

Other smaller, religiously-oriented guerrilla groups included the Ansari Group (*Grouhe Ansari*) in Shiraz; the Call of The Masses (*Faryad-i Khalq*) in Karaj, a suburb of Tehran; the Mansuroun Group (*Gorouheh Mansuroun*) and the Group of the True Shi'ites (*Gorouh-i Shi'iyān-i Rastin*) in Hamadan; the Valasar Group (*Gorouh-i Valasar*) and the Sarbdaran Group (*Gorouh-i Sarbdaran*) in Mashad; the Al-fajr Group (*Gorouh-i Alfajr*) in Zahedan, and the Allah-Akbar Group (*Gorouh-i Allah O-Akbar*) in Isfahan. There is no information, however, on their activities or their membership.

The Student Opposition

In addition to these early groups, there were the university students' Islamic Councils, which by early 1978 dominated the leadership of the student organizations opposing the regime. By 1977-1978, Iran had 21 universities and 206 institutions of higher education with a total of 160,000 students. There was a major Iranian student organization in exile (Confederation of Iranian Students Abroad) that numbered over 60,000, and included both past and current students opposing the regime. Iranian university students played an important role in the revolution. Coming mostly from the traditional middle class, they soon joined the religious organizations and became active in demonstrations and strikes.⁴¹ At the beginning student opposition advanced economic and secular grievances, such as housing shortages, high tuition, and lack of freedom. Gradually, it turned to political issues which later became dominated by religious slogans and the symbolic language of conflict and protest. In February 1969, the government-run bus company raised the fare to more than three times the original fee. Tehran University students, joined by students from other colleges and universities and even high schools, called for a bus boycott. At this time the slogans were still secular. The students chanted a part of a poem by Hamid Mossadeq, a secular poet with a Leftist orientation:

If I sit, if you sit, who is going to rise?

If I rise, if You rise, we all will rise.

The Tehran bus boycott gradually spread and involved the millions of people who used the bus every day. Finally, when a high school student (Javad Rahnama-Chitsaz), burned himself alive with gasoline, the whole city went on a rampage. The security forces clashed with the demonstrators who turned over buses and ticket booths, and then set fire to them. The Tehran bazaar was closed. Finally, the government was forced to reconsider, and, on 24 February, radio Tehran announced that the Shah had ordered the fare to be rolled back to its original rate.

In August 1977, students, this time claiming food shortages, again fought with the security forces. Rural immigrants, whose houses had been demolished by the government because they did not have building permits, also clashed with the police. In November and December, sporadic and spontaneous strikes and demonstrations occurred in several factories in the southern part of Tehran. By October 1977, Tehran University students demonstrated their religious fervor when, in masks, they distributed pamphlets demanding a total separation of male and female activities outside the classroom and warning female students that any violation of this Islamic stricture would result in death.

Double Sovereignty and the Emergence of Revolutionary Power

By the end of 1977 there were indications that a limited double sovereignty existed in many mid-sized, religiously-oriented cities, where the mosque was the center of authority and not the government. Dehqani-Tafti, Bishop of the Episcopal church in the Middle East who lived in Iran during

the revolution, remembers a case that illustrates the situation. The religious organization of Yazd led by Ayatollah Sadduqi, a Khomeini supporter and a prominent religious leader in Yazd, proclaimed 10 November 1977 a mourning day. It was completely observed and all the shops and businesses closed. The Bishop had to go outside the town to a designated repair shop to fix a flat tire on his car. When he asked the repairman why his shop was open, the man said:

According to an order by the Aqa (Ayatollah Sadduqi) all the shops are closed. For the traveller's sake, this shop and another one at the other side of the town is open for business.⁴²

January 1978 was the decisive month for the revolution. At least five identifiable and important changes in the direction and structure of the revolution occurred. First, perhaps the most critical change took place when the government attacked Khomeini directly. The government's action had the unintended consequence of recognizing Khomeini as the leader of the opposition, over the National Front leadership and other high *Ulama*, such as Shariatmadari.⁴³ Once the government identified Khomeini as the opposition leader, so did all of those traditionally-oriented status groups with a religious orientation, who, until then, may have been following another *Marja*.⁴⁴ On 19 and 20 January 1978, when the Tehran bazaar closed, the call came from both Khomeini and Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front Organization — a secular organization. Sanjabi's action convinced other secular organizations and groups to accept Khomeini's leadership.

Second, recognition of Khomeini as the leader by all of the contending forces provided the opportunity for his organization to take control of the movement, and to determine the direction of the revolution. As a result of these two vicissitudes, the final three changes of the five being described were introduced into the revolutionary process. Third, under the religious leadership the relatively spontaneous nature of the resistance changed to become more disciplined and organized. Fourth, all the slogans and demands changed from the more economic (bread and butter) issues to the more ideological-Islamic ones. Fifth, the government, which was trying to reach a compromise with the secular opposition, faced a powerful block that would not settle for anything less than the elimination of the *ancien regime*.⁴⁵

The first organized and efficiently administered demonstration occurred on 9 January 1978 in the city of Qum, a protest precipitated by the government's publication of a slanderous article about Khomeini.⁴⁶ The demonstrators called for Khomeini's return, the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and the death of the Shah. From then on, the religious opposition and religiously-motivated masses were in control. And, perhaps it could be claimed that by this time the people no longer recognized the state's legitimacy to rule and they began to obey an alternative power — themselves. For nearly fourteen months, the Qum bazaar remained closed, and only bakers, butchers, and men who sold produce off barrows in the streets kept operating in a normal fashion. Qum received all of its food and clothing

through local mosques.⁴⁷ This was more or less the situation in most of the urban centers.

After Khomeini's exile in 1964, almost all of the prominent religious leaders, with the exception of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, were on the SAVAK list and had spent a major part of the fifteen years between the 1963 uprising and the 1978-1979 revolution either in prison or in internal exile. Rouhani claims that by 1965 fifty-four high ranking religious leaders were in the Shah's prisons.⁴⁸

After January 1978, the community mosque became the center of power, replacing all government apparatus. Led by preachers who often suffered reprisals by the government, every mosque became a center of resistance to the authorities. Ayatollah Mohammad Sadduqi preached in Yazd, Shaykh Mohammad Hashemian in Rafsanjan, Hojat al-Islam Mahdavi Kani (who had received repeated prison terms and who became the Minister of the Interior after the revolution) led congregational prayers at the Jalili Mosque. Ayatollah Reza Sa'idi, a former student of Khomeini, preached at the Qiathi Mosque. Sa'idi, who was arrested in 1970 for preaching against American investment in Iran, died under torture. Husayn Ghaffari, who preached at Khatam al-Osya and the al-Hadi Mosques in Tehran, was arrested in 1974 for comparing the Shah to Mu'awiyah,⁴⁹ and also died under torture. Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, who preached at the Hedayat Mosque, had spent years in the Shah's prison.

This pattern occurred in other cities and towns throughout Iran. Ayatollah Mahalati, who preached at the Mo'la Mosque in Shiraz, called for an armed struggle in his sermons. Ayatollah Taheri, who preached at the Jumi mosque of Isfahan, was arrested (August 1978), dragged from his bed in the middle of the night, and taken to Tehran. The next day, the Isfahanis established a *bast* (sanctuary) in the home of another *Ulama*, Ayatollah Khademi. On the tenth day of the *bast*, Isfahanis took to the streets setting fire to eighty-five banks as well as fire-bombing the Shahr-i Frang Cinema and two luxury hotels, the Poul and the Shah Abass. The security forces opened fire and hundreds were killed. Shaul Bakhash describes the revolutionary process:

It was after listening to mosque sermons, in a pattern that occurred again and again, that crowds emerged in large cities like Shiraz and Yazd, and small towns like Shahsavar, Jahrom and Behbahan, to demonstrate, protest, clash with security forces and attack particular targets.⁵⁰

The total collapse of government authority came in December 1978. From then on, the religious organizations controlled the country and ran it from the community mosques. Anthony Parsons, the British ambassador to Iran, remembers that even the capital was in the hands of the opposition.

Even in Tehran the police had disappeared and traffic was being directed, rather efficiently, by young civilians. Food and fuel for the poor in the cities, including Tehran, was being distributed by the mosque, not by the authorities.⁵¹

Two important factors in the organization of the Iranian revolution helped to maintain its radical posture during these fifteen years: the charismatic leadership of Khomeini, who kept his radical stand against the regime without compromise; and the domination of the leadership of the opposition organization in Iran by community mosque leaders, rather than by the high *Ulama*. Almost all of the demonstrations were initiated, organized and led from the mosque (in the name of Khomeini) by the preachers, religious students and lay-organizers in charge of mosques.

CONCLUSIONS

Iran has few equals in the world insofar as the number and intensity of its rebellions and revolutions in the last one hundred years. The two major mass uprisings, which rightly deserve to be called revolutions, were the Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911 and the revolution of 1978-1979. Both revolutions were preceded by less dramatic events that were preludes to these major social and political upheavals. The Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911 followed the Tobacco rebellion of 1891-1892, and the seeds of the 1978-1979 revolution were sown in the June 1963 uprising. It is coincidental that both intervals were fifteen years.

It is also an historical fact that in these minor and major upheavals religious leaders played crucial and determining roles. Although individuals changed, the triangle alliance among the clergy, the bazaar, and the intellectuals, first forged in the Tobacco rebellion, remained in effect in all of these uprisings. The clergy and the intellectuals provided leadership, the bazaar financed the operations, and the mosques organized community grassroots and close-knit networks that made recruitment and mass mobilization possible.

As this essay has emphasized, a major feature of the Iranian revolution was the important role played by pre-existing community networks, with their friendship and kinship relationships, in disseminating revolutionary ideology and recruiting support. It is ironic that, after more than fifty years of rapid modernization and Westernization by the Pahlavi dynasty, the traditional neighborhood organizations and committees, and not modern political parties, took the lead for social change.

The revolution of 1978-1979 was a popular revolution, and of the millions of people who participated, not all were Muslims, Shi'ites, or those inspired to build an Islamic Republic. The Shah's brutal policies of eliminating all the secular forces opposing his regime were more successful than his efforts to crush the religious opposition. He easily claimed that the Tudeh party and the Fada'i guerrillas were agents of world communism, but to make people believe that the clergy were agents of foreign powers proved to be impossible. He called the Mujahedeen "Islamic Marxists" and the name stuck, but when he called the clergy "the red and black reactionaries" and labelled Khomeini "an adventurer, without faith, . . . a man with a dubious past, tied to more superficial and reactionary colonialists," his slurs backfired

and resulted in three days of bloody riots that swept all the major Iranian cities in June 1963.

This essay has attempted to draw connections between the unsuccessful 1963 uprising and the popular revolution of 1978-1979. This study maintains that two major factors were missing from the 1963 rioting: a unified leadership and a centralized nationwide organization that could bring all the neighborhood networks under one banner and lead them in one direction. The 1963 riot brought Khomeini into the political arena, and his banishment and exile to Iraq provided him with relative immunity from the oppressive and coercive power of the state. Whereas many of his colleagues suffered and were forced to compromise. As the state's pressure for absolute conformity and its vicious treatment of the dissidents increased, some were forced to compromise, others were coopted and many were imprisoned, tortured and killed. Khomeini's relatively safe position gave him the opportunity to keep his uncompromising opposition to the Shah intact. Khomeini's preponderant revolutionary credentials and his resolute stand against the Shah gained him the respect and admiration of both the secular and the religious opposition. By 1978, when his extensive organizational networks inside the country managed to disseminate his appeals, statements, and messages to the Iranian people, he emerged as the only man who could unite the diverse opposition groups under a common slogan. The phrase "the Shah must go" (*Shah bayad Beravad*) advocated the most radical plan of action, and proved to be the only slogan acceptable to both the secular and religious opposition. Thus, Khomeini's charisma and impeccable credentials provided traditionally-trusted leadership, and the time-honored, historically-legitimized community organizations provided the center for mobilization. Without these two factors, the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 might never have happened.

Appendix 1

Middle Class Religiously-Oriented Organizations formed during the revolutionary process and associated with The Islamic Coalition Councils (HMI)

1. Muslim Crusaders (*Mosalmanan-i Mojahed*).
2. Council of United Muslims (*Shura-ye Musalmanan-i Mottahed*).
3. Movement of Free Muslims (*Jonbesh-i Mosalmanan-i Azadeh*) with more than 500 members in Tehran.
4. Society for Struggling Clergy (*Majma-i Ruhaniyun-i Mojahed*).
5. Revolutionary Movement of Iranian Muslims (JAMA) led by Dr. Kazem Saami, an advocate of Islamic Socialism.
6. The Movement (*Junbesh*).
7. The Islamic Movement of the Iranian People (*Junbesh-i Islami-ye Mardum-i Iran*).
8. The Movement of Militant Muslims (*Junbesh-i Muslamanan-i Mobarez*). The Movement was led by a dentist, Dr. Payman, and emerged in 1965.
9. The Islamic Freedom-Loving Party (*Hezb-i Azadekhahan-i Islam*) with membership coming mostly from the medical profession.
10. The Amal Group (*Sazeman-i Amal*) with connections to an organization with the same name as the Shi'ites in Lebanon. Dr. Chamran, Mohandes Qarazi, and Jalaladdin Farsi, all members of Khomeini's inner circle, spent years of training in Lebanon with the PLO, and were active members of Amal. After the revolution, Chamran became the head of the irregular army in the Iran-Iraq war and later was killed; Qarazi became governor of oil-rich Khuzestan and later minister of oil, and Farsi was appointed as a member of the Council on the Cultural Revolution.
11. The Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic (*Sazeman-i Inqelabi-ye Jumhuri-ye Islami*).
12. Islamic Society of Engineers (*Anjuman-i Islami-ye Mohandeseen*). With close cooperation with the Freedom Movement. Four ministers in Bazargan's Cabinet were members of this organization (Taheri, Mo'infar, Katira'i, and Taj).
13. The Liberation Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-i Azadi-ye Iran*).

Endnotes

1. For the Shah's vision of history and his insistence on modernization at any cost, see Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran 1926-1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 265-66; R. Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 77-79; and Jerrold Green, *Revolution in Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 54-56, 63-64.
2. There was no apparent reason for the attack. The gathering at the Faizieyyeh Madrasa was the regular annual mourning ceremony for one of the Shi'ite Imam (Imam Sadeq) organized by the theological students at Qum. But for a regime that had already outlawed political gatherings and was aware that these gatherings were political, this was probably a good time to show its coercive power and make a point.
3. Ashura is the tenth day of the Muslim month of Moharram, the month of mourning for the massacre of Husayn, the prophet's grandson and his followers in 680 AD.
4. This tradition goes back to early Islam. The Friday prayer leader speaking for the entire congregation was required to open the Friday prayer in the name of the Amir, the Caliph or the king. Failing to do so was a sign of opposition and non-cooperation. However, impeaching the government and withdrawing public allegiance would have meant an open conflict and could have brought the government's wrath down upon the community, town or city.
5. Alvin Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) p. 27.
6. Hojat al Islam Ali Khamene'i, *Ettela'at*, 4 June 1986, p. 8.
7. Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 427.
8. The rate of population growth in Iran during this period was estimated to be less than 3% and Tehran was 4.23%, which accounts for the rural to urban immigration. Ebrahim Razaqi, *Eqtasad-i Iran* (Tehran, 1988), p. 85; Martin Seger, *Tehran, Eine Stadtgeographische Studie* (Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1978), pp 21-23.
9. For more information on the condition of the poor migrant workers in Tehran and other urban areas see Farhad Kazemi, *Poverty and Revolution in Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1980).
10. For the wealth of the Shah and his family, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 437-39.
11. This attack was called the "Siahkal incident" after the name of the village where the attack originated. The attack also marked the first appearance of a Leftist guerrilla organization known as *Sazeman-i Cherikha-ye Feda'i Khalq*, whose members played an important role in the overthrow of the regime.
12. On the impact of President Carter's Human Rights policies in the Iranian revolution, see A. Ashraf and A. Banuazizi, "The State, Classes and Mode of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution," *State, Culture and Society* 1, no. 3 (1985), pp. 3-40; and Henry Kissinger, "Kissinger's Critique," *The Economist* 10 February 1979, pp. 31-36.
13. Initially, Khomeini was known only to his followers and the religiously-oriented organizations inside Iran. The first time many heard his name was in the June 1963 uprising. It was only in mid-1988 that Khomeini emerged as a leader capable of uniting all of the opposition.
14. Said Amir Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," *Government and Opposition* 16, no. 3 (1981), p. 312.
15. Ali Davani, *Nezhat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*, vol. 4 (Tehran, Iran, 1983); and Sayyid Hamid Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahltli as Nezhat-i Imam Khomeini* (Tehran, Iran, 1981).
16. Ambassador Sullivan, Tehran, 6 September 1978 - two days before the "Black Friday" massacre, *Mission to Iran* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

17. In 680 AD Husayn, the son of Ali, the first Imam and the grandson of Mohammad, was massacred with 73 of his followers at the plain of Karbala (in the present state of Iraq) by the Caliph Yazid's troops. This historical incident marked the beginning of the Shi'ite political existence and gradually the Shi'ite philosophy developed into a unique world-view that considers martyrdom the highest stage of man's achievement and self-actualization, and Husayn as the Lord of martyrs. This world-view is called "the Karbala paradigm" by Fischer. See Martin Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 21-27.
18. William S. Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965); Crane Brinton, *The Jacobins* (New York: Macmillan, 1930); Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973); John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control and Tactics* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop, 1979); R.A. Stallings, "Social Movements as Emergent Coalitions: an Interorganizational Approach," paper no. 14, The Public Polity Institute (Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, 1977); William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1988), and *The Strategy of Social Protest* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975); L. Killian, "The Significance of Extremism in the Black Revolution," *Social Problems* 20 (Summer 1972), pp. 41-49; L. Gerlack and V.H. Hine, *People, Power, Change* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).
19. For an extensive analysis on the role of the Tudeh party in Iranian politics, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*.
20. V.I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), pp 124, 1160-68.
21. Nazim al-Islam Kermani, *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iran*, vol. 1 (Tehran, 1978), pp. 243-280; Ahmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashruteh-i Iran* (Tehran, Iran, 1957).
22. Allen, *Nazi Seizure*, p. 17
23. Brinton, *Jacobins*, p. 11.
24. Davani, *Nehzat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*, vol. 4, p. 202.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 318. See also Ali Rabbani-Khalkhali, *Shuhada-ye Rouhaniyat-i Shi'ie Dar Yeksad Saleh-i Akhier* vol. 1 (Tehran, 1982), p. 448.
26. *Resalat*, 19 January 1989.
27. *Resalat*, 16 May 1988.
28. For more on HMI see *Payam-e Enqelab*, nos. 138, 139, 140, 144, 146, 1986, and no. 208, 1988.
29. *Resalat*, 30 August 1989. Raja'i became Prime Minister in the Bani-Sadr government and President after Bani Sadr's ouster. Bahonar was appointed Raja'i's Prime Minister. But both were killed on 30 August 1981 when a bomb exploded at the Prime Minister's office in Tehran. Farsi was a prominent member of the Republic Party and an influential member of the Council for Cultural Revolution.
30. This is the same school where Khomeini established his headquarters on his return to Iran. Raja'i served as his host.
31. Ayatollah Quddusi, who was appointed the revolutionary prosecutor-general, was assassinated in September 1981 in his office in Tehran.
32. Davani, *Nehzat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*, vol. 4; Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahlili as Nehzat-i Imam Khomeini*.
33. Mohammad Taheri, *Ettela'at*, 8 February 1986.
34. For a list of these organizations see Appendix 1.
35. For the concept of the "package" of modernity see Peter Berger, et al., *The Homeless Mind* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 109-111.
36. Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 1963-1977," *MERIP Report* no. 86 (March/April 1980), p. 5.
37. The largest and perhaps best organized religiously-oriented guerrilla organization was the *Mujahedi-e Khalq*, which was formed in 1965 by a group of college students, engineers and intellectuals. The leaders of the MKO came mostly from the ranks of another organization,

- the Freedom Movement, to form a more active guerrilla style of struggle. The MKO did not work directly with the HMI, but they were connected through Hojat al-Islam Hashemi-Rafsanjani. The Mujahedin Organization needs a separate study to do justice to their activities. For a sympathetic treatment, see S. Irfani, *Revolutionary Islam in Iran* (London: Zed Press, 1983). For a more recent study see Ervand Abrahamian, *The Iranian Mojahedin* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
38. Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahlili as Nehzat-i Imam Khomeini*; Davani, *Nehzat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*, vol. 4; Farhad Kazemi, "The *Fada'iyān-e Islam*: Fanaticism, Politics and Terror," in S.A. Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp. 158-176; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*; A.K. Ferdows, "Religion in Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the *Fada'iyān-e Islam*," (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1967).
 39. Ayatollah Khalkhali in a recent interview points out that after the connection between the radical clergy and the Abuzar group was discovered by the security forces, many high ranking clergy, including Ayatollas Montazeri, Jannati, Meshkini, Rabani-Shirazi, and Khalkhali, were arrested and exiled to remote towns inside Iran. *Payam-e Enqelab* no. 180, 31 January 1987.
 40. Davani, *Nehzat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*, vol. 5, (Tehran, Iran, 1983), p. 175; Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahlili as Nehzat-i Imam Khomeini*, p. 817.
 41. For the socioeconomic background of the Iranian university students see Morteza Nassaffat, *Sanjeshi-i Afkar-i Daneshjuyan-i Keshwaar* (Tehran: University of Tehran Press, 1975).
 42. H.B. Dehqani-Tafti, *The Hard Awakening* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981).
 43. According to Hamid Algar (1972), Ayatollah Shariatmadari had higher educational credentials than Khomeini. After Khomeini's exile in 1964, Shariatmadari was treated by the government as the sole *Marja*, and Shariatmadari himself did not mind it at all. In March 1966, Ayatollah Montazeri and Rafsanjani proposed cancelling all of their classes as a sign of protest for Khomeini's banishment by the government, but Shariatmadari refused to do so; thus, the tactic did not work. Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahlili as Nehzat-i Imam Khomeini*; Davani, *Nehzat-i Rohaniyyun-i Iran*.
 44. *Marja-i taqlid* is a high religious and scholastic social status in Shi'ite Islam, usually held by a high clergyman who is considered to be a supreme authority on religious law. Usually there are more than one *Marja* at a time, each with independent and sometimes opposing opinions on religious as well as political matters. Shi'ites are free to choose their own *Marja* according to their own preferences based on ethnic, communal, or scholastic factors. In 1975 there were six first-rank *Marja* in Iran.
 45. Domination of the revolutionary process by Khomeini's organization proved critical when months later the Shah admitted that he had lost and decided to compromise with the opposition. A compromise between the Shah's government and the National Front leadership failed when it was rejected by Khomeini. The plan called for the Shah to be replaced by his son and a Regency Council headed by Queen Farah, which would have run the country until the crown prince became old enough to occupy the throne.
 46. On 7 January 1978, an article published in *Ettela'at*, a semi-official newspaper in Tehran, attacked Khomeini directly for the first time. The article was entitled "Iran and the Red and Black Reactionaries" and was signed with a pseudonym "Ahmad Rashidi-Motlaq." Later it was revealed that the article was actually written by Daryush Humayun, then the Shah's Minister of the Interior. The article called the religious movement a "black reaction" and Khomeini "an adventurer, without faith . . . a man with a dubious past, tied to the more superficial and reactionary colonialists."
 47. Roy Motahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 13.
 48. Rouhani, *Barressi Va Tahlili as Nehzat-i Imam Khomeini*, pp. 841-42.
 49. Mu'awiyah was the Caliph when Imam Husayn and his followers were massacred at Karbala.

50. Shaul Bakhash, "Sermons, Revolutionary Pamphleteering and Mobilization: Iran, 1978." in Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, p. 180.
51. Anthony Parsons, *The Pride and the Fall* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), p. 124.