Perhaps the most important insights appear in one of the comments. Barry Zorthian had performed the near-impossible task of directing the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. Commenting on Paddock's paper Zorthian says that the two things that really count in this field are integration and integrity: "integration of effort, integration of personnel, certainly integration of basic concept; integrity of message, consistency of that message, recognition that the message must be based on reality." And he is the only contributor to stress the crucial role of the psy-ops specialist in influencing military planning. "The important input of psychological operations personnel is in the determination of military action rather than in the implementation of their own program." Zorthian speaks from the heart, and one wonders if his Vietnam experience broke it.

Attention to the psychology of conflict cannot be regarded as an optional extra, as something to be considered after the plan is made, the die cast. All rational coercive politics and military conflict is about changing the opponent's mind. Therefore the likely effect on minds should be of first importance in policy-making. Although specialist communicators are important, no country will succeed in the influence game unless its political leadership and senior officials develop an aptitude in this direction — something that the youthful revolutionary possesses as a by-product of being a revolutionary leader in the first place.

This book will serve to keep the topic alive.

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This book is a consideration of low intensity conflict (LIC) by six researchers at the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Five of these authors have produced chapters on low intensity warfare as it has occurred in the region of their specialization. The areas being considered are the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, southern Africa and Southeast Asia. The final chapter analyzes U.S. policy and strategic planning for LIC. The basic purpose of the work appears to be to familiarize U.S. Air Force officers with some of the dimensions of low intensity warfare throughout the world.

Despite the military sponsorship of this work, it does not comment on tactical lessons or combat operations to any significant extent. Rather, it focuses on the political, sociological, historical and economic factors feeding instability in various regions of the world. All of the region specific chapters use the case study technique so that a wide variety of insurgencies are discussed as well as various countries where indicators suggest potential LICs
in the future. The work is, therefore, very much an overview rather than an in-depth analytical study. The analytical depth of each of the case studies is limited by the provision of significant amounts of basic historical background. There is, however, a useful cross-section of cases that are considered.

All of the case studies are organized chronologically with long discussions of key historical events. The basic purpose here is to provide a narrative of how the conflicts developed and flourished. This form of presentation does not involve any central theme nor are there any effective efforts to examine the components of each conflict for their significance until the conclusion of each chapter. These conclusions are brief and basically are confined to summarizing the general nature of the conflicts being considered.

Despite the above problem, the book achieves one of its main purposes of illustrating the widespread nature of instability in the Third World. Also, by reading this overview one can become acquainted with a variety of examples of the different manifestations of LIC. These include such things as sabotage, urban warfare, terrorism, and especially insurgency.

In making this examination, the authors have also had to address the issue of the Soviet role in LIC. They have done this by stressing that a "common thread" in their work is an opposition to "a heavy curtain of myth that depicts all low intensity conflicts as manifestations of superpower rivalry." This view that all major LICs are manipulated and controlled by the Soviet Union seems so unlikely as to need no serious opposition. Nevertheless, some of the analysis in this book, particularly that on southern Africa, challenges statements about Soviet control that have been put forward seriously by members of the U.S. Congress who have held hearings on the nature of the African National Congress. This work is also in clear disagreement with a continuing stream of statements from the South African government.

The final chapter on U.S. policy and strategic planning provides a brief discussion of how the U.S. should prepare to meet the problem of LICs that involve a U.S. military response. This chapter makes an effort to suggest how the earlier portions of the book provide lessons that might be considered in this regard. This discussion is brief and stresses the intellectual problems associated with making generalizations about diverse LICs. No attempt is made to develop a typology of different subtypes of LICs, although it could conceivably be quite useful in providing a richer conclusion to the work.

In summary, specialists in LIC may find this work overly descriptive and lacking in an ability to organize information into analytical categories for comparison. Individuals without a strong background in LIC and world politics would, however, be exposed to a variety of new information about past and current insurgencies as well as some basic generalizations about the individual conflicts and regions.

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