
This collection of seven papers with twelve comments and an Afterword originated at a conference on the subject of political warfare and psychological operations in Washington, DC in November 1986. Like many such collections, the book lacks cohesion and does not make for easy reading. Whereas debate over definitions, the juxtapositioning of diverse material, and the mixing of historical overview with current analysis provide the stuff of stimulating symposia, the same mixture lumped together in book form can be frustrating. Nevertheless, many of the individual papers are good and the reader who perseveres will be rewarded.

The collection begins with a paper by former Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle discussing the importance of the subject to U.S. strategy. Carnes Lord, who was responsible for this subject as a staff member of the National Security Council in the early Reagan years, explains how American efforts in the field have often been handicapped by the absence of integrated strategic planning at the national level. Colonel Alfred Paddock provides a good account of the past, present and future role of psychological operations within the U.S. military, in which the tendency to link the subject almost exclusively to unconventional warfare is deplored. Angelo Codevilla, a conservative analyst, delivers a broadside against America's failures of policy and determination which, he argues, undercut all attempts to conduct successful political warfare. Although the contributor carries his argument to extremes, it is stimulating stuff.

The fifth paper, by the Fletcher School's Richard Shultz, deals with the psychological-political aspects of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare. This paper contains a compelling analysis of the essentially political (and therefore psychological) nature of modern revolution, pointing to the futility of counter-revolutionary programs that ignore this dimension. Alvin Bernstein, who chairs the Strategy Department of the Naval War College, discusses the place of psychology in U.S. policy concerning the limited use or threatened use of force. Here we see that political coercion and certain military actions are of themselves psychological operations — where the object is to change an opponent's mind rather than destroy him. Henry Rowen, a former director of the National Intelligence Council, deals with the political-psychological dimension of the East-West confrontation (misleadingly referred to as "General War") and concludes that the Western approach to communicating with the Warsaw Pact and their armies has been weak.
Perhaps the most important insights appear in one of the comments. Barry Zorthian had performed the near-impossible task of directing the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. Commenting on Paddock's paper Zorthian says that the two things that really count in this field are integration and integrity: "integration of effort, integration of personnel, certainly integration of basic concept; integrity of message, consistency of that message, recognition that the message must be based on reality." And he is the only contributor to stress the crucial role of the psy-ops specialist in influencing military planning. "The important input of psychological operations personnel is in the determination of military action rather than in the implementation of their own program." Zorthian speaks from the heart, and one wonders if his Vietnam experience broke it.

Attention to the psychology of conflict cannot be regarded as an optional extra, as something to be considered after the plan is made, the die cast. All rational coercive politics and military conflict is about changing the opponent's mind. Therefore the likely effect on minds should be of first importance in policy-making. Although specialist communicators are important, no country will succeed in the influence game unless its political leadership and senior officials develop an aptitude in this direction — something that the youthful revolutionary possesses as a by-product of being a revolutionary leader in the first place.

This book will serve to keep the topic alive.

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This book is a consideration of low intensity conflict (LIC) by six researchers at the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Five of these authors have produced chapters on low intensity warfare as it has occurred in the region of their specialization. The areas being considered are the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, southern Africa and Southeast Asia. The final chapter analyzes U.S. policy and strategic planning for LIC. The basic purpose of the work appears to be to familiarize U.S. Air Force officers with some of the dimensions of low intensity warfare throughout the world.

Despite the military sponsorship of this work, it does not comment on tactical lessons or combat operations to any significant extent. Rather, it focuses on the political, sociological, historical and economic factors feeding instability in various regions of the world. All of the region specific chapters use the case study technique so that a wide variety of insurgencies are discussed as well as various countries where indicators suggest potential LICs